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Abstract 
	  Breaking	   from	   the	   traditional	   understanding	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   relations	   in	   terms	   of	   the	  cultural,	   diplomatic	   and	   military	   ‘Special	   Relationship’,	   this	   thesis	   explores	   the	  interdependent	   political-­‐economic	   development	   of	   Britain	   and	   the	   United	   States.	   I	   argue	  that	   this	   interdependence	   has	   generated	   a	   specifically	   Anglo-­‐American	   field	   of	   capitalist	  development	   that	   has	   been	   crucial	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   global	   political	   economy,	  particularly	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   creation	   and	   eventual	   undermining	   of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  monetary	  order.	  	  Reflecting	   the	   imbalance	  of	  power	  between	  Britain	  and	   the	  U.S.,	   the	   thesis	   focuses	  principally	   upon	   the	   role	   of	   American	   power	   in	   shaping	   the	   transformation	   of	   Britain’s	  political	   economy	   and	   affecting	   Britain’s	   position	   within	   the	   global	   political	   economy.	  Moving	   away	   from	   the	  narrow	  preoccupation	  with	  decline	   that	   has	  dominated	   studies	   of	  British	  capitalism,	  I	  open	  up	  the	  study	  of	  British	  development	  within	  a	  broader	  transatlantic	  horizon	  that	  enables	  an	  alternative	  analysis	  which	  reveals	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  political	  economy.	  I	   argue	   that	   the	   financial	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   states	   and	   the	   key	   role	   of	  interaction	   between	   bankers	   in	   London	   and	   New	   York,	   in	   collaboration	   with	   their	  respective	  Treasuries	  and	  Central	  Banks,	  was	  crucial	  to	  the	  post-­‐war	  transformation	  of	  the	  global	   political	   economy.	   The	   interactive	   development	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   finance	   was	  central	  to	  the	  development	  of	  financial	  globalisation,	  undermining	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order	  in	   the	   process.	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers	   alongside	   their	   respective	   Central	   Banks	   and	  Treasuries	   formed	   the	   basis	   of	   enduring	   economic	   orthodoxy	   within	   both	   states	   and	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presided	  over	  financial	  deregulation	  that	  critically	  undermined	  the	  basis	  of	   the	  Keynesian	  state	   in	  Britain.	   In	   the	  U.S.,	   these	   transatlantic	  deregulatory	  dynamics	  eroded	   the	  basis	  of	  financial	  regulations	  that	  had	  been	  central	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  New	  Deal.	  In	  both	  countries,	  the	   financial	   communities	   supported	   monetarism	   and	   the	   neoliberal	   central	   banking	  regimes	  of	  the	  Thatcher-­‐Reagan	  era,	  which	  spurred	  a	  wider	  endorsement	  of	  the	  politics	  of	  price	  stability	  throughout	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  
	  
	  	   iv	  
Acknowledgements	  	  Undertaking	  this	  kind	  of	  intellectual	  project	  requires	  the	  support	  of	  many	  different	  people.	  My	   family	   in	   England	   have	   always	   been	   very	   supportive	   and	   in	   particular	   my	   mother,	  Victoria,	  has	  provided	  unwavering	  and	  unquestioning	  support	  for	  my	  endeavours,	  despite	  the	   fact	   that	   I	   was	   many	   thousands	   of	   miles	   from	   home	   throughout	   much	   of	   this	   PhD.	  Special	  thanks	  must	  also	  go	  to	  my	  brother	  Oliver,	  who	  provided	  me	  with	  a	  place	  to	  stay	  in	  London	  while	  I	  carried	  out	  archival	  research	  and	  made	  several	  visits	  to	  see	  me	  while	  I	  was	  studying	  in	  Canada.	  My	  second	  family	  over	  in	  Canada	  have	  also	  played	  a	  crucial	  role.	  Eric	  George,	  Joseph	  Baines,	  Sandy	  Hager,	  Julian	  Germann	  and	  Brigitte	  Noel,	  all	  gave	  me	  incredible	  support	  and	  encouragement	  through	  some	  testing	  times.	  When	  studying	  abroad	  these	  support	  networks	  become	   even	   more	   important	   and	   I	   am	   forever	   indebted	   to	   their	   kindness	   and	  encouragement.	  The	  many	  intellectual	  discussions	  I	  shared	  with	  my	  closest	  friends	  at	  York	  over	  those	  years	  have	  also	  had	  a	  crucially	  formative	  impact	  upon	  my	  outlook	  on	  the	  world	  and	  the	  study	  of	  political	  economy.	  Within	   the	  department,	   I	  have	   to	   thank	   first	  and	   foremost,	  Hannes	  Lacher	  and	  Leo	  Panitch.	  Their	  intellectual	  encouragement,	  knowledge	  and	  experience	  have	  been	  crucial	  in	  enabling	  me	  to	  complete	  this	  PhD	  thesis.	  Without	  their	  consistent	  input	  this	  project	  would	  have	  never	  been	  possible	  and	  without	  their	  critical	  comments	  and	  attentive	  reading	  of	  my	  work,	   I	   would	   no	   doubt	   have	   produced	   a	   much	   less	   convincing	   and	   consistent	   analysis.	  	  Both	  Hannes	  and	  Leo	  have	  also	  provided	  support	  during	  other	  difficult	  moments	  during	  my	  
	  	   v	  
time	  living	  in	  Canada	  and	  I	  am	  very	  much	  indebted	  to	  their	  support	  and	  the	  support	  from	  the	  entire	  department	   through	  some	  challenging	  circumstances.	  The	   third	  member	  of	  my	  committee,	  Stephen	  Gill,	  provided	  and	  inspirational	  introduction	  to	  York	  while	  teaching	  the	  IPE	  core	  course	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  my	  studies.	  On	  the	  administrative	  side,	  I	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  Marlene	   Quesenberry	   and	   in	   particular	   Judy	  Matadial	   for	   helping	  me	   navigate	  my	  way	  through	  the	  organisational	  aspects	  of	  the	  PhD.	  I	  must	  also	  thank	  Andreas	  Bieler,	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Nottingham,	  without	  whom	  I	  would	  never	  have	  thought	  to	  undertake	  the	  PhD	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  Over	  in	  Britain,	  my	  employers	  at	  SPERI	  gave	  me	  the	  space	  and	  support	  required	  to	  finish	  off	  this	  PhD	  while	  also	  undertaking	  post-­‐doctoral	  work.	  In	  particular,	  Sarah	  Boswell,	  Colin	  Hay	  and	  Tony	  Payne	  have	  provided	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  support	  and	  encouragement.	  Tony	  in	  particular	  needs	  to	  be	  singled	  out	  for	  the	  patience	  and	  belief	  he	  has	  shown	  in	  me,	  I	  am	  very	  much	  indebted	  to	  him	  for	  that.	  	  Scott	  Lavery	  has	  also	  provided	  camaraderie	  and	  many	  moments	  of	  levity	  during	  the	  arduous	  final	  year	  of	  the	  PhD	  project.	  I	  am	  also	  grateful	  to	  the	  assistance	   of	   the	   archivists	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   during	  my	   two	   research	   visits	   there.	  Their	  knowledge	  and	  professionalism	  has	  made	  conducting	  this	  research	  much	  easier.	  Finally,	  I	  dedicate	  this	  thesis	  to	  the	  memory	  of	  Ray	  Lock:	  a	  dear	  friend	  of	  the	  family	  and	  someone	  who	  maintained	  an	  enduringly	  critical	  attitude	  towards	  America’s	  role	  in	  the	  world	  and	  its	  impact	  upon	  Britain.	  	  	   	  
	  	   vi	  
1.1 List	  of	  Figures 
1.1 London Banks Market Share Current Account Deposits of Overseas Residents   175                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
1.2 American Banks Total Current Account Deposits of Overseas Residents              177 
 
1.3 British Overseas and Commonwealth Banks Total Current Account Deposits of 
Overseas Residents                                                                                                 178 
 
2.1 Comparative Interest Rates: UK Bank Rate, US Federal Funds Rate and London 
Eurodollar Rate                                                                                                        182 
 
2.2 Comparative Interest Rates: Eurodollar Rate and US Federal Funds Rate            185                                                                                                                
 
3.1 UK Banks Capitalization as a share of National Market Capitalization                    326 
 
 
	  	   vii	  
Table	  of	  Contents	  	  Abstract	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  ii	  Acknowledgements	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  iv	  List	  of	  Figures	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  vii	  	  
Introduction	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  	  Synopsis	  	  6	  A	  Note	  on	  archival	  sources	  	  14	  
	  
	  
1	  Conceptualising	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  The	  decline	  paradigm	  	  21	  Internationalising	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  	  25	  The	  transatlantic	  vector	  	  33	  U.S.	  power:	  redefinition	  or	  retreat?	  	  42	  Beyond	  structural	  power:	  power	  as	  process	  	  52	  
	  
	  
2	  The	  Great	  Reversal:	  Anglo-­‐American	  Development	  from	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  58	  
the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  to	  the	  1930s	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Interdependence,	  war,	  and	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  	  62	  Resuscitating	  the	  gold	  standard	  	  71	  The	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  road	  to	  war	  	  	  87	  	  The	  limits	  and	  effects	  of	  the	  great	  reversal	  	  94	  
	  
	  
3	  British	  Development	  and	  Post-­‐war	  American	  Power:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  
	  Beyond	  the	  ‘Hegemony/Rivalry’	  Binary	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  continuity	  of	  process:	  integrating	  war	  and	  post-­‐war	  	  101	  Anglo-­‐American	  currents	  of	  institutional	  development	  	  104	  Disaggregating	  the	  national	  interest:	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  beyond	  	  109	  The	  ‘capitulation	  thesis’	  	  121	  The	  ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’	  thesis	  	  125	  Beyond	  the	  capitulation/rivalry	  binary	  	  127	  The	  restoration	  of	  orthodoxy	  	  131	  The	  stillbirth	  of	  the	  ‘Keynesian’	  state	  	  144	  	  
	  
	  
	  	   viii	  
	  
4	  Anglo-­‐American	  Development,	  the	  Euromarkets,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  147	  
Decomposition	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  States,	  markets	  and	  the	  Euromarkets	  	  150	  The	  Bank,	  sterling,	  and	  the	  City’s	  international	  role	  	  153	  American	  development	  and	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  dimension	  	  159	  The	  birth	  of	  the	  Eurobond	  and	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  	  164	  The	  parallel	  of	  deficits	  	  167	  The	  Americans	  arrive	  in	  the	  City	  	  173	  The	  fiscal	  basis	  of	  the	  British	  state	  	  195	  Anglo-­‐American	  finance	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  Keynesianism	  	  204	  
	  
	  
5	  Britain	  and	  America	  in	  the	  Eye	  of	  the	  Storm:	  From	  the	  Breakdown	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  208	  
Bretton	  Woods	  to	  the	  IMF	  Crisis	  of	  1976	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	  The	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  state	  	  	  211	  The	  death	  throes	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  	  219	  The	  breakdown	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  consensus	  	  	  229	  Internationalising	  the	  British	  state	  	  241	  A	  prelude	  to	  Thatcherism	  	  270	  
	  
	  
6	  Internalising	  Discipline:	  The	  Bank,	  the	  Fed	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  274	  
the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  	  Price	  Stability	  
	  Floating	  rates	  and	  the	  inflationary	  challenge	  	  280	  Opening	  the	  floodgates	  	  287	  The	  epistemological	  break:	  monetarism	  triumphant?	  	  303	  The	  differential	  impacts	  of	  neoliberal	  central	  banking	  	  313	  Anglo-­‐American	  symbiosis	  and	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  compromise	  	  328	  
	  
	  
Conclusion:	  The	  Persistence	  of	  Orthodoxy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  333	  
	  
	  
References	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  343	  
	  
	  
	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  





‘Little by little, the two countries established an instinctive conjunction of financial 
interests, so that it seemed impossible on either side, to imagine life without it. This, and 
not sentiment and language, was the innermost guts of the ‘Special Relationship’ 
(Strange, 1971: 71).  
	  
	  The	   close	   post-­‐war	   association	   between	   Britain	   and	   the	   United	   States	   has	   come	   to	   be	  known	  by	   a	   single	  mnemonic,	   the	   ‘Special	   Relationship’.	   The	   term	   refers	   to	   an	   unusually	  close	   and	   cooperative	   relationship,	   encompassing	  diplomatic,	  military-­‐	   strategic,	   political,	  economic	   and	   cultural	   spheres,	   between	   two	   independent	   nation	   states.	   For	   Britain,	   the	  Special	  Relationship	  has	  offered	  a	  means	   to	  preserve	  Great	  Power	   status	   even	   though	   its	  capacity	   for	   unilateral	   action	   in	   pursuit	   of	   foreign	   policy	   objectives	   has	   been	   greatly	  diminished	  (Curtis,	  1998:	  19).	  While	   for	  the	  U.S.,	  Britain’s	  possession	  of	  nuclear	  weapons,	  its	   access	   to	   political	   and	   military	   intelligence	   and	   its	   position	   on	   the	   United	   Nations	  Security	   Council	   to	   name	   but	   a	   few	   factors,	   have	   served	   as	   valuable	   appendages	   to	  American	   power	   (Watt,	   1986:	   10).	   Diplomatic	   relations	   between	   the	   two	   states	   have,	  despite	  the	  occasional	  spat	  and	  periods	  of	  cooling,	  remained	  extraordinarily	  close,	  perhaps	  never	  more	  so	   than	  during	   the	   so-­‐called	   ‘War	  on	  Terror’	  marshalled	  by	  George	  Bush	  and	  Tony	  Blair	  to	  devastating	  and	  tragic	  effect	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  9/11	  (Dumbrell,	  2006:	  4).	  	  	  Yet	  for	  all	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  has	  illuminated,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  great	  deal	  that	  it	  has	  obscured.	  The	  political	  economy	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  has	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been	   buried	   beneath	   more	   fashionable	   scholarly	   preoccupations	   with	   diplomacy,	   grand	  strategy	  and	  the	  cultural	  and	  sentimental	  linkages	  between	  these	  two	  states.	  That	  is	  a	  great	  shame	  because,	  as	  Susan	  Strange	  so	  aptly	  noted,	  it	  was	  the	  exchange	  of	  roles	  between	  the	  dollar	   and	   sterling	   and	   the	   deep	   financial	   ties	   between	   the	   two	   countries	   that	   ultimately	  formed	  the	  bedrock	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  unity	  and	  integration	  (Strange,	  1971:	  71).	  	  It	   is	   with	   this	   oft-­‐neglected	   political	   economy	   dimension	   of	   Britain’s	   relationship	  with	   the	  U.S.	   that	   this	   thesis,	   in	   the	   chapters	   that	   follow,	   is	   principally	   engaged.	   Steering	  away	   from	  the	   traditional	  preoccupations	  of	  enquiries	   into	  Britain’s	   relationship	  with	   the	  U.S.,	   I	  explore	   the	  modern	   transformation	  of	  British	  capitalism	  through	   the	   lens	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  focusing	  upon	  the	  financial	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  states	  and	  the	  key	  role	  of	  interaction	  between	  bankers	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  in	  collaboration	  with	  their	   respective	   Treasuries	   and	   Central	   Banks,	   in	   driving	   these	   processes	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   another	   treatise	   on	   British	   decline.	   The	   emphasis	  upon	   Britain’s	   ‘development’	   is	   an	   intentional	   departure	   from	   the	   preoccupation	   with	  decline,	   which	   has	   dominated	   the	   narrative	   of	   the	   modern	   transformation	   of	   Britain’s	  political	  economy.	   	  That	   narrative	   has	   led	   to	   a	   fixation	   upon	   questions	   of	   national	  competitiveness	   and	   economic	   growth	   that	   obscured	   the	   analytical	   potential	   that	   a	   focus	  upon	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  opens	  up.	  Through	  a	  long-­‐term	  historical	  study	  and	  the	  use	  of	  original	  archival	  material,	  which	  examines	  key	  episodes	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  interaction	  that	  were	  central	  not	  only	  to	  British	  development	  but	  to	  the	  wider	  global	  political	  economy	  too,	  this	  thesis	  explores	  the	  manner	  in	   which	   the	   development	   of	   British	   capitalism	   has	   been	   articulated	   in	   and	   through	   a	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broader	   field	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development. 1 	  The	   thesis	   engages	   with	   three	   main	  research	  questions:	  How	  did	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics	  shape	  the	  transition	  from	  Keynesianism	  to	  monetarism	  in	  Britain?	  How	  did	  these	  processes	  feed	  back	  into	  the	  development	  of	   the	  U.S.	  political	  economy?	  And	   finally,	   in	  what	  ways	  did	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	   both	   shape	   and	   reflect	   the	   broader	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system?	  	  Anglo-­‐American	   development	   has	   not	   been	   a	   one-­‐way	   street,	   despite	   being	  decidedly	   and	   increasingly	   uneven	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   period.	   What	   the	   following	   chapters	  demonstrate	   is	   that	   not	   only	   has	   American	   power	   been	   fundamental	   in	   shaping	   the	  institutional	  landscape	  of	  modern	  British	  capitalism,	  but	  also	  that	  America’s	  relationship	  to	  Britain	  has,	  at	  different	  points,	  fed-­‐back	  into	  the	  development	  of	  American	  capitalism.	  The	  positioning	  and	  repositioning	  of	  British	  capitalism	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  has	  also	  been	  extremely	  significant	  for	  the	  endeavour	  to	  refashion	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  which	  the	  U.S.	  energetically	  undertook	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  	  That	  endeavour	  should	  not,	  at	  least	  in	  relation	  to	  Britain,	  be	  viewed	  simply	  as	  a	  case	  of	  hegemony	  or	  indeed	  ‘imperialism’.	  Instead,	  it	  should	  be	  viewed	  as	  a	  complex	  and	  uneven	  co-­‐articulation	  of	  capitalist	  development	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  specific	  Anglo-­‐American	  field	  of	  developmental	   interaction.	   American	   ascendance	   did	   not,	   however,	   occur	   through	   a	  straightforward	  subordination	  of	  Britain.	  It	  actually	  took	  on	  a	  much	  more	  integrative	  form,	  particularly	  in	  the	  post-­‐WW2	  era.	  Underway	  here	  was	  not	  simply	  the	  passing	  of	  leadership	  from	   one	   phase	   into	   the	   next,	   but	   a	   complex	   and	   uneven	   co-­‐articulation	   of	   capitalist	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Regarding	   British	   and	   American	   capitalism,	   I	   refer	   to	   the	   broad	   totality	   of	   state	   and	   societal	  relations	  pertaining	  to	  matters	  of	  ‘political’	  and	  ‘economic’	  power.	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development.	   Over	   time,	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   integration	   produced	   a	   specifically	  Anglo-­‐American	   field	   of	   capitalist	   development,	   centred	   upon	   the	   international	   roles	   of	  London	   and	   New	   York.	   These	   developments	   involved	   the	   recalibration	   of	   national	  sovereignty,	   with	   increased	   interdependence	   between	   private	   and	   central	   banking	   in	  London	  and	  New	  York	  transforming	  the	  way	  that	  national	  economic	  policy	  was	  conducted.	  These	   two	   states,	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   often	   in	   conjunction	   but	   also	   through	  competition	   and	   contestation,	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   advancement	   of	   financial	  globalisation.	   Having	   been	   the	   architects	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   international	   monetary	  system,	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  through	  their	  interdependent	  development,	  were	  central	  to	  the	  subsequent	   decomposition	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   system	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   financial	  globalisation.	  Although	  scholars	  have	  recognised	  the	  important	  role	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  within	   the	   politics	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	   system,	   they	   have	   not	   identified	   or	  delineated	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   specific	   field	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   that	   was	  central	  to	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Theoretically,	  this	  thesis	  builds	  from	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  key	  nexus	  of	  financial	  power	   within	   the	   capitalist	   state:	   that	   between	   the	   Central	   Bank,	   Treasury	   and	   private	  banking.	   Within	   Britain,	   it	   is	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   that	   has	   represented	   the	  intersection	  between	  private	   and	  public	   financial	   power.	   In	   the	  U.S.	   the	   Federal	  Reserve-­‐Wall	  Street-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  performs	  a	  comparable	  role.	  In	  both	  countries,	  the	  integration	  of	  private	  banking	  power	  with	  the	  key	  financial	  components	  of	  the	  state	  has	  been	  central	  to	  their	   modern	   development.	   	   	   It	   is	   through	   this	   central	   nexus	   between	   private	   finance,	  Treasury	  control	  and	  Central	  Banking	  that	  capitalist	  power	  is	  principally	  instituted	  within	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the	   state.	   The	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Central	   Bank	   function	   as	   two	   related	   components	   of	   the	  government	  account.	  The	  Treasury	  is	  empowered	  with	  the	  capacity	  to	  spend,	  tax	  and	  issue	  public	  debt,	  while	  the	  Central	  Bank	  sets	  interest	  rates,	  regulates	  credit	  supply,	  governs	  the	  exchange	  rate	  and	  pursues	  price	  objectives	  while	  also	  serving	  as	  the	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  to	  private	   banks.	   Through	   these	   interrelated	   processes,	   the	   behaviour	   of	   Treasuries	   and	  Central	  Banks	  are	  crucial	  to	  regulating	  and	  shaping	  the	  overall	  flow	  of	  national	  economies	  and	  their	  situation	  within	  the	  broader	  world	  market.	  	  The	   central	   authoring	   power	   of	   state	   institutions	   within	   capitalism,	   which	   is	  exercised	  in	  close	  conjunction	  with	  private	  banks,	   is	  grossly	  understated	  in	  contemporary	  neoliberal	   discourse,	   which	   tends	   to	   portray	   business	   and	   the	   state	   as	   antagonistic	  interests.	   In	   reality	   there	   is	   a	   fundamental	   ontological	   proximity	   between	   the	   central	  financial	  institutions	  of	  the	  state	  and	  the	  banking	  system	  that	  underpins	  economic	  activity	  at	   large.	   	  Public	  debt,	   for	  example,	  provides	  a	  major	   interest-­‐earning	  asset	   to	   the	  banking	  system	   and	   the	   holding	   of	   accounts	   with	   the	   Central	   Bank	   by	   major	   private	   banks	   is	  foundational	  to	  the	  monetary	  system	  in	  capitalist	  states.	  	  This	   thesis	  examines	   the	   interactions	  between	  these	  centres	  of	   instituted	   financial	  power	   within	   the	   capitalist	   state	   across	   time	   and	   space,	   by	   fixing	   the	   study	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	  upon	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  interactions	  and	  co-­‐constitution	  of	  instituted	  financial	   power	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic.	   These	   concentrations	   of	   financial	   power	  within	   the	   state	   have	   been,	   I	   argue,	   central	   to	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   and	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship.	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  As	   this	   thesis	   demonstrates,	   an	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   field	   centred	   upon	  increasing	   financial	   interdependence	   between	   the	   two	   states	   began	   to	   emerge	   in	   earnest	  during	  the	  1920s,	  with	  the	  disastrous	  attempt	  to	  restore	  the	  gold	  standard	  in	  which	  Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   cooperation	   was	   key.	   After	   the	   interwar	   years,	   this	   interdependence	  began,	  tentatively,	  to	  re-­‐emerge.	  But	  it	  was	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  and	  the	   Americanisation	   of	   the	   City	   from	   the	   late	   1950s	   that	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	  began	   to	   reach	   a	   much	   fuller	   expression,	   shaping	   the	   crisis	   years	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	  regime	  in	  the	  process.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  these	  processes	  came	  to	  undermine	  the	  national	  monetary	   systems	   and	   regulatory	   orders	   in	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   driving	   the	   financial	  liberalisation	   and	  development	   of	   new	  Central	   Bank	  practices	   that	   ushered	   in	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	  transition	  to	  neoliberalism	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  	  
	  
Synopsis:	  
	  In	  chapter	  one,	  I	  set	  out	  the	  theoretical	  framework	  required	  for	  conceptualising	  the	  political	  economy	   of	   the	   Special	   Relationship	   by	   establishing	   a	   methodological	   basis	   suitable	   for	  studying	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  I	  critique	  the	  way	  that	  IPE	  has	  tended	  to	  overlook	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  due	  to	  a	  fixation	  with	  hegemonic	  cycles	  of	  rise	  and	  decline.	  I	  argue	   that	   as	   a	   consequence,	   British	   development	   has	   been	   understood	   in	   terms	   of	   a	  ‘decline’	   narrative	   that	   has	   foreclosed	   alternative	   analytical	   strategies.	   Similarly,	   the	  projection	   of	   American	   power	   within	   the	   global	   political	   economy	   has	   been	   rendered	  ambiguous	  by	   the	  debate	  over	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  U.S.	  has	  experienced	  a	  decline	   from	   its	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post-­‐war	  peak	  of	  hegemonic	  power.	  Accordingly,	  the	  analytical	  potential	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	   for	   understanding	   the	   transformation	   of	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   within	   the	  context	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  has	  been	  obscured.	  	  I	  propose	  an	  alternative	  approach	   that	   conceives	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   interdependent	  and	   co-­‐constitutive	   relationship	   between	   the	   ‘Federal	   Reserve-­‐Treasury-­‐	   Wall	   Street’	  complex	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   American	   financial	   power,	   and	   the	   central	   nexus	   of	   instituted	  financial	  power	  within	  the	  British	  state;	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus.	  	  By	  conceiving	  of	  American	  power	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  active	  set	  of	  constitutive	  processes,	  rather	   than	   the	   conventional	   structural	   power	   approach,	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   can	   begin	   to	  uncover	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics	   that	  were	  key	   to	   the	   transformation	  of	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  was	  also	  central	  to	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  financial	  order.	  As	   I	   explain	   in	   chapters	   two	   and	   three,	   America’s	   transcendence	   of	   British	  dominance	  was	  accelerated	  greatly	  by	  the	  two	  World	  Wars,	  which	  sapped	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  and	  gave	   the	  American’s	   the	   leverage	  power	  of	   creditor	  over	  Britain’s	  spiralling	  national	  debt	  (Hudson,	  1972:	  9).	  It	  was	  a	  power	  that	  they	  wielded	  with	  gusto	  in	  order	   to	  displace	  Britain’s	  standing.	  But	  although	  this	  dynamic	  of	  displacement	  was	  often	  beset	   with	   friction	   and	   rivalry,	   it	   was	   also	   marked	   by	   an	   underlying	   and	   developing	  compatibility	  of	   interest	  between	  key	  players	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic,	  none	  more	  so	  than	  the	  banking	  communities	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  	  Chapter	  two	  examines	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  from	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  up	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  WW2.	  I	  focus	  upon	  the	  great	  reversal	  in	  power	  that	  occurred	  during	  this	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period,	  during	  which	  the	  U.S.	  caught	  up	  with	  Britain.	  That	  process	  was	  encapsulated	  within	  the	   ill-­‐fated	   attempt	   to	   resuscitate	   the	   gold	   standard	   after	   the	  First	  World	  War.	  The	  War	  weakened	  Britain	  and	  strengthened	  its	  U.S.	  creditor.	  	  With	  sterling	  and	  the	  British	  economy	  weakened,	  the	  City	  was	  forced	  to	  draw	  upon	  American	  financial	  support,	  from	  both	  private	  and	   central	   bankers,	   in	   order	   to	   re-­‐launch	   the	   gold	   standard	   and	   restore	   sterling	  convertibility.	  This	   foreshadowed	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	   interdependence	   that	  would	  find	  fuller	  expression	  from	  the	  1950s,	  with	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  	  The	  role	  of	  the	  private	  House	  of	  Morgan	  banking	  dynasty	  was	  central	  to	  the	  attempt	  to	  put	  sterling	  back	  on	  gold,	  with	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  ties	  built	  up	  before	  and	  during	  the	  war	  key	  to	  the	  pattern	  of	  cooperation	  that	  emerged	  in	  the	  1920s.	  This	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	   cooperation	  was	   also	   reflected	   in	   broader	   attempts	   to	  manage	   the	   international	  monetary	   system	   during	   the	   1920s.	   But	   while	   cooperation	   between	   bankers	   occurred	  successfully,	   the	   issue	   of	   war	   debts	   damaged	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   states.	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation	  was	  ultimately	  undermined	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  U.S.	  willingness	  and	  capacity	  to	  play	  a	  greater	   leadership	  role	  and	  respect	   its	  duties	  and	  obligations	  under	  the	  gold	  standard	  system,	  leading	  to	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  and	  the	  increasing	  rivalry	  and	   protectionism	   of	   the	   1930s.	   The	   failure	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   management	   of	   the	  international	   monetary	   system	   in	   the	   inter-­‐war	   years	   had	   a	   formative	   impact	   upon	   the	  priorities	  instituted	  at	  Bretton	  Woods	  during	  the	  1940s.	  	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  crux	  of	  the	  international	  economy	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  framework	  that	  heralded	  the	  end	  of	  WW2	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	   financial	   system.	   In	   chapter	   three,	   I	   contest	   the	  dominant	   interpretations	  of	  Britain’s	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post-­‐war	   relationship	   to	   the	  U.S.	   and	  provide	  an	  alternative	   interpretation,	   characterising	  the	   post-­‐war	   Anglo-­‐American	   relationship	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘contained	   rivalry’	   and	   ‘uneven	  interdependence’.	   By	   disaggregating	   the	   state,	   I	   trace	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   struggle	  between	  economic	  orthodoxy	  and	  Keynesian	  ideas	  shaped	  the	  interactions	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  during	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Britain	  needed	  financial	  support	  from	  the	  U.S.	  in	   order	   to	   support	   sterling	   and	   finance	   reconstruction,	   while	   the	   New	   York	   banking	  community	  looked	  to	  London	  to	  help	  foster	  the	  recovery	  of	  international	  trade	  and	  banking	  by	  re-­‐launching	  sterling	  convertibility.	  American	  ambitions	  were	   initially	   thwarted	  by	   the	  Bank’s	   preference	   for	   bilateralism,	   but	   as	   the	   forces	   of	   economic	   orthodoxy	   within	   the	  British	   state	   reasserted	   themselves	   during	   the	   late	   1940s	   and	   early	   1950s,	   they	   aligned	  with	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  Fed	  and	  American	  bankers	  once	  more	  in	  a	  common	  commitment	  to	  multilateralism.	  This	  would	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  deeper	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  integration	  later	  in	  the	  1950s.	  	  
In	   chapter	   four	   I	   explore	   the	   way	   in	   which	   restrictions	   upon	   the	   use	   of	   sterling,	  imposed	   in	   response	   to	   periodic	   balance	   of	   payments	   crises	   during	   the	  1950s,	   prompted	  British	   merchant	   bankers	   to	   develop	   an	   innovative	   method	   for	   financing	   international	  trade.	   They	   tapped	   in	   to	   the	   large	   volume	   of	   offshore	   dollars	   that	   had	   developed	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	  massive	  overseas	  American	  spending	  through	  military	  aid	  and	  the	  Marshall	  Plan,	  using	   these	  dollars	   to	   finance	   trade	  between	  third	  parties.	  So	  was	  born	  the	  offshore	  ‘Eurodollar	  Market’.	  By	  switching	  their	  allegiance	  to	  the	  dollar,	  British	  bankers	  were	  able	  to	  restore	  the	  City’s	  international	  role	  and	  reassert	  their	  privileged	  position	  within	  the	  British	  state.	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However,	  this	  development	  came	  at	  a	  price.	  The	  growth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  further	  entrenched	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  dollar	  and	  led	  to	  a	  massive	  influx	  of	  American	  banks	  into	  London	  during	   the	  1960s.	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  decade	   the	  money	  markets	   in	  New	  York	  and	  London	   had	   become	   intimately	   connected,	   with	   interest	   rate	   shifts	   on	   each	   side	   of	   the	  Atlantic	   closely	   linked.	   The	   City’s	   role	   had	   been	   restored,	   but	   it	   was	   now	   a	   nodal	   point	  within	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  American	  finance	  and	  the	  dollar.	  	  Through	   the	  Euromarkets,	   a	   specifically	  Anglo-­‐American	   field	  of	   development	  was	  emerging.	   As	   American	   banks	   integrated	   the	   Euromarkets	   into	   their	   business	   strategy,	  attempts	  by	  American	  monetary	  authorities	  to	  control	  credit	  were	  undermined	  by	  inflows	  of	  Eurodollars.	  The	  integration	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  finance	  undermined	  the	  policy	  autonomy	  of	  state	  officials	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  aggravated	  the	  contradictions	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system,	  unleashing	  a	  global	  capital	  market	  that	  undermined	  the	  system	  of	   capital	   controls	   and	   fixed	   exchange	   rates.	   Increasingly,	   the	   Fed-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	   Street	  nexus	  was	  transmitting	  its	  growing	  influence	  through	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  within	  Britain.	  	  
Embracing	  American	  power	  in	  this	  manner	  also	  had	  a	  crucial	  domestic	   importance	  for	   Britain.	   It	   enabled	   the	   City’s	   bankers	   and	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   to	   maintain	   their	  predominance	  within	  British	   capitalism	  at	   a	   time	  when	  many	   in	   the	  business	   community	  were	   calling	   for	   a	   rethink	   of	   British	   industrial	   strategy.	   In	   accepting	   the	   dollar,	   British	  bankers	  insulated	  themselves	  from	  the	  fate	  of	  sterling.	  International	  banks	  in	  the	  City	  were	  now	   increasingly	   independent	   from	   the	   fortunes	   of	   the	   British	   currency	   and	   the	   British	  economy,	  tapping	   in	  to	  a	  wider	  circuit	  of	  global	  business.	  For	  the	  Americans,	   the	  City	  and	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the	   Euromarkets	   enabled	   the	   sidestepping	   of	   New	   Deal	   regulations	   and	   a	   window	   for	  expansion	  into	  Europe.	  After	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	   Woods	   the	   global	   economy	   entered	   a	   period	   of	  sustained	  turmoil.2	  The	  oil	  shock	  of	  1973	  contributed	  to	  a	  severe	  ‘stagflationary’	  crisis:	  the	  combination	  of	  high	   inflation	  and	   low	  growth.	  Britain	   suffered	  more	   than	  most	   advanced	  capitalist	  states	  during	  the	  1970s.	  In	  chapter	  five	  I	  focus	  upon	  the	  IMF	  crisis	  of	  1976.	  I	  argue	  that	   conceptions	   of	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   state	   tend	   to	   overlook	   the	   privileged	  power	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   encouraging,	   directing	   or	   sometimes	   unwittingly	   affecting	   these	  transformations	  at	  key	  moments;	  especially	  during	  the	  negotiations	  over	  Britain’s	  IMF	  loan	  in	  1976.	   	  Of	  particular	  significance	  here	  are	  the	  relationships	  between	  financially	  oriented	  state	   institutions,	   for	   example	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   and	   the	  Federal	   Reserve.	   But	   as	   well	   as	   American	   power	   pushing	   in	   on	   Britain	   (with	   notable	  resistance	  from	  members	  of	  the	  Labour	  Cabinet),	  it	  was	  also	  very	  much	  a	  case	  of	  powerful	  class	   interests	   within	   Britain,	   particularly	   in	   the	   City,	   pulling	   in	   American	   discipline	   by	  voraciously	  attacking	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  consensus	  through	  the	  frequent	  pro-­‐monetarist	  salvos	  launched	  in	  the	  financial	  press.	  Coming	   after	   several	   decades	   of	   British	   balance	   of	   payments	   difficulties	   and	   the	  preceding	  inflationary	  expansion	  of	  the	  Heath	  government,	  the	  1976	  crisis	  drew	  the	  British	  state	  into	  the	  disciplinary	  embrace	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  a	  degree	  not	  seen	  since	  the	  early	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  By	   the	  collapse	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	   I	   refer	   to	   the	  unilateral	   termination	  of	   the	  dollar’s	  fixed	  convertibility	  to	  gold	  by	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1971.	  Despite	  the	  shift	  to	  floating	  exchange	  rates,	   the	  pillars	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order,	   the	  dollar	  and	   the	   IMF,	   continued	   to	  play	  a	  central	  role	  in	  international	  monetary	  politics	  after	  1971	  (Gill	  &	  Law,	  1988:	  177).	  	  
	  	   12	  
post-­‐war	  negotiations	  over	  the	  Washington	  Loan	  Agreement.	  It	  also	  signalled	  the	  symbolic	  termination	  of	  Britain’s	  ill-­‐starred	  Keynesian	  project.	  That	  project	  had	  been	  gradually	  undermined,	  notably	  by	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  global	  finance	  anchored	   in	   the	  City’s	   international	   restoration,	  but	  also	  by	   the	   incompatibility	  of	  defending	  sterling	  and	  stimulating	  economic	  expansion.	  The	  leverage	  of	  the	  American	  state	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  1976.	  The	  Americans	  wanted	  to	  make	  an	  example	  of	  the	  British	  that	  sent	  a	  clear	  message	   internationally	  and	  within	  America	  about	   the	   future	  direction	  of	   the	  international	  economy.	  	  	  The	  key	   financial	   institutions	  of	   the	  American	  state,	  with	   their	   influence	  veiled	  by	  the	  IMF,	  aligned	  themselves	  directly	  behind	  the	  IMF	  conditionality	  dictates	  and	  used	  their	  power	  to	  shape	  Britain’s	  development.	  This	  was	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  what	  would	  come	  to	  be	  known	   as	   the	   ‘internationalisation’	   of	   the	   state,	   with	   domestic	   policy	   increasingly	  reconfigured	   to	   suit	   the	   needs	   of	   international	   markets	   rather	   than	   national	   welfare.	   In	  Britain,	   it	  was	  the	  Treasury	  that	  was	  the	  key	  focal	  point	  of	  the	  process.	  The	  crisis	  of	  1976	  demonstrates,	  I	  argue,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  British	  state	  has	  been	  ‘Atlanticised’	  as	  much	  as	  it	  has	  been	  ‘internationalised’.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  with	  spiralling	  inflation	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Paul	  Volcker,	  as	  head	  of	  the	   Fed,	   adopted	   a	   radical	  monetary	   stance,	   pushing	   interest	   rates	   up	   to	   record	   highs	   in	  order	  to	  break	  inflation	  and	  undermine	  the	  wage	  militancy	  of	  American	  workers.	  In	  the	  U.S.	  this	   restoration	   of	   class	   power,	   underpinning	   the	   neoliberal	   political	   project,	   relied	   upon	  high	  interest	  rates,	  recession	  and	  market	  liberalisation.	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Across	  the	  Atlantic,	  the	  formula	  for	  capitalist	  restructuring	  under	  Thatcher	  exhibited	  remarkable	   parallels,	   something	   that,	   as	   I	   show	   in	   chapter	   six,	  must	   be	   understood	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  way	  that	  both	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Britain	  had	  positioned	  themselves	  as	  lynchpins	  of	  the	  global	  financial	  system;	  they	  intended	  to	  signal	  that	  the	  1980s	  would	  be	  nothing	   like	   the	   crisis	   decade	   of	   the	   1970s.	   	   The	   synchronicity	   of	   the	   transformation	  towards	   neoliberal	   austerity	   and	   unconventional	   Central	   Bank	   policies	  was	   not	  merely	   a	  product	  of	  ideological	  convergence,	  as	  it	  has	  predominantly	  been	  understood,	  but	  rather	  a	  consequence	  of	  institutional	  symbiosis	  and	  the	  co-­‐development	  of	  central	  banking	  practices	  that	  emerged	  from	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics.	  	  Embracing	   the	   credo	   of	   monetarism,	   Thatcher	   and	   Reagan	   made	   clear	   that	   price	  stability	  would	  be	  restored	  and	  working	  class	  power	  broken.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  framework,	  both	  states	  demonstrated	  their	  commitment	  to	  internalising	  discipline	  through	  extreme	  applications	  of	  monetary	  policy	  and	  direct	  confrontations	  with	  the	  labour	  movement.	  Developments	   in	  Britain	  and	   the	  U.S.	   led	   the	  way	   for	   the	  broader	  adoption	  of	  neoliberalism	   within	   the	   global	   political	   economy	   and	   the	   further	   development	   of	  financialisation	  that	  fed	  into	  the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	  	  The	  pursuit	  of	  price	  stability	  over	  and	  above	  the	  Keynesian	  commitment	  to	  full	  employment	  helped	  maintain	  the	  roles	  of	  London	  and	  New	  York	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  global	  financial	  markets.	  Finally,	  I	  conclude	  by	  examining	  the	  enduring	  economic	  orthodoxy	  of	  fiscal	  austerity	  and	   price	   stability,	   linking	   it	   to	   the	   pervasive	   interests	   of	   finance	  within	  Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism.	   Ultimately,	   I	   conclude	   that	   the	   Keynesian	   transformations	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough.	  Private	  finance	  was	  given	  too	  much	  freedom	  and	  the	  core	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institutional	   complexes	   within	   the	   state	   were	   not	   transformed	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   might	  enable	   a	   lasting	   commitment	   to	   full	   employment	   and	   the	   pursuit	   of	   more	   equitable	   and	  democratic	  social	  goals.	  
	  
A	  note	  on	  archival	  sources	  
	  From	  chapter’s	  four	  to	  six,	  much	  of	  the	  supporting	  evidence	  employed	  within	  this	  thesis	  is	  based	  upon	  original	  archival	  material.	  Those	  materials	  were	  drawn	  from	  two	  sources;	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Archives	  at	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	   in	  Threadneedle	  Street	  London	  and	   the	  National	  Archives	  in	  Kew,	  Surrey.	  The	  research	  was	  conducted	  primarily	  across	  a	  two-­‐week	  period	  during	  which	  I	  visited	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  National	  Archives	  in	  July	  2012,	  and	  an	  earlier	  visit	  to	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  to	  carry	  out	  initial	  research	  on	  the	  Euromarkets	  during	  December	  of	  2011.	  	  	  	  It	   is	  only	   in	  recent	  years	  and	  during	  the	  researching	  of	   this	  PhD	  that	  access	  to	  the	  entirety	   of	   this	   wide	   range	   of	   archival	   material	   has	   been	   possible,	   with	   many	   of	   the	  documents	   pertaining	   to	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   Thatcher	   government	   only	   becoming	  available	  since	  2009.	  With	  those	  documents	  on	  the	  early	  years	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  revolution	  now	   available,	   it	   has	   become	   much	   easier	   to	   examine	   the	   development	   of	   key	   state	  institutions	  during	  both	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  and	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  This,	  of	  course,	   affords	   a	   much	   better	   opportunity	   to	   examine	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   British	  state,	   tracing	   the	   collapse	   of	   Keynesianism	   and	   the	   ascendancy	   of	   monetarist	   principles	  during	   the	   transition	   towards	  neoliberalism.	  These	  new	  archival	  sources	  dealing	  with	   the	  
	  	   15	  
early	   years	   of	   the	   Thatcher	   government,	   which	   have	   yet	   to	   be	   examined	   in	   published	  literature,	  inform	  much	  of	  the	  analysis	  in	  chapter	  six.	  That	  chapter	  draws	  largely	  upon	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  archives	  in	  order	  to	  shed	  light	  upon	  the	  development	  of	  monetary	  policy	  during	  the	  first	  term	  of	  the	  Thatcher	  government.	  	  Archival	  information	  on	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  has	  been	  available	  for	  longer,	  but	  there	  has	  been	  little	  research	  conducted	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  these	  documents.	  Importantly,	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  dimensions	  of	   the	  development	  of	   the	  Euromarkets	  had,	  prior	   to	   this	  study,	   largely	   been	   unexplored.	   These	   sources	   from	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   are	   used	  extensively	   in	   chapter	   four,	   while	   I	   also	   make	   use	   of	   Treasury	   archives	   that	   link	   the	  development	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   to	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   fiscal	   basis	   of	   the	   British	  state.	  Similarly,	  while	  the	  archival	  records	  dealing	  with	  the	  IMF	  crisis	  have	  been	  available	  since	  the	  mid-­‐2000s,	  researchers	  have	  tended	  to	  focus	  on	  different	  questions	  and	  made	  use	  of	  different	  archival	  content	  than	  that	  which	  I	  explore	  in	  chapter	  five.	  Chapter	  five	  primarily	  makes	  use	  of	  documents	  from	  the	  Treasury	  archives	  in	  order	  to	  explore	  the	  role	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	   dynamics	   during	   the	   IMF	   crisis	   and	   Britain’s	   role	   within	   the	   collapse	   of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  during	  the	  early	  1970’s.	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1	  Conceptualising	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  
	  	  The	  post-­‐war	  international	  economic	  order	  constructed	  at	  Bretton	  Woods	  was	  at	  heart	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  project	  (Helleiner,	  1994;	  Burnham,	  1990;	  Cox,	  1987;	  Ruggie,	  1982).	   	   John	  Maynard	   Keynes	   and	   Harry	   Dexter	   White,	   leading	   the	   British	   and	   American	   negotiators	  respectively,	  provided	   the	  principal	   intellectual	   synergy	  behind	   the	  agreement.	   Indeed,	   in	  terms	  of	  the	  role	  played	  by	  states	  in	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  international	  economic	  order	  and	  then	  in	  driving	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation	  that	  gradually	  came	  to	  undermine	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	   framework,	   Britain	   and	   the	  U.S.	  were	   crucial	   players.	   But	   despite	   the	  centrality	   of	   Britain	   and	  America	   to	   the	   foundation	   of	   Bretton	  Woods	   and	   the	   politics	   of	  financial	   globalisation,	   the	   longer-­‐term	   developmental	   connectivity	   between	   the	   two	  countries	  has	  been	  overlooked.	  	  	  Any	   attempt	   to	   trace	   this	   connectivity	   by	   identifying	   and	   delineating	   a	   specific	  sphere	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  as	  this	  thesis	  does,	  must	  be	  contextualised	  within	  the	   creation,	   continuation	   and	   collapse	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system	   of	   international	  monetary	  relations.3	  The	  important	  roles	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  creation	  and	  eventual	  collapse	   of	  Bretton	  Woods	  have	  not	   been	   lost	   on	   scholars	   of	   IPE	   (Block,	   1977;	  Helleiner,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Kees	  Van	  der	  Pijl’s	  outstanding	  work	  (1998;	  2006)	  on	  the	  role	  of	  the	  ‘Lockean	  heartland’	  in	  driving	  capitalist	  globalisation	  and	  the	  unfolding	  of	  global	  rivalries	  captures	   important	  elements	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  but	  Van	  Der	  Pijl’s	  work	  engages	  a	  much	  broader	  problematique	   than	   this	  thesis	   by	   attempting	   to	   understand	   the	   historical	   transformation	   of	   global	   capitalism	   and	  international	  relations	  over	  a	  number	  of	  centuries.	  Van	  der	  Pijl	  also	   fails	   to	  disaggregate	   the	  state	  and	   its	   component	   institutions	  beyond	   the	   schism	  between	   ‘Lockean’	   and	   ‘Hobbesian’	   states.	  This	  leaves	  the	  analysis	  at	  too	  great	  a	  level	  of	  abstraction	  to	  capture	  the	  specific	  institutional	  interactions	  of	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  and	   their	   interrelation	  with	   the	   international	  monetary	  system.	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1994;	   Eichengreen,	   2008).	   Within	   this	   literature,	   Eric	   Helleiner	   (1994:	   5-­‐14)	   has	   made	  perhaps	   the	   most	   important	   and	   influential	   contribution	   to	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  politics	  of	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  international	  monetary	  system	  by	  identifying	  the	  centrality	   of	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   as	   key	   actors	   in	   the	   construction	   and	   eventual	  deconstruction	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  Helleiner	  draws	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  bankers	  in	  New	  York	   and	   London,	   in	   cooperation	  with	   state	   agencies,	   in	   pushing	   for	   the	   liberalisation	   of	  international	  capital	  markets	  and	  helping	  undermine	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order.	  	  Unfortunately	  however,	  Helleiner	  never	   takes	   the	  step	   from	  simply	  acknowledging	  the	   centrality	   of	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   to	   identifying	   what	   exactly	   the	   mechanisms	   that	  interlinked	   the	   development	   of	   these	   two	   states	   were	   and	   how	   those	   mechanisms	  interacted	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  His	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  is	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  broader	  myopia	  within	  IPE	  that	  has	  disguised	  the	  centrality	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  Like	  so	  many	  other	  works	  within	  IPE,	  Helleiner’s	  analysis	  remains	  trapped	  within	  the	  dominant	  narrative	  of	   hegemonic	   transitions.	   Accordingly,	   Britain’s	   commitment	   to	   liberalised	   international	  finance	   and	   the	   City’s	   role	   in	   eroding	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   restrictions	   are	   understood	   in	  terms	  of	  a	   ‘hegemonic	   lag’	   (Helleiner,	  1994:	  14).	  This	  concern	  with	  hegemonic	   leads,	   lags	  and	  transitions	  obscures	  the	  complex	  co-­‐development	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism,	  which	  realised	  a	  new	  form	  and	  intensity	  after	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  in	  the	  late	  1950s.	  Rather	   than	   cyclically	   differentiated	   moments	   of	   hegemonic	   rule,	   American	   financial	  ascendance	  was	  articulated	   in	  and	   through	   the	  retrenchment	  and	  redefinition	  of	  Britain’s	  global	   role.	   	  The	  bankers	  of	   the	  City	  were	  not	   simply	   the	  agents	  of	   an	  archaic	  hegemonic	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commitment	   to	   international	   finance.	   They	   were,	   in	   fact,	   re-­‐articulating	   their	   national	  dominance	   by	   integrating	   Britain	   into	   a	   specific	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   sphere	  centred	  upon	  the	  competitive	  and	  collaborative	  interaction	  between	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  tied	  Britain’s	  developmental	  trajectory	  more	  closely	  than	  ever	  into	  the	  fate	  of	  American	  capitalism.	  	  Helleiner’s	  focus	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  states	  in	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  global	  finance	  and	  his	  commitment	  to	  hegemonic	  stability	  theory	  neglect	  the	  crucial	  intersections	  between	  public	  state	   power	   and	   private	   market	   power	   that	   have	   been	   central	   to	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   financial	   globalisation.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   argue	   that	   the	  failure	   of	   Helleiner	   and	   IPE	   scholarship	   more	   broadly	   to	   convincingly	   problematise	   and	  identify	  patterns	  and	  processes	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  and	  their	  impact	  upon	  the	  transformation	   of	   global	   capitalism,	   is	   rooted	   in	   the	   way	   that	   British	   and	   American	  development	  have	  been	  approached	  as	  separate	  analytical	  problematiques.	  Indeed,	  because	  of	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  narrative	  of	  hegemonic	  cycles	  of	  rise	  and	  decline	  within	  IPE	  the	  study	   of	   both	   states	   has	   been	   mired	   within	   contention	   over	   the	   extent,	   causes	   and	  consequences	  of	  their	  decline	  from	  peak	  power.	  Scholars	  have	  identified	  different	  reasons	  for	  the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  hegemonic	  powers,	  but	  the	  commitment	  to	  a	  cyclical	  view	  of	  the	  historical	  development	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  punctuated	  by	  different	  moments	  of	  hegemonic	  order	  under	  the	  leadership	  of	  a	  dominant	  state,	  is	  common	  to	  these	  approaches	  (Gilpin,	  1975,	  1983;	  Krasner,	  1976:	  Olson,	  1982;	  Keohane,	  1984;	  Cox,	  1987;	  Arrighi,	  1990).	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Within	  these	  studies,	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  are	  taken	  to	  be	  exemplary	  of	  the	  modern	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  hegemonic	  powers.4	  	  Whereas	  for	  Britain,	  that	  pattern	  of	  decline	  is	  often	  discerned	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  later	  nineteenth	  century,	   for	  the	  U.S.,	   the	  concern	  with	  decline	  began	  to	  emerge	  during	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s.	  Despite	  the	  historical	  proximity	  and	  closely	  interrelated	  processes	  that	  link	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  British	  imperial	  power	  and	  America’s	  rise	  to	  pre-­‐eminence,	  the	  two	  phenomena	  have	  been	  examined	  as	  analytically	  distinctive	  processes.	  Instead,	  I	  suggest	  that	  we	  need	  to	  examine	  British	  and	  American	  development	  within	  a	  unified	  analytical	  lens	  that	  allows	  us	  to	  examine	  the	  complex	  dynamics	  of	  ‘Anglo-­‐American	  development’	  outside	  of	   the	   confines	   of	   the	   hegemonic	   rise	   and	   decline	   narrative	   that	   has	   shaped	   our	  understanding	   of	   British	   development	   and	   framed	   the	   debate	   over	   America’s	   post-­‐war	  power.	  This	  chapter	  sets	  out	  to	  construct	  a	  methodological	  basis	  that	  enables	  us	  to	  define	  and	   explore	   the	   problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   that	   has	   been	   buried	  within	   existing	   IPE	   scholarship.	   In	   order	   to	   do	   this,	   I	   propose	   that	   we	   break	   from	   the	  preoccupation	   with	   American	   ‘structural	   power’	   and	   instead	   consider	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   dynamic	   set	   of	   power	   processes	   in	   which	   American	  predominance	  was	   articulated	  within	   a	   relationship	   of	   uneven	   interdependence	   between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  that	  had	  significant	  ramifications	  for	  the	  wider	  global	  political	  economy.	  	  The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  chapter	  critically	  reviews	  the	  literature	  dealing	  with	  British	  decline.	   	  I	  suggest	  that	  the	  decline	  debate	  has	  obscured	  crucial	  facets	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  development	   and	   shackled	   our	   understanding	   within	   a	   narrow	   conceptual	   lens.	   This	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  A	   good	   example	   of	   this	   is	   Robert	   Gilpin’s	   comparison	   (1975:	   63)	   of	   the	   relationship	   between	  foreign	  investment	  and	  the	  decline	  of	  economic	  predominance	  in	  the	  cases	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	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declinist	  lens	  contains	  distorting	  preconceptions	  and	  purposes	  that	  obstruct	  a	  more	  sober	  analysis	   of	   the	   transformation	  of	  British	   capitalism	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	  period.	   In	   the	   second	  section,	  I	  draw	  out	  the	  potential	  for	  an	  alternative	  methodological	  approach	  that	  provides	  a	  foundation	   for	   understanding	   Anglo-­‐American	   development,	   by	   building	   from	   the	  identification	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   within	   British	   capitalism.	   That	  methodological	   basis,	   I	   argue,	   needs	   to	   be	   internationalised,	   or	   more	   specifically	  ‘Atlanticised’	  in	  order	  to	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  study	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  In	  the	  third	  section,	  I	  demonstrate	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  Atlanticise	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  is	  reflective	   of	   a	   broader	   limitation	   of	   the	   literature	   on	   British	   development,	   which	   has	  acknowledged	  the	  centrality	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  dynamics	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  but	  has	  failed	  to	  make	  the	  methodological	  adjustments	  required	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  analytical	  substance	  and	  generative	  impact	  of	  these	  dynamics	  upon	  Britain,	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  The	  chapter	  then	  moves	  on	  to	  explore	  the	  way	  in	  which	  ambiguity	  over	   the	   status	   of	   American	   power	   within	   the	   global	   political	   economy	   has	   limited	   the	  potential	  for	  scholars	  to	  explore	  the	  long-­‐term	  impact	  of	  American	  development	  upon	  other	  states.	   Because	   of	   the	   ambiguity	   over	   American	   power,	   scholars	   of	   British	   development	  have	  been	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  offer	  a	  fuller	  exposition	  of	  the	  long-­‐term	  tendencies	  and	  consequences	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development.	   Finally,	   I	   argue	   that	   we	   must	   shift	   from	  conceptions	  of	  US	  ‘structural	  power’	  towards	  a	  more	  dynamic	  notion	  of	  	  ‘power	  as	  process’:	  constitutive	  and	  continual	  creation	  and	  re-­‐creation	  of	   instituted	  political-­‐economic	  orders	  that	  involve	  the	  negation	  of	  alternative	  developmental	  possibilities.	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The	  decline	  paradigm	  
	  Over	  the	  last	  forty	  years	  a	  prodigious	  amount	  of	  literature	  has	  emerged	  heralding	  Britain’s	  decline	   (Burnham,	  1990;	  Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980;	  Gamble,	  1990;	  Strange,	  1971;	  Overbeek,	  1990).5	  In	   absolute	   terms,	   Britain’s	   decline	   from	   its	   imperial	   pinnacle	   is	   undeniable.	   It	  began	  in	  the	   latter	  part	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  accelerated	  rapidly	  after	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  	  The	  two	  World	  Wars	  took	  an	  enormous	  toll	  on	  the	  resources	  of	  the	  British	  government	  and	  British	  capital.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  WW2	  Britain	  had	  amassed	  the	  largest	  external	   debt	   in	   history,	   with	   almost	   twenty	   five	   per	   cent	   of	   pre-­‐war	   national	   wealth	  destroyed	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  18).	  It	  was	  within	  this	  context	  of	  British	  exhaustion	  that	  the	  U.S.	  emerged	   as	   the	   preeminent	   force	   in	   the	   global	   political	   economy.	   By	   the	   late	   1960s,	  conscious	   recognition	   of	   British	   decline	   had	   become	   widespread	   (Overbeek,	   1990:	   1).	  Despite	   the	   obvious	   reality	   of	   decline	   however,	   the	   causes	   remain	   keenly	   contested	  (Gamble,	  1990:	  32;	  English	  &	  Kenny,	  2000:	  279-­‐300).	  Nevertheless,	  there	  are	  a	  number	  of	  recurrent	  themes	  within	  the	  decline	  literature.	  David	  Coates	  (1994:	  28-­‐55)	  divides	  theses	  on	  decline	  into	  those	  focusing	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  labour	   and	   unions	   in	   frustrating	   modernisation,	   those	   that	   lay	   the	   blame	   at	   the	   feet	   of	  capital,	   and	   finally	   arguments	   that	   identify	   the	   British	   state	   as	   the	   prime	   suspect	   in	   the	  search	   for	   the	   chief	  perpetrator	  of	  British	  decline.	   Jim	  Tomlinson	   (2000:	  3)	   suggests	   that	  contributions	  to	  the	  debate	  can	  be	  categorised	  as	  either;	  focusing	  upon	  decline	  from	  Great	  
Power	  status,	  or	  understanding	  decline	  in	  terms	  of	  economic	  performance.	  Finally,	  Andrew	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  For	  a	  good	  overview	  of	  the	  debate	  cf:	  English	  	  R.	   	  &	  Kenney	  M.	  (2000),	   ‘Decline	  or	  Declinism?’	  in,	  English	  R.	  &	  Kenney	  M.	  (eds)	  Rethinking	  British	  Decline,	  London:	  Palgrave:	  279-­‐300.	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Gamble	   (1990:	   30-­‐33)	   opts	   for	   a	   fourfold	   typology	   of	   imperial,	   cultural,	   supply-­‐side	   and	  democratic	  theses,	  with	  each	  type	  identifying	  the	  primary	  cause	  within	  a	  distinctive	  aspect	  of	  Britain’s	  social	  structure.	  If	  the	  causes	  of	  British	  decline	  are	  so	  varied	  and	  contentious,	  perhaps	  it	  is	  the	  very	  question	   of	   decline	   itself,	   as	   a	   starting	   point	   for	   analysis	   that	   is	   the	   problem?	  This	   is	   the	  view	  held	   by	   English	   and	  Kenny	   (2000:	   291)	  who	   question	  whether	   decline	   is	   really	   the	  most	  appropriate	  conceptual	   lens	   through	  which	  to	  consider	  British	  politics.	  A	  number	  of	  factors	  prompt	  us	  to	  re-­‐evaluate	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  decline	  paradigm.	  	  Approaching	  British	  development	   under	   the	   rubric	   of	   decline	   has	   obscured	  many	   other	   important	   questions.	  The	   analysis	   has	   tended	   to	   be	   preordained	   in	   a	   negative	   manner	   that	   occludes	   broader	  transformations	   of	   British	   capitalism.	   For	   example,	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	   transition	  from	  Keynesianism	   to	  monetarism	   in	  Britain	   remains	   analytically	   ambiguous.	  Who	  drove	  this	   process?	   Which	   groups	   benefited	   most	   and	   what	   was	   the	   role,	   if	   any,	   of	   American	  power	  in	  shaping	  this	  transformation?	  	  The	  focus	  on	  decline	  also	  contains	  implicit	  assumptions	  about	  what	  studies	  of	  British	  development	   should	   aspire	   to.	   	   Within	   the	   decline	   paradigm	   the	   project	   of	   critical	  scholarship	   is,	   often	   implicitly,	   limited	   to	   the	   arresting	   or	   reversal	   of	   decline.	   But	   given	  Britain’s	  imperial	  history	  these	  assumptions	  are	  troubling.	  Not	  only	  do	  they	  colour	  the	  sort	  of	  palliative	  measures	  that	  we	  are	  likely	  to	  propose	  in	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  British	  development,	   they	   also	   introduce	   the	   legacy	   of	   empire	   in	   a	   way	   that	   clouds	   the	   ethical	  possibilities	  of	   critical	   scholarship.	  Our	  evaluations	  of	  British	  development	   risk	  becoming	  locked	   within	   two	   equally	   unsatisfying	   frames	   of	   reference.	   Either	   we	   think	   of	   British	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development	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   it	   matches	   up	   to	   Britain’s	   former	   national	  primacy,	   or	   we	   remain	   trapped	   within	   a	   statist	   discourse	   principally	   concerned	   with	  judging	   British	   development	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   relative	   standing	   vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   other	   existing	  capitalist	  states.	  	  	  In	   the	   first	   instance,	  we	  risk	  employing	  Britain’s	   imperial	  past	  as	   the	  yardstick	   for	  contemporary	  development.	   In	   the	   second,	  we	  encounter	   the	  pitfall	   of	   an	  often	  uncritical	  and	   unrealistic	   elevation	   of	   other	   capitalist	   states	   that	   are	   considered	   to	   have	   developed	  more	   effectively	   than	   Britain.	   While	   the	   utility	   of	   a	   comparative	   framework	   for	   judging	  British	   development	   is	   undeniable,	   we	   must	   not	   lose	   sight	   of	   a	   broader	   critical	  consideration	  of	  capitalist	  development	  sui	  generis.	  All	  too	  often,	  decline	  arguments	  simply	  accept	  the	  necessity	  of	  national	  competitiveness	  within	  a	  global	  capitalist	  system.	  	  Instead,	  critical	  scholarship	  should	  be	  guided	  first	  and	  foremost	  by	  a	  normative	  consideration	  of	  the	  good	  society.	  	  The	   predominant	   frameworks	   for	   evaluating	   British	   development	   also	   present	  methodological	   obstacles	   to	   the	   study	   of	   the	   global	   political	   economy.	   The	   debate	   over	  decline	   began	   during	   an	   era	   in	   which	   it	   was	   still	   commonplace	   to	   talk	   about	   discreet	  national	   economies.	   Yet	   contemporary	   global	   political	   economy	   has	   been	   transformed	  enormously	  by	  globalisation,	  casting	  doubt	  over	  whether	  we	  can	  even	  speak	  of	  Britain	  as	  a	  self-­‐contained	   national	   economy.	   In	   a	   globalised	  world,	   we	   need	   to	   understand	   Britain’s	  development	  not	  simply	  as	  a	  transformation	  of	  Britain	  within	  the	  international	  system,	  but	  rather	  as	  part	  of	  a	  process	  of	  global	  transformation	  (Overbeek,	  2000:	  232).	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Here,	  however,	  a	  new	  problem	  emerges.	  	  Studying	  global	  transformation	  as	  a	  whole	  presents	  enormous	  methodological	  challenges.	  To	  study	  Britain’s	  development	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  global	  system	  would	  be	  a	  herculean	  task.	  In	  this	  thesis,	  then,	  the	  focus	  is	  upon	  the	  key	  transnational	   relationship	   between	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   which	   has	   been	   central	   to	   the	  constitution	  and	  reconstitution	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  I	  attempt	  to	  identify	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	   sphere,	   centred	   upon	   the	   interdependence	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   banking	   in	  the	   City	   and	   New	   York,	   that	   has	   been	   key	   to	   the	   broader	   transformation	   of	   the	   global	  political	  economy.	  	  How	   do	   we	   begin	   to	   think	   about	   this	   relationship	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   breaks	   from	  statist	  and	  nationalist	  discourse?	  Firstly,	  we	  need	  to	  identify	  a	  methodological	  basis	  for	  our	  inquiry.	  	  Several	  influential	  studies	  of	  British	  development	  have	  identified	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  as	  the	  dominant	  institutional	  configuration	  of	  power	  within	  British	   capitalism.	   Internationalising	   this	   nexus,	   by	   examining	   it	   within	   the	   context	   of	  American	   power,	   provides	   a	   methodological	   basis	   for	   understanding	   Anglo-­‐American	  development.	   By	   situating	   the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   relationship	  within	   the	  British	   state	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve-­‐Wall	  Street-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  explore	   the	   dynamic	   and	   interactive	   relationship	   between	   the	   key	   centres	   of	   financial	  power	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  In	  this	  way	  we	  can	  move	  beyond	  a	  broad	  focus	  upon	  the	  role	   of	   ‘the	   state’	   as	   an	   aggregate	   and	   undifferentiated	   whole	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   financial	  globalisation	  and	  capitalist	  development,	  towards	  a	  more	  nuanced	  approach	  that	  unearths	  the	  central	   locus	  of	   financial	  power	  within	   the	  capitalist	   state	  by	  disaggregating	   the	   state	  and	  revealing	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  state	  power	  is	  articulated	  within	  the	  context	  of	  broader	  
	  	   25	  
international	   forces.	   This	   methodological	   approach	   enables	   us	   to	   understand	   the	  revitalisation	   of	   the	   City	   of	   London’s	   dominance	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era	   and	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  the	  key	  centres	  of	  financial	  power	  were	  able	  to	  subvert	  and	  eventually	  dismantle	  the	  post-­‐war	   Keynesian	   state.	   It	   also	   enables	   us	   to	   reveal	   the	   contours	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  the	  way	  that	  the	  interaction	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  despite	  being	  highly	  uneven	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   lines	   of	   causality,	   also	   impacted	   the	   development	   of	   American	  capitalism	  and	  shaped	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  
	  
Internationalising	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  
	  The	  most	  authoritative	  and	  influential	  identification	  of	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  comes	  from	  Geoffrey	   Ingham.	   In	   his	  masterly	   account	   of	   British	   development,	   Ingham	  examines	  the	   historical	   function	   of	   the	   City	   of	   London	   within	   global	   capitalism.	   Ingham	   (1984:	   5)	  suggests	   that	   London	   has	   held	   a,	   ‘near	  monopolisation’	   of	   commercial	   activities	   that	   are	  based	   on	   international	   economic	   exchanges,	   giving	   it	   a	   central	   role	   within	   the	   world	  economy.	  Crucially,	  London’s	  role	  as	  an	  international	  commercial	  hub	  goes	  beyond	  merely	  facilitating	  British	  economic	  interests,	  to	  the	  performance	  of	  functions	  for	  the	  ‘world	  system	  as	  a	  whole’.	  This	  global	  role	  is	  encapsulated	  by	  sterling’s	  historical	  role	  as	  an	  international	  currency.	  For	  Ingham	  (1984:	  6)	  the	  key	  consequence	  of	  the	  City’s	  status	  as	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  world	   capitalist	   system	   has	   been	   the	   development	   of	   a	   ‘dual	   character’	   within	   British	  capitalism.	  Britain’s	  standing	  as	  the	   first	   industrial	  economy	  coexisted	  with	   its	  role	  as	  the	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world’s	   major	   commercial	   entrepot.	   Although	   coexistent,	   the	   two	   facets	   have	   not	   been	  equal.	  International	  commercial	  capitalism	  has	  been	  dominant,	  leading	  it	  to	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	   upon	   British	   society.	   Internally,	   the	   City’s	   privilege	   over	   industrial	   interests	   has	  been	  bolstered	  by	  institutional	  support	  from	  both	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England.6	  The	  commercial	  orientation	  of	  the	  City	  has	   left	  British	   industry	  without	  adequate	  support	  from	  banks,	  with	  the	  resultant	  low	  investment	  explaining	  the	  low	  productivity	  of	  post-­‐war	  Britain’s	   capitalism.	   The	   fundamental	   schism	  within	   British	   capitalism,	   between	   the	   City	  and	  industry,	  was	  already	  in	  place	  by	  the	  end	  of	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  By	  this	  point	  the	  City	  stood	  in	  ‘complete	  indifference’	  to	  domestic	  industry	  (Ingham,	  1984:	  149).	  	  Ingham’s	   account	   is	   primarily	   concerned	   with	   identifying	   the	   central	   structural	  weaknesses	  that	  explain	  British	  decline.	  But	  in	  doing	  so	  he	  provides	  a	  fertile	  methodological	  framework	  for	  understanding	  the	  central	  nexus	  of	  power	  within	  British	  capitalism.	  In	  order	  to	   explain	   the	   continued	   division	   between	   the	   City	   and	   industry,	   and	   the	   failure	   of	   the	  British	   state	   to	   develop	   sufficiently	   interventionist	   tendencies	   to	   successfully	   modernise	  industry,	  Ingham	  focuses	  upon	  the	  ‘City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury’	  nexus.	  	  By	   the	   late	   nineteenth	   century,	   the	   relationship	   between	   these	   three	   poles	   of	  institutionalised	   power	   had	   evolved	   into	   an	   integrated	   and	   interdependent	   system	  (Ingham,	   1984:	   131).	   The	   contours	   of	   this	   relationship,	   however,	   predated	   the	   industrial	  era.	   	  The	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  management	  of	  government	  debt	   through	   loans	   raised	   in	   the	  City	  established	  an	  early	  and	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  City,	  while	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  This	  is	  not,	  for	  Ingham	  (1984:	  36-­‐37),	  a	  consequence	  of	  ‘City	  hegemony’	  or	  the	  capture	  of	  the	  state	  by	  banking	  capital.	  Rather,	  this	  coincidence	  of	  interests	  has	  emerged	  from	  the	  desire	  of	  each	  of	  the	  players	   involved	   to	  maintain	   their	   power	   and	   standing	  within	   the	   broader	   institutional	  matrix	   of	  British	  capitalism.	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Treasury’s	  capacity	   to	   levy	   interest	  upon	   these	   loans	  gave	   it	  a	  stake	   in	   the	  debt	   financing	  process.	   During	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   William	   Gladstone,	   the	  Treasury’s	   role	   evolved	   substantially.	   Customs	   revenues	   were	   abolished	   and	   public	  expenditure	  was	  drastically	   reduced.	  This	   led	   to	   the	   rise	   of	   rational	   accountancy	   and	   the	  doctrine	  of	   the	  balanced	  budget,	  as	  part	  of	   the	   ‘Treasury	  View’	  of	  minimal	  state	  spending	  and	   intervention	   that	  became	   increasingly	  dominant	   as	   the	  Treasury	   came	   to	   control	   the	  expenditure	  of	  the	  entire	  state	  apparatus	  (Ingham,	  1984:	  130).	  	  The	  major	  cornerstones	  of	  British	   economic	   policy	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   free	   trade	   and	   the	   gold	   standard,	  arose	  out	  of	  an	  emerging	  commonality	  of	  interest	  between	  modernising	  groups	  within	  the	  state	  and	  the	  commercial	  and	  wholesale	  banking	  capitalists	  of	  the	  City	  (Ingham,	  1984:	  126).	  Within	  the	  associated	  regimes	  of	  free	  trade	  and	  the	  gold	  standard,	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  arrived	  at	  a,	  ‘complementary	  and	  mutually	  sustaining’	  set	  of	  policy	  commitments.	  The	  Treasury’s	  parsimony	  and	  proclivity	  for	  balanced	  budgets	  was	  matched	  by	  the	  Bank’s	  sensibility	   towards	   sound	   money	   (Ingham,	   1984:	   132).	   Tasked	   with	   managing	   the	   gold	  standard	   system,	   the	   Bank	   adopted	   an	   increasingly	   interventionist	   stance	   towards	   the	  money	  markets,	   lowering	  or	   increasing	   interest	  rates	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  requirement	  to	  maintain	  the	  gold-­‐sterling	  parity.	  	  The	  linkages	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  are	  also	  underpinned	  by	  structural	  connections	  with	  the	  City	  and	  its	  major	  banking	  institutions	  in	  particular.	  The	  institutional	  structure	  of	   the	  money	  markets	   and	   the	   specific	   role	  of	   the	   clearing	  banks	  within	  British	  capitalism	   have	   been	   the,	   ‘most	   important	   power	   resources	   by	   which	   commercial	   and	  wholesale	   banking	   capital’s	   hegemony	   has	   been	  maintained’	   (Ingham,	   1984:	   153).	   These	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institutional	   linkages	   were	   reinforced	   by	   cultural	   cross-­‐fertilisations	   that	   centred	   upon	  associations	  between	  bankers	  and	  the	  landed	  aristocracy.	  While	  the	  government	  offices	  and	  City	  institutions	  tended	  to	  be	  staffed	  by	  members	  of	  the	  public	  school	  and	  Oxbridge	  elites.	  The	  upheaval	  caused	  by	  two	  World	  Wars	  presented	  opportunities	  for	  the	  reform	  of	  the	  core	  institutions	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  What	  actually	  transpired,	  however,	  was	  a	  gradual	  return	  to	  the	  former	  orthodoxy	  centred	  upon	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus.	  	  The	  disastrous	  return	   to	   the	   gold	   standard	   in	   1925,	   with	   a	   severely	   overvalued	   pound,	   was	   eventually	  aborted	  in	  1931.	  But	  despite	  the	  global	  economic	  turmoil	  set	  in	  train	  after	  the	  Wall	  Street	  crash,	  no	  fundamental	  restructuring	  of	   the	  state	  occurred,	  with	  the	  Treasury	   in	  particular	  continuing	   to	   function	   as	   an	   obstacle	   to	   greater	   state	   involvement	   in	   Britain’s	   industrial	  development	  (Ingham,	  1984:	  191).	  	  After	  WW2,	  sterling	  was	  maintained	  as	  an	  international	  currency	  while	  the	  Conservative	  governments	  of	  the	  1950s	  restored	  the	  City	  to	  its	  former	  pre-­‐eminence.	   These	   missed	   opportunities	   for	   radical	   restructuring	   of	   British	   capitalism	  cast	   the	   die	   for	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   development.	   They	   also	   formed	   the	   backdrop	   for	   the	  failed	  attempts	  at	  industrial	  modernisation	  in	  the	  1960s,	  while	  providing	  the	  natural	  basis	  of	   support	   for	   the	   monetarist	   principles	   and	   liberal	   international	   economic	   policies	  associated	  with	  Thatcherism	  from	  1979.	  Other	  accounts	  of	  British	  development	  have,	   less	  explicitly	   than	   Ingham,	  also	  been	  attentive	   to	   the	   powerful	   influence	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus.7In	  what	   came	   to	   be	  known	  as	  the	  ‘Anderson/Nairn	  thesis’	  Perry	  Anderson	  and	  Tom	  Nairn	  produced	  a	  number	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  For	  other	  important	  identifications	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  see:	  Sidney	  Pollard	  (1982)	   ‘The	  Wasting	  of	  the	  British	  Economy:	  British	  Economic	  Policy	  1945	  to	  the	  present’,	  New	  York:	  St	   Martin’s	   Press;	   Gary	   Burn(1999)	   ‘The	   State,	   the	   City	   and	   the	   Euromarkets’,	   Review	   of	  
International	  Political	  Economy,	  Vol.	  6,	  No.	  2,	  225-­‐261,	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of	   influential	   articles	   critiquing	   Britain’s	   idiosyncratic	   and	   archaic	   form	   of	   capitalist	  development.	   Anderson	   and	   Nairn	   argued	   that	   much	   of	   Britain’s	   economic	  underperformance	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  and	  the	  almost	  continual	  condition	  of	  economic	  crisis,	   were	   traceable	   to	   the	   deeper	   history	   of	   the	   British	   state.8	  	   Of	   the	   two	   authors,	  Anderson’s	  writings	  are	  the	  more	  relevant	  here.	  	  Anderson	   and	   Nairn	   identified	   a	   number	   of	   peculiarities	   specific	   to	   British	  development.	   These	   included	   the	   limited	   and	   early	   occurrence	   of	   bourgeois	   revolution,	  Britain’s	  status	  as	  an	  industrial	  pioneer,	  the	  impact	  of	   imperial	  history	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  external	   invasion	   and	   radical	   state	   restructuring	   during	   the	   two	  World	  Wars	   (Anderson,	  1964:	  27-­‐37).	  Taken	  altogether,	  these	  peculiarities	  amounted	  to	  a	  stunted	  form	  of	  capitalist	  development,	   characterised	   by	   a	   subservient	  working	   class	   bound	  within	   the	   confines	   of	  labourism,	   a	   traditionalist	   ruling	   elite	   that	  was	   resistant	   to	   industrial	   and	   administrative	  modernisation	   and	   a	   generally	   ossified	   social	   structure	   permeated	   by	   deep	   and	   durable	  capitalist	   hegemony.	   The	   crisis	   of	   the	   1960s	   was,	   for	   both	   Anderson	   and	   Nairn,	   a	  consequence	   of	   more	   immediate	   conjunctural	   factors	   interacting	   with	   the	   longstanding	  deficiencies	  of	  British	  capitalism	  (Anderson,	  1964:	  53;	  Nairn,	  1979:	  44).	  	  There	   is	   no	   doubt	   that	   Anderson	   and	   Nairn	   erred	   too	   far	   towards	   structural	  determination	   in	   their	   analyses,	   presenting	   a	   theoretical	   oeuvre	   that	   essentially	   reduced	  class	  actors	  to	  mere	  executors	  of	  strategies	  that	  are	  heavily	  over-­‐determined	  by	  the	  deeper	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  The	   relevant	   articles	   here	   are;	   Perry	   Anderson	   (1964),	   ‘Origins	   of	   the	   Present	   Crisis’,	  New	  Left	  
Review,	  I/23,	  pp27-­‐53;	  Anderson	  (1992),	  ‘The	  Figures	  of	  Descent’,	  in	  ‘English	  Questions’,	  pp121-­‐193,	  London:	  Verso:	  121-­‐193;	  Tom	  Nairn	   (1964),	   ‘The	  Nature	  of	   the	  Labour	  Party-­‐1’,	  New	  Left	  Review,	  I/27,	  38-­‐65;	  Nairn	  (1964),	   ‘The	  Nature	  of	   the	  Labour	  Party-­‐2,	  New	  Left	  Review,	   I/28,	  33-­‐62;	  Nairn	  (1979),	  ‘The	  Future	  of	  Britain’s	  Crisis’,	  New	  Left	  Review,	  I/23,	  113-­‐114:	  43-­‐69;	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history	   of	   British	   development.	   	   This	   sort	   of	   approach	   left	   little	   room	   for	   historical	  contingency	  or	  genuine	  class	  agency.	  Within	  Anderson’s	  original	  essay	  however,	  there	  is	  an	  illuminating	   awareness	  of	   the	   impact	   that	  Britain’s	   imperialist	   internationalism	  exercised	  over	  capitalist	  development.	  This	  was	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  regard	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  City.	  Anderson	   (1964:	   51)	   attacked	   the	   continued	   existence	   of	   the	   Sterling	   Area	   as	   the	   final	  enduring	   form	  of	  empire,	  dominated	  by	  the,	   ‘first	  historic	  nucleus	  of	  British	   Imperialism’-­‐	  the	  City.	  The	  City	  had	  a	  singularly	  significant	  impact	  upon	  the	  contours	  of	  the	  1960s	  crisis,	  being	   both	   the,	   ‘most	   sociologically	   revealing	   and	   the	   most	   sectionally	   decisive	   single	  determinant	   of	   the	   shape	   of	   the	   economy’.	   For	   Anderson,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   City	   neatly	  encapsulated	  all	  the	  defects	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  Anderson	  also	  implicated	  the	  Treasury	  in	  Britain’s	   crisis,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   failure	   to	   adopt	   an	   interventionist	   stance	   had	   cost	  Britain	  dearly.	  Writing	  on	   the	  eve	  of	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  Conservative	  premiership,	  Tom	  Nairn	   (1979:	   53)	   shared	   Anderson’s	   conviction	   that	   the	   predominance	   of	   the	   City	   had	  directly	  contributed	  to	  Britain’s	  industrial	  failings.	  These	  themes	  are	  taken	  on	  more	  extensively	  in	  Anderson’s	  later	  work.	  In	  ‘Figures	  of	  
Descent’	   Anderson	   expanded	   upon	   his	   original	   analysis	   of	   the	   City’s	   culpability	   for	   the	  failings	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  Drawing	  on	  Ingham’s	  account,	  Anderson	  (1992:	  139)	  points	  to	  the	   relative	   independence	   of	   the	   City	   and	   industry	   as	   distinctive	   factors	   in	   British	  development	  and	  draws	  out	  the	  implications	  for	  Britain’s	  class	  and	  state	  structure.	  The	  City	  continued	   to	   support	   free	   trade	   despite	   its	   impact	   upon	   falling	   British	   manufacturing	  competitiveness	   as	   other	   countries	   turned	   to	   protectionism.	   Britain’s	   belated	   embrace	   of	  protectionism,	   long	  after	  the	  horse	  of	  British	   industrial	  decline	  had	  bolted,	   is	  explained	  in	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terms	   of	   the	   close	   ties	   between	   the	   City	   and	   the	   Conservatives.	   This	   influence	   was	  strengthened	  by	  the	  unusual	   financial	  dominance	  of	   the	  Treasury	  within	  the	  British	  state,	  which	  reigned	  supreme	  as	  the	  nerve-­‐centre	  of	  government	  from	  the	  Gladstone	  era	  onwards	  (Anderson,	  1992:	  144).	  	  Anderson	  (1992:	  166)	  criticises	  the	  post-­‐war	  Labour	  government	  for	  failing	  to	  break	  sufficiently	  with	  the	  existing	  orthodoxies	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  a	  failure	  that	  was	  evidenced	  by	   the	  ease	  with	  which	   the	  Conservatives	  restored	   the	  City	  during	   the	  1950s.	  During	   this	  process	  the	  Bank	  recovered	  its	  role	  as	  ‘conductor	  to	  the	  City’	  and	  the	  Treasury	  was	  able	  to	  reassert	   its	   primacy	   within	   the	   state.	   The	   1960s	   and	   70s	   witnessed	   several	   different	  attempts,	   first	   by	   Wilson	   and	   then	   by	   Heath,	   to	   revitalise	   British	   capitalism.	   Both	   were	  unable	   to	   arrest	   the	   acceleration	   of	   decline.	   Thatcher’s	   efforts	   to	   reverse	   decline	   actually	  reinforced	   the	   process	   by	   further	   entrenching	   the	   primacy	   of	   the	   City	   and	   provoking	   an	  unprecedentedly	  rapid	  period	  of	  deindustrialisation	  (Anderson,	  1992:	  169-­‐184).	  	  	  Both	   Ingham	   and	   Anderson	   correctly	   identify	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  within	  the	  development	  of	  British	  capitalism	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  they	  produce	  powerful	   analyses	   of	   Britain’s	   chronic	   economic	   underperformance	   and	   the	   crisis	  tendencies	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  By	  disaggregating	  the	  state	  into	  its	  constituent	  elements	  and	   identifying	   the	   privileged	   centres	   of	   power	   within	   the	   broader	   state	   complex,	   they	  generate	  a	  remarkable	  level	  of	  precision	  in	  their	  diagnoses	  of	  British	  decline	  and	  provide	  a	  rich	  understanding	  of	  the	  particularities	  of	  British	  development.	  	  The	  great	  deficiency	  here	  is	  not	  to	  be	  found	  in	  an	  errant	  analysis,	  but	  rather	  in	  the	  way	   that	   within	   the	   work	   of	   both	   Ingham	   and	   Anderson,	   the	   guiding	   problematique	   of	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decline	   circumscribes,	   a	   priori,	   the	   explanatory	   potential	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury.	   By	  identifying	  the	  explanation	  of	  decline	  as	  the	  principal	  intellectual	  task	  of	  their	  analyses,	  they	  obscure	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   the	   explanatory	   potential	   that	   the	   focus	   upon	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  offers.	  The	  interaction	  between	  the	  City,	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  is	  not	  only	  a	  useful	  focus	  for	  understanding	  decline	  and	  economic	  performance,	  it	   is	  also	  able	  to	  tell	  us	  a	  great	  deal	  about	  a	  number	  of	  other	  questions:	  why	  the	  Keynesian	  state	  project	  that	  was	  launched	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  World	  War	  II	  failed	  so	  spectacularly,	  how	  the	  transition	  away	  from	   the	  Keynesian	   state	  was	   articulated	  within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system	  and	  why	  the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  that	  undermined	  and	  supplanted	  the	  Keynesian	   state	  occurred,	  which	   social	   forces	   and	   institutions	  drove	   the	  process,	   and	  who	  were	  the	  major	  beneficiaries.	  	  Unfortunately,	   this	   analytical	   potential	   is	   buried	   beneath	   the	   overriding	   concern	  with	   accounting	   for	   decline.	   But	   the	   latent	   explanatory	   potential	   of	   this	   methodological	  approach	   is	   not	   confined	   to	   understanding	   Britain’s	   development	   in	   a	   predominantly	  national	   sense,	   in	   fact	   understanding	   that	   development	   requires	   us	   to	   introduce	   the	  transatlantic	   vector	   into	   our	   analysis	   of	   Britain	   by	   Atlanticising	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus.	   In	   the	   process,	   we	   are	   able	   not	   only	   to	   get	   a	   firmer	   handle	   on	   the	   post-­‐war	  transformation	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  but	  also	   to	  understand	   the	  role	   that	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  has	  played	  within	  the	  broader	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  	  By	  broadening	  and	  redefining	  the	  intellectual	  ambitions	  that	  motivate	  our	  investigation	  into	  the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus,	   we	   are	   able	   to	   activate	   the	   latent	   explanatory	   potential	  within	   this	   framework.	   This	   is	   a	   rather	   simple	   step	   to	   take,	   it	   would	   seem,	   but	   the	  
	  	   33	  
dominance	  of	  the	  decline	  narrative	  has	  smothered	  this	  potential	  and	  left	  it	  buried	  beneath	  other	   concerns	   and	   intellectual	   preoccupations.	   	   By	   methodologically	   incorporating	  American	   power,	  we	   are	   able	   to	   shift	   the	   terrain	   of	   inquiry	   away	   from	   the	  well-­‐trodden	  territory	  of	  British	  decline	  and	  towards	  new	  vistas	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  	  
The	  transatlantic	  vector	  	  Having	  examined	   the	   importance	  of	   the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus,	  we	  now	  move	  on	   to	  a	  related	   limitation	   of	   the	   decline	   literature;	   the	   absence	   of	   a	   sustained	   treatment	   of	   the	  relationship	   between	   American	   power	   and	   British	   development.	   This	   is	   despite	   the	  widespread	   acknowledgement	   that	   the	   U.S.	   has	   played	   a	   privileged	   role	   in	   the	  reconstitution	   of	   the	   global	   political	   economy	   post-­‐WW2	   (Cox,	   1987;	   Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	  2012;	  Rupert,	  1995;	  Keohane,	  1984;	  Gilpin,	  1987;	  Gowan,	  1999;	  Arrighi,	  1990).	  It	  is	  only	  by	  addressing	   this	   related	   deficiency	   that	  we	   are	   able	   to	   bring	   the	   problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	  towards	  the	  surface.	  	  While	  the	  decline	  literature	  often	  acknowledges	  the	  importance	  of	  American	  power	  to	   British	   development,	   it	   does	   so	   in	   a	   latent,	   implicit	   or	   empirically	   and	   conceptually	  underdeveloped	   manner.	   What	   we	   have	   is	   acknowledgement	   and	   partial	   explanation	  without	  the	  required	  methodological	  adjustment	  necessary	  to	  fully	  incorporate	  the	  role	  of	  American	   power	   into	   our	   analysis	   of	   British	   development.	   Overwhelmingly,	   studies	   of	  British	   decline	   remain	   enclosed	   within	   a	   statist/national	   development	   theoretical	  framework.	   In	  order	  to	  uncover	  the	  political	  economy	  of	   the	  Special	  Relationship,	  a	  much	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fuller	   methodological	   adaptation	   is	   required.	   Returning	   to	   Geoffrey	   Ingham	   reveals	   the	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  existing	  literature	  in	  more	  detail.	  	  	  	  American	  power	  was,	  according	  to	  Ingham,	  crucial	  to	  the	  post-­‐war	  restoration	  of	  the	  City’s	   prominence.	   But	   rather	   than	   the	   exercise	   of	   post-­‐war	   hegemony	   that	   one	   might	  expect	   from	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  City	  was	   in	   fact	   restored	  precisely	  because	  of	   the	  unwillingness	  and	  inability	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  take	  on	  the	  role	  that	  Britain	  had	  formerly	  played	  as	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	  For	  Ingham	  (1984:	  201)	  then,	  British	  decline	  is	  rooted	  more	  in	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   American	   leadership,	   rather	   than	   the	   overbearing	   predominance	   of	  American	   power.	   In	   particular,	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   discussions	   over	   the	  future	  of	   the	   international	   economy	  both	  during	   and	   after	   the	  war,	   are	  understood	   to	  be	  central	  to	  understanding	  sterling’s	  international	  role	  and	  the	  revitalisation	  of	  the	  City.	  	  	  Britain’s	  successful	  recovery	  of	  a	  world	  role	  for	  sterling	  and	  the	  City	  would	  require	  that	   American	   policymakers	   agree	   to	   underwrite	   the	   British	   balance	   of	   payments	   deficit	  and	   defend	   sterling.	   The	   American’s	   did	   just	   that	   and	   the	   consequences	   were	   severe.	  American	   sponsorship	   enabled	   the	   City	   to	   be	   restored	   as	   a	   commercial	   and	   wholesale	  banking	  centre.	  This	  had	  a	  major	  impact	  upon	  British	  economic	  strategy	  at	  large,	  with	  the	  policies	  required	  to	  support	  sterling	  placing,	  ‘definite	  constraints’	  upon	  the	  management	  of	  the	   domestic	   economy.	   In	   the	   longer	   term,	   the	   effort	   to	   maintain	   the	   value	   of	   sterling	  through	  deflationary	  measures	  ‘proved	  to	  be	  a	  barrier	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  long	  term	  planned	  productive	  growth’	  (Ingham,	  1984:	  201-­‐202).	  	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  politics	  of	   the	  post-­‐war	  period	  are	  clearly	  central	   to	   Ingham’s	  analysis	  of	  Britain’s	  development.	  Importantly,	  Ingham	  suggests	  that	  the	  unwillingness	  and	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hesitancy	   of	   American	   global	   leadership	   in	   the	   early	   post-­‐war	   years	   led	   American	   policy	  makers	  to	  articulate	  their	  power	  through	  the	  subordinate	  integration	  of	  Britain’s	  traditional	  international	  role.	  What	  resulted,	  then,	  was	  effectively	  a	  co-­‐articulation	  of	  global	  capitalist	  governance	  in	  which	  Britain	  would	  now	  clearly	  play	  second	  fiddle	  to	  American	  dominance.	  American	  sponsorship	  of	  sterling’s	  international	  role	  and	  the	  revitalisation	  of	  the	  City	  that	  went	   alongside	   it	   were	   the	   key	   support	   struts	   for	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   traditional	  institutional	  basis	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  	  The	  problem	  here	  is	  that	  Ingham	  conceives	  of	  American	  power	  over	  Britain	  only	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  tightly	  delineated	  framing	  process	  that	  occurred	  in	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years	  and	  involved	   the	   establishment	   of	   parameters	   for	   subsequent	   British	   development.	   After	   this	  moment	  passes,	  with	  Britain	  set	  upon	  a	  particular	  path,	  American	  agency	  disappears	  from	  the	   analysis	   altogether.	   The	   continually	   co-­‐constitutive	   patterns	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	  remain	  invisible	  and	  where	  they	  are	  explored,	  the	  concern	  is	  to	  explore	  their	  impact	  upon	  Britain’s	  economic	  failings.	  In	  much	  the	  same	  vein	  as	   Ingham,	  Andrew	  Gamble	  argues	  that	   the	  contours	  of	   the	  Special	  Relationship	  after	  1945	  ensured	  the,	  ‘prolongation,	  not	  the	  termination,	  of	  Britain’s	  traditional	   world	   role’.	   	   This	   prolongation	   had	   disastrous	   effects.	   It	   led	   to	   a	   renewal	   of	  Britain’s	   traditional	   liberal	   approach	   to	   the	   world	   economy	   and	   the	   continuation,	   at	  American	   behest,	   of	   high	   overseas	   spending	   on	   military	   commitments.	   These	   policies	  provoked	   tension	   between	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   domestic	   economy	   and	   Britain’s	  international	   priorities	   that	   were	   manifested	   most	   clearly	   in	   the	   terminal	   balance	   of	  payments	  crises	  of	   the	  1950s	  and	  60s	   	   (Gamble,	  1991:	  106-­‐111).	  Unfortunately	  however,	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Gamble	  acknowledges	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  relationship	  in	  structuring	  post-­‐war	   British	   development	   but	   does	   not	   offer	   any	   further	   elucidation	   on	   the	  matter.	   Here	  then,	  Gamble	   falls	   into	  the	  same	  trap	  as	   Ingham:	   identifying	  the	  role	  of	  America	  power	   in	  framing	  British	  development	  during	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years,	  but	  abandoning	  any	  attempt	  to	   trace	   this	   co-­‐constitutive	   relationship	   into	   the	   subsequent	   decades	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  Susan	   Strange’s	   study	   on	   the	   decline	   of	   sterling	   similarly	   offers	   a	   limited	   but	  revealing	   exploration	   of	   the	   transatlantic	   dimension.	   Strange	   examines	   the	   international	  role	  of	  sterling	  and	  its	  connection	  to	  British	  imperial	  power.	  Focusing	  on	  the	  overextension	  of	  British	  power	  after	  WW2,	  Strange	  (1971:	  178-­‐180)	  suggests	   that	  Britain’s	  high	   level	  of	  overseas	   military	   spending,	   which	   was	   linked	   to	   the	   preservation	   of	   the	   Sterling	   Area,	  caused	  severe	  strains	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  payments.	  This	  was	  a	  primary	  cause	  of	  the	  repeated	  crises	  of	  sterling	  that	  derailed	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  economic	  revitalisation.	  Britain’s	  desire	  to	  maintain	   the	   international	   role	   of	   sterling,	   according	   to	   Strange,	   necessitated	   extremely	  high	   levels	   of	   defence	   expenditure.	   Countries	   that	   held	   sterling	   balances	   tended	   to	   do	   so	  under	   the	   proviso	   of	   British	  military	   guarantees.	   As	   Britain’s	   economic	  might	  waned	   the	  need	  to	  provide	  political	  protection	  for	  those	  holding	  sterling	  became	  more	  acute.	  	  Within	   this	   context,	   American	   post-­‐war	   power	   played	   a	   very	   important	   role.	  	  American	   financial	   aid	   through	   the	  Marshall	  Plan,	   and	   the	  broader	  American	   tolerance	  of	  sterling’s	   international	   role	   and	   the	   protected	   monetary	   system	   of	   the	   Sterling	   Area,	  enabled	  the	  prolongation	  of	  a	  massively	  defective	  and	  outmoded	  British	  policy	  framework	  (Strange,	  1971:	  66).	  Strange’s	  account	  shows	  a	  greater	  breadth	  of	  awareness	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐
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American	  dimension	  than	  most	  studies.	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  in	  her	  treatment	  of	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  from	  the	  late	  1950s.	  Here,	  Strange	  provides	  important	  clues	  as	   to	   the	   role	   of	   American	   power	   and	   the	   dollar	   in	   enabling	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   City	  within	   an	   increasingly	   integrated	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   matrix	   (Strange,	   1971:	   207).	  But	  once	  again,	  there	  is	  no	  attempt	  to	  isolate	  or	  treat	  continuously	  the	  contours	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	   development,	   or	   to	   identify	   a	   specific	   sphere	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	  within	   the	   global	   political	   economy.	   American	   power	   is	   brought	   in	   to	   explain	   important	  signposts	   on	   the	   road	   towards	   decline,	   but	   it	   recedes	   into	   the	   background	   once	   more	  thereafter.	  Where	  the	   focus	  upon	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  aspect	  of	  British	  development	  has	  been	  more	  empirically	  substantive,	  it	  has	  tended	  to	  be	  chronologically	  confined	  to	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	   years.	   Peter	   Burnham	   and	   Edward	   Brett	   provide	   contending	   accounts	   of	   the	  centrality	   of	   American	   hegemony	   to	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   development.	  While	   Brett	   argues	  (1985:	  138-­‐147)	  that	  it	  is	  Britain’s	  capitulation	  to	  American	  hegemony	  that	  explains	  post-­‐war	   decline,	   Burnham	   argues	   (1990:	   177)	   the	   reverse	   positions,	   suggesting	   that	   the	  successful	  resistance	  of	  U.S.	  hegemony	  cast	  the	  die	  on	  British	  decline.	  These	  are	  provocative	  and	   revealing	   analyses	  but	   they	  provide	   an	   extremely	   limited	  basis,	   both	  historically	   and	  theoretically,	   from	  which	   to	   uncover	   the	   problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development.	  We	   return	   to	   the	   contending	   interpretations	   of	   Brett	   and	   Burnham	   at	   greater	   length	   in	  chapter	   three,	   as	   part	   of	   a	   wider	   discussion	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   framework	   and	   the	  emergence	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  relationship.	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Perry	   Anderson’s	   account	   of	   British	   decline	   exhibits	   a	   similar	   recognition	   of	   the	  American	   dimension.	   But	   although	   Anderson	   treats	   the	   impact	   of	   American	   power	   in	   a	  more	  chronologically	  extensive	  manner,	  the	  account	  remains	  theoretically	  and	  empirically	  limited.	  Anderson	  identifies	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  with	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  key	  component	   of	   the	   restoration	   of	   British	   imperial	   power	   in	   1945.	   By	   accepting	   American	  imperial	  power,	  British	  elites	  preserved	   the	   traditional	   class	   structure	  and	  prolonged	   the	  existing	   developmental	   deficiencies.	   Decisions	  made	   in	  Washington	  were	   now	   effectively	  shaping	   the,	   ‘cycles	   of	   reformism’	   in	   London.	   Reflecting	   upon	   the	   failed	   attempt	   at	  modernisation	  during	  the	  1960s,	  Anderson	  notes	  the	  failure	  of	   the	  Labour	  government	  to	  reconsider	   the	   international	  position	  of	  Britain.	  While	  France,	   ‘expelled	  US	  bases	   from	   its	  territory,	  withdrew	   from	  NATO’s	  military	   command,	   and	  disavowed	   the	  American	  war	   in	  Indochina’,	   Britain,	   by	   contrast,	   placidly	   accepted	   its	   traditional	   subordination	  within	   the	  American	   protectorate	   (Anderson,	   1992:	   171).	   After	   a	   cooling	   of	   the	   relationship	   during	  Heath’s	  courtship	  of	  EEC	  membership	  in	  the	  early	  1970s,	  the	  relationship	  between	  British	  and	   American	   imperialism	   was	   revivified	   by	   the	   unusual	   ideological	   compatibility	   of	  Thatcher	  and	  Reagan.	  Anderson’s	  work	   represents	  a	  more	   sustained	   consideration	  of	   the	  impacts	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  but	  there	  is	  no	  explicit	  or	  extensive	  delineation	  of	  the	  patterns	  and	  processes	  central	  to	  the	  constitution	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  and	  the	  feedback	  effects	  upon	  the	  U.S.	  are	  never	  explored.	  Causality	  here,	  as	  with	  much	  of	  the	  British	   decline	   literature,	   runs	   along	   a	   one-­‐way	   street,	   with	   the	   U.S.	   shaping	   Britain	   but	  without	  any	  comparable	  impact	  of	  British	  development	  upon	  the	  U.S.	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Much	   like	   Anderson’s	   essay,	   Henk	   Overbeek’s	   study	   places	   significant	   analytical	  weight	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  American	  power	  in	  shaping	  British	  development.	  Overbeek	  (1990:	  1)	   reads	   the	   evolution	   of	   British	   capitalism	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   development	   of	   the	  capitalist	  world	  system,	  identifying	  different	  hegemonic	   ‘concepts	  of	  control’	  employed	  by	  ruling	  groups	  in	  conjunction	  with	  distinct	  phases	  of	  capital	  accumulation.	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	   was	   strictly	   limited	   by	   the	   contours	   of	   U.S.	   hegemony	   and,	   crucially,	  American	  power	  provided	  the	  framework	  within	  which	  the	  City’s	  internal	  dominance	  could	  be	   restored.	   	   American	   support	   for	   sterling’s	   international	   role	   and	   acceptance	   of	   the	  continuation	   of	   the	   Sterling	   Area,	   contributed	   to	   persistent	   capital	   outflows	   and	   the	  repeated	  balance	  of	  payments	  crises	  associated	  with	  the	  stop-­‐go	  cycle	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s.	  American	   investment,	   first	   through	   the	   Marshall	   Plan	   and	   later	   through	   private	   inflows,	  underpinned	   the	   international	   financial	   position	   of	   Britain	   and	   led	   to	   a	   deeper	   economic	  integration	  between	  the	  two	  states	  (Overbeek,	  1990:	  91-­‐105).9	  Most	   importantly,	  Overbeek	   (1990:	  33	  &	  108)	  describes	   the	  manner	   in	  which	  U.S.	  hegemony	  underpinned	  the	  City’s	  restoration	  as	  an	  international	  financial	  centre	  and,	  in	  the	  process,	   enabled	   the	   continued	   pre-­‐eminence	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   within	  British	  capitalism.	  Similarly	  to	  Strange,	  Overbeek	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  financial	  dimension	  of	  the	  transatlantic	   relationship,	   particularly	   in	   regard	   to	   the	   birth	   of	   the	   Euromarkets,	   but	  includes	   it	   only	   as	   a	   component	   of	   the	  broader	   concern	  with	  decline.	  Despite	   the	   limited	  scope	  of	  Overbeek’s	  treatment	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  his	  study	  offers	  by	  far	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Overbeek	  (1990:	  91)	  identifies	  the	  misuse	  of	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  funds	  by	  British	  policy	  makers	  and	  capitalists	   as	   serious	   failing.	   By	   investing	   the	   funds	   overseas,	   British	   investors	   missed	   the	  opportunity	  for	  the	  sort	  of	  thoroughgoing	  modernisation	  that	  British	  industry	  required.	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most	   promising	  methodological	   potential	   of	   all	   the	   decline	   literature.	   It	   is	   in	   Overbeek’s	  work	  that	  we	  can	  first	  see	  genuine	  clues	  as	  to	  how	  a	  methodology	  that	  captures	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  might	  be	  constructed.	  All	  of	   the	  above	  studies	  have,	   in	  different	  ways,	   contributed	   towards	   revealing	   the	  importance	   of	   post-­‐war	   Anglo-­‐American	   dynamics	   to	   shaping	   Britain’s	   role	   within	   the	  global	   economy	   and	   setting	   the	   contours	   for	   the	   subsequent	   development	   of	   British	  capitalism.	   What	   they	   collectively	   fail	   to	   excavate,	   however,	   is	   the	   re-­‐emergence	   and	  intensification	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  field	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  which	  continued	  to	  shape	  capitalist	  development	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  as	  well	  as	  the	  wider	  international	  monetary	   system,	   during	   the	   decades	   that	   followed	   Bretton	  Woods.	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   interdependence	   had	   been	   prominent	   during	   the	   19th	   century,	  and	  it	  became	  more	  important	  during	  the	  1920s	  as	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  played	  central	  roles	  in	  attempting	   to	   reconstruct	   the	  gold	  standard.	  During	   this	   time,	   the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  City	  and	  sterling	  became	   increasingly	   intertwined	  with	   the	  development	  of	  New	  York	  and	  the	  dollar.	  It	  was	  this	  nascent	  field	  of	  developmental	  interactivity	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	   U.S.,	   hinging	   upon	   the	   interdependence	   of	   their	   respective	   currencies	   and	   financial	  centres	  and	  the	  state	  institutions	  within	  which	  they	  were	  imbricated,	  that	  would	  re-­‐emerge	  during	   the	   post-­‐war	   period	   and	   play	   a	   central	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	   construction	   and	  subsequent	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  	  This	  force	  field	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  exerted	  a	  generative	  influence	  both	  on	  the	  development	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  but	  also	  upon	  the	  wider	  institutional	  basis	  of	  the	  international	   monetary	   system.	   Because	   of	   the	   systemic	   importance	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	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banking,	   and	   the	   centrality	   of	   sterling	   and	   the	   dollar	   as	   the	   dominant	   international	  currencies,	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics	  were	  central	  to	  the	  composition	  and	  decomposition	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   international	   monetary	   system.	   Despite	   the	   decline	   of	  British	   economic	  power,	   it	   remained	   central	   to	   the	  politics	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system.	   American	   bankers	   and	   government	   agencies	   of	   the	   U.S.	   recognised	   the	   need	   to	  articulate	   American	   financial	   power	   through	   a	   subordinate	   and	   increasingly	   integrated	  British	  financial	  system	  that	  became	  part	  of	  a	  transatlantic	  financial	  axis	  hinging	  upon	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  which	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  a	  rapidly	  globalising	  political	  economy.	  For	  their	  part,	  bankers	  and	  government	  officials	  in	  Britain	  increasingly	  recognised	  the	  need	  to	  draw	  in	   American	   financial	   power	   and	   capacity	   in	   order	   to	   maintain	   their	   own	   national	  dominance	   and	   international	   standing.	   These	   actors	   and	   interests	   constituted	   the	   core	   of	  the	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   Special	   Relationship,	   exerting	   a	   major	   impact	   upon	   the	  development	   of	   the	   global	   political	   economy,	   not	   only	   during	   the	   formation	   of	   Bretton	  Woods,	  but	  also	  with	  the	  hugely	  important	  development	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  from	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  the	  attempt	  to	  instantiate	  an	  increasingly	  liberalised	  international	  financial	  system	  under	   floating	  exchange	   rates	  during	   the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  Why	   then,	  have	   these	  dynamics	   not	   been	   properly	   uncovered	   or	   explicated?	  The	   answer	   lies	   only	   partly	   in	   the	  deficiencies	  of	  the	  ‘declinist’	  literature	  that	  we	  have	  reviewed	  above.	  It	  also	  stems	  from	  the	  ambiguity	  and	  contention	  surrounding	  America’s	  post-­‐war	  status	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	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U.S.	  power:	  redefinition	  or	  retreat?	  	  The	   preoccupation	   with	   decline	   and	   failure	   to	   consistently	   examine	   Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	   dynamics	   has,	   as	   we	   have	   seen,	   limited	   our	   understanding	   of	   British	  development	   and	   obscured	   an	   important	   set	   of	   institutional	  mechanisms	   that	   have	   been	  central	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  Apart	  from	  studies	  that	  focus	  upon	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐war	   years,	   a	   sustained	   discussion	   and	   methodological	  incorporation	   of	   the	   impact	   of	   U.S.	   power	   has	   been	   neglected.	   This	   is	   partly	   due	   to	   the	  preoccupation	   with	   decline,	   which	   has	   largely	   confined	   the	   interest	   in	   Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  interaction	  to	  the	  first	  decade	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  where	  the	  shape	  of	  the	  emerging	  Special	  Relationship	  is	  suggested	  to	  have	  concretised	  British	  decline	  by	  restoring	  and	  prolonging	  the	  pre-­‐existing	  deficiencies	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  	  Oversight	   on	   the	   part	   of	   contributors	   to	   the	   decline	   debate	   is	   not,	   however,	  exclusively	   responsible	   for	   the	   absence	   of	   long-­‐term	   analyses	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  Ambiguities	  within	  IPE	  have	  also	  played	  a	  very	  important	  part.	  Firstly,	  there	  has	  been	  no	   consensus	   established	  over	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  or	  not	  American	  power	  has	  been	   in	  retreat.	  A	  number	  of	   influential	  studies	  have	  suggested	  that	   the	  United	  States	  was	  a	  hegemonic	  power	   in	   the	  early	  post-­‐war	  period	   	   (Keohane,	  1984;	  Cox,	  1987:	  Gilpin,	  1987;	   Arrighi,	   1990;	   Rupert,	   1995).	   While	   realist	   studies	   saw	   this	   hegemony	   as	   being	  rooted	   in	   material	   power	   predominance	   and	   liberals	   understood	   it	   as	   an	   imbrication	   of	  state	  power	  within	  international	  regime	  building,	  critical	  theorists	  pointed	  to	  the	  class	  and	  ideological	   dimensions	   of	   American	   hegemony	   arising	   from	   the	   expansion	   of	   Fordist	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accumulation	   regimes.	   	   Despite	   the	   consensus	   over	   American	   predominance	   post	   WW2,	  there	   is	   much	   more	   ambiguity	   over	   whether	   or	   when	   this	   hegemonic	   power	   began	   to	  decline.	  Prompted	  by	  turbulence	  in	  international	  affairs,	  a	  debate	  over	  American	  hegemonic	  decline	  began	  in	  the	  late	  1960’s.	  While	  a	  number	  of	  scholars	  suggest	  that	  American	  power	  has	  experienced	  a	  pronounced	  decline,	  a	  contending	  group	  proposes	  that	  American	  power	  has	   been	   redefined	   rather	   than	   suffering	   terminal	   retreat.	   The	   debate	   over	   American	  decline	   has	   created	   ambiguity	   regarding	   the	   form	   and	   extent	   of	   American	   power	   and	   its	  projection	  and	  impact	  upon	  subordinate	  states.	  Those	   theorists	   who	   have	   contested	   the	   notion	   of	   U.S.	   decline	   have	   done	   so	   by	  evoking	   the	   concept	   of	   American	   ‘structural	   power’.	   	   Whilst	   this	   is	   a	   useful	   heuristic	  concept,	   it	   is	   extremely	   difficult	   to	   operationalise	   methodologically.	   A	   further	   problem	  relates	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  clear	  indicators	  of	  American	  power	  being	  exerted	  over	  Britain.	  In	  the	  earlier	  post-­‐war	  period	  the	  Washington	  Loan	  negotiations	  are	  often	  examined	  as	  a	  key	  example	  of	  U.S.	  leverage	  being	  applied	  to	  Britain.	  Unfortunately,	  similarly	  clear	  criterions	  of	  U.S.	  power	  are	  harder	  to	  identify	  over	  the	  longer	  span	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  	  Beginning	  with	  proponents	  of	  the	  decline	  thesis,	  Robert	  Keohane	  suggests	  that	  U.S.	  hegemonic	   leadership	   peaked	   during	   the	   long	   decade	   of	   the	   1950s	   (Keohane,	   1982:	   49).	  Industrial	   and	   financial	   dominance,	   allied	   with	   overwhelming	   military-­‐political	   power,	  enabled	   America	   to	   adopt	   a	   relatively	   benign	   posture	   towards	  Western	   capitalism.	   This	  form	   of	   US	   leadership	   was,	   however,	   short-­‐lived.	   The	   U.S.	   contracted	   a	   ‘disease	   of	   the	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strong’	  by	  refusing	  to	  adapt	  to	  change	  and	  failing	  to	  reproduce	  the	  conditions	  of	  its	  earlier	  success,	  namely	  trade	  dominance	  and	  monetary	  control	  (Keohane,	  1982:	  66-­‐68).	  Following	  from	  Keohane,	  Krasner	  (1982)	  correspondingly	  proposes	  that	  U.S.	  power	  has	   been	   in	   decline	   since	   the	   late	   1960’s.	   	   The	   increasing	   discord	   experienced	   in	   the	  coordination	   of	   international	   economic	   relations	   during	   the	   1970’s	   testified	   to	   the	  diminishment	  of	  America’s	  hegemonic	   control.	   The	   ‘overwhelming	  power	  of	   the	  U.S.’	   had	  formed	  the	  ‘central	  structural	  characteristic’	  of	  the	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  period.	  In	  this	  era	  U.S.	  power	  dominated	  not	  only	  at	  the	  aggregate	  level,	  but	  also	  over	  a,	  ‘wide	  range	  of	  specific	  issue	   areas’.	   This	   period	  was	   characterised	   by	   America’s	   commitment	   to	   internationalist	  goals	   that	   benefited	   the	   whole	   of	   Western	   capitalism	   and	   not	   just	   American	   national	  interests.	  But	  from	  the	  late	  1960’s,	  as	  American	  power	  began	  to	  decline	  sharply,	  nationalist	  policy	  goals	  began	  to	  re-­‐emerge	  and	  hegemonic	  considerations	  fell	  by	  the	  wayside.	  Nixon’s	  delinking	  of	  the	  dollar	  from	  gold	  in	  1971	  signalled	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  international	  stance	  of	  the	  U.S.	   After	   this	   point	   American	   leaders	   were	   no	   longer	   amenable	   to	   sacrificing	   national	  interests	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  global	  economic	  prosperity	  (Krasner,	  1982:	  33-­‐42).	  Approaching	  the	  question	  of	  US	  decline	  from	  a	  different	  angle,	  Robert	  Gilpin	  locates	  the	   retreat	   of	   American	   power	   within	   the	   growing	   disconnect	   between	   multinational	  corporate	   interests	   and	  American	  national	   interests	   (Gilpin,	   1975:	   6-­‐8).	   Gilpin	   challenges	  the	  wisdom	   of	   pursuing	   corporate	   expansion	   through	   foreign	   direct	   investment,	   arguing	  that	   overinvestment	   abroad	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   home	   economy	  would	   lead	   the	   U.S.	   to	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experience	   a	   similar	   decline	   to	   former	   world	   powers. 10 	  After	   the	   mid-­‐1960’s	   U.S.	  investment	  abroad	  signified	  decline	  rather	  than	  ascendance	  (Gilpin,	  1975:	  46-­‐47).	  Whether	  or	  not	  American	  power	  has	  declined	   from	  a	  post-­‐war	  peak	   is	  of	   course	  a	  crucial	   question.	   	   How	   we	   answer	   that	   question	   informs	   our	   understanding	   of	   the	  contemporary	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  the	  structures	  of	  state	  power	  and	  authority	  that	  shape	   it.	   	   Yet	   the	   focus	   upon	  delineating	   decline	   has	   served	   to	   push	   other	   questions	   and	  concerns	   into	  the	  background.	   	   IPE	  scholarship	  has	  become	  too	  concerned	  with	  the	  what,	  why	  and	  how	  of	  U.S.	  decline,	  to	  the	  neglect	  of	  the	  underlying	  developmental	  processes	  that	  have	   defined	   America’s	   role	   within	   the	   post-­‐war	   international	   political	   economy.	   In	  particular,	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	   in	  shaping	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  recedes	  from	   vision,	   with	   attention	   turning	   to	   the	   level	   of	   material	   capacities	   and	   the	   scope	   of	  American	   interests	   that	   are	   taken	   to	   guide	  American	   statecraft.	   By	   already	   accepting	   the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  hegemonic	  cycles	  approach	  to	  understanding	  IPE,	  these	  accounts	  become	  fixated	   upon	   exploring	   the	   transition	   from	   hegemony	   to	   decline	   rather	   than	   tracing	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  development	  of	  American	  capitalism	  has	  continued	  to	  shape	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  Methodologically,	  the	  analyses	  remain	  fixed	  on	  U.S.	  power	  as	  a	  national	  question,	   but	   this	   neglects	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   the	   American	   state	   had	   already	   been	  internationalised	  in	  the	  process	  of	  reconstructing	  global	  capitalism	  after	  WW2,	  through	  the	  formation	   of	   Bretton	   Woods,	   the	   promotion	   of	   the	   international	   role	   of	   the	   dollar,	   the	  extension	  of	  New	  Deal	   institutional	  patterns	   into	  Western	  Europe	  with	   the	  Marshall	  Plan.	  The	   debate	   over	   U.S.	   hegemonic	   decline	   further	   obscured	   key	   process	   of	   American	   state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Here	  he	  points	  to	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  in	  particular	  Britain	  whose	  historical	  decline	  is	  used	  as	  a	  point	  of	  comparison	  for	  American	  development	  (Gilpin,	  1975:	  63).	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internationalisation	   during	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   first	   in	   the	   attempt	   to	   maintain	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order	  and	  then	  with	  the	  instantiation	  of	  an	  international	  monetary	  system	  based	  on	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  7-­‐13).	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   prevalence	   of	   decline	   arguments	   within	   American	   academic	  circles	  in	  the	  1970’s	  and	  80s,	  contending	  theorisations	  of	  structural	  power	  were	  developed.	  	  The	   general	   thrust	   of	   these	   arguments	   is	   that	   the	   international	   system	   had	   been	  transformed	   by	   the	   growing	   interconnection	   of	   the	   global	   economy.	   This	   transformation	  meant	  that	  structural	  power	  was	  now	  more	  significant	  than	  relational	  power	  (understood	  as	  the	  power	  of	  A	  over	  B)	  traditionally	  examined	  by	  realists.	  These	  accounts	  of	  structural	  power	   were	   intended	   to	   draw	   attention	   to	   the	   continuing	   imbrication	   of	   American	  dominance	  within	  the	  systemic	  transformation	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  precisely	  the	  dynamics	  that	  the	  declinist	  arguments	  had	  neglected.	  Susan	  Strange	  (1987:	  565)	  provides	  the	  most	  concise	  definition	  of	  structural	  power	  as	  ‘the	  power	  to	  choose	  and	  to	  shape	  the	  structures	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  within	  which	   other	   states,	   their	   political	   institutions,	   their	   economic	   enterprises,	   and	   their	  professional	   people	   have	   to	   operate’.11	  Structural	   power	   is	   rooted	   in	   four	   distinct	   yet	  related	  spheres:	  security,	  knowledge,	  production	  and	   finance	  (Strange,	  1988a:	  26).	  As	   the	  nature	  of	   relationships	  between	   states	   changed,	   from	   the	  mid-­‐1960’s	  onwards,	   structural	  power	   became	   more	   important	   (Strange,	   1987:	   553).	   America	   benefited	   from	   this	  transformation,	  with	  its	  structural	  power	  increasing.	  Strange	  points	  to	  continued	  American	  financial	  and	  military	  dominance	  as	  evidence	  of	  this	  enduring	  power	  (Strange,	  1988b:	  7-­‐8).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11 	  For	   a	   fuller	   discussion	   of	   the	   concept	   cf:	   Susan	   Strange	   (1988),	   ‘States	   and	   Markets:	   An	  
Introduction	  to	  International	  Political	  Economy’,	  London:	  Pinter	  Publishers:	  23-­‐28.	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In	   a	   comparable	   manner	   to	   Strange,	   Stephen	   Gill	   focuses	   upon	   the	   structural	  transformation	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  global	  political	  economy.	  Gill	  denies	  that	  U.S.	  power	  was	  in	  decline	  during	  the	  1970’s	  and	  80’s,	  arguing	  instead	  that,	   ‘American	  centrality	  in	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  has	  changed	  and	   in	  some	  respects	  has	  been	  re-­‐emphasised’.	   	  What	  was	  occurring	  during	  the	  supposed	  period	  of	  U.S.	  hegemonic	  decline	  was	  in	  fact	  a	  change	  in	  key	  social	  forces	  within	  global	  capitalism	  (Gill,	  1990:3-­‐7).	  Critiquing	  the	  notion	  of	  US	  hegemonic	  decline,	  Gill’s	  work	  challenges	  realism’s	  state-­‐centric	  understanding	  of	  American	  power.	  	  Gill	  argues	  that	  Realist’s	  empiricist	  methodology	  and	   preoccupation	   with	   Weberian	   ‘power	   over’	   leave	   them	   unable	   to	   understand	   the	  foundations	   of	   U.S.	   hegemony.	   Realists	   accordingly	   neglect	   the	   structural	   and	   cultural	  dimensions	   of	   American	   power.	   They	   also	   underestimate	   the	   degree	   of	   systemic	  transformation	  attendant	  to	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  U.S.	  corporations	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	   more	   interdependent	   world	   economy.	   Concluding	   his	   challenge,	   Gill	   proffers	   that,	   ‘the	  basic	   structural	   continuities	   in	   the	   American	   neo-­‐imperial	   system	   have	   remained	   intact’	  (Gill,	  1990:	  63-­‐86).	  The	   interpretations	   offered	   by	   Gill	   and	   Strange	   are	   important	   correctives	   to	   the	  preoccupation	  with	  decline	  that	  had	  come	  to	  shape	  studies	  of	  American	  power.	  By	  shifting	  our	   attention	   to	   structural	   dimensions	   of	  American	  power,	   they	   are	   able	   to	   elucidate	   the	  continuing	   influence	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   shaping	   the	   parameters	   of	   action	   within	   the	   global	  economy	   and	   promoting	   American	   interests	   in	   the	   process.	   In	   order	   to	   trace	   more	  concretely	  the	  intersection	  of	  American	  power	  with	  British	  development	  however,	  we	  need	  to	   achieve	   a	   greater	   disaggregation	   of	   the	   institutional	   power	   bases	  within	   the	  American	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state	  than	  these	  accounts	  provide.	  By	  doing	  so,	  we	  can	  move	  beyond	  a	  broad	  concern	  with	  structural	   power,	   towards	   a	   framework	   that	   enables	   us	   to	   chart	   the	   co-­‐articulation	   of	  developmental	   processes	   central	   to	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   Special	   Relationship.	  Several	   studies	   that	   have	   attempted	   to	   disaggregate	   the	   concentrations	   of	   institutional	  power	  within	  the	  U.S.	  help	  bring	  us	  closer	  towards	  achieving	  this	  end.	  Peter	  Gowan’s	   study	  of	  American	  dominance	   illuminates	   the	  privileged	  position	  of	  the	   U.S.	   within	   the	   global	   financial	   and	   security	   structures.	   For	   Gowan	   the	   continued	  dominance	   of	   the	   U.S.	   into	   the	   current	   era	   rests	   upon	   two	   key	   elements.	   Firstly,	   Gowan	  identifies	  the	  global	  ‘Protectorate	  System’	  that	  the	  U.S.	  employed	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  has	   since	   extended	   in	   the	   post-­‐Cold	  War	   era.	   The	   Protectorate	   System	   pacified	   relations	  between	  core	  capitalist	  states	  by	  enabling	  a	  qualitatively	  new	  form	  of	  globally	  extensive	  U.S.	  sovereignty.	  The	  Protectorate	  System	  enabled	  the	  U.S.	  to	  set	  limits	  upon	  the	  actions	  of	  other	  states,	  to	  define	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  security	  climate	  and	  perhaps	  most	  importantly	  to	  behave	  exceptionally	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  rules	  that	  constrained	  others	  (Gowan,	  2003:	  1).	  Accompanying	   the	   Protectorate	   System	   is	   the	   second	   axis	   of	   American	   structural	  power:	   the	   ‘Dollar-­‐Wall	   Street	   Regime’,	   in	   which	   the	   interaction	   between	   The	   Federal	  Reserve,	   Treasury	   and	   Wall	   Street	   are	   central	   (Gowan,	   1999:	   19).	   	   It	   is	   this	   aspect	   of	  Gowan’s	   study	   that	   it	   most	   relevant	   to	   our	   present	   purpose.	   	   Regarding	   the	   financial	  transformation	  of	  the	  Nixon	  era,	  Gowan	  identifies	  the	  enactment	  of	  a	  new	  global	  monetary	  regime	   based	   solely	   on	   the	   dollar	   as	   a	   means	   to	   restore	   the	   international	   dominance	   of	  American	  power	   (Gowan,	  1999:	  23).	   For	  Gowan,	   then,	   the	   collapse	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	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system	   did	   not	   signal	   the	   faltering	   steps	   of	   a	   stumbling	   hegemon.	   It	   signalled	   the	  reassertion	  of	  American	  financial	  muscle	  over	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  capitalist	  world.	  Echoing	  Strange	  and	  Gowan,	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	   (2009:	  32-­‐36)	  argue	   that	  a	  global	  financial	  system	  centred	  upon	  New	  York	  capital	  markets	  and	  American	  debt	  testifies	  to	  the	  continued	  supremacy	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Under	  this	  interpretation,	  Bretton	  Woods	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  cradle	  for	  American	  finance.	  American	  financial	  power	  would	  be	  liberated	  from	  restrictive	  measures	  once	  sufficient	  redevelopment	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  had	  occurred.	  The	  crisis	  of	   the	   later	  1960’s	  and	  1970’s	   is	  understood	  not	  as	  evidence	  of	  declining	  American	  power,	   but	   rather,	   ‘the	   difficulty	   of	   controlling	   and	   steering	   a	   financial	   system	   that	   was	  bursting	  at	  the	  seams’	  (Panitch	  &	  Konings,	  2009:	  3).	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  go	  beyond	  Gowan	  by	  providing	  a	  much	  deeper	  historicisation	  of	  the	   Federal	   Reserve-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	   Street	   nexus.	   Their	   analysis	   is	   intended	   as	   a	  counterpoint	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   Gowan	   downplays	   the	   links	   between	  Wall	   Street	   and	  Washington	  throughout	  the	  entire	  post-­‐war	  period	  by	  stressing	  their	  centrality	  only	   from	  the	   1970s	   onwards.	   This	   nexus	   of	   power	   within	   the	   American	   state	   was	   progressively	  internationalised	   as	   American	   capitalists	   and	   state	   officials	   sought	   to	   refashion	   global	  capitalism	   and	   steer	   globalisation,	   transforming	   the	   international	   orientation	   and	  characteristics	  of	  other	  capitalist	  states	  in	  the	  process	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  1-­‐15)	   	  The	   particular	   emphasis	   placed	   upon	   the	   role	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury,	   the	   Federal	  Reserve	  and	  Wall	   Street	   in	   shaping	  global	   capitalism	   is	   common	   to	   the	   interpretations	  of	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Gowan,	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin12.	  By	  bringing	  attention	  to	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  ‘making’	  global	  capitalism,	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin	  draw	  us	  towards	  an	  extremely	  important	  appreciation	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  transformation	  of	  American	  state	  capacities	  in	  driving	  the	  development	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  This	   focus	   takes	  us	  away	   from	  the	  preoccupation	  of	   structural	  power	   theories	  around	  the	  way	  that	  the	  U.S.	  defines	  the	  parameters	  of	  action,	  or	  the	  limits	  of	  the	  possible,	  and	   towards	   the	   role	  of	  American	  agency	   in	  actually	   constituting	  classes,	   states	  and	   their	  interests	  through	  interaction	  with	  other	  states	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  Focus	  upon	  this	  nexus	  of	  financial	  power	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  and	  its	  constitutive	  role	  in	  shaping	   the	   global	   political	   economy,	   draws	   us	   naturally	   towards	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	  dimension,	   as	   there	   has	   been	   a	   profound	   and	   unusual	   symmetry	   between	   the	   core	  institutional	   complexes	   of	   capitalist	   power	   in	   both	   countries.	   	   The	   ‘Federal	   Reserve-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	   Street’	   complex	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   American	   financial	   power,	   has	   been	  articulated	   in	   and	   through	   the	   central	   nexus	   of	   power	  within	   the	   British	   state;	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus.	   This	   process	   was	   central	   to	   the	   way	   in	   which	   the	   gradual	  diminishment	  of	  British	  power	  has	  interacted	  with	  American	  ascendance.	  By	  examining	  the	  dynamic	  interactions	  of	  these	  two	  institutional	  nexuses,	  through	  which	  the	  intersection	  of	  private	  and	  public	  financial	  power	  is	  produced	  and	  reproduced,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  position	  the	  problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	   	  Britain	   played	   a	   privileged	   role	   in	   the	   formation	   of	   global	   capitalism	   during	   the	  nineteenth	   century	   by	   sponsoring	   free	   trade	   and	   financing	   global	   capitalism	   through	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	   Martijn	   Konings	   (2011)	   ‘The	   Development	   of	   American	   Finance’,	   Cambridge:	   Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  for	  a	  further	  study	  employing	  this	  framework.	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commercial	  operations	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  Under	  the	  classical	  gold	  standard,	  the	  pound	  sterling	   functioned	   as	   the	   key	   international	   currency,	   with	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   and	   the	  British	   Treasury	   playing	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   managing	   and	   underpinning	   the	   system.	   The	  precondition	   of	   American	   capitalism’s	   modern	   ascendance	   then,	   with	   the	   post-­‐war	  dominance	   of	   American	   banks,	   American	   corporations	   and	   the	   U.S.	   dollar,	   was	   the	  decomposition	  of	  the	  old	  international	  financial	  system	  centred	  around	  Britain.	  During	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  global	  capitalism	  under	  U.S.	  leadership,	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  have	  played	  increasingly	  important	  managerial	  roles.	  In	   both	   countries,	   the	   integration	   of	   private	   banking	   power	   with	   key	   financial	  institutions	  of	  the	  state	  has	  been	  central	  to	  their	  modern	  development.	   	   	   It	   is	  through	  this	  central	  nexus	  between	  private	  finance,	  Treasury	  control	  and	  central	  banking	  that	  capitalist	  power	  is	  principally	  instituted	  within	  the	  state.	  The	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Central	  Bank	  function	  as	   two	   related	   components	   of	   the	   government	   account	   (Wray,	   2012).	   The	   Treasury	   is	  empowered	  with	   the	  capacity	   to	  spend,	   tax	  and	   issue	  public	  debt,	  while	   the	  Central	  Bank	  sets	   interest	   rates,	   regulates	   credit	   supply,	   governs	   the	   exchange	   rate	   and	   pursues	   price	  objectives	  while	   also	   serving	   as	   the	   lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	   to	   private	   banks.	   Through	   these	  interrelated	   processes,	   the	   behaviour	   of	   Treasuries	   and	   Central	   Banks	   are	   crucial	   to	  regulating	  and	  shaping	  the	  overall	  flow	  of	  national	  economies	  and	  their	  situation	  within	  the	  broader	  world	  market.	  There	   is,	   therefore,	   a	   fundamental	   interdependence	   between	   these	   public	   and	  private	  components	  of	   capitalism	   instituted	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  state	  and	  enacted	   through	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fiscal	  policy	  and	  monetary	  policy.	  13	  	  Contrary	  to	  the	  prevailing	  neoliberal	  discourse,	  which	  tends	  to	  view	  ‘states’	  and	  ‘markets’	  as	  opposing	  interests	  and	  clearly	  differentiated	  spheres	  of	   activity,	   the	   reality	   of	   economic	   activity	  within	   a	  modern	   capitalist	   system	  points	   to	   a	  much	   deeper	   functional	   co-­‐articulation	   between	   ‘market’	   and	   ‘state’	   power.	   To	   examine	  how	   this	   co-­‐articulation	   has	   unfolded	   within	   Anglo-­‐American	   development,	   we	   need	   to	  move	  beyond	  structural	  power	  and	  towards	  a	  more	  dynamic	  conception	  	  
Beyond	  structural	  power:	  power	  as	  process	  
	  This	   study	   shifts	  our	   focus	   towards	  elements	  of	  American	  power	   that	   are	  not	   adequately	  captured	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   structural	   power	   by	   exploring	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	  through	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  key	  centres	  of	  financial	  power	  within	  each	  state	  and	  the	   way	   that	   these	   interactions	   occurred	   through	   the	   institutional	   architecture	   of	   the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  Over	  the	  long	  run,	  we	  can	  see	  that	  the	  power	  interactions	  between	   Britain	   and	   the	   United	   States	   have	   been	   diverse.	   They	   have	   ranged	   from	  more	  direct	  and	  explicit	  forms	  of	  American	  leverage	  over	  the	  British	  state,	  to	  a	  more	  indirect	  and	  often	  unintentional	  impact	  upon	  the	  trajectory	  of	  British	  development.	  But	  even	  within	  the	  context	   of	   these	  more	   indirect	   and	  direct	   forms	  of	   power	   there	   are	   further	   nuances.	   The	  power	   exerted	   over	   Britain	   during	   the	   Washington	   Loan	   negotiations	   was	   much	   more	  explicit	   than	   with	   the	   IMF	   loan	   of	   1976,	   where	   the	   American	   influence	   was	   refracted	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  See	   Randal	   Wray	   (2012)	   ‘Modern	   Money	   Theory:	   A	   Primer	   on	   Macroeconomics	   for	   Sovereign	  
Monetary	  Systems’,	  102-­‐108,	  Basingstoke:	  Palgrave	  Macmillan,	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  this	  process.	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through	  the	  medium	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  institutional	  power	  and	  the	  political	  imperatives	  of	  other	  contributing	  states.	  It	  was	  American	  imposition	  at	  one	  remove,	  through	  the	  mediation	  of	  an	  international	   financial	   institution	   and	   multilateral	   bargaining.	   There	   are,	   therefore,	  instances	  both	  of	  direct,	  and	  more	  discreet,	  impacts	  of	  American	  power	  upon	  Britain.	  	  As	   a	   concept,	   structural	   power	   is	   unable	   to	   capture	   these	   nuances.	   This	   is	  particularly	   the	   case	   because,	   according	   to	   Strange,	   structural	   power	   did	   not	   become	  prevalent	   until	   the	   1960s.	   Strange’s	   dualism	   of	   relational	   and	   structural	   power	   also	  overlooks	  the	  fact	  that	  both	  forms	  of	  power	  always	  involve	  fluid	  power	  processes	  that	  occur	  over	   a	   diachronic	   horizon.	   In	   this	   sense	   structural	   power	   implies	   a	   misleading	   sense	   of	  stasis	   that	   obscures	   the	   micro-­‐dynamism	   of	   capitalist	   state	   development	   within	   the	  international	   political	   economy.	   Studying	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   over	   the	   longer	  run,	   then,	   requires	   a	  more	   chronologically	   extensive	   conception	   of	   American	   power.	   It	   is	  better	   to	   think	   in	   terms	  of	   power	   as	   a	   set	   of	   dynamic	  processes	  rather	  than	  exclusively	  as	  
structural	   presence	   or	   ordering.	   Power	   through	   processes	   certainly	   draws	   upon	   and	  mobilises	  the	  resources,	  both	  material	  and	  ideational,	  associated	  with	  structural	  power,	  but	  it	   implies	   a	   more	   dynamic	   and	   formative	   sense	   of	   co-­‐development	   between	   interactive	  national	  capitalisms.14	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Robert	  Cox’s	  influential	  work	  (1992:	  30)	  on	  the	  ‘internationalisation	  of	  the	  state’	  captures	  some	  of	  this	   notion	   of	   power	   as	   process,	   identifying	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   state	  within	   the	   context	   of	  broader	  developments	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  that	  led	  social	  forces	  to	  reorient	  the	  state	  towards	  transnational	  capital.	  But	  Cox’s	   ‘outside-­‐in’	  approach	  to	  understanding	  this	  process,	  relies	  upon	  too	  neat	  a	  delineation	  between	  the	  global	  and	  national	  economy	  (Panitch,	  1994:	  71)	  while	  his	  analysis	   also	   understates	   the	   continuing	   centrality	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   driving	   these	   dynamics.	   Cox’s	  theorisation	  is	  taken	  up	  at	  greater	  length	  in	  chapter	  five.	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Structural	   power	   too	   often	   posits	   a	   one-­‐way	   monolithic	   impressing	   of	   American	  power	   onto	   the	   broader	   global	   political	   economy.	   Contrary	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   structural	  power,	   American	   policies	   and	   practices	   often	   ended	   up	   constraining	   and	   delimiting	   the	  possibilities	  for	  American	  development	  and	  not	  only	  subordinate	  states.	  The	  stress	  placed	  on	   the	   American	   state’s	   capacity	   to	   ‘choose	   and	   to	   shape	   the	   structures	   of	   the	   global	  political	   economy	   within	   which	   other	   states,	   their	   political	   institutions,	   their	   economic	  enterprises,	  and	  their	  professional	  people	  have	  to	  operate’,	  fails	  to	  capture	  the	  unintended	  and	   unexpected	   outcomes	   of	   co-­‐development	   between	   capitalist	   states	   (Strange,	   1988a:	  26).	  Although	  the	  lines	  of	  causality	  here	  are	  complex	  and	  uneven,	  with	  American	  power	  a	  much	  more	   decisive	   factor	   in	  British	   development	   than	   vice	   versa,	   there	   is	   an	   important	  developmental	  feedback	  loop	  that	  has	  also	  impacted	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  wider	  global	  political	  economy.	  By	   shifting	   the	   focus	   to	   development	   as	   a	   set	   of	   dynamic	   processes	   driven	   by	  unstable	   combinations	   of	   private	   and	   public	   power,	   occurring	   over	   different	   temporal	  horizons	   and	   initiated	   by	   different	   class	   actors	  within	   different	   institutional	   settings,	   we	  arrive	   at	   a	   more	   fluid	   and	   diachronically	   extensive	   notion	   of	   American	   power	   that	   can	  inform	   the	   problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development.	   These	   power	   processes	   feed	  into	   the	   composition	   and	   decomposition	   of	   historically	   instituted	   frameworks	   of	   social	  power,	   which	   constitute	   the	   global	   political	   economy.	   Nationally,	   the	   most	   significant	  transformation	  has	  been	   the	   shift	   from	   the	  Keynesian	   form	  of	   post-­‐war	   capitalism	   to	   the	  contemporary	   neoliberal	   state.	   Internationally,	   the	   transition	   from	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	  framework	  to	  the	  Post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	  system	  is	  paramount.	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Anglo-­‐American	  development	  must,	  therefore,	  be	  contextualised	  within	  the	  creation,	  continuation	  and	  collapse	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  of	  international	  monetary	  relations.	  At	   this	   point	   we	   can	   return	   to	   the	   discussion	   of	   Helleiner’s	   work	   with	   which	   we	   began.	  Although	   Helleiner	   is	   aware	   (1994:	   14)	   of	   the	   predominance	   of	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  in	  shaping	  British	  development,	  his	  explanation	  of	  Britain’s	  orientation	  towards	  the	  politics	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	   system	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   a	   ‘lagging’	   hegemonic	  policy,	   essentially	   a	   hangover	   from	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   leads	   him	   to	   understate	   the	  dynamic	   role	   of	   this	   nexus	   and	   the	   way	   that	   it	   actively	   reconstituted	   its	   interests	   and	  strategies	  through	  interaction	  with	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  financial	  power	  of	  Wall	  Street.15	  In	  the	  process,	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  played	  a	  central	  role	  within	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  Although	  his	  work	   intelligently	  recognises	   the	  central	   importance	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  Helleiner	  is	  unable	  to	  tease	  out	  the	  contours	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  and	  the	  constitutive	  role	  of	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  in	  shaping	  the	  transformation	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  Helleiner’s	  work	   never	   explicitly	   considers	  where	   the	   institutional	   nexus	   between	  private	  and	  public	  financial	  power	  lies	  within	  the	  capitalist	  state.	  The	  dynamics	  that	  drove	  towards	   the	   eventual	   collapse	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   regime	   did	   not	   emerge	   exclusively	  from	   the	   strategic	   actions	   of	   states.	   Instead,	   they	   frequently	   emerged	   from	   a	   haphazard	  construction	   of	   regulatory	   imbalances	   and	   developments	   that	   were	   authored	   through	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  In	  applying	  the	  concept	  of	   ‘hegemonic	   lags’,	  Helleiner	  draws	  upon	  Stephen	  Krasner’s	  analysis	  of	  British	  international	  trade	  and	  monetary	  policy.	  	  According	  to	  Krasner,	  ‘the	  British	  state	  was	  unable	  to	   free	   itself	   from	   the	   domestic	   structures	   that	   its	   earlier	   policy	   decisions	   had	   created,	   and	  continued	  to	  follow	  policies	  appropriate	  for	  a	  rising	  hegemony	  long	  after	  Britain’s	  star	  had	  begun	  to	  fall’	  (Krasner,	  1976:	  342).	  Thus,	  institutions	  created	  during	  a	  period	  of	  hegemonic	  ascendancy	  came	  to	  exert	  static	  and	  ‘lagging’	  policy	  orientations	  long	  after	  that	  ascendancy	  had	  passed.	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private/public	   interactivity	   and	   which	   drew	   in	   international	   actors,	   provoking	   broader	  responses	   in	   international	  policy.	  Within	   these	   transformative	  processes,	   the	   interactions	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  were,	  as	  this	  thesis	  demonstrates,	  very	  important.	  In	  some	   instances,	   these	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  processes	  were	  driven	  by	  American	   leverage	  power	   ‘pushing	   in’	   on	  Britain,	   as	   in	   1945	   and	   again	   in	   1976.	  At	   these	  moments,	   some	   British	   state	   officials	   resisted	   the	   imposition	   of	   American	   power.	   But	   at	  other	   moments	   in	   the	   lineage	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development,	   it	   was	   more	   a	   case	   of	  bankers	   and	   officials	  within	  Britain	   ‘pulling	   in’	   American	   power	   in	   order	   to	   further	   their	  own	   ambitions.	   This	   was	   very	   much	   the	   case	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	  Eurodollar	   market	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s,	   when	   the	   City	   sought	   to	   restore	   its	  international	   standing	  by	  drawing	   in	   the	  dollar	  and	  embracing	  American	   financial	  power.	  The	  American’s	  have	  also	  retained	  the	  disciplinary	  option	  of	  ‘pulling	  out’	  their	  support	  for	  Britain,	   particularly	   during	   the	   crisis	   years	   of	   Bretton	  Woods,	   when	   Britain	   was	   heavily	  dependent	  upon	  recourse	  to	  financial	  support.	  Over	  time,	  these	  combinations	  of	  pushing	  in,	  pushing	   back,	   pulling	   in	   and	   pulling	   out	   have	   been	   part	   of	   a	   dynamic	   reconfiguration	   of	  sovereign	  power	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  the	  uneven	  co-­‐articulation	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  	  This	   dynamic	   has	   also	   impacted	   the	   articulation	   and	   extensity	   of	   spheres	   of	  
sovereign	  and	  private	  power	  within	  Britain.16	  As	  the	  British	  state	  was	  transformed	  through	  the	  decomposition	  of	  Keynesian	   capitalism	  and	   the	   emergence	  of	   neoliberal	   capitalism,	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  For	  a	  more	  focused	  and	  extended	  discussion	  of	  the	  evolving	  dynamics	  between	  private	  and	  public	  power	   within	   IPE,	   cf:	   Stephen	   Gill	   (1995)	   ‘Globalisation,	   Market	   Civilisation,	   and	   Disciplinary	  Neoliberalism’,	   Millennium	   Journal	   of	   International	   Studies,	   24:	   399-­‐423;	   Claire	   Cutler	   (1999)	  ‘Locating	  “Authority”	  in	  the	  Global	  Political	  Economy’,	  International	  Studies	  Quarterly,	  43(1):	  59-­‐81.	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process	   shaped	   by	   and	   through	   American	   power,	   the	   balance	   and	   interaction	   between	  sovereign	   power	   and	   private	   capitalist	   power,	   has	   altered.	   With	   regard	   to	   the	   banking	  communities	   on	   each	   side	   of	   the	   Atlantic,	   a	   compatibility	   of	   interests	   and	   accumulation	  imperatives	   has	   frequently	   acted	   as	   a	   centrifugal	   force	   drawing	   British	   and	   American	  capitalism	  together.	  Methodologically	  the	  constructive	  and	  destructive	  consequences	  of	  these	  interactive	  developmental	   processes,	   the	   way	   that	   they	   create	   certain	   potential	   state	   and	   capitalist	  strategies	  while	  negating	  others,	  can	  best	  be	  uncovered	  through	  a	  strategy	  of	  tracing.	  This	  requires	   us	   to	   explore	   developmental	   interaction	   by	   uncovering	   the	   origins,	   charting	   the	  processes	  and	  examining	  the	  outcomes	  of	  interactive	  international	  development.	  The	  focus	  on	  the	  articulation	  of	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  through	  its	  relationship	  to	  the	  Federal	  Reserve-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	   Street	   nexus	   provides	   an	   institutional	   basis	   for	   exploring	   the	  political	   economy	  dimension	  of	   these	  processes.	  The	   following	   chapters	   seek	   to	   flesh	  out	  these	  suppositions.	  	  The	   following	   chapters	   mobilise	   this	   methodology	   to	   explain	   a	   number	   of	   key	  moments	  in	  the	  development	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  reading	  those	  moments	  through	  the	  lens	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  and	  situating	   them	  within	   the	  broader	   transformation	  of	  the	   international	   monetary	   system.	   Rather	   than	   selectively	   drawing	   on	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	  to	  explain	  decline,	  I	  explore	  key	  moments	  and	  processes	  that	  were	  important	  not	   just	   for	  British	  development,	  but	  also	   in	  terms	  of	   their	   impact	  and	  ramifications	  upon	  the	  wider	  global	  political	  economy.	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2	  The	  Great	  Reversal:	  	  
	  	  	  	  Anglo-­‐American	  Development	  from	  the	  Nineteenth	  Century	  to	  the	  1930s	  	  	  In	   the	   middle	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   Britain	   was	   at	   the	   peak	   of	   its	   power,	   having	  achieved	   naval	   dominance	   and	   with	   it	   an	   unprecedented	   role	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  burgeoning	   world	   economy.	   Sterling	   functioned	   as	   the	   dominant	   trading	   and	   reserve	  currency	  around	  the	  world	  and	  the	  City	  of	  London	  was	  the	  principal	  centre	  for	  international	  finance.	   	   The	   spoils	   of	   empire	   had	   conferred	   enormous	   wealth	   upon	   the	   members	   of	  Britain’s	   ruling	   elite	   who	   invested	   their	   capital	   around	   the	   world	   to	   handsome	   reward.	  Britannia’s	  predominance	  looked	  set	  to	  endure	  indefinitely.	  	  Beneath	  the	  surface	  appearance	  of	  enduring	  power,	  however,	  British	  predominance	  had	   in	   actual	   fact	   already	   reached	   its	   zenith.	   It	   would	   rapidly	   diminish	   during	   the	   latter	  decades	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   and	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   U.S.	  would	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   this	  transformation	  as	   the	  development	  of	   the	   two	  countries	  became	   increasingly	   central,	   not	  only	  to	  their	  own	  futures	  but	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  international	  economy	  as	  a	  whole.	  From	  a	  colonial	  province	  of	  the	  British	  Empire	  in	  the	  18th	  century,	  the	  United	  States	  had	  become,	  by	  the	  end	  of	  WW1,	  an	  industrial	  giant	  and	  growing	  financial	  power	  to	  rival	  Britain.	  The	  shift	  from	   British	   dominance	   to	   American	   primacy	   has	   been	   understood	   largely	   in	   terms	   of	  hegemonic	   transitions	   between	   great	   powers.	   For	   a	   series	   of	   scholars	   the	   two	   countries	  serve	   as	   exemplars	   of	   ‘hegemonic	   leadership’,	   and	   the	   tale	   of	   their	   respective	   rise	   and	  decline	  serves	  as	  a	  template	  for	  the	  history	  of	  modern	  international	  relations	  (Gilpin,	  1987;	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Cox,	  1983;	  Keohane,	  1984;	  Arrighi,	  1990).	  	  Despite	  this	  emphasis,	  little	  heed	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  mechanisms	  that	  account	  for	  the	  changing	  fortunes	  of	  the	  two	  powers	  in	  their	  mutual	  relations,	   or	   the	   attendant	   consequences	   for	   their	   national	   development	   and	   that	   of	   the	  international	   economy	   as	   a	   whole.	   This	   chapter	   attempts	   to	   correct	   that	   deficiency	   by	  exploring	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  upon	  financial	  relations	   between	   the	   two	   states.	   The	   period	   is	   important	   not	   only	   because	   of	   the	   great	  reversal	   in	   Anglo-­‐American	   power	   dynamics,	   but	   also	   because	   the	   developments	   of	   the	  1920s	   and	   1930s	   were	   instructive	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	   planners	   who	   drew	   up	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	  system	  of	   international	  monetary	  organisation	  (Pauly,	  1997:	  45).	  As	  the	  processes	  driving	  this	  great	  reversal	   in	  the	  relative	  standing	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	   intensified,	   their	  increasing	  economic	   interdependence	  meant	   that	   the	   future	  of	   the	   international	  economy	  came	  to	  rest	  ever	  more	  upon	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  twin	  pivot	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation,	  with	  the	  national	  development	  of	  both	  countries	  increasingly	  expressed	  in	  and	  through	  the	  development	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  This	   chapter	   provides	   an	   overview	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   from	   the	  nineteenth	   century	   up	   to	   the	   outbreak	   of	  WW2.	   The	   central	   argument	   is	   that	   American	  ascendance	  and	  the	  deterioration	  of	  British	  power	  fostered	  an	  increasing	  level	  of	  economic	  interdependence,	   expressed	  most	   clearly	   in	   the	   intertwined	   fortunes	  of	   London	  and	  New	  York	   alongside	   the	  pound	  and	   the	  dollar.	  As	  Britain’s	   capacity	   to	   singularly	  underpin	   the	  international	  monetary	  system	  weakened,	  a	  process	  greatly	  accelerated	  by	  the	  war,	  greater	  cooperation	   between	   the	   financial	   communities	   became	   a	   necessary	   cornerstone	   of	   the	  emerging	  Anglo-­‐American	  axis	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	  The	  City	  of	  London	  was	  forced	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to	   draw	   in	   American	   financial	   power	   in	   order	   to	   restore	   its	   domestic	   and	   international	  hegemony,	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  foreshadowed	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  City	  would	  draw	  upon	  the	  dollar’s	  strength	  under	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  	  But	   although	   cooperation	   intensified	   after	   the	  war,	   there	  was	   still	   a	   great	   deal	   of	  rivalry	  as	   the	  U.S.	  sought	   to	  employ	  British	  war	  debts	  as	  a	   lever	   to	  weaken	  British	  power	  and	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  American	  expansion.	  Ultimately,	  the	  informal	  and	  ad	  hoc	  patterns	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	   cooperation	   proved	   too	   weak	   to	   hold	   together	   the	   reconstructed	   gold	  standard,	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  sterling	  and	  the	  dollar	  were	  fundamental	  to	  its	  collapse	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  rival	  financial	  blocs	  during	  the	  1930s.	  This	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  take	  on	  appropriate	  responsibilities	  under	  the	  new	  gold	  standard,	  but	  also	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  enduring	  deficiencies	  of	  its	  financial	  system	  to	  play	  such	  an	  internationally	  calibrated	  role	  (Konings,	  2011:	  71).	  It	  was	  only	  in	  the	  post-­‐WW2	  period,	  with	  the	  institutionalisation	  of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   agreement,	   that	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   would	   play	   a	   formalised	   role	  within	   an	   increasingly	   multilateral	   international	   monetary	   system	   that	   rested	   no	   longer	  upon	   the	   supremacy	   of	   sterling,	   but	   on	   the	   unrivalled	   strength	   of	   the	   dollar	   and	   the	  U.S.	  economy.	  	  	  In	  the	  first	  section,	  we	  review	  the	  economic	  interdependence	  of	  Britain	  and	  America	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century	  and	  outline	  the	  role	  of	  the	  classical	  gold	  standard	  at	  the	  heart	  of	   industrial,	   trade	   and	   financial	   links	   between	   the	   two	   countries.	   American	   industrial	  development,	   fuelled	   by	   inflows	   of	   British	   capital,	   rapidly	   caught	   up	   with	   Britain’s	  pioneering	   industrial	   system.	   As	   American	   ascendance	   gathered	   momentum,	   Britain’s	  stuttering	   economic	   development	   undermined	   the	   foundations	   of	   the	   classical	   gold	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standard.	  But	  despite	  the	  acceleration	  of	  American	  catch-­‐up	  during	  the	  century,	  it	  took	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  in	  1914	  to	  really	  close	  the	  gap	  between	  the	  two	  states,	  by	  eroding	  Britain’s	  financial	  status	  and	  dragging	  it	  into	  the	  disciplinary	  orbit	  of	  its	  new	  American	  creditor.	  The	  First	   World	   War	   also	   led	   to	   an	   increasing	   intermeshing	   between	   private	   transatlantic	  financial	  power	  and	  the	  financial	  capacity	  of	  the	  British	  state,	  with	  important	  consequences	  for	   the	   way	   in	   which	   both	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   would	   approach	   the	   issue	   of	   post-­‐war	  economic	  reconstruction.	  The	  second	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  then	  examines	  the	  attempt	  to	  reconstruct	  the	  gold	  standard	  and	  resuscitate	   the	   international	  economy	  in	   the	  wake	  of	   the	  Great	  War.	  Britain	  and	   Europe	   suffered	   the	   loss	   of	   export	   markets	   during	   the	   war	   and	   emerged	   from	   it	  burdened	   by	   an	   enormous	   debt	   load	   and	   increasingly	   uncompetitive	   within	   the	   world	  market.	  For	  the	  U.S.,	  by	  contrast,	  the	  war	  was	  a	  boon	  for	  economic	  development.	  Whereas	  the	  pound	  sterling	   lost	  value	  and	  broke	   from	  gold,	   the	  dollar	  remained	   firmly	  convertible	  throughout	  and	  enjoyed	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  its	  international	  standing	  as	  New	  York	  attracted	  more	  and	  more	  business.	  But	  although	  the	  American	  financial	  power	  was	  augmented	  by	  the	  war,	  it	  continued	  to	  lack	  a	  sufficient	  market	  infrastructure	  to	  spur	  the	  dollar	  on	  to	  greater	  heights	  and	  entrench	  New	  York	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  international	  payments	  system.	  Instead,	  the	  narrowing	  gap	  between	  New	  York	  and	  London	  meant	  that	  the	  two	  financial	  centres,	  and	  their	   respective	   currencies,	   became	   increasingly	   interdependent.	   This	   foreshadowed	   the	  centrality	  of	  these	  two	  centres	  within	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  financial	  system	  in	  the	  post-­‐WW2	  era.	   Increased	   interdependence	   necessitated	   closer	   cooperation	   between	   both	   private	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bankers	  and	  central	  bankers	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  But	  after	  the	  American	  rejection	  of	  the	  Genoa	  proposals,	  cooperation	  emerged	  only	  on	  a	  limited,	  halting	  and	  ad	  hoc	  basis.	  Finally,	   the	  chapter	  explores	   the	  breakdown	  of	   the	  restored	  gold	  standard	  and	   the	  emergence	  of	  separate	  currency	  and	  trading	  blocs	  within	  the	  increasingly	  rivalrous	  pattern	  of	   international	   relations	   that	   preceded	   the	   outbreak	   of	  WW2.	   The	   behaviour	   of	   the	   U.S.	  government	  in	  attempting	  to	  manage	  national	  economic	  development	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  gold	  standard,	  and	  continuing	  to	   insist	  on	  the	  repayment	  of	  war	  debts,	  was	  central	   to	  the	   collapse	   of	   the	   interwar	   gold	   standard.	  Ultimately,	   I	   argue,	   the	   informal	   structures	   of	  Anglo-­‐American	   cooperation	   at	   the	   centre	  of	   the	   reconstructed	   gold	   standard	  proved	   too	  weak	   to	  prevent	   the	   international	   economy	   from	  breaking	   into	   rival	   spheres	  of	   influence	  during	  the	  1930s,	  ending	  Britain’s	  longstanding	  commitment	  to	  free	  trade	  in	  the	  process.	  	  
Interdependence,	  war,	  and	  the	  rise	  and	  fall	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  
	  Although	   American	   secession	   from	   the	   British	   Empire	   was	   both	   violent	   and	   rapid,	   a	  remarkable	   degree	   of	   cultural	   and	   economic	   affinity	   endured	   after	   the	   separation.	   	   The	  mutual	   trade	   dependence	   of	   the	   two	   nations	  was	   inescapable	   during	   the	   first	   half	   of	   the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Britain’s	  early	  industrial	  development	  boosted	  the	  Atlantic	  slave	  trade	  and	   the	   Southern	   plantation	   system.	   British	  workers,	   who	   emigrated	   to	   the	   U.S.	   in	   large	  numbers	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   brought	   with	   them	   the	   know-­‐how	   of	   industrial	  production.	   In	   the	   1820s	   and	   1830s	   it	   was	   Lancashire	   specialists	   who	   were	   largely	  responsible	   for	   introducing	   Calico	   printing	   to	   New	   England	   (Temperley,	   2002:	   35-­‐36).	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British	  methods	  were	   imported	  too,	  with	   techniques	  originating	   from	  Leeds	  and	  Sheffield	  employed	   in	   the	   wool	   and	   iron	   industries.	   Great	   Britain	   accounted	   for	   around	   half	   of	  American	   exports	   in	   1850	   with	   America	   deriving	   one	   third	   of	   its	   imports	   from	   Britain	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  11).	  	  	  There	  was	  a	  strong	  reciprocal	  dimension	  to	  the	  balance	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  trade.	  	  So	  much	  so	   that	  Temperley	  (2002:	  36)	  encourages	  us	   to	   think	  of	  Britain	  and	  America	  not	  as	  separate	  economies,	  but	  rather	  as,	  ‘closely	  interrelated	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  fast-­‐developing	  web	  of	   global	   credit	   and	   commercial	   enterprise,	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   which	   were	   the	   bankers,	  merchants	   and	   insurers	   of	   the	   City	   of	   London’.	   America	   relied	   on	   the	   import	   of	   British	  manufactured	   and	   semi-­‐manufactured	   goods	   and	   its	   prodigious	   industrial	   expansion	  was	  nourished	   by	   a	   torrent	   of	   British	   capital,	   which	   poured	   into	   America	   in	   unparalleled	  volumes	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  In	  1854	  a	  quarter	  of	  British	  investment	  was	  in	  U.S.	  assets,	   by	   1870	   it	   had	   reached	   27%	  of	   total	   foreign	   investment	   before	   declining	   prior	   to	  WW1.	   Britain	   was	   heavily	   dependent	   upon	   imports	   of	   American	   grain	   and	   other	   raw	  materials	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  10).	  The	   international	   monetary	   system	   based	   on	   the	   gold	   standard	   was	   key	   to	   the	  development	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  economic	   interdependence.	  Britain	  was	  the	  originator	  of,	  and	   the	   main	   player	   within,	   the	   classical	   gold	   standard	   system	   of	   payments.	   The	  convertibility	  of	   sterling,	   the	  world’s	  principal	   trading	  and	   reserve	   currency,	   into	  gold	  on	  demand	   was	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   system.	   The	   City	   of	   London	   was	   home	   to	   the	   most	  sophisticated	   clearing	   mechanisms	   in	   the	   world	   and	   the	   predominance	   of	   Britain	   as	   a	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foreign	   investor	   and	   trader	  meant	   that	   sterling	  was	   the	   dominant	   international	   currency	  with	  over	  60%	  of	  world	  trade	  denominated	  in	  the	  currency	  (Eichengreen,	  2011:	  15).	  	  Other	   countries	   followed	   the	   lead	   of	   the	  world’s	   preeminent	   power,	   with	   the	   U.S.	  moving	   onto	   the	   gold	   standard	   by	   1879.	   By	   the	   early	   twentieth	   century	   the	   system	  was	  widespread	  internationally.	  Under	  the	  system,	  countries	  promised	  to	  exchange	  currency	  for	  gold	  at	  a	  fixed	  price,	  with	  the	  national	  money	  supply	  underpinned	  by	  a	  correspondent	  level	  of	  gold	  reserves.	  The	  widely	  shared	  commitment	  of	  governments	  to	  maintain	  convertibility	  was	   the	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   system.	   Markets	   had	   confidence	   that	   the	   required	   policy	  measures	  would	  be	  taken	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  the	  fixed	  value	  of	  currencies	  in	  gold	  terms.	  The	   commitment	   to	   convertibility	   generated	   the	   level	   of	   confidence	   required	   for	   an	  extensive	   system	   of	   international	   trade	   and	   capital	   flows	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   6-­‐29).	  Britain’s	   economic	   pre-­‐eminence	   was	   central	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   the	   system.	   British	  international	  lending,	  which	  served	  as	  the	  major	  source	  of	  liquidity	  for	  international	  trade	  and	   investment,	   was	   supported	   by	   capital	   goods	   and	   merchandise	   exports	   that	   boosted	  Britain’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  (Block,	  1977:	  13;	  Ahamed,	  2009:	  423).	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  played	  a	  key	  coordinating	  role	  at	  the	  head	  of	  a	  ‘follow-­‐the-­‐leader’	  convention	  within	  central	  banking,	   according	   to	   which	   changes	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   discount	   rate	   would	   be	   followed	   by	  foreign	  Central	  Banks	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  41).	  Given	  Britain’s	  financial	  predominance,	  it	  was	  no	  surprise	  that	  American	  importers	  and	   exporters	   relied	   upon	   London	   as	   the	   principal	   source	   of	   trade	   credit.	   Although	  American	  financial	  dependence	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  British	  financial	  power,	  it	  was	  also	  in	  part	   a	   result	   of	   the	   relatively	   underdeveloped	   nature	   of	   American	   financial	  markets.	   The	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American	  financial	  system	  was	  born	  out	  of	   its	  British	  counterpart,	  but	   it	  began	  to	  diverge	  from	   the	   British	   model	   in	   significant	   ways	   during	   the	   course	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	  (Konings,	  2011:	  9).	  Compared	  to	  the	  British	  model,	  the	  American	  financial	  system	  remained	  fragmentary	   and	   lacked	   an	   overall	   network	   power	   of	   concentrated	   and	   integrated	   credit	  relations.	  	  This	  meant	  that	  American	  traders	  remained	  dependent	  upon	  the	  British	  financial	  system.	  Without	  a	  Central	  Bank	  until	   the	  creation	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  1913,	  the	  U.S.	  financial	   system	   was	   much	   more	   prone	   to	   crises,	   experiencing	   fourteen	   in	   the	   century	  before	  WW1.	  	  The	  gold	  standard’s	  reliance	  upon	  British	  pre-­‐eminence	  was,	  paradoxically,	  both	  the	  source	  of	  its	  strength	  and	  its	  fundamental	  weakness.	  As	  Britain	  lost	  ground	  to	  competitors	  towards	  the	  end	  of	   the	  nineteenth	  century,	   its	  status	  at	   the	  centre	  of	   the	  system	  began	  to	  weaken.	  The	  United	  States	  led	  the	  pack	  of	  late	  industrialising	  countries	  that	  began	  to	  catch	  up	  with	  and	  the	  overtake	  Britain.	  Railway	  mileage	  in	  America,	  a	  key	  indicator	  of	  industrial	  development,	  expanded	  rapidly	  between	  1850	  and	  1860;	   increasing	   from	  9000	  to	  30,000	  miles	   and	   fostering	   a	   large	   internal	   market	   (Holmes,	   1976:	   13).	   Railway	   expansion	   also	  played	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   increasing	   concentration	   of	   ownership	   in	   America	   and	   the	  associated	  development	  of	  the	  holding	  company.	  A	  great	  wave	  of	  industrial	  mergers	  during	  the	  1880s	  and	  1890s	  gave	  birth	  to	  giant	  enterprises.	  America	   was	   much	   less	   dependent	   upon	   foreign	   trade	   for	   its	   industrialisation,	  benefitting	   from	   the	   existence	   of	   an	   increasingly	   large	   internal	   market	   and	   a	   generous	  endowment	  of	  natural	  resources	  important	  for	  industrial	  development	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  74;	  Temperley,	   2002:	   66).	   In	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   America	   began	   to	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diversify	  its	  exports,	  shifting	  towards	  higher	  value-­‐added	  manufactured	  goods.	  	  Up	  until	  the	  1860s	  America	  ran	  a	  deficit	  on	  both	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  payments,	  with	  interest	  charges	  on	  British	  capital	  accounting	  for	  the	  latter.	  But	  during	  the	  1870s	  America	  began	  to	  achieve	  balance	  of	  payments	  surpluses	  in	  some	  years.	  Britain	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  never	  experienced	  surpluses	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  trade	  but	  did	  consistently	  achieve	  balance	  of	  payments	   surpluses	   through	   earnings	   from	   ‘invisibles’	   such	   as	   banking,	   insurance	   and	  merchant	  shipping	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  90).	  By	   the	   eve	   of	   WW1,	   the	   economic	   gap	   between	   the	   two	   nations	   had	   narrowed	  considerably.	  American	  growth,	   from	  1870-­‐1914,	  outpaced	  that	  of	  Britain	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  25).	   Population	   growth,	   a	   larger	   country	   and	   an	   entrepreneurial	   class	   ready	   to	   invest	  capital	  were	  among	  the	  factors	  that	  combined	  to	  produce	  rapid	  American	  catch-­‐up.	  Britain	  was	   still	   reliant	   on	   the	   older	   industrial	   activities	   of	   the	   first	   Industrial	   Revolution:	   coal,	  steel,	  iron	  and	  shipbuilding.	  Moreover,	  while	  Britain	  still	  depended	  heavily	  upon	  American	  imports,	   the	   U.S.	   had	   effectively	   undertaken	   to	   diversify	   away	   from	   reliance	   on	   British	  markets.	  Overall,	  economic	  primacy	  had	  shifted	  towards	  America,	  which	  surpassed	  Britain	  as	  the	  world’s	  biggest	  manufacturing	  nation	  (Allen,	  1956:	  29;	  Dimbleby	  &	  Reynolds,	  1988:	  34).	  	  In	   more	   general	   terms,	   Britain’s	   relative	   power	   was	   diminishing	   by	   the	   turn	   of	   the	  twentieth	   century.	   	   Between	   1870	   and	   1910,	   Britain’s	   share	   of	   world	   manufacturing	  capacity	  decreased	   from	  32%	  down	   to	  15%.	   	  The	  British	   share	  of	  world	   trade	  decreased	  from	  25%	  down	  to	  14%	  in	  the	  same	  period	  (Temperley,	  2002:	  89).	  	  Now	  it	  was	  Britain	  who	  looked	   to	   the	  U.S.	   for	   the	   latest	   techniques	   in	  manufacturing	  and	   industrial	  know-­‐how.	   In	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chemicals,	  automobile	  manufactures,	  industrial	  management	  and	  electrical	  goods,	  America	  led	  the	  way.	  We	  begin	  to	  see	  in	  this	  period	  the	  first	  wave	  of	  American	  corporate	  expansion	  into	  Britain:	   Singer	   opened	   a	   factory	   outside	  Glasgow	   in	   the	  1860’s	  while	   Ford	  opened	   a	  large	  factory	  in	  Manchester	  in	  1908	  (Temperley,	  2002:	  90).	  The	  great	  reversal	  had	  begun	  to	  gather	   momentum.	   Crucially	   however,	   Britain	   remained	   predominant	   in	   matters	   of	  
international	   finance;	   still	   performing	   a	   role	   as	   the	   world’s	   principal	   creditor.	   Strength	   in	  shipping	  and	  other	  invisibles	  continued	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  substantial	  source	  of	  national	  income.	  	  Although	   the	   American’s	   had	   caught	   up	   in	   terms	   of	   industrial	   prowess	   and	  merchandise	   exports,	   the	   U.S.	   financial	   system	   remained	   insufficiently	  mature	   to	   service	  international	   markets.	   American	   banks	   were	   prohibited	   from	   establishing	   branches	  overseas	  and	  national	  banks	  were	  also	  forbidden	  from	  dealing	  in	  trade	  credit	  up	  until	  the	  Federal	   Reserve	   Act	   of	   1913.	   The	   lack	   of	   foreign	   branches	   made	   it	   very	   difficult	   for	  American	  banks	  to	  support	  their	  clients	  abroad.	  Although	  private	  banks	  such	  as	  J.P.	  Morgan	  and	  Company	  were	  not	  burdened	  with	   these	   restrictions,	   they	  still	  did	  not	  move	   into	   the	  financing	  of	  U.S.	  foreign	  trade	  on	  a	  large	  scale.	  The	  major	  problem	  for	  American	  banks	  was	  the	  cost	  advantage	  enjoyed	  by	  London.	   Interest	   rates	  and	  risks	  were	   lower	   in	  London,	  as	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  broad	  population	  of	  investors	  to	  whom	  trade	  acceptances	  could	  be	  resold,	  gave	  the	  market	  a	  highly	  liquid	  character.	  	  The	  well-­‐developed	  market	  meant	  that	  there	  was	  little	  uncertainty	  over	  the	  price	  that	  could	  be	  obtained	  when	  discounting	  a	  bill.	  London	  also	  had	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  Central	  Bank	  that	  would	  step	   in	   to	  rediscount	  bank’s	  securities	  when	  they	  needed	  to	  cash	  them,	  with	  the	  effect	  of	  stabilising	  the	  market	  (Eichengreen,	  2011:	  17-­‐20).	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  It	   would	   take	   the	   outbreak	   of	   war	   in	   1914	   to	   dislodge	   Britain’s	   financial	  predominance,	  and	  even	  then	  the	  U.S.	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  establish	  itself	  in	  a	  comparable	  manner.	   The	   war	   brought	   an	   end	   to	   the	   gold	   standard,	   with	   the	   increased	   rivalry	   and	  military	   tensions	   within	   Europe	   having	   undermined	   the	   financial	   solidarity	   that	  underpinned	  the	  gold	  standard.	  Countries	  then	  sought	  to	  cordon	  off	  their	  gold	  supplies	  and	  suspend	  convertibility	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  for	  essential	  materials	  (Block,	  1977:	  14;	  Eichengreen,	  2008:	  42).	  	  At	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  the	  U.S.	  remained	  the	  junior	  partner	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  relationship.	   By	   the	   time	   peace	   fell	   across	   Europe	   in	   1919,	   a	   drastic	   turnaround	   had	  occurred.	   War	   sapped	   the	   strength	   from	   Britain	   while	   swelling	   American	   coffers	   and	  emboldening	  her	   leaders.	  Britain	  was	  now	   forced	   to	  go	  cap	   in	  hand	   to	  her	  American	  ally.	  	  The	  primary	  mechanism	  of	   this	  reversal	  was	   the	  power	  of	  credit.	   	   It	  was	  a	   lever	  of	  power	  that	  the	  U.S.	  would	  use	  to	  great	  effect	  in	  order	  to	  break	  European	  predominance	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  world.	  	  Although	   the	   reversal	   of	   credit-­‐debtor	   relations	   was	   enormously	   significant	   for	  inter-­‐governmental	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  nations,	  private	  power	  played	  a	  major	  role.	  During	   the	   three	   years	   of	   American	   neutrality,	   from	  1914	   to	   1917,	   the	  House	   of	  Morgan	  banking	   dynasty	   supplied	   liquidity	   to	   the	   Allied	   war	   effort.	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   House	   of	  Morgan	  raise	  funds	  through	  placement	  of	  British	  and	  Allied	  bonds	  in	  the	  New	  York	  money	  market,	   by	   1915	   it	   was	   also	   the	   exclusive	   purchasing	   agent	   for	   all	   Allied	   acquisition	   of	  goods	  from	  the	  United	  States	  (Burk,	  1985:	  19;	  Chernow,	  1990:	  187).	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The	   House	   of	   Morgan	   grew	   out	   of	   the	   massive	   import	   of	   European	   capital	   into	  American	  during	  the	  nineteenth	  century.	  Financial	  relations	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  European	  countries	   gave	   rise	   to	   investment	   banking	   houses	   that	   dealt	   in	   foreign	   exchange	   and	  orchestrated	  the	  sale	  of	  American	  securities	   to	  European	   investors	  (Corey,	  1969:	  42).	   	  By	  the	   late	  1860s,	   the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  organised	   the	  majority	  of	  British	   investments	   in	   the	  U.S.	   	   These	   investments	   were	   large.	   By	   1869	   Europeans	   owned	   around	   $1	   billion	   of	  American	   government	   bonds	   and	   around	   $465	   million	   of	   American	   corporate	   securities	  (Corey,	  1969:	  87).	  More	   than	  any	  other	  activity,	   it	  was	  railroad	  expansion	   that	  accounted	  for	  the	  largest	  amount	  of	  foreign	  investment.	  	  	  The	   investment	   bank	   oversaw	   centralisation,	   enabling	   it	   to	   acquire	   overall	  discretion	  over	  the	  paramount	  issues	  of	  business	  management.	  J.	  P.	  Morgan’s	  predominance	  heralded	  the	  more	  general	  historical	  shift	  towards	  investment	  bank’s	  strategic	  control	  over	  industry	   at	   large	   within	   the	   U.S.	   Having	   achieved	   unprecedented	   consolidation	   in	   the	  control	  of	  assets	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  looked	  abroad	  for	  new	  opportunities.	  Nearly	   all	   of	   the	   industrial	   combinations	   controlled	   by	  Morgan’s	   took	   a	   dynamic	   role	   in	  America’s	  budding	   imperialism,	   investing	   large	  amounts	  of	  capital	  overseas	  (Corey,	  1969:	  333).	   	   This	  was	   part	   of	   a	   larger	   competition	  with	   European	   investors	   in	   China	   and	   Latin	  America.	  Morgan’s	  overseas	  ambitions	  received	  active	  encouragement	   from	  the	  American	  government	  (Corey,	  1969:	  333;	  Chernow,	  1990:	  132).	  The	   U.S.	   government	   had	   adopted	   a	   stance	   of	   formal	   neutrality	   towards	   the	  belligerents.	   This	   foreclosed	   the	   possibility	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   raising	   funds	   for	   Britain	  through	  placements	   of	  British	   bonds	   in	  America	  Private	   banking	  was	   the	   only	   remaining	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alternative:	   the	   House	   of	   Morgan	   duly	   stepped	   forward.	   An	   avowed	   anglophile,	   John	  Pierpont	   Morgan	   spent	   half	   of	   every	   year	   in	   Britain	   (Dimbleby	   &	   Reynolds,	   1988:	   45;	  Ovendale,	   1998:	   12).	   Crucially,	   the	   House	   of	   Morgan	   had	   no	   major	   linkages	   to	   German	  industrial	   firms,	   leaving	   the	  way	   clear	   for	   unrestricted	   engagement	  with	   the	  Allied	   cause	  (Burk,	  1981:	  27).	  This	  engagement	  came	  at	  huge	  risk:	  if	  Britain	  lost	  the	  war	  Morgan’s	  would	  likely	   be	   bankrupted.	   But	   beyond	   the	   raw	   profit	   motive,	   genuine	   sentiments	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   patriotism	   conveyed	   in	   private	   communications	   between	   the	   American	   and	  British	  branches	  of	  the	  bank,	  appear	  to	  have	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  decision	  (Burk,	  1985:	  27).	   By	  1915	  Morgan’s	  had	  become	  the	  sole	  purchasing	  agent	  for	  the	  Allies.	  Not	  only	  did	  Morgan’s	   purchase	   goods,	   they	   also	   initiated	   an	   expansion	  of	   new	  productive	   capacity	   to	  meet	  surging	  Allied	  demand.	  Financiers	  and	  manufacturers	  were	  brought	  together	  to	  accept	  huge	  contracts	  from	  the	  British	  government	  (Burk,	  1985:	  24).	  The	  disordered	  competition	  and	   inflation	   that	   attended	   early	   Allied	   purchasing	   was	   brought	   under	   control	   by	   the	  Morgan	   monopoly.	   As	   Allied	   orders	   increased,	   Britain’s	   financial	   dependence	   rose	  accordingly.	   	  Already	  by	  October	  1915,	   the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  had	  arranged	  a	   loan	  of	  $500	  million	   to	   be	   spent	   by	   the	   Allies	   on	   American	   purchases,	   by	   the	  war’s	   end,	   the	  House	   of	  Morgan	   had	   raised	   over	   $1.5billion	   in	   Allied	   credits	   (Corey,	   1969:	   423;	   Chernow,	   1990:	  200).	   Private	   lending	  was	  virtually	  extinguished	  once	   the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  monopolised	   the	  creditor	   function	   after	   joining	   the	   war	   effort.	   The	   American	   government	   established	  enormous	   control	   over	   the	   U.S.	   economy,	   setting	   prices	   and	   directing	   industry	   (Corey,	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1969:	  426;	  Burk,	  1985:	  57).	  Morgan’s	  power	  was	  greatly	  diminished	  as	  a	  consequence,	  with	  the	   American	   government	   placing	   loans	   and	   organising	   purchases.	   Wartime	   state	   of	  emergency	   enabled	   a	   massive	   reassertion	   of	   government	   sovereignty	   over	   economic	  activity.	  	  Undoubtedly,	   America’s	   participation	   in	   the	   war	   swung	   the	   conflict	   in	   the	   Allies’	  favour.	  America’s	  vast	  resources	  were	  immediately	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  war	  effort.	  But	  it	  
also	  meant	  that	  the	  legacy	  of	  inter-­‐Allied	  borrowing	  would	  be	  intensely	  politicised,	  creating	  a	  
major	  bone	  of	  contention	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  political	  economy.	  Although	  temporarily	  maligned,	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  relations	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	   period	   of	   reconstruction	   and	   uncertainty.	   Indeed,	   its	   efforts	   were	   central	   to	   the	  disastrous	   attempt	   to	   restore	   the	   gold	   standard	   during	   the	   1920s,	   as	   the	   cooperation	  between	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers	   became	   increasingly	   important	   in	   shaping	   the	  international	  economy.	  	  
	  
Resuscitating	  the	  gold	  standard	  	  As	  the	  guns	  fell	  silent	  across	  Europe	  in	  November	  of	  1919,	  the	  dust	  settled	  upon	  a	  radically	  altered	  landscape.	  Many	  of	  the	  old	  certainties	  of	  the	  international	  order	  had	  been	  shaken	  at	  their	  foundations,	  none	  more	  so	  than	  Britain’s	  position	  at	  the	  apex	  of	  international	  power.17	  The	  war	  greatly	  destabilised	  the	  international	  economy.	  While	  American	  industrial	  power	  had	   increased,	   European	   economies	   had	   been	   gravely	   weakened	   and	   their	   currencies	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  In	   continental	   terms,	   Europe	   had	   clearly	   been	  weakened	   through	   its	   internal	  warring.	   America	  and	  Japan	  both	  experienced	  an	  increase	  in	  their	  relative	  power	  as	  a	  consequence.	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experienced	  major	  instabilities	  (Eichengreen	  &	  Temin,	  2000:	  194).	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  war,	   the	   international	   economy	  was	   blighted	   by	   overproduction,	   overcapacity	   and	   rising	  inflation	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  107).	  	  For	  Britain,	   economic	   adjustment	   to	   the	   post-­‐war	  world	  would	   be	   painful.	   Two	  of	  Britain’s	   key	   industries,	   shipbuilding	   and	   steel,	   were	   hit	   hard	   by	   overproduction	   and	  overcapacity.	  International	  competitors	  had	  emerged	  and	  world	  demand	  had	  slackened.	  To	  add	   to	   this,	   British	   industrial	   dominance	   in	   coal	   and	   textiles	   was	   also	   under	   threat.18	  Wartime	   textiles	   industries	   in	   Japan	   and	   America	   posed	   a	   particularly	   sharp	   challenge	  (Holmes,	   1976:	   109).	   Britain	   would	   experience	   a	   worsening	   balance	   of	   trade	   during	   the	  1920s	  as	  imports	  remained	  high	  but	  exports	  declined	  markedly.19	  Reliance	  upon	  traditional	  industries	   (coal,	   steel,	   textiles)	   hamstrung	   the	   possibility	   of	   export	   led	   growth	   in	   a	  more	  competitive	   world	  market	   (Moggridge,	   1972:	   29,	   Dimbleby	   &	   Reynolds,	   1988:	   97).	   Even	  Britain’s	   longstanding	   predominance	   in	   ‘invisibles’	   was	   under	   threat.	   Around	   seven	  hundred	  thousand	  tonnes	  of	  merchant	  shipping	  were	  lost	  during	  the	  war.	  	  Nowhere	  was	  the	  transformation	  of	  British	  power	  more	  evident	  than	  in	  the	  reversal	  of	   its	   financial	   status.	   	   No	   longer	   creditor	   supreme	   to	   American	   industrialisation,	   Britain	  was	  now	  heavily	  indebted	  to	  the	  U.S.	  By	  March	  1920,	  Britain’s	  overall	  public	  debt	  stood	  at	  7.8	  billion	  pounds.	  During	  the	  1920s	  debt	  servicing	  consumed	  a	  staggering	  40%	  of	  Britain’s	  budget	  (Temperley,	  2001:	  123).	  The	  majority	  of	  this	  was	  owed	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  and	  would	   have	   to	   be	   repaid	   in	   dollars.	   Britain’s	   trade	  deficit	  with	   both	  America	   and	  Canada	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  The	   destruction	   of	   merchant	   vessels	   during	   the	   war	   hastened	   the	   introduction	   of	   oil-­‐powered	  vessels,	  accelerating	  the	  obsolescence	  of	  coal	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  159).	  	  19	  Britain’s	   trade	   deficit	   with	   the	   dollar	   area	   increased	   by	   156.4	   million	   pounds	   during	   the	   war	  (Moggridge,	  1972:	  34)	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made	  this	  difficult,	  as	  did	  the	  increasingly	  protectionist	  stance	  of	  the	  U.S.	  during	  the	  1920s	  (Holmes,	  1976:	  106).	  	  These	  changes	  drastically	  undermined	  Britain’s	  capacity	  to	  stand	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  international	   economy	   as	   it	   had	   before	   1914	   (Block,	   1977:	   14;	   Konings,	   2011:	   71).	   As	  British	  power	  waned,	  American	  ascendance	  accelerated.	  The	  interactive	  fortunes	  of	  sterling	  and	  the	  dollar	  were	  central	  to	  this	  process.	  From	  1915,	  sterling’s	  value	  relative	  to	  gold	  had	  fluctuated,	   reducing	   its	   reliability	   as	   an	   international	   trading	   and	   reserve	   currency.	   By	  contrast,	   the	   dollar	   remained	   pegged	   to	   gold	   during	   the	   period.	   Because	   of	   the	   dollar’s	  greater	   stability,	   importers	   and	   exporters	   throughout	   Latin	   America,	   Asia	   and	   the	   U.S.	  decided	  that	  the	  dollar	  was	  a	  more	  appealing	  unit	  through	  which	  to	  conduct	  their	  business.	  Although	  Britain	  was	  able	  to	  peg	  sterling	  to	  the	  dollar	  from	  1916,	  the	  fears	  of	  investors	  and	  traders	   were	   not	   allayed.	   	   Britain	   had	   run	   up	  massive	   wartime	   budget	   deficits	   and	   was	  experiencing	   substantial	   inflation.	   The	  markets	   rightly	   anticipated	   that	   the	  pound’s	   value	  would	   fall	   once	  American	   support	   for	   the	   currency	  was	  withdrawn	  at	   the	  end	  of	   the	  war	  (Eichengreen,	  2011:	  27).	  	  Britain’s	   diminishing	   power	   contrasted	   starkly	   to	  American	   ascendance,	   a	   process	  encapsulated	   by	   the	   rise	   of	   the	   dollar.	   	   The	  war	   led	   to	   a	  massive	   expansion	   of	   American	  export	  business	   as	   the	  U.S.	   became	   the,	   ‘factory	   and	  grainery	   to	   the	  world’	   (Eichengreen,	  2011:	   26)	   American	   businesses	   were	   the	   primary	   beneficiaries	   of	   the	   withdrawal	   of	  European	   producers	   from	   foreign	   markets	   during	   the	   war.	   The	   war	   had	   also	   severely	  disrupted	   the	   credit	   mechanisms	   in	   place	   before	   1914.	   German	   and	   British	   banks	   were	  forced	   to	   turn	   to	   their	   counterparts	   in	   New	   York	   for	   the	   acceptance	   of	   bills	   in	   order	   to	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purchase	   imports	   from	   the	   U.S.,	   Latin	   America	   and	   Asia	   (Eichengreen,	   2011:	   26).	   This	  expansion	   of	   dollar	   denominated	   trade	   credit	   was	   part	   of	   a	   broader	   decentralisation	   of	  credit	   relations	   that	  damaged	  sterling	  and	  empowered	   the	  dollar.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  New	  York	   emerged	   as	   the	   key	   social	   space	   for	   the	   transmission	   of	   international	   credit.	   From	  1921-­‐1924,	   the	   value	   of	   new	   issues	   of	   foreign	   securities	   in	   New	   York	   stood	   at	   $2,373	  million,	   compared	   to	  a	  meagre	  $917	  million	   in	  London	  during	   the	  same	  period.	  The	  First	  World	  War	  had	  set	   in	  place	  a	   ‘competitive	  duality’	  between	  New	  York	  and	  London	  as	   the	  key	  international	  financial	  centres,	  with	  power	  increasingly	  shifting	  away	  from	  London	  and	  towards	   New	   York	   (Langley,	   2002:	   61).	   This	   was	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   substantial	  competitive	  interaction	  between	  London	  and	  New	  York	  that	  would	  prove	  to	  be	  so	  crucial	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation	  in	  the	  post-­‐	  World	  War	  Two	  era.	  The	  dollar’s	  rise	  was	  not,	  however,	  exclusively	  a	  consequence	  of	  sterling’s	  demise.	  It	  also	   reflected	   the	   growing	   capacity	   of	   American	   financial	   markets.	   The	   creation	   of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  1913	  was	  a	  game	  changer	  in	  this	  respect.	  The	  American	  system	  now	  had	  a	  Central	  Bank	   that	   could	  act	   as	   a	   lender-­‐of-­‐last	   resort	   and	  play	  a	  market-­‐making	   role	   to	  extend	   the	   liquidity	   of	   trade	   acceptances	   in	   the	   U.S.	   market	   (Konings,	   2011:	   73).	   The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Act	  also	  empowered	  national	  banks	  to	  deal	  in	  trade	  credit	  for	  the	  first	  time	  and	  enabled	  them	  to	  establish	  branches	  abroad.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1920,	  American	  banks	  were	  operating	   181	   branches	   abroad	   (Eichengreen,	   2011:	   18-­‐28).	   But	   despite	   this	   enhanced	  financial	   infrastructure,	   the	  U.S.	   still	   lagged	  behind	  Britain	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  maturity	   of	   its	  financial	   system	   and	   its	   suitability	   to	   play	   an	   international	   entrepot	   role.	  While	   Britain’s	  dominant	  position	  had	  been	  rooted	   in	   its	  unprecedented	  pre-­‐eminence	   in	  world	  trade,	   its	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massive	   overseas	   investments	   and	   a	   highly	   liquid	   discount	   market,	   the	   U.S.	   was	   not	   yet	  comparably	   endowed	   with	   these	   features	   (Konings,	   2011:	   72).	   The	   demise	   of	   Britain’s	  
financial	  capacity,	  and	  the	  immaturity	  of	  the	  American	  alternative,	  were	  crucial	  factors	  in	  the	  
disastrous	   attempt	   to	   resuscitate	   the	   gold	   standard	   during	   the	   1920s	   as	   Anglo-­‐American	  
dynamics	  played	  a	  decisive	  role	  in	  the	  transformation	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  Reactivation	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   was	  made	   all	   the	   more	   difficult	   by	   the	   difficult	  negotiations	  over	  war	  debt	   repayments	   and	   trade	   relations	   that	  marked	   the	   early	  1920s.	  The	  1920s	  witnessed	  intensive	  financial	  rivalry	  between	  Britain	  and	  America.	  Britain	  had	  a	  number	  of	  goals	  that	  shaped	  the	  approach	  to	  international	  reconstruction.	  A	  financial	  bloc	  centred	   on	   London	   was	   identified	   as	   a	   means	   to	   maintain	   sterling’s	   international	   role.	  Britain	  also	  sought	  favoured	  status	  in	  Russian	  development,	  the	  reduction	  of	  war	  debts	  and	  a	   regulated	   system	  of	  world	   capital	   flows	  as	  well	   as	   stability	   in	  world	  prices.	   In	   all	   these	  endeavours	  Britain	  was	  opposed	  by	  the	  United	  States	  (Costigliola,	  1977:	  914;	  Watt,	  1984:	  49).	   Contrary	  to	  Britain,	  the	  U.S.	  intended	  to	  rebuild	  the	  world	  economy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  free	   market	   rather	   than	   regulation	   and	   special	   privileges.	   America	   turned	   to	   the	   ‘Open	  Door’	   policy. 20 	  The	   American	   stance	   was	   motivated	   by	   a	   desire	   to	   ease	   industrial,	  agricultural	  and	  capital	  surpluses	   through	  outlets	   in	   the	   international	  market	   (Costigliola,	  1977:	   915).	   But	   the	   American	   position	   was	   beset	   by	   a	   major	   contradiction:	   although	  pushing	  for	  open	  markets	   internationally,	  America	  was	  insistent	  upon	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  This	  same	  ‘open	  door’	  policy	  would	  be	  pursued	  vigorously	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	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her	   own	   high	   tariffs	   and	   full	   war	   debt	   repayment.	   This	   stance	  made	   it	   very	   difficult	   for	  European	  countries	  to	  earn	  the	  currency	  required	  to	  pay	  off	  their	  war	  debts	  to	  the	  U.S.	  War	   debts	   proved	   the	   most	   rancorous	   bone	   of	   contention	   in	   the	   great	   power	  diplomacy	  of	  the	  period.	  The	  burden	  of	  the	  debts,	   imposed	  on	  top	  of	  the	  European	  loss	  of	  export	   markets	   and	   overseas	   investments,	   had	   a	   crippling	   impact	   upon	   the	   economic	  recovery	   of	   the	   major	   European	   powers.	   Michael	   Hudson	   interprets	   the	   American	  government’s	  reluctance	  to	  soften	  its	  stance	  on	  the	  repayment	  of	  Allied	  war	  debts	  as	  part	  of	  an	  emerging	  imperialist	  strategy.	  Hudson	  views	  American	  conduct	  towards	  Britain	  after	  the	  war	  as	  ‘political	  aggression’:	  forcing	  Britain	  to	  pay	  crippling	  interest	  and	  capital	  charges	  on	  the	  debt	  despite	  implied	  promises	  to	  the	  contrary	  made	  to	  the	  Allies.	  Britain	  and	  her	  Allies	  were	   prevented	   from	   raising	   dollars	   through	   exports	   by	   the	   imposition	   of	   the	   Fordney	  McCumber	  Tariff	  in	  1922	  (Hudson,	  1972:9,	  18).	  America	  expected	  the	  Allies	  to	  repay	  debts	  not	  by	  boosting	  their	  export	  growth	  (as	  this	  would	  likely	  damage	  American	  industry),	  but	  rather	  through	  austerity	  at	  home.	  	  Further	  signals	  of	  America’s	  intention	  to	  disassemble	  British	  power	  were	  indicated	  in	  the	  lenient	  stance	  towards	  Germany,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  Hudson	  concludes	  (1972:	  23)	  that	   the	   U.S.	   coveted	   Britain’s	   empire.	   Debt	   had	   become	   a	   weapon	   to	   be	   wielded	   in	   the	  struggle	  between	  rival	  imperialisms.	  By	  re-­‐establishing	  Germany	  as	  Britain’s	  rival,	  the	  U.S.	  sought	  to	  check	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  power.	  Britain	  was	  trapped	  in	  a	  vicious	  cycle.	  Declining	  world	  prices	  in	  the	  later	  1920s	  and	  the	  growing	  demand	  for	  dollars,	  weakened	  sterling	  and	  served	  to	  increase	  the	  real	  burden	  of	  Britain’s	  war	  debts.	  	  For	  Hudson	  (1972:	  33),	  no	  single	  mechanism	  had	  more	  of	  role	  in	  the	  genesis	  of	  World	  War	  II	  than	  the	  American	  insistence	  on	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debt	   repayment	   by	   European	   powers.	   Rather	   problematically,	   however,	   Hudson’s	   thesis	  ignores	   key	   cooperative	   tendencies	   driven	   by	   the	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   banking	   community.	  Private	   banking	   power	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   solidifying	   Anglo-­‐American	   relations	   and	  spurring	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	   system	   during	   this	   period,	  something	  that	  Hudson	  neglects	  in	  preference	  for	  a	  focus	  upon	  government	  driven	  financial	  imperialism.	   The	   great	   difficulty	   in	   delineating	   the	   boundary	   between	   ‘private’	   and	  ‘government’	   power	   during	   the	   1920s,	  makes	   the	   clear	   conceptual	   distinction	   upheld	   by	  Hudson	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  Although	  the	  negotiations	  and	  contestation	  over	  war	  debts	  was	  intense,	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  were	  able	  to	  cooperate	  effectively	  in	  their	  attempt	  to	  re-­‐establish	  the	  gold	  standard.	  The	   primary	   motivation	   for	   Britain’s	   desire	   to	   return	   to	   gold	   was	   the	   need	   to	   restore	  London	   as	   the	   premier	   financial	   centre	   of	   the	   world	   (Clarke,	   1967:	   72;	   Dimbleby	   &	  Reynolds,	  1988:	  90).21	  But	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  imperial	  unity	  around	  the	  dominant	  role	  of	  sterling	   in	   the	   face	   of	   the	   rising	   American	   challenge	   provided	   the	  wider	   political	   context	  (Costigliola,	   1977:	   923).	  With	   the	   increase	   in	   trade	   financed	   in	   dollars	   during	   the	   1920s,	  Britain	  feared	  a	  gold	  standard	  based	  upon	  the	  dollar	  as	  a	  mortal	  threat	  to	  the	  international	  role	  of	  sterling.	  	  For	  the	  City	  and	  the	  Bank,	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  was	  seen	  as	  integral	  to	   maintaining	   the	   dominance	   of	   sterling,	   while	   it	   was	   also	   hoped	   that	   renewing	   the	  commitment	  to	  gold	  convertibility	  would	  prevent	  politicians	  from	  interfering	  in	  monetary	  politics.	   The	   government	   also	   stood	   to	   benefit	   from	   a	   return	   to	   gold,	   with	   increased	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Prior	  to	  the	  war	  some	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  world’s	  trade	  credit	  had	  passed	  through	  London	  and	  half	  the	  world’s	  long-­‐term	  investments	  (Ahamed,	  2009:	  130).	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confidence	   in	   the	   pound	   expected	   to	   reduce	   the	   cost	   of	   new	   government	   borrowing	   and	  help	   service	   the	   huge	   national	   debt.	   It	   was	   further	   hoped	   that	   the	   return	   to	   gold	  would	  increase	  the	  City’s	  contributions	  to	  national	  revenue	  and	  provide	  a	   firm	  financial	  base	   for	  industry	  (Boyce,	  2004:215).	  	  The	  attitude	  of	  British	  industry	  was	  much	  cooler	  towards	  the	  return	  to	  gold,	  but	  it	  was	  the	  City	  that	  ‘exercised	  overwhelming	  influence	  over	  deliberations	  on	  the	  future	  of	  sterling’	  (Boyce,	  2004:	  220).	  Not	  for	  the	  last	  time,	  the	  privileged	  view	  of	  the	  City	  would	  lead	  Britain	  towards	  economic	  disaster.	  Despite	  the	  coolness	  of	  industrial	  opinion,	  the	  decision	  to	  return	  to	  gold	  won	  the	  day.	  This	  was	  in	  large	  part	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  predominance	  of	  gold	  standard	  thinking	  among	  British	  bankers	  and	  government	  officials.	  Britain	  had	  been	  on	  the	  gold	  standard	  from	  1717	  to	  1914,	  interrupted	  only	  by	  a	  brief	  interval	  during	  the	  Napoleonic	  wars.	  By	  the	  1830s	  the	  gold	   standard	   had	   become,	   ‘an	   unquestioned	   article	   of	   faith	   to	   most	   economists	   and	  bankers’,	  it	  remained	  so	  until	  1914	  and	  was	  still	  central	  to	  their	  thinking	  during	  the	  1920s	  (Moggridge,	  1972:	  2;	  Eichengreen	  &	  Temin,	  2000:	  183).	  But	  the	  support	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  in	  favour	  of	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  Bank	  and	  the	  City,	  was	  also	  crucial.	   	  The	  Treasury’s	  need	  to	  finance	  the	  national	  debt	  gave	  it	  a	  natural	  interest	  in	  the	  health	  of	  financial	  markets,	  which	  overlapped	  with	  that	  of	  the	  City	  and	  the	  Bank.	  In	  line	  with	  its	  traditional	  balanced-­‐budgets	  orthodoxy,	   the	   Treasury	   believed	   that	   the	   gold	   standard	   could	   exert	   an	   important	  disciplinary	  effect	  upon	  British	  workers	  and	  government	  expenditure	  (Boyce,	  2004:	  222).	  There	  were	  nonetheless,	  concerns	  about	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  returning	  to	  gold.	  Winston	  Churchill,	  the	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer,	  expressed	  concern	  that	  the	  higher	  interest	  rates	  required	   to	   return	   to	   gold	   might	   severely	   retard	   the	   progress	   of	   trade,	   industry	   and	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employment.	   While	   the	   increasingly	   influential	   John	   Maynard	   Keynes,	   was	   also	   an	  outspoken	   critic	   (Ahamed,	   2009:	   172).	   But	   the	   Governor	   of	   the	   Bank,	  Montagu	   Norman,	  assuaged	   Churchill’s	   concerns	   by	   claiming,	   entirely	   disingenuously,	   that	   there	   was	   no	  relationship	   between	   the	   gold	   standard	   and	   domestic	   conditions	   (Eichengreen	   &	   Temin,	  2000:	  194).	  It	  was	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus,	  then,	  which	  was	  central	  to	  Britain’s	  desire	  to	  return	  to	  gold.	  	  	   The	   return	   to	   gold	  was,	   however,	   impossible	  without	   broader	   international	  support.	   Anglo-­‐American	   cooperation	   was	   crucial	   in	   this	   regard.	   The	   new	   gold	   standard	  system	  emerged	  on	  an	  ad	  hoc	  basis,	  owing	  to	  the	  non-­‐participation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  1922	  Genoa	  Conference.	  Led	  by	  the	  British	  delegation,	   the	  subcommittee	  on	  financial	  questions	  produced	   a	   report,	  which	   recommended	   that	   countries	   should	   negotiate	   an	   international	  convention	  that	  would	  permit	  their	  Central	  Banks	  to	  hold	  an	  unlimited	  amount	  of	  foreign-­‐exchange	  reserves.	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  overcome	  the	  gold	  supply	  problem	  that	  threatened	  to	   limit	   the	   scope	   for	   international	   economic	   growth,	   by	   moving	   on	   to	   a	   gold-­‐exchange	  standard	  under	  which	  reserves	  could	  also	  underpin	  the	  monetary	  base.	  The	  conference	  also	  sought	  to	  promote	  international	  cooperation,	  with	  Central	  Banks	  expected	  to	  work	  together	  in	   order	   to	   maintain	   stable	   prices	   and	   fixed	   convertibility	   through	   an	   appropriate	  adjustment	   of	   interest	   rates.	   The	   Genoa	   proposals,	   ‘reflected	   a	   British	   perspective	   on	  international	  monetary	   relations’,	  with	   the	   holding	   of	   exchange	   reserves	   likely	   to	   benefit	  Britain,	  as	  they	  would	  most	  probably	  be	  held	  as	  sterling	  balances	  in	  London	  (Eichengreen.	  2008:	   60).	   Bringing	   foreign-­‐exchange	   reserves	   to	   London	  would	   restore	   its	   international	  position	  and	  reconstruct	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  mechanism	  that	  had	  operated	  prior	  to	  the	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war.	  But	  the	  follow	  up	  meeting	  of	  Central	  Banks	  that	  the	  subcommittee	  proposed,	  in	  order	  to	  work	  out	  the	  details,	  never	  occurred.	  This	  was	  due	  to	  a	   lack	  of	  American	  support,	  with	  Fed	  officials	  resentful	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  leadership	  of	  the	  meeting	  and	  political	  interests	  within	  the	  U.S.	   sceptical	  of	  both	   the	  gold-­‐exchange	  standard	  and	   the	  need	   for	   formalised	  Central	  Bank	  cooperation.	  	  The	   Americans	  were	   now	   in	   a	   very	   strong	   bargaining	   position.	   By	   the	   end	   of	   the	  war,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  the	  largest	  gold	  supply	  in	  the	  world,	  which	  would	  make	  it	  potentially	  the	  key	  player	   in	  a	  restored	  gold	  standard	  and	  produced	  scepticism	  over	  the	  need	  for	  a	  gold-­‐exchange	   system	   (Ahamed,	   2009:	   95;	   Eichengreen,	   2008:	   61).	   	   	   Although	   the	   Genoa	  proposals	  were	   not	   adopted,	   the	   role	   of	   the	   League	   of	  Nations	   in	   attempting	   to	   organise	  multilateral	  solutions	  to	  international	  economic	  problems	  as	  part	  of	  an	  economic	  oversight	  role,	   throughout	   the	   1920s	   and	   into	   the	   1930s,	   formed	   a	   template	   for	   the	   eventual	  development	   of	   much	   more	   through	   multilateral	   regimes	   within	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	  framework	  (Pauly,	  1997:	  47-­‐59).	  The	  Genoa	  episode	  demonstrated	  that	  although	  key	  social	  forces	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  shared	  a	  commitment	  to	  rebuilding	  the	  world	  economy,	  ‘their	  contrasting	  positions	  of	   ascending	   and	   descending	   power	   led	   to	   considerable	   disagreements	   as	   to	   the	  appropriate	   organisation	   of	   world	   finance’	   (Langley,	   2002:	   63-­‐64).	   This	   prevented	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  broadly	  agreed	  multilateral	   framework	   for	  restoring	  the	  gold	  standard	  and	  meant	  that	  ad	  hoc	  central	  bank	  cooperation	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  would	  be	  key	  to	   the	   revival	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	   system	   when	   sterling	   was	   restored	   to	   gold	  convertibility	  in	  1925.	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Within	   the	   context	   of	   these	   broader	   Anglo-­‐American	   disagreements,	   the	   banking	  communities	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   functioned	   as	   the	   primary	   engine	   in	   driving	  cooperation	  forward	  (Burk,	  1991:	  126).	  American	  international	  bankers	  supported	  the	  plan	  to	  restore	  sterling’s	  convertibility	   to	  gold	  at	   the	  pre-­‐war	  parity	  because	   they	  viewed	   it	  as	  central	  part	  of	  the	  stabilisation	  of	  the	  European	  monetary	  system	  as	  a	  whole,	  which	  was	  a	  necessary	   precondition	   for	   the	   realisation	   of	   American	   economic	   ambitions.	   As	   a	   whole,	  internationalist	  sections	  of	  American	  capital,	  exemplified	  by	  Wall	  Street	  bankers,	  tended	  to	  take	   a	   more	   lenient	   approach	   to	   the	   question	   of	   war	   debts	   and	   pushed	   for	   a	   more	  constructive	   engagement	   with	   European	   politics.	   Although	   divided	   over	   the	   best	   means	  through	   which	   to	   supplant	   the	   British,	   American	   bankers	   viewed	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	  international	   monetary	   system,	   alongside	   the	   British,	   as	   the	   best	   means	   to	   establish	  American	  banking	  predominance	   internationally.	  But	  within	   the	   context	  of	   an	   isolationist	  Republican	  administration,	  the	  capacity	  to	  pull	  American	  diplomatic	  power	  along	  with	  them	  was	  limited	  (Block,	  1977:	  15-­‐18;	  Konings,	  2011:	  74;	  Chernow,	  1990:	  227).	  	  Once	   again	   the	   House	   of	   Morgan	   was	   to	   the	   fore	   in	   leading	   cooperative	   efforts	  alongside	  central	  bankers	  from	  both	  countries.	  The	  central	  figures	  were	  Montagu	  Norman,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  and	  Benjamin	  Strong,	  head	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  men	  reflected	  the	  growing	  significance	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   central	   banking	   to	   the	   international	   economy	   as	   a	  whole,	  with	  the	  rise	  of	   the	  dollar	  and	  the	  demise	  of	  sterling	  bringing	  about	  a	  dualistic	  pattern	  of	  central	   bank	   leadership	   based	   upon	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Fed.	   Indeed,	   because	   of	   the	   heavy	  exposure	  of	  New	  York	  financial	  houses	  to	  European	  war	  debts,	  the	  New	  York	  Fed	  frequently	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appeared	   to	   be	  more	   concerned	  with	   its	   relationship	   to	   the	  Bank	   of	   England	   than	   it	  was	  with	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  in	  Washington	  (Konings,	  2011:	  66).	  On	   a	   personal	   level,	   Norman	   and	   Strong	   were	   close	   friends	   who	   had	   developed	  enduring	  personal	  ties	  during	  the	  war	  and	  both	  aimed	  towards	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  gold	  standard	  and	  increased	  autonomy	  for	  Central	  Banks	  (Chernow,	  1990:	  244;	  Ahamed,	  2009:	  92).	   Norman	   recognised	   that	   he	   would	   need	   to	   draw	   upon	   American	   financial	   power	   in	  order	   to	   restore	   the	   City’s	   position.	   This	   realisation	   stemmed	   in	   part	   from	   the	   increased	  interdependence	   of	   New	   York	   and	   London	   money	   markets	   after	   the	   war.	   The	   Bank	   of	  England	   had	   reluctantly	   placed	   an	   embargo	   upon	   foreign	   loans	   to	   all	   but	   the	   Dominion	  countries	   after	   the	  war	   (Ahamed,	   2009:	   210).	   The	   restrictions	  were	   initially	   put	   in	   place	  because	   the	   Treasury	   wanted	   to	   make	   sure	   that	   there	   was	   a	   ready	   market	   for	   British	  government	   and	   corporate	   stock	   sales	   but	   they	  were	   subsequently	   extended	   in	   order	   to	  keep	  domestic	  savings	  and	  gold	  reserves	   from	  flowing	  out	  (Attard,	  2004:	  196).	  As	  part	  of	  this	   effort,	   Norman	   actively	   diverted	   business	   to	   New	   York	   in	   order	   to	   decrease	   the	  pressure	   on	   sterling	   and	   the	   London	   capital	  market.	   In	   fact,	  Norman	  had	   even	   suggested	  that	  Dominion	  countries	  should	  raise	  funds	  in	  the	  New	  York	  capital	  markets.	  For	  Norman,	  the	  restoration	  of	  sterling’s	  standing	  as	  the	  foremost	  international	  currency	  was	  paramount	  above	  concerns	  with	  London’s	  predominance	  as	  a	  capital	  market	  (Attard,	  2004:	  211).	  Norman’s	  recognition	  of	   the	  need	  to	  draw	   in	  American	   financial	  power	   in	  order	   to	  restore	   the	   City	   was	   also	   based	   on	   the	   realisation	   that	   the	   pound	   simply	   wasn’t	   strong	  enough	   on	   its	   own.	   By	   building	   up	  Wall	   Street	   linkages,	   Norman	   hoped	   to	   recover	   pre-­‐eminence	  for	  the	  City	  and	  the	  Bank.	  Just	  as	  it	  would	  do	  in	  the	  1950s,	  with	  the	  birth	  of	  the	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Euromarkets	   and	   the	   importation	   of	   dollar	   business	   into	   London,	   the	   City	   looked	   to	  American	   financial	   power	   to	   restore	   its	   own	   national	   and	   international	   predominance.	  Norman’s	  relationship	  with	   the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  was	  a	  key	  component	  of	   the	  strategy	   to	  draw	   in	   the	  Americans.	   	  At	   a	   time	  when	  Anglo-­‐American	   rivalry	  was	  on	   the	   rise	   in	  other	  areas,	   the	  House	  of	  Morgan’s	  London	  branch,	  Morgan	  Grenfell,	   ‘emerged	  as	   an	   important	  conduit	   between	   the	   City	   and	  Wall	   Street’	   (Chernow,	   1990:	   273).	   The	   American	  Morgan	  partners	   in	   New	   York	   shared	   the	   appetite	   of	   their	   London	   colleagues	   for	   getting	   Britain	  back	   onto	   gold.	   They	   saw	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   as	   a	   means	   to	   protect	  exchange	  rates	  from	  manipulation	  by	  politicians.	  The	  U.S.	  Treasury	  gave	  its	  approval	  for	  the	  New	  York	   Fed	   and	   the	  House	   of	  Morgan	   to	   coordinate	  Britain’s	   return	   to	   gold	   (Chernow	  1990:	  275).	  The	  key	  question	   in	   the	   run	  up	   to	   restoration	  was	  at	  what	  dollar	  price	   should	   the	  pound	  be	  fixed	  to	  gold?	  It	  was	  decided	  that	  sterling	  should	  be	  restored	  at	  the	  pre-­‐war	  parity	  of	  $4.86,	  despite	  the	  dissenting	  voice	  of	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  who	  believed	  that	  the	  pound	  was	  overvalued	  by	  10-­‐15%	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  57).	  British	  financial	  leaders	  feared	  that	  if	  the	   pound	   returned	   to	   gold	   at	   under	   $4.86	   foreign	   investors	   would	   lose	   confidence	   in	  sterling,	   taking	   even	  more	  of	   their	   business	   to	  New	  York	   (Costigliola,	   1977:	   923).	  Money	  markets	  on	  each	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  had	  become	  more	  tightly	  intertwined	  than	  ever	  before	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  New	  York.	  	  Crucially,	  this	  meant	  that,	  	  	  ‘Changes	  in	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  New	  York	  as	  a	  deposit	  centre	  for	  secondary	  money	  markets	  or	   changes	   in	  New	  York’s	   volume	  of	   lending	   affected	   the	   sterling	   exchanges	   independently	   of	   the	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position	  of	  the	  British	  pattern	  of	  settlements	  and	  balance	  of	  payments	  at	  the	  time’	  (Costigliola,	  1977:	  34-­‐6).	  	   	  This	   degree	   of	   interdependence	   made	   Central	   Bank	   cooperation	   imperative.	   Strong	   and	  Norman	   enabled	   sterling’s	   return	   to	   gold	   through	   a	   cooperative	   strategy	   dealing	   with	  relative	  prices,	   interest	   rates	   and	   stabilisation	   credits	   (Clarke,	  1972:	  75).	  By	  making	   sure	  that	   interest	   rates	  were	  kept	  higher	   in	  London,	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  Bank	  of	  England	  created	   conditions	   that	   drew	   capital	   away	   from	   New	   York.	   The	   New	   York	   Fed	   and	   J.P.	  Morgan	   Co.	   provided	   $200	  million	   and	   $100	  million	   respectively	   in	   support	   of	   sterling’s	  return	   to	   gold	   (Hogan,	   1977:	  73;	   Chernow,	  1990:	  276).	  The	  centrality	  of	  London	  and	  New	  
York	   to	   the	   resuscitation	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   during	   the	   1920s	   anticipated	   their	   crucially	  
interdependent	  role	  within	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  of	  international	  monetary	  relations	  that	  
was	  put	   in	  place	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  American	  financial	  ascendance	  was	  gradually	  
de-­‐privileging	  Britain’s	   unique	   role	  within	   the	   international	  monetary	   system	  and	  driving	  a	  
much	   more	   interdependent	   and	   equal	   Anglo-­‐American	   axis	   upon	   which	   the	   system	  
increasingly	  rested.	  Beyond	   the	   return	   to	   gold	   in	   1925,	   the	   early	   to	  mid-­‐1920s	   had	  marked	   the	   high-­‐water	  mark	  of	  inter-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation	  over	  international	  finance.	  During	  the	  war	   a	   grouping	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers	   emerged	   who,	   ‘shared	   common	   values	   and	  goals,	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  commitment	  to	  prevent	  future	  wars	  through	  cooperating	  in	  financial	  questions’	  (Dayer,	  1991:	  158).	  These	  bankers	  wanted	  governments	  to	  remove	  themselves	  from	   business,	   pushed	   Central	   Banks	   to	   regain	   control	   over	   national	   currencies	   and	  
	  	   85	  
stabilise	  exchange	  rates,	  and	  looked	  to	  the	  funding	  of	  war	  debts	  and	  the	  return	  to	  gold	  to	  prevent	  the	  political	  manipulation	  of	  currencies	  (Ibid).	  Simultaneously	   however,	   American	   and	   British	   bankers	   were	   also	   rivals.	   Bankers	  from	  both	  nations	  strove	  to	  achieve	  dominance	  within	  international	  markets.22	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	  America	  had	  established	  a	  foreign	  banking	  system	  (Abrahams,	  1969:	  572).	  Both	  Strong	  and	  Norman	   intended	  to	  establish	   their	  own	  national	  currencies	  as	   the	  major	  unit	  for	   international	   trade	   and	   attempted	   to	   convince	   foreign	   governments	   to	   hold	   their	  reserves	   in	   dollars	   or	   pounds	   (Dayer,	   1991:	   159-­‐60).	   	   This	   tension	  had	  been	   in	   evidence	  during	  negotiations	  over	  how	  the	  reformed	  Reichsbank	  should	  hold	  international	  reserves	  earlier	   in	   the	   decade.	   The	   Americans	  wanted	   Germany’s	   foreign	   exchanges	   to	   be	   held	   in	  New	  York,	  in	  order	  to	  be	  readily	  convertible	  into	  gold.	  Britain	  viewed	  the	  potential	  transfer	  of	  reserves	  to	  New	  York	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  sterling’s	  credibility.	  Eventually,	  Britain	  triumphed	  in	  this	  negotiation,	  but	  the	  effect	  was	  to	  increase	  the	  pressure	  for	  a	  swift	  return	  of	  sterling	  to	  convertibility	  with	  gold.	  	  Nevertheless	  financial	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  powers	  were	  part	  of	  an	  emerging	  ‘informal	   entente’	   between	   the	   two	   states	   (Hogan,	   1977:77).	   After	   the	   war	   British	   elites	  realised	   that	   they	   would	   have	   to	   open	   up	   areas	   of	   the	   world	   formerly	   under	   their	  domination.	   This	   meant	   rescinding	   some	   control	   over	   international	   finance,	   resource	  development	  and	  communications.	   	  The	  British	  saw	   that	   cooperation	  with	   the	  U.S.	  would	  avoid	  unprofitable	  competition	  and	  prompt	  the	  Americans	  to	  share	  some	  of	  the	  burden	  of	  managing	  world	  order.	  From	  the	  American	  perspective,	  the	  Republican	  government	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  The	   Federal	   Reserve	   Act	   of	   1913	   had	   enabled	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   American	   banking	  (Abrahams,	  1969:	  572).	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1920s	   wanted	   cooperation	   based	   upon	   private	   programs	   organised	   and	   orchestrated	   by	  business	  and	  financial	  leaders.	  The	  upshot	  of	  this	  was	  that	  both	  domestic	  and	  international	  
arenas	  of	  public	  policy	  became	  largely	  a	  private	  concern	  (Hogan,	  1977:	  1,7).	  	  The	  Republicans	  promoted	   the	   role	   of	   private	   finance	   in	   the	   reconstruction	   of	   the	  European	   powers.23	  Groundwork	   for	   cooperation	   was	   laid	   when	   the	   Congressional	   War	  Foreign	  Debt	  Committee	  cancelled	  50%	  of	  the	  combined	  Allied	  debt	   in	  1922,	  after	  Britain	  had	  made	  a	  desperate	  last	  ditch	  attempt	  to	  soften	  terms	  with	  the	  Balfour	  note.	  The	  accord	  over	  debt	  was	  crucial	  to	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation.	   	  It	  alleviated,	  at	  least	  temporarily,	  a	  major	   source	   of	   disquiet	   between	   the	   two	  powers	   and	   represented,	   ‘the	   first	   block	   in	   an	  incipient	  structure	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  cooperation’	  (Hogan,	  1977:	  56).	  The	  House	  of	  Morgan’s	  involvement	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  attempts	  to	  restore	  sterling’s	  convertibility	  and	  finance	  European	  reconstruction	  was	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  broader	  trend	  in	  international	   affairs:	   the	   involvement	   of	   private	   bankers	   in	   political	   as	  well	   as	   ‘financial’	  discussions	  with	  governments.	  The	  1920s	  were	  an	  age	  of	  unprecedented	  prestige	   for	   the	  international	  banking	  community,	  with	  central	  bankers	  in	  particular	  now	  a	  major	  focus	  of	  public	   attention	   (Ahamed,	   2009:	   9).	   Private	   bankers	   laid	   out	   political	   requirements	   for	  securing	   loans.	   The	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   community	   was	   the	   most	   internationally	  influential	   of	   all.	   During	   a	   time	   of	   great	   economic	   and	   political	   uncertainty,	   cooperation	  between	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  communities	  provided	  a	  key	  impetus	  in	  integrating	  the	  economic	  strategies	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  with	  the	  merging	  entente	  between	  the	  two	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  In	   fact	   the	  Treasury	   resisted	   attempts	  by	   the	  American	  banking	   community	   to	  promote	   a	   large	  influx	   of	   American	   government	   financial	   aid	   to	   the	   struggling	   European	   economies	   (Abrahams,	  1969:	  577-­‐80).	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countries	   during	   the	   1920s	   ‘reflected	   in	   central	   and	   private	   bank	   cooperation,	   and	   in	   a	  common	   British	   and	   American	   approach	   to	   the	   important	   issues	   of	   war	   debts	   and	  reparations’	  (Hogan,	  1977:	  77).	  Anglo-­‐American	   bankers	   had	   grown	   accustomed	   to	   working	   with	   one	   another,	  finding	   cooperation	   easier	   than	   their	   respective	   Treasuries	   did	   (Hogan,	   1977:	   149).	  Governments	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	  Atlantic	   recognised	   the	   importance	   of	   their	   respective	  financial	   communities,	   endeavouring	   to	   utilise	   them	   for	   political	   ends	   and	   national	  interests.	  Nevertheless	  they	  did	  respect	  ‘boundaries	  beyond	  which	  it	  was	  not	  legitimate,	  or	  possible	   to	  control	  private	  banks	  and	  bankers	  as	   they	  went	  about	   their	  business’	   (Hogan,	  1977:	   149).	   In	   a	   deeply	   undemocratic	   manner,	   private	   bankers	   often	   made	   decisions	   of	  enormous	  political	  significance	  during	  the	  1920s.	  	  
	  
The	  Great	  Depression	  and	  the	  road	  to	  war	  
	  Despite	   the	  centrality	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   cooperation	   to	   rebuilding	   the	  post-­‐war	  international	  economy,	   the	   tail	  end	  of	   the	  1920s	  was	  marked	  by	  a	  rapid	  disintegration	  of	  efforts	  at	  cooperation	  as	  the	  flimsily	  reconstructed	  gold	  standard	  rapidly	  began	  to	  unravel.	  During	   the	   latter	   half	   of	   the	   decade	   cooperative	   efforts,	   ‘coexisted	   with	   new	   strains	   in	  Anglo-­‐American	  relations’	  (Hogan,	  1977:	  220).	  Sterling	  proved	  to	  be	  grossly	  overvalued,	  as	  Keynes	  had	  suggested	  prior	  to	  the	  return	  to	  gold.	  European	  exports	  were	  cheaper	  and	  an	  overvalued	   currency	   hindered	   Britain’s	   economic	   recovery	   during	   the	   second	   half	   of	   the	  1920s.	   The	   fundamental	   conditions	   underpinning	   the	   classical	   gold	   standard	   were	   no	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longer	   in	   place	   during	   the	   post-­‐war	   gold	   standard.	   The	   old	   mechanisms	   of	   adjustment	  under	  the	  gold	  standard,	  which	  relied	  upon	  wage	  deflation	  to	  correct	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits	  and	  boost	  competitiveness	  through	  a	  downward	  shift	  in	  prices,	  could	  no	  longer	  be	  applied	  without	   political	   resistance.	   The	   growth	   of	   trade	   unionism,	  working	   class	   parties	  and	  unemployment	  benefits	  all	   contributed	   to	   the	   slowing	  down	  of	  wage	  adjustment	  and	  meant	   that	   austerity	   couldn’t	   be	   imposed	   upon	   workers	   as	   it	   once	   had	   been.	   Central	  bankers	   were	   not	   nearly	   as	   insulated	   from	   political	   pressures	   as	   they	   wished	   to	   be	  (Eichengreen	  &	  Temin,	  2000:	  192).	  This	  reality	  was	  nowhere	  demonstrated	  clearer	  than	  in	  Britain.	  Ever	  since	  returning	  to	  gold	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  had	  been	  battling	  gold	   losses,	  as	  gold	  was	  horded	  by	  France,	  Germany	  and	  the	  U.S.	  With	  gold	  holdings	  now	  so	  overwhelmingly	  concentrated	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  European	   countries,	   particularly	   Britain	   and	   Germany,	   were	   left	   facing	   major	   supply	  shortages	  (Ahamed,	  2009:	  164).	  	  Although	  Britain	  had	  been	  keen	  for	  other	  country’s	  to	  hold	  sterling	   reserves	   rather	   than	   underpinning	   their	   monetary	   base	   exclusively	   with	   gold,	  French	  officials	  viewed	  the	  proposals	  made	  by	  Britain	  at	  Genoa	  as	  a	  ‘British	  ploy	  to	  fortify	  London’s	  position	  as	  a	  financial	  centre	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  Paris’.	  They	  preferred	  to	  hold	  gold	  instead	  and	  built	  up	  huge	  reserves	  on	  the	  back	  of	  an	  undervalued	  franc.	  Capital	  inflows	  into	  Germany,	   with	   the	   U.S.	   as	   the	   major	   source,	   led	   to	   a	   tripling	   of	   the	   Reichsbank’s	   gold	  reserves	   between	   1924	   and	   1928.	   This	   absorption	   of	   gold	   by	   France	   and	   Germany	   put	  increased	  pressure	  on	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  65).	  	  	  In	  response	  to	  these	  pressures	  the	  Bank	  would	  raise	  Bank	  Rate	  to	  pull	   in	  gold	  and	  limit	   domestic	   liquidity	   through	   the	   imposition	   of	   austerity.	   But	   this	   strategy	   could	   no	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longer	  be	  undertaken	  with	  the	  ease	  of	   the	  pre-­‐war	  period.	  Persistent	  high	  unemployment	  meant	  that	  Montagu	  Norman	  was	  constrained	  by	  the	  political	  implications	  of	  raising	  rates	  (Attard,	  2004:	  205).	  Churchill	  demanded	  that	  Norman	  reduce	  Bank	  Rate	  in	  1925	  and	  after	  initially	  resisting,	  Norman	  agreed	  to	  do	  so	  (Boyce,	  2004:	  226).	  The	  gold	  standard	  had	  not	  provided	   the	   desired	   degree	   of	   insulation	   from	   political	   pressure.	   When	   a	   coal	   strike	  morphed	   into	   the	   General	   Strike	   in	   1926,	   the	   political	   opposition	   to	   the	   gold	   standard	  dictates	  grew	  even	  stronger	  (Block,	  1977:	  17;	  Eichengreen	  &	  Temin,	  2000:	  193).	  Britain’s	  weakening	   balance	   of	   payments,	  with	   the	   overvalued	   pound	   pricing	   British	   goods	   out	   of	  foreign	   markets,	   further	   undermined	   the	   maintenance	   of	   convertibility	   and	   led	   to	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  the	  City	  and	  British	   industrial	  producers	  (Boyce,	  2004:	  216).	  Britain’s	  preoccupation	  with	  her	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  America	  and	  the	  dollar	  led	  policy	  elites	  to	   neglect	   the	   problem	   of	   undervaluation	   from	   her	   European	   competitors	   (Costigliola,	  1977:	  927-­‐8).	  Once	  convertibility	  had	  been	  restored,	  the	  coordination	  required	  to	  prevent	  Britain	  experiencing	  shortages	  of	  gold	  did	  not	  arise.	  	  But	  the	  decisive	  blow	  to	  the	  post-­‐war	  gold	  standard	  came	  from	  the	  dynamics	  of	  the	  American	  economy	  and	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  behaved	  in	  its	  attempts	  to	  manage	  them.	   As	   the	   American	   economy	   prospered	   during	   the	   1920s	   and	   war	   debt	   repayments	  were	   collected,	   gold	   flowed	   in	   to	   the	   country.	   By	   1926,	   the	   U.S.	   held	   nearly	   45%	   of	   the	  world’s	   gold	   supply,	   with	   one	   quarter	   of	   this	   ‘free	   gold’-­‐	  meaning	   that	   it	   was	   above	   and	  beyond	   the	  40%	  per	   cent	   backing	   for	   the	  money	   supply	  mandated	  by	   the	  American	   gold	  standard	  law.	  But	  rather	  than	  allowing	  the	  domestic	  money	  supply	  to	  increase	  in	  response	  to	   these	   inflows,	   as	   gold	   standard	   protocol	   dictated,	   the	   Americans	   sterilised	   the	   gold	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inflows	  and	  refused	  to	  allow	  American	  prices	  to	  increase	  in	  order	  to	  allow	  other	  countries	  to	   adjust	   (Block,	   1977:	   21;	   Eichengreen,	   2008:	   65-­‐67;	  Ahamed,	   2009:	   170).	  Rejecting	   the	  traditional	   gold	   standard	   relationship	   between	   the	   gold	   supply	   and	   the	   money	   supply,	  Benjamin	   Strong	   at	   the	  New	  York	   Fed	   devised	   a	   new	   and	   expanded	  mandate	   for	   central	  banking.	   No	   longer	   was	   the	   Fed	   exclusively	   concerned	   with	   stabilising	   domestic	   prices	  (although	  this	  remained	  its	  primary	  objective),	  it	  was	  also	  attentive	  to	  the	  need	  to	  respond	  to	   fluctuations	   in	   the	   level	   of	   domestic	   business	   activity	   by	   making	   appropriate	  	  adjustments	   to	   the	   credit	   supply.	   Strong’s	   new	  monetary	   policy	   principles	   foreshadowed	  the	  expanded	  Central	  Bank	  mandates	  of	  the	  modern	  era.	  But	  the	  domestic	  concerns	  of	  the	  Fed	  were	  now	  jeopardising	  the	  entire	  international	  payments	  system.	  By	  hoarding	  gold	  and	  failing	  to	  allow	  a	  commensurate	  increase	  in	  the	  money	  supply	  (with	  an	  associated	  increase	  in	   demand	   for	   imports	   and	   higher	   U.S.	   prices	   that	   would	   dampen	   exports)	   Strong	   was	  undermining	   the	   gold	   standard	   system	   by	   forestalling	   the	   adjustments	   that	   would	   help	  correct	  international	  imbalances	  (Ahamed,	  2009:	  171).	  In	  addition	  to	  these	  American	  policy	  failures,	   the	   weaknesses	   of	   the	   newly	   inaugurated	   Federal	   Reserve	   System	   also	   caused	  problems	   and	   symbolised	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   America’s	   institutional	   capacity	   for	  international	  financial	  leadership.	  The	  exact	  locus	  of	  power	  within	  the	  system	  was	  unclear	  and	  this	  resulted	  in	  internal	  struggles	  over	  who	  should	  wield	  power.	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  in	  Washington	  was	  hamstrung	  by	  an	  unclear	  mandate	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  precisely	  defined	  purpose.	   Ambiguities	   and	   tensions	  within	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   System	   left	   it	   ill-­‐suited	   to	  play	  its	  emerging	  global	  role	  with	  genuine	  conviction	  (Ahamed,	  2009:	  176).	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A	  bad	  situation	  then	  became	  much	  worse	  in	  the	  final	  years	  of	  the	  1920s.	  A	  booming	  New	  York	  stock	  market	  had	  fuelled	  an	   increasingly	  speculative	  pattern	  of	   investment	  and	  reoriented	   the	   interests	   of	   American	   investors	   away	   from	   Europe	   and	   towards	  opportunities	  within	   the	  U.S.	   This	   effectively	   cut	   European	   countries	   off	   from	   the	   capital	  inflows	  upon	  which	  they	  were	  dependent	   in	  order	   to	  service	  war	  debts.	  The	  U.S.	  stood	  at	  the	   centre	   of	   a	   complex	   payments	   triangle	   in	   which	   American	   private	   financial	   inflows	  funded	  Germany,	  which	  then	  made	  debt	  repayments	  to	  Britain	  or	  France,	  who	  in	  turn	  made	  payments	   to	   the	  U.S.	   (Konings,	   2011:	  74).	  When	   the	  Fed	   raised	   interest	   rates	   in	   order	   to	  stem	  the	  boom,	  Europe	  was	  deprived	  of	  essential	  capital	   inflows	  and	  forced	  to	  pay	  higher	  interest	  rates	  on	  existing	  loans	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  69).	  Once	  the	  private	  loans	  to	  Germany	  began	  to	  dry	  up,	  the	  system	  came	  under	  increasing	  strain,	  but	  the	  U.S.	  steadfastly	  refused	  to	  annul	  the	  debts.	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Crash	  in	  October	  1929	  sent	  the	  U.S.	  stock	  market	  into	  free	  fall.	  Within	   a	  month,	   in	  October	  1929,	   shares	  on	  Wall	   Street	  had	   lost	  40%	  of	   their	   value.	  Around	   six	   thousand	   American	   banks	   closed	   between	   1929	   and	   1932.	   By	   1933	  unemployment	  had	  reached	  25%	  in	  America	  and	  economic	  output	  had	  fallen	  by	  one	  third	  (Dimbleby	  &	  Reynolds,	  1988:	  110).	  Overall,	   the	  U.S.	  contribution	  to	  international	  financial	  development	  during	  the	  interwar	  years	  was	  ‘more	  destructive	  than	  constructive’	  (Konings,	  2011:	  75).	  Developments	   in	   the	  U.S.	   had	   a	   huge	   impact	   on	   Britain’s	   standing	  within	   the	   gold	  standard.	  The	  imposition	  of	  tariffs	  abroad	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  world	  trade	  associated	  with	  the	  Depression	  undermined	  the	   invisible	  earnings	  that	  had	  supported	  Britain’s	  balance	  of	  payments.	  Between	  1929	  and	  1931,	  Britain	  experienced	  a	  major	  deterioration	  in	  its	  trade	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balance	  and	  a	  massive	  collapse	  of	  its	  invisible’s	  balance.	  British	  exports	  declined	  by	  31%	  in	  the	   same	   period.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   Britain	   to	   maintain	  sterling’s	   value	   against	   gold.	   	   Britain	   initially	   benefited	   as	   investors	   retreated	   from	   the	  dollar	  after	  1929,	  but	  pressure	  soon	  turned	  to	  sterling	  in	  1931.	  Despite	   increases	  to	  Bank	  Rate,	   Britain	   continued	   to	   suffer	   from	   major	   capital	   outflows	   until	   currency	   traders	  eventually	  provoked	  a	  major	  sterling	  crisis	  (Block,	  1977:	  28;	  Eichengreen,	  2008:	  78-­‐82).	  A	  worsening	   budget	   deficit	   prompted	   a	   run	   on	   sterling.	   In	   a	   humiliating	   twist,	   the	   Labour	  Prime	  Minister	  Ramsey	  Macdonald	  appealed	  to	  J.	  P.	  Morgan	  for	  assistance	  but	  was	  told	  that	  he	   must	   cut	   social	   security	   spending	   and	   balance	   the	   books	   in	   order	   to	   receive	   funds	  (Temperley,	  2002:	  129;	  Allen,	  1955:	  760).	  Morgan’s	  power	  had	  enabled	  the	   imposition	  of	  conditionality	  upon	  a	  British	  Prime	  Minister.	  	  The	   Labour	   government	   acceded	   to	   the	   deficit	   cuts	   and	   received	   a	   $200	   million	  credit	  from	  J.P.	  Morgan	  (Chernow,	  1990:	  330;	  Ahamed,	  2009:	  427).	  But	  these	  actions	  were	  not	   enough	   and	   Britain	   was	   forced	   to	   go	   off	   gold	   on	   September	   19th,	   1931.	   This	   action	  symbolised	   the	   termination	   of	   the	   interwar	   gold	   standard	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   82).	   By	  1932,	   the	   international	  monetary	   system	  had	   fragmented	   into	   three	  distinctive	  blocs	   and	  later	  in	  the	  year	  Roosevelt	  took	  the	  dollar	  off	  gold	  and	  devalued	  by	  40%	  against	  gold.	  The	  end	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   also	   seriously	   restricted	   the	   dollar’s	   rise	   as	   an	   international	  currency	  in	  more	  general	  terms	  and	  revitalised	  sterling’s	  relative	  standing	  during	  the	  1930s	  (Konings,	  2011:	  74;	  Eichengreen,	  2011:	  36)	  The	   collapse	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   further	   aggravated	   tensions	   between	   the	   two	  countries;	   with	   the	   war	   debt	   issue	   having	   recurred	   from	   1929-­‐1931,	   while	   Britain	   and	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America	  were	  at	   loggerheads	  once	  again	  over	   the	   issue	  of	   full	  cancellation.	  Tensions	  over	  the	   naval	   balance	   between	   the	   two	  nations	   also	   re-­‐emerged	   in	   the	   later	   1920’s.	   Growing	  Japanese	  power	  raised	  American	  concerns	  over	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  combined	  Anglo-­‐Japanese	  naval	  threat	  in	  the	  Far	  East.	  Britain	  went	  to	  great	  lengths	  to	  make	  clear	  to	  America	  that	  this	  was	  not	  a	  realistic	  possibility	  but	  to	  no	  avail.	  Wrangling	  over	  the	  Washington	  Naval	  Treaty	  continued	  to	  blight	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  the	  two	  powers	  (Allen,	  1955:	  734-­‐50).	  	  Britain	   eventually	   defaulted	   on	   the	   remaining	   debt	   to	   America.	   Amidst	   a	   rapidly	  deteriorating	   international	   economic	   climate,	   Britain	   abandoned	   its	   longstanding	  commitment	   to	   free	   trade.	   At	   the	  Ottawa	   Conference	   in	   1932,	   Britain	  moved	   to	   Imperial	  Preference	  and	  discrimination	  against	  American	  goods.	  As	   the	  storm	  of	  depression	  raged,	  Britain	  sought	  refuge	  within	  protected	  imperial	  markets.	  Sterling	  could	  no	  longer	  function	  as	   the	   international	   ‘Top	   Currency’	   (Strange,	   1971:	   55).	   Instead,	   Montagu	   Norman	  established	   an	   exclusive	   ‘Sterling	   Area’	   of	   dependent	   colonial	   territories	   that	   traded	   in	  sterling	  with	  Britain	  at	  its	  centre.	  The	  international	  monetary	  system	  had	  fragmented	  into	  rival	  currency	  and	  trading	  blocs	  and	  would	  not	  be	  restored	  on	  an	  effective	  multilateral	  basis	  until	   the	   1950s.	   The	   structures	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   cooperation	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	  reconstructed	   gold	   standard	   had	   proved	   too	   weak	   and	   the	   international	   economy	   was	  thrown	  into	  lasting	  turmoil	  that	  fed	  directly	  into	  the	  inflammation	  of	  geopolitical	  tensions	  and	  the	  outbreak	  of	  WW2.	  Although	   the	   informal	   cooperative	   efforts	   of	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   had	   failed,	   there	  were	  important	  changes	  in	  multilateral	  thinking	  which	  occurred	  during	  the	  depression	  era.	  	  After	   1933,	   the	   Economic	   and	   Financial	   Organization	   of	   the	   League	   of	   Nations	   began	   to	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develop	  a	  new	  model.	  This	  model	  would	  go	  on	  to	  become	  a	  direct	  forebear	  to	  the	  IMF.	  	  The	  final	  economic	  studies	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  League	  went	  on	  to	  shape	  the	  post-­‐war	  settlement,	  by	  moulding	  a	  new	  consensus	  that	  was	  institutionalised	  through	  the	  1944	  Bretton	  Woods	  Agreement.	  Under	  the	  new	  consensus,	  obstacles	  to	  trade	  would	  gradually	  be	  removed	  and	  transparent,	  monitored	  agreements	  would	  facilitate	  an	  orderly	  approach	  to	  exchange-­‐rate	  adjustments.	  The	  scope	   for	  countercyclical	   fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policies,	  as	  well	  as	  capital	  mobility,	  would	  be	  shaped	  by	  the	  need	  to	   liberalise	  trade	  and	  promote	  a	  stable	  system	  of	  exchange	  rates	  (Pauly,	  1997:	  73).	  Although	  the	  endurance	  of	  the	  old	  orthodoxies	  had	  nearly	  brought	  the	  world	  economy	  to	  ruin,	  the	  seeds	  of	  a	  new	  international	  monetary	  order	  were	  beginning	  to	  be	  sown.	  
	  
The	  limits	  and	  affects	  of	  the	  great	  reversal	  
	  From	   a	   colonial	   dependency	   late	   in	   the	   18th	   century,	   the	   United	   States	   had	   become	   the	  foremost	   industrial	   power	   in	   the	   world	   by	   the	   eve	   of	   WW2.	   As	   this	   chapter	   has	  demonstrated,	  American	  ascendancy	  was	  closely	  linked	  to	  the	  gradual	  diminution	  of	  British	  power.	  In	  matters	  of	  finance,	  the	  de-­‐privileging	  of	  Britain’s	  singular	  role	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	   system	  occurred	   in	   no	   small	   part	   due	   to	   the	   growth	   of	   American	  power.	  American	  industrial	  catch-­‐up	  eroded	  British	  trade	  dominance	  and	  the	  impact	  of	  the	  war	   greatly	   accelerated	   the	   rate	   at	   which	   America	   was	   able	   to	   emulate	   British	   pre-­‐eminence.	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It	  was	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  First	  World	  War	  that	  enabled	  the	  financial	  power	  of	  the	  Morgan	  dynasty	   to	   attain	   such	   a	   significant	   role	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  Anglo-­‐American	   financial	  linkages.	  By	  eroding	  British	  power	  and	  stimulating	  American	  industry,	  the	  war	  accelerated	  America’s	  rise	  in	  relative	  standing.	  But	  it	  also	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  drawing	  Britain	  into	  a	  critical	  borrowing	  relationship	  with	  the	  American	  government	  that	  soured	  relations	   in	  the	  1920s	  and	  increased	  British	  dependency	  upon	  American	  finance.	  	  Through	  the	  war	  transatlantic	   financial	  relationships	  became,	  paradoxically,	  both	  a	  source	  of	  contestation	  and	  a	  fulcrum	  of	  cooperation.	  The	  post-­‐war	  transatlantic	  relationship	  was,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  marked	  by	  bitter	  political	  disagreements	  between	  governments	  over	  the	   repayment	   of	  war	  debts.	   Simultaneously,	   it	  was	  defined	  by	  Central	  Bank	   cooperation	  and	   the	  growing	   importance	  of	  an	  Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   community	   that	   spanned	   the	  Atlantic.	  By	  the	  1920s	  a	  form	  of	  private	  international	  governance,	  led	  by	  private	  and	  central	  bankers,	  had	  begun	  to	  play	  a	  key	  role	  in	  international	  politics.	  As	  sterling’s	  singular	  dominance	  ebbed	  away,	  and	  the	  dollar	  rose	  to	  prominence,	  the	  fates	  of	  monetary	  politics	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  became	  increasingly	  intertwined	  during	  the	  1920s.	   That	   pattern	   would	   continue	   to	   be	   crucial	   to	   the	   wider	   international	   political	  economy	  under	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  after	  WW2.	  But	  although	  Britain	  and	  America	  managed	   to	   resuscitate	   the	   gold	   standard	   through	   sporadic	   and	   ad	   hoc	   cooperation,	   the	  absence	   of	   a	   firmer	   multilateral	   commitment	   to	   economic	   cooperation	   and	   the	   policy	  blunders	  of	  American	   financial	   authorities,	   played	  a	   key	   role	   in	   the	  decomposition	  of	   the	  interwar	  gold	  standard	  and	  the	  disintegration	  of	  the	  liberal	  international	  political	  economy.	  This	  was	  not	  merely	   a	   case	  of	   a	   failure	  of	  American	   leadership,	  but	   also	  a	  product	  of	   the	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inadequacy	  of	  American	  financial	  capacity	  to	  supplant	  Britain’s	  ailing	  role	  as	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	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3	  British	  Development	  and	  Post-­‐war	  American	  Power:	  
	  	  	  	  Beyond	  the	  Hegemony/Rivalry	  Binary	  
	  
	  After	  the	  devastation	  of	  World	  War	  II,	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  were	  once	  again	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  efforts	   to	   reconstruct	   the	   international	   monetary	   system.	   But	   with	   Britain	   now	   gravely	  weakened	   by	   its	   role	   in	   a	   second	   global	   conflagration	   in	   less	   than	   thirty	   years,	   the	   great	  reversal	   in	   power	   that	   had	   accelerated	   after	   WW1	   reached	   terminal	   velocity.	   American	  power	  vastly	  outstripped	  that	  of	  Britain.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  WW2,	  American	  predominance	  was	  beyond	  doubt.	  Britain’s	  junior	  role	  in	  the	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  Special	  Relationship	  was	  clearly	  evinced	  by	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  American	  representatives	  led	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  negotiations	  that	  eventually	  produced	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement	  in	  1944.	  	  	  In	  their	  attempts	  to	  understand	  the	  impact	  of	  American	  predominance	  upon	  British	  development	   in	   the	   early	  post-­‐war	  years,	   scholars	  have	   arrived	  at	   a	  polarised	   stasis.	  The	  contending	   interpretations	   offered	   by	   Edward	   Brett,	   and	   Peter	   Burnham,	   represent	   the	  central	   cleavage	   in	   this	   debate.	   For	   Brett	   (1985:	   139),	   Britain’s	   capitulation	   to	   American	  hegemony	   was	   complete.	   Burnham	   (1990:	   2)	   by	   contrast,	   chided	   Brett	   for	   overstating	  British	  capitulation	  and	  overlooking	  the	  degree	  of	  rivalry	  that	  persisted.	  Both	  scholars	  tied	  their	  analyses	  of	  early	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  relations	  into	  diagnoses	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	   economic	  malady.	   But	   the	   conclusions	   they	   arrived	   at	   were	  markedly	   different.	   For	  Brett	  (1985:	  156)	  it	  was	  the	  degree	  of	  capitulation	  that	  spelled	  Britain’s	  undoing,	  while	  for	  Burnham	  it	  was	  precisely	  the	  opposite.	  Britain’s	  successful	  evasion	  of	  American	  hegemony	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was	  ultimately	  self-­‐defeating,	  prolonging	  the	  defunct	  Sterling	  Area	  and	  keeping	  Britain	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  robust	  intra-­‐European	  trade	  growth	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  12).	  	  This	   chapter	   contests	   the	   polarised	   interpretations	   offered	   by	   Edward	   Brett	   and	  Peter	  Burnham,	  arguing	  that	  both	  authors,	  despite	  drawing	  attention	  to	  important	  aspects	  of	  the	  emerging	  post-­‐war	  relationship,	  overlook	  many	  of	  the	  key	  processes	  and	  tensions	  at	  play.	   In	   the	   first	   section	   of	   the	   chapter	   I	   explore	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	  processes	  at	  play	  during	  the	  interwar	  and	  wartime	  periods	  arguing	  that	  these	  processes	  are	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years	  and	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  the	  international	  political	  economy.	  The	  chapter	  then	  stresses	  the	  need	  to	  disaggregate	  the	  national	  interests	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  in	  order	  to	  trace	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  currents	  of	  institutional	   development	   shaped	   the	   negotiations	   over	   Bretton	   Woods.	   In	   light	   of	   this	  analysis,	   	   	   I	   then	   review	   the	   contending	   ‘capitulation’	   and	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	   rivalry’	   theses	  propounded	   by	   Edward	   Brett	   and	   Peter	   Burnham.	   	   I	   argue	   that	   Brett’s	   ‘capitulation’	  interpretation	  overstates	  the	  degree	  of	  British	  subordination	  and	  obscures	  the	  underlying	  compatibility	   of	   interests	   between	   the	   banking	   communities	   in	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   The	  conditions	   of	   the	   immediate	   post-­‐war	   political	   economy	   produced	   obstacles	   to	   the	  realisation	   of	   these	  mutual	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   interests,	   but	   the	   nascent	   foundations	   for	   their	  subsequent	  confirmation	  were	  already	  firmly	  in	  place.	  	  Moving	  on	  to	  Peter	  Burnham’s	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’	   thesis,	   I	  argue	  that	  Burnham	  exaggerates	   the	  notion	  of	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’	  by	   falling	  prey	  to	   the	  realist	   fetish	  of	   the	  ‘national	   interest’	   and	   failing	   to	   disaggregate	   the	   different	   centres	   of	   institutional	   power	  within	  the	  state.	  Breaking	  from	  the	  capitulation/rivalry	  binary,	  I	  argue	  that	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐
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America	   dynamics	   should	   be	   characterised	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘contained	   rivalry’	   and	   ‘uneven	  interdependence’.	  	  Although	  Britain	  and	  America	  remained	  rivals,	  the	  rivalry	  existed	  within	  a	  militarily	  pacified	  relationship	  that	  had	  emerged	  during	  the	  war.	  While	  Brett’s	  emphasis	  upon	   capitulation	  unduly	   erases	   all	   traces	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	   rivalry,	  Burnham’s	   account,	  conversely,	   anachronistically	   overstates	   the	   fractiousness	   of	   the	   relationship	   by	  conceptualising	  it	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’.	  The	  contained	  rivalry	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  pattern	  of	  ‘uneven	  interdependence’	  that	  would	  continue	  to	  characterise	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  in	  the	  decades	  after	  Bretton	  Woods.	  This	  was	  a	   two-­‐way	   dynamic	   in	   which	   American	   power	   was	   predominant,	   but	   both	   countries	  recognised	   their	   mutual	   dependence	   upon	   the	   developmental	   trajectory	   of	   the	   other.	  Britain	  was	   financially	  dependent	  upon	   the	  U.S.,	  but	  American	  state	  officials	  and	   the	  New	  York	  banking	   community	   in	   particular,	   recognised	   that	   in	   order	   to	   realise	   their	   post-­‐war	  ambitions,	  they	  would	  need	  to	  encourage	  Britain	  to	  adopt	  a	  multilateral	  outlook	  upon	  the	  international	  economy	  and	  work	  towards	  the	  restoration	  of	  sterling	  convertibility.	  	  	  In	   contrast	   to	   the	   picture	   of	   policy	   consensus	   and	   unified	   national	   interests	   that	  Brett	  and	  Burnham	  present,	   I	  argue	   that	  serious	   tensions	  over	   the	  best	  policy	   framework	  for	  post-­‐war	  international	  monetary	  relations	  existed	  within	  the	  British	  state.	  While	  Keynes	  and	  the	  government	  grudgingly	  accepted	  the	  need	  to	  move	  towards	  multilateralism	  under	  the	   Bretton	   Woods	   framework,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   and	   orthodox	   elements	   within	   the	  Treasury	  preferred	  the	  maintenance	  of	  a	  bilateral	  framework	  grounded	  in	  the	  prolongation	  of	   the	   Sterling	   Area.	   Over	   time,	   the	   orthodox	   forces	   within	   the	   British	   state,	   which	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prioritised	   the	   international	   status	   of	   sterling	   and	   the	   City	   above	   the	   need	   for	  reconstruction	   and	   full	   employment,	   gradually	   achieved	  dominance.	   	   Tensions	  within	   the	  British	  state	  were	  mirrored	  in	  the	  different	  degrees	  of	  emphasis	  that	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  State	  Department	  placed	  upon	  the	  need	  for	  Britain	  to	  return	  to	  convertibility.	  The	  U.S.	  Treasury’s	   role	   as	   the	   primary	   representative	   of	   American	   state	   power	   during	   the	  negotiations	   at	  Bretton	  Woods	  produced	   a	   firm	  emphasis	   upon	   the	   right	   for	   countries	   to	  implement	   capital	   controls	   and	   enabled	   Keynes	   to	   secure	   breathing	   space	   before	   Britain	  had	  to	  restore	  convertibility.	  Yet	  the	  New	  York	  banking	  community,	  who	  rallied	  around	  the	  New	   York	   Fed’s	   ‘Key	   Currency	   Plan’	   and	   received	   support	   from	   the	   State	   Department,	  opposed	  the	  plan.	  	  Although	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement	  primarily	  reflected	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury’s	  post-­‐war	   blueprint,	   the	   balance	   of	   power	   within	   the	   American	   state	   shifted	   after	   Roosevelt’s	  death	  in	  1945.	   	  Prominent	  New	  York	  bankers	  within	  the	  State	  Department	  and	  influential	  within	  the	  Truman	  administration	  were	  able	  to	  challenge	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement	  by	  pushing	  Britain	   towards	   a	   swifter	   restoration	  of	   convertibility.	  That	   attempt	   failed,	   but	   it	  brought	   about	   the	   eventual	   realisation	   by	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   that	   only	   a	   multilateral	  approach	  could	  safeguard	  sterling’s	  international	  role.	  	  It	   is	   precisely	   these	   tensions	   and	   struggles	   then,	  within	   both	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	  which	  account	  for	  the	  limited	  triumph	  of	  Keynesian	  thinking	  within	  the	  British	  state	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	  the	  orthodox	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  under	  the	  Conservative	  governments	  of	   the	   1950s.	   These	   early	   struggles	   for	   influence	   over	   the	   post-­‐war	   economic	   agenda,	   on	  both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic,	   laid	   the	   groundwork	   for	   the	   subsequent	   undermining	   of	   the	  
	  	   101	  
Keynesian	  compromise	  in	  the	  decades	  that	  followed.	  The	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  influence	  of	  private	   and	   central	   bankers	   in	   the	   early	   1950s	   laid	   the	   foundations	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	  integration	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  finance	  that	  followed	  with	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  later	   in	   the	  decade.	   	   In	   the	  post-­‐war	  years,	  Anglo-­‐American	  banking	  power	  would	   lay	   the	  foundations	  for	  the	  subsequent	  subversion	  of	  Keynesianism	  and	  the	  realisation	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  	  
	  
The	  continuity	  of	  process:	  integrating	  war	  and	  post-­‐war	  
	  Understanding	   the	   post-­‐war	   Anglo-­‐American	   context	   requires	   us	   to	   dismantle	   the	  traditional	   analytical	   division	   between	   ‘war’	   and	   ‘post-­‐war’	   to	   unearth	   the	   continuity	   of	  developmental	   processes	   that	   span	   across	   the	   two	   periods.	   The	   tendency	   to	   attempt	   the	  neat	  delineation	  of	  phases	  of	  world	  order,	  common	  within	  IPE,	  obscures	  a	  focus	  on	  longer-­‐term	   developmental	   processes	   (Lacher:	   2006).	   Processes	   of	   institutional	   transformation	  were	  underway	  during	  and	  after	   the	  war	  but	  were	  manifested	   in	  different	   strategies	  and	  outcomes.	   During	   the	  war	  many	   of	   the	   conditions	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	  world	  were	  moulded,	  particularly	  those	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  (Kolko,	  1968:	  7;	  Hudson,	  1972:	  37;	  Dobson,	  1995:	   72).	   Negotiations	   over	   Lend-­‐Lease	   were	   central	   here.	   The	   war	   rapidly	   exhausted	  Britain’s	  financial	  reserves.	  Gold	  reserves	  that	  had	  stood	  at	  $4	  billion	  in	  1938	  were	  down	  to	  $1	   billion	   by	   September	   of	   1940.	   The	   British	   government	   nationalised	   private	   overseas	  investment	   holdings	   of	   citizens	   to	   meet	   the	   mounting	   costs	   of	   war.	   As	   Britain’s	   reserve	  position	  worsened	  they	  turned	  to	  the	  U.S.,	  resulting	  in	  the	  Lend-­‐Lease	  agreement	  of	  1941.	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Under	   Lend-­‐Lease	   Britain	   would	   no	   longer	   need	   dollars	   to	   purchase	   U.S.	   goods,	  abating	   the	   pressure	   on	   reserves	   (Skidelsky,	   2000:	   100).	   The	   cost	   of	   transactions	   was	  deferred	  until	   after	   the	  war.	  But	   as	  Michael	  Hudson	  notes,	   the	  agreement	  was	  not	  only	  a	  strategy	  to	  bolster	  Britain’s	  resistance	  to	  Nazi	  Germany,	  it	  was	  also	  a	  lever	  with	  which	  the	  U.S.	   could	   ensure	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   dependence,	   win	   commitment	   to	   the	   end	   of	   British	  trade	   discrimination	   and	   gain	   access	   to	   formerly	   exclusive	   areas	   of	   British	   interests	  (Hudson,	  1972:	  44;	  Dobson,	  1986:	  32).	  What	  Hudson	  misses	  is	  that	  Lend-­‐Lease	  also	  pushed	  the	   two	   countries	   closer	   towards	   cooperative	   integration	   by	   intensifying	   the	   pooling	   of	  resources	   (Ovendale,	   1998:	   47).	   Financial	   integration	  was	  matched	   by	   integration	   in	   the	  technological	   and	   intelligence	   fields	   (Ovendale,	   1998:	   45;	   Dobson,	   1995:	   74).	   There	   was	  enormous	  transatlantic	  exchange	  of	  administrative	  capacities	  too,	  with	  Grosvenor	  Square	  in	  London	  becoming	  the	  home	  of	  a	  huge	  American	  presence	  while	  in	  Washington,	  during	  the	  height	   of	   the	   war,	   around	   nine	   thousand	   British	   officials	   were	   based	   around	   the	   British	  Embassy.	  	  The	  alliance	  of	  World	  War	   II	  was	  much	  closer	   than	  that	   forged	  during	  WW1	  and	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  mutual	  suspicion	  of	  the	  1930s	  (Kolko,	  1968:	  13;	  Dimbleby	  &	  Reynolds,	  1988:	   Saville,	   1993:	   64).	   Viewing	   the	   relationship	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   imperial	   rivalry	  obscures	   these	   important	   cooperative	   aspects.	   	   The	   Quid	   pro	   Quo	   for	   this	   integration	  however	   was	   a	   redefinition	   of	   British	   sovereignty,	   with	   the	   U.S.	   now	   permitted	   to	   audit	  British	   finances	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   the	   Lend-­‐Lease	   agreement	   (Temperley,	   2002:	   162;	  Dobson,	  1995:	  72).	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Although	   the	   overall	   context	   of	   allegiance	   was	   never	   in	   doubt	   once	   the	   U.S.	   had	  entered	  the	  war,	  there	  were	  still	  significant	  strategic	  differences	  (Saville,	  1993:	  64).	  Kolko	  (1968:	  21)	  neatly	  describes	  Anglo-­‐American	  wartime	  strategy	  as	  a,	   ‘synthesis	  of	  grudging	  compromises’.	   American	  officials	  were,	   at	   times,	   concerned	   that	  Britain	  might	   attempt	   to	  form	   a	   post-­‐war	   Western	   European	   bloc,	   based	   on	   an	   allegiance	   with	   France	   and	  independent	  of	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  U.S.S.R.	  Post-­‐war	  tensions	  over	  economic	  policy	  were	  briefly	  foreshadowed	  in	  Anglo-­‐American	  positions	  on	  the	  future	  of	  Italy.	  Both	  powers	  were	  committed	   to	   keeping	   the	   Left	   out	   of	   Italian	   politics,	   but	   the	   U.S.	   was	   keen	   to	   secure	   a	  dominant	   position	   as	   principal	   economic	   donor	   to	   prevent	   Italian	   integration	   within	   an	  independent	  British	  political	  bloc	  (Kolko,	  1968:	  6,	  49).	  In	   many	   ways,	   then,	   the	   dependency	   of	   Britain	   upon	   the	   U.S.	   had	   already	   been	  entrenched	  during	  the	  war,	  rather	  than	  in	  a	  post-­‐war	  capitulation.	  There	  was	  no	  dissolution	  of	  competing	  interests	  and	  priorities	  during	  the	  war	  either.	  The	  war	  acted	  as	  a	  crucible	  for	  the	   transformation	   of	   British	   sovereignty,	   permitting	   an	   unprecedented	   degree	   of	  cooperative	   subordination	   to	   the	   United	   States.	   But	   the	   U.S.	   was	   still	   dependent	   upon	  British	   power	   too,	   giving	   the	   British	   considerable	   bargaining	   power	   and	   making	   this	   a	  relation	  of	  uneven	  interdependence.	  As	  the	  Key-­‐Currency	  proposals	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  and	  American	  international	  bankers	  after	  the	  war	  made	  clear,	  the	  New	  York	   financial	   community	   realised	   that	   they	   needed	   to	   restore	   sterling’s	   international	  status	   alongside	   the	   City’s	   entrepot	   role	   in	   order	   to	   realise	   their	   vision	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	  world	  economy	  (Langley,	  2002:	  72).	  Just	  as	  Montagu	  Norman	  had	  looked	  to	  boost	  the	  City’	  s	  status	   through	   drawing	   in	   American	   support,	   the	   New	   York	   bankers	   now	   looked	   to	   re-­‐
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establish	   the	   City	   and	   sterling	   as	   integrated	   components	   of	   their	   attempt	   to	   establish	  international	  financial	  dominance.	  As	  American	  power	  expanded	  British	  sovereignty	  was	  transformed,	  but	  so	  too	  was	  the	  developmental	   interdependence	  between	  the	  two	  countries.	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  wartime	  relationship	  display	  continuity	  with	  the	  context	  of	  post-­‐war	  relations	  of	  contained	  rivalry.	  It	  also	   gave	   rise	   to	   important	   processes	   of	   state	   formation,	   in	   both	   countries,	   key	   to	  understanding	  Britain’s	   development	  within	   a	   transatlantic	   orbit.	   It	   is	   to	   these	   processes	  that	  our	  analysis	  now	  turns.	  
	  
Anglo-­‐American	  currents	  of	  institutional	  development	  	  The	  key	  wartime	  development	  within	  the	  British	  state	  was	  the	  temporary	  demotion	  of	  the	  Treasury.	   For	  most	   of	   its	   history	   the	  Treasury	  was	   at	   the	   centre	   of	  British	   governmental	  power,	   exerting	   a	   powerful	   and	   continuous	   influence	   upon	   the	   development	   of	   British	  society	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  9).	  War	  acted	  as	  a	  catalyst	  for	  Treasury	  evolution,	  which	  had	  seen	  its	  powers	  extended	  after	  WW1.	  But	   the	  Treasury’s	   fortunes	  during	  and	  after	  WWII	  were	  mixed.	  From	  1939	  until	  1942,	  the	  Treasury	  was,	   ‘under	  a	  political	  shadow	  which	  not	  only	  diminished	  its	  customary	  prestige	  and	  authority	  but	  disqualified	  it	  from	  access	  to	  the	  new	  centres	  of	  deliberation’	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  325,	  273).24	  	  The	   inter-­‐war	   years	   and	   the	   attempt	   to	   restore	   the	   gold	   standard	   had	   led	   to	   an	  unprecedented	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   Treasury’s	   role	   as	   its	   Finance	   Department	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Side-­‐lining	  of	  Treasury	  authority	  enabled	  the	  development	  of	  a	  more	  expansive	  welfare	  state	   in	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  (Cronin,	  1991:	  151).	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undertook	  multilateral	   efforts	   to	   rebuild	   the	   international	  monetary	   system,	   through	   the	  League	  of	  Nations,	  alongside	  the	  finance	  ministries	  of	  other	  countries.	  This	  new	  activism,	  a	  break	   from	   the	   informal	   evolution	   of	   the	   classical	   gold	   standard	   during	   the	   nineteenth	  century,	  was	  evidenced	  in	  the	  prominent	  role	  of	  Treasury	  officials	  during	  the	  1922	  Genoa	  Conference	  organised	  through	  the	  League	  of	  Nations	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  261).	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  and	  Ralph	  Hawtrey,	  who	  was	   the	  Director	  of	  Financial	  Enquiries	   at	   the	  Treasury,	  played	   significant	   roles	   in	   drafting	   the	   Genoa	   proposals	   and	   made	   sure	   that	   Britain’s	  perspective	   on	   monetary	   relations	   was	   paramount	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   60).	   During	   the	  1930s	   Treasury	   representatives	  were	   frequently	   present	   in	   the	   foreign	   embassies	   of	   the	  major	  powers.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  the	  new,	  expanded	  function	  of	  the	  Treasury	  reflecting	  the,	  ‘breadth	  and	   intensity	  of	  Britain’s	  monetary	  problems’	  as	   it	  attempted	  to	  restore	  the	  gold	  standard	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  gravely	  weakened	  interwar	  political	  economy	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  261).	  	   Simultaneous	   to	   this	   expansion	   of	   Treasury	   mandate	   was	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	  creeping	   Keynesian	   influence	   within	   the	   department,	   represented	   most	   explicitly	   by	  Keynes’s	  direct	   involvement	   in	  drafting	  the	  Genoa	  proposals.	  The	  slump	  of	   the	  1920s	  and	  the	   global	   failure	   of	   the	   1930’s	   spurred	   the	   progress	   of	   Keynesian	   thinking,	   while	   the	  implementation	   of	   Imperial	   Preference	   and	   protectionist	   measures	   during	   the	   1930s	  represented	   a	   further	   rupture	   from	   traditional	   orthodoxy.	   The	   Treasury	   had	   assumed	   a	  greater	  influence	  over	  monetary	  affairs	  after	  Britain	  broke	  from	  gold	  in	  1931,	  with	  the	  City	  and	  the	  Bank	  experiencing	  a	  diminished	  influence	  due	  to	  their	  implication	  in	  the	  disastrous	  return	   to	   gold.	   Using	   its	   increased	   influence,	   the	   Treasury	   began	   to	   push	   for	   a	  monetary	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policy	  that	  was	  more	  germane	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  domestic	  goals	  rather	  than	  maintaining	  external	  balance.	  An	  ‘Exchange	  Equalization	  Account’	  was	  established,	  under	  the	  Treasury’s	  mandate,	   in	   order	   to	   offset	   the	   impact	   of	   short-­‐term	   gold	   movements	   upon	   domestic	  monetary	   dynamics	   while	   the	   Treasury	   also	   maintained	   surveillance	   over	   the	   foreign	  lending	  of	  City	  firms	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  32).	  But,	  crucially,	  the	  advance	  of	  Keynesianism	  was	  never	   more	   than	   partial	   (Roseveare,	   1969:	   261-­‐268).	   	   In	   the	   fiscal	   realm,	   the	   Treasury	  remained	  largely	  committed	  to	  the	  old	  orthodoxy	  of	  balanced	  budgets,	  while	  its	  support	  for	  low	  interest	  rates	  was	  more	  a	  reflection	  of	  the	  need	  to	  finance	  national	  debt	  at	  low	  cost	  than	  to	  stimulate	  domestic	  expansion.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  outbreak	  of	  war	  that	  attitudes	  began	  to	  shift	  away	  from	  the	  old	  gold	  standard	  thinking	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  32).	  The	  incompleteness	  of	  the	   Treasury’s	   Keynesian	   transformation	   would	   prove	   absolutely	   critical	   to	   the	  development	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  political	  economy.	  With	   the	   arrival	   of	   Churchill	   as	   Prime	  Minister	   in	   1940,	   the	   focus	   shifted	   towards	  organising	  the	  necessary	  raw	  materials	  for	  the	  war	  effort.	  Consequently,	  the	  Treasury	  was	  subordinated	  to	  other	  ministers	  and	  other	  departments.25	  But	  as	  the	  war	  effort	  matured	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  Treasury	  was	  re-­‐established.	  Securing	  finances	  for	  the	  war	  effort,	  and	  the	  related	  dollar	  diplomacy	  with	   the	  U.S.,	   became	   increasingly	  prominent	   issues	   (Roseveare,	  1969:	  273-­‐	  274).	  As	  the	  Treasury’s	  centrality	  was	  restored	  it	  underwent	  a	  transformation	  of	  purpose	   (Green,	   1992:	   203).	   After	   the	   budget	   of	   1941	   the	   Treasury’s	   domestic	   role	   was	  extended	  to	  include	  responsibility	  for	  the	  balance	  of	  resources	  and	  demand	  in	  the	  economy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  New	  departments	   emerged	  dealing	  with	  wartime	  planning	  and	   for	   a	   time	   the	  Chancellor	  of	   the	  Exchequer	  was	  excluded	  from	  the	  meetings	  of	  the	  war	  cabinet.	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as	   a	   whole	   (Roseveare,	   1969:	   274;	   Hall,	   1986:	   72).26	  This	   represented	   a	   break	   from	  balanced	  budgets,	  Gladstonian	  orthodoxy.	  The	  Treasury	  was	  now	  partially	  responsible	  for	  price	   levels,	   savings	   incentives	   and	   the	   level	   of	   capital	   investment.27	  Acceptance	   of	   this	  expanded	   role	   by	   the	   wartime	   Treasury	   marked	   the,	   ‘long-­‐deferred	   triumph	   of	   the	  Keynesian	  philosophy	  over	  the	  nineteenth-­‐century	  orthodoxies’	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  276).28	  	  Importantly,	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   Treasury’s	   responsibilities	   disrupted	   its	  traditional	   relationship	   to	   the	  Bank	  of	  England.	  Under	  pre-­‐war	  orthodoxy,	   the	  Treasury’s	  domestic	  role	  was	  limited	  to	  the	  management	  of	  government	  finances.	  This	  meant	  that	  the	  Bank	  was	  the	  Treasury’s	  principal	  point	  of	  contact	  with	  the	  wider	  economy	  (Green,	  1992:	  203).	  Under	  its	  expanded	  remit	  the	  Treasury	  was	  now	  brought	  into	  regular	  contact	  with	  a	  wider	   range	  of	  actors,	  diluting	   the	   traditionally	  privileged	   role	  given	   to	   the	  Bank.	   Indeed,	  Cairncross	  (1995:	  71)	  suggests	  that	   from	  1941,	   ‘the	  Bank	  was	  nearly	  always	  at	  odds	  with	  Keynes	   and	   the	   Treasury’.	   But,	   crucially,	   both	   the	   triumph	   of	   Keynesian	   ideas	   and	   the	  disruption	  of	  the	  Treasury-­‐Bank	  nexus	  were	  temporary	  and	  partial.	  By	  the	  early	  1950s	  the	  traditional	   orientation	   of	   institutional	   power	   was	   restored,	   opening	   the	   way	   for	   the	  integration	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  power	  that	  would	  follow	  with	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  later	  in	  that	  same	  decade.29	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Britain’s	   wartime	   budget	   was	   inspired	   by	   Keyne’s	   work	   ‘How	   to	   Pay	   for	   the	  War’.	   Keynes	   had	  begun	   to	   exert	   a	   big	   impact	   upon	   the	   orthodoxy	   of	   Treasury	   thinking	   from	   1937	   onwards	  (Skidelsky,	  2000:	  20).	  27	  Under	   inflationary	   conditions	   the	   Treasury	   would	   be	   expected	   to	   increase	   taxation	   to	   curb	  excessive	   demand,	   while	   a	   deliberate	   budget	   deficit	   could	   expect	   to	   be	   implemented	   during	   a	  recession.	  	  28	  This	  triumph	  was	  not,	  however,	  complete.	  29	  Restoration	   of	   the	   traditional	   orientation	   occurred	   within	   a	   new	   acceptance	   of	   American	   pre-­‐eminence	  however,	  with	   the	  British	  Treasury	  now	  subordinated	   to	   that	  of	   the	  United	  States	   in	   its	  responsibilities	  for	  the	  management	  of	  the	  international	  economy.	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Within	  the	  American	  state,	  comparable	  processes	  of	  transformation	  were	  underway.	  The	   U.S.	   entered	   the	   war	   still	   working	   through	   the	   resolution	   of	   New	   Deal-­‐era	   politics.	  Blueprints	   for	   American	   post-­‐war	   international	   reconstruction	   reflected	   the	   ambivalent	  way	   that	   domestic	   struggles	   over	   distribution	  were	   resolved	   before	   and	   during	   the	  New	  Deal	   (Maier,	   1977:	   607;	   Waddell,	   1999:	   232).	   During	   the	   1930’s	   the	   New	   Deal	  administration	  recognised	  that	  greater	   involvement	   from	  public	   institutions	  was	  required	  to	  remedy	  the	  maladies	  of	  American	  capitalism	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  55).	  	  Central	  here	  was	  the	  rise	  to	  prominence	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  relative	  to	  other	  key	  institutions	  within	  the	  American	   state	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   30;	   Sarai,	   2009:	   76).	   The	   U.S.	   Treasury	   supplanted	   the	  State	   Department,	   Federal	   Reserve	   and	   private	   bankers	   such	   as	   the	   House	   of	  Morgan	   in	  taking	  responsibility	   for	   international	   financial	  negotiations	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  71).	  Indeed,	   the	  Roosevelt	   administration	  blamed	   the	  New	  York	   financial	   community,	   and	   the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  in	  particular,	  for	  the	  catastrophic	  failure	  of	  the	  interwar	  monetary	  system	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  30).	  Government	  borrowing	  during	  the	  New	  Deal	  expanded	  the	  market	  in	  Treasury	   Bills	   as	   private	   investors	   increased	   their	   holdings.	   The	   Treasury	   Bill	   market	  became	   important	   to	   the	  restoration	  of	  Wall	  Street.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  banking	  crisis,	   the	  Federal	   Reserve	   was	   granted	   extended	   authority	   by	   Congress.	   The	   1935	   Banking	   Act	  expanded	   the	   Federal	   Reserve’s	   powers	   (Brinkley,	   1996:	   81),	   but	   the	   Fed’s	   remit	   was	  subsequently	  subordinated	  to	  Treasury	  imperatives	  during	  the	  war	  as	  fiscal	  policy	  came	  to	  dominate	  monetary	  policy	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	  7).	  During	   the	   1930s	   labour	   radicalism	   had	   pushed	   Roosevelt	   towards	   drastic	   social	  reforms.	   Under	   the	   Wagner	   Act,	   trade	   unionism	   was	   legalised.	   The	   Social	   Security	   Act	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founded	   the	   American	   welfare	   state	   with	   nation-­‐wide	   provision	   of	   unemployment	   and	  retirement	   benefits	   (Brinkley,	   1996:	   202;	   Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   59).	   These	   changes	  greatly	   enhanced	   the	   administrative	   capacities	   of	   the	   American	   state.	   In	   1938	   a	   ‘Grand	  Truce’	   with	   capital	   was	   instantiated	   (Brinkley,	   1996:	   89).	   The	   truce	   was	   a	   product	   of	  meetings	  held	  by	  Roosevelt	  with	  moderate	  trade	  unionists,	  bankers	  and	  industrialists.	  Out	  of	   this	   truce	   emerged	   a	   transformation	   in	   economic	   thinking	   that	   mirrored	   the	  advancement	   of	   Keynesianism	   within	   the	   British	   Treasury.	   The	   American	   Treasury	  recognised	   the	  need	   for	  deficit	   spending	   to	   stimulate	  demand	  and	   investment	   (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  62).	  Just	  as	  in	  Britain	  this	  represented	  a	  break	  from	  the	  traditional	  balanced	  budgets	   orthodoxy	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   era.	   And	   just	   as	   in	   Britain,	   the	   break	   was	   only	  partial.	  	  
	  
Disaggregating	  the	  national	  interest:	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  beyond	  
	  These	   currents	   of	   institutional	   development	   within	   both	   states	   fed	   into	   the	   negotiations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  eventual	  formulation	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement.	  For	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	   U.S.	   the	   formulation	   of	   policy	   positions	   on	   the	   future	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	  system	   proved	   divisive,	   reflecting	   the	   new	   patterns	   of	   power	   that	   had	   evolved	   between	  different	  departments	  within	  the	  state.	  In	  Britain,	  it	  caused	  a	  major	  split	  between	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  Keynes,	  a	  contentious	  figure,	  represented	  the	  Treasury	  in	  its	  negotiations	   with	   the	   U.S.	   and	   divided	   opinion	   within	   the	   British	   state.	   Britain’s	  commitments	  to	  maintaining	  sterling	  as	  an	  international	  currency,	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  remain	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outside	   of	   an	   integrated	   European	   Payments	   Union	   caused	  major	   tensions	   with	   the	   U.S.	  Treasury.	  American	  policy	  makers,	  for	  their	  part,	  identified	  the	  Sterling	  Area	  and	  Imperial	  Preference	  as	  major	  obstacles	  to	  the	  reconstruction	  of	  an	  open	  international	  economy	  after	  the	  war	  (Kolko,	  1968:	  246).30	  	  American	   post-­‐war	   priorities	   eventually	   converged	   around	   a	   commitment	   to	  multilateralism	  and	  currency	  convertibility,	  international	  free	  trade,	  exchange	  rate	  stability	  and	  European	  integration	  (Hogan,	  1984:	  289;	  Hearden,	  2002:	  59).	  But	  as	  with	  Britain	  there	  were	   differences	   and	   tensions	   between	   institutional	   interests	   that	   emerged	   during	   the	  articulation	  of	  these	  objectives.	  During	  the	  war	  the	  contending	  interests	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	   the	   State	   Department	   caused	   frictions	   over	   a	   number	   of	   issues,	   with	   disagreements	  over	   the	   future	   of	   Germany	   particularly	   prominent	   (Skidelsky,	   2000:	   133).	   Treasury	  Secretary	  Henry	  Morgenthau,	  mistrusted	  British	  motives	  and	  hoped	  to	  establish	  American	  financial	   hegemony	   after	   the	  war	   by	   exhausting	  British	   financial	   assets	   (Skidelsky,	   2000:	  98).	  In	  general,	  however,	  the	  Treasury	  was	  staffed	  by	  progressive	  New	  Deal	  figures	  such	  as	  Morgenthau	   and	   White,	   who	   favoured	   more	   heterodox	   blueprints	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	  international	  economy	   that	  would	  allow	  greater	   scope	   for	  deficit	   spending	  and	   insulation	  from	  deflationary	  pressures.	  The	  State	  Department	  by	  contrast,	  headed	  by	  Cordell	  Hull,	  was	  principally	  concerned	  with	  dismantling	  Britain’s	   Imperial	  Preference	  System	  and	  creating	  the	  kind	  of	  open	  world	  economic	   conditions	   that	  had	  underpinned	   the	  gold	   standard	  era	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30 	  By	   1938	   the	   Sterling	   Bloc	   accounted	   for	   one-­‐third	   of	   world	   trade	   and	   was	   increasingly	  independent	  of	  dollar	  imports	  (Kolko,	  1968:	  246).	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(Skidelsky,	   2000:	   126)31.	   Both	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   State	   Department	   were,	   however,	  agreed	  upon	  the	  importance	  of	  gaining	  British	  acceptance	  of	  multilateralism	  and	  currency	  convertibility	  at	  the	  earliest	  date	  possible.	  They	  viewed	  Britain	  as	  a	  key	  cog	  to	  be	  turned	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  restore	  the	  international	  economic	  order	  (Block,	  1977:	  41).	  While	  American	   officials	   harboured	   clear	   objectives	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	   international	  economy,	  Britain’s	   leaders	   lacked	  coherent	  political-­‐economic	  war	  aims	   (Skidelsky,	  2000:	  137).	   The	   Foreign	   Office	   in	   particular,	   underestimated	   the	   coherence	   of	   the	   American’s	  post-­‐war	   ambitions	   and	   objectives	   and	   clung	   to	   the	   old	   priorities	   of	   the	   British	   Empire	  (Saville,	   1993:	   65).	   British	   and	   American	   officials	   expected	   to	   emerge	   from	   the	   war	   in	  different	   circumstances,	   with	   Britain,	   ‘stripped	   of	   trade	   and	   assets	   and	   burdened	   with	  debts’,	   with	   the	   U.S.	   in	   the,	   ‘opposite	   position’.	   These	   differences,	   between	   debtor	   and	  creditor	   nation,	  were	   reflected	   in	   the	   divergent	   priorities	   for	  Bretton	  Woods,	   ‘the	  British	  wanted	  a	  scheme	  which	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  borrow	  without	  strings;	  the	  Americans	  one	  which	  would	  lend	  with	  strings’	  (Skidelsky,	  2000:	  182).	  	  Within	   the	   British	   state	   the	   Bank	   of	   England,	   which	   represented	   the	   interests	   of	  banking	  and	   financial	   services	   (Green,	  1992:	  203),	  disagreed	  with	  Keynes’s	   general	  plans	  for	  the	  post-­‐war	  international	  economy,	  although	  they	  did	  agree	  upon	  the	  need	  for	  capital	  controls	   (Cottrell,	   1995:	   110;	   Cairncross,	   1995:	   71).	   In	   contrast	   to	   Keynes’s	   plan	   for	   an	  international	  clearing	  union	  based	  on	  the	  ‘bancour’,	  the	  Bank	  favoured	  continuity	  with	  the	  wartime	   system	   based	   on	   payments	   agreements	   and	   preservation	   of	   the	   Sterling	   Area.	  Counter	   to	   American	   Treasury	   and	   State	   Department	   demands	   for	   the	   liquidation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  These	  agendas	  were	  contradictory,	  as	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  British	  financial	  assets	  would	  inevitably	  increase	  the	  desire	  to	  maintain	  an	  Imperial	  privileged	  trading	  zone	  after	  the	  war.	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Sterling	  Area,	  the	  Bank	  believed	  that	  it	  would	  be	  better	  to	  build	  on	  the	  use	  of	  sterling	  and	  the	   dollar	   in	   existing	   international	   payments	   arrangements	   rather	   than	   attacking	   the	  Sterling	   Area	   payments	   system.	   The	   problem	   for	   the	   Bank	   was	   that	   its	   influence	   over	  monetary	  policy	  was	  limited	  under	  the	  post-­‐war	  Labour	  government	  (Cairncross,	  1995:	  70-­‐71).	   Given	  the	  significance	  of	  this	  disagreement	  between	  key	  institutional	  components	  of	  the	  British	  state	   it	   is	  surprising	   that	  Brett	  and	  Burnham	  pay	  such	   little	  attention	   to	   them.	  Disaggregating	   the	   state	   enables	   comprehension	   of	   the	   developmental	   dynamics	   at	   play.	  Under	  the	  Conservative	  governments	  of	  the	  1950’s,	  with	  their	  traditional	  affiliation	  with	  the	  City	   of	   London,	   a	   revitalised	   Bank	   of	   England	   would	   begin	   to	   interpolate	   much	   more	  coherently	  with	   the	   interests	  of	   resurgent	  American	  banking.	  Through	   the	   channel	  of	   the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  interests	  of	  British	  banking	  would	  be	  expressed	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  effectively	  rendering	  the	  Keynesian	  transformation	  stillborn.	  The	  transformation	  of	  British	  and	  American	  state	  capacities,	  and	  the	  advancement	  of	  ideas	   that	   broke	   from	   the	   classical	   liberal	   economic	   orthodoxy	   within	   their	   respective	  Treasuries,	  were	  reflected	  both	  in	  the	  planning	  for	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  pattern	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  monetary	  relations	   in	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years.	  The	  Anglo-­‐American	  agreement	  instituted	   at	   Bretton	  Woods	   reflected	   both	   the	   lessons	   of	   the	   past	   and	  projections	   of	   the	  future.	  The	  two	  chief	  architects	  of	  the	  plan,	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes	  and	  Harry	  Dexter	  White,	  who	  represented	  the	  British	  and	  American	  Treasuries	  respectively,	  were	  determined	  not	  to	  replay	   the	   failings	   of	   the	   interwar	   years	   and	   to	   advance	   the	   interests	   of	   their	   respective	  states	  to	  the	  greatest	  degree	  possible.	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Despite	   the	   different	   interests	   of	   Britain	   and	   America,	   which	   became	   increasingly	  apparent	   as	   the	   negotiations	  wore	   on,	   both	  men	  were	   able	   to	   converge	   upon	   a	   common	  commitment	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  capital	  controls.	  In	  fact,	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  had	  already	  been	   in	  contact	  with	   its	  British	  counterpart	  after	  1936	  over	   the	  possibility	  of	  cooperative	  efforts	   to	   control	   flows	   of	   hot	   money	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   31).	   These	   bilateral	   contacts	  foreshadowed	  the	  collaborative	  planning	  undertaken	  in	  preparation	  for	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement.	  	  Both	  Keynes	  and	  White	  were	  critical	  of	   the	  orthodox	  economic	  thinking	  associated	  with	  the	  gold	  standard.	  They	  viewed	  the	  implementation	  of	  capital	  controls	  as	  an	  essential	  precondition	   for	   the	  kind	  of	   international	  monetary	   system	   that	  would	  protect	   the	  policy	  autonomy	   of	   the	   interventionist	   welfare	   state	   from	   disruptive	   international	   capital	  movements,	   while	   also	   providing	   conditions	   suitable	   for	   the	   continuation	   of	   economic	  planning	  processes	  that	  had	  been	  developed	  during	  the	  1930s.	  Their	  convictions	  on	  capital	  controls	  were	  rooted	  in	  a	  shared	  belief	  that	  the	  maintenance	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  and	  a	  liberal	  international	  trading	  system	  was	  not	  compatible	  with	  a	  fully	  liberal	  financial	  order.	  Keynes	   and	   White	   were	   not,	   however,	   opposed	   to	   all	   forms	   of	   capital	   flows.	   Both	   men	  accepted	  the	  need	  for	  ‘productive’	  (as	  opposed	  to	  speculative	  flows)	  capital	  flows	  and	  were	  in	  support	  of	  equilibrating	  flows	  that	  would	  help	  correct,	  rather	  than	  aggravate,	  balance	  of	  payments	   imbalances.	   	   Despite	   these	   caveats,	   Keynes	   and	   White	   identified	   the	   right	   of	  states	   to	   control	   capital	   flows	   as	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   international	   monetary	  system.	  Their	  thinking	  embodied	  a	  critical	  appraisal	  of	  the	  interwar	  monetary	  system	  and	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reflected	   a	   marked	   departure	   from	   the	   liberal	   financial	   principles	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  33-­‐38).	  The	  shared	  commitment	  to	  capital	  controls	  contained	  in	  the	  early	  drafts	  created	  by	  Keynes	  and	  White	  were	  not	  well	  received	  by	  all	  quarters.	  New	  York	  bankers	  were	  troubled	  by	   White’s	   emphasis	   upon	   capital	   controls	   and	   feared	   that	   they	   would	   lose	   the	   highly	  profitable	   business	   of	   receiving	   European	   capital	   flight,	   which	   had	   benefited	   New	   York	  during	   the	   1930s	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   39).	   Too	  much	   emphasis	   upon	   capital	   controls	  might	  impede	  the	  bankers	  in	  their	  quest	  to	  establish	  the	  international	  predominance	  of	  American	  banking,	  a	  goal	  that	  they	  had	  held	  since	  the	  1920s.	  	  Around	   the	   issues	   of	   Bretton	   Woods	   we	   see	   the	   re-­‐emergence	   of	   pre-­‐war	  complementarity	   between	   bankers	   in	   New	   York	   and	   London.	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	  cooperation,	  between	  private	  and	  central	  bankers	  alike,	  had	  been	  key	  to	  the	  international	  reconstruction	   efforts	   of	   the	   1920s.	   But	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   these	  informal	  efforts	  were	  not	  strong	  enough	  to	  hold	  the	   interwar	  gold	  standard	  together.	  The	  impetus	   for	  restoring	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	  axis	  of	   international	   financial	  power	  now	  came	  from	   the	   Americans	   and	  was	   encapsulated	   by	   the	   ‘Key	   Currency	   Plan’	   proposed	   by	   John	  Williams,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  FRBNY,	  as	  a	  critical	  riposte	  to	  White’s	  planning	  for	  Bretton	  Woods.	  The	  Key	  Currency	  Plan	  rested	  upon	  the	  belief	  that	  restoring	  the	  convertibility	  of	  the	  world’s	  two	  foremost	  currencies,	  sterling	  and	  the	  dollar,	  would	  provide	  the	  surest	  route	  to	  a	   rapid	   international	   economic	   recovery	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   41).	   The	   U.S.	   would	   provide	  Britain	   with	   a	   substantial	   loan	   in	   order	   to	   underwrite	   the	   restoration	   of	   sterling’s	  international	  role.	  The	  loan	  would	  then	  enable	  Britain	  to	  swiftly	  return	  to	  convertibility	  and	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pursue	  multilateral	  trade	  policies.	  It	  would	  also	  restore	  London	  as	  an	  international	  capital	  market	   and	   foster	   British	   cooperation	   with	   the	   U.S.	   in	   the	   shared	   management	   of	   the	  international	   monetary	   system	   (Block,	   1977:	   52).	   Crucially,	   the	   Plan	   would	   require	   the	  removal	   of	   all	   controls	   on	   sterling	   and	   the	   dollar,	   as	   such	   it	   stood	   in	   direct	   tension	  with	  White’s	   endorsement	   of	  mandatory	   capital	   controls.	   Not	   only	   did	   the	   Plan	   challenge	   the	  direction	  of	  White’s	  planning,	  it	  was	  also	  based	  upon	  a	  serious	  underestimation	  of	  sterling’s	  post-­‐war	   weakness.	   Britain’s	   exposure	   to	   massive	   sterling	   balances	   accumulated	   by	   its	  Imperial	  territories	  during	  the	  war	  had	  rendered	  the	  pound	  incredibly	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  mass	  sell-­‐off	  in	  favour	  of	  much	  needed	  dollars	  once	  convertibility	  were	  restored.	  These	  problems	  would	  become	  very	  clear	  just	  two	  years	  after	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement.	  Despite	   the	   grave	   flaws	   of	   the	   plan,	   the	   New	   York	   financial	   community	  enthusiastically	   rallied	   around	   it	   and	   proceeded	   to	   publicly	   champion	   its	   cause.	   Lamont,	  Chairman	   of	   J.	   P.	  Morgan,	   suggested	   that	   a	   better	   plan	   for	   the	   establishment	   of	   post-­‐war	  international	  monetary	   stability	  would	  be	   to	  have	  American	  and	  British	  bankers	   create	   a	  dollar-­‐pound	  exchange	   ratio	   to	  which	  all	   other	   currencies	  were	   tied	   (Hearden,	  2002:	  61)	  Randolph	  Burgess	  of	  the	  National	  City	  Bank	  was	  keen	  for	  the	  American	  government	  to	  give	  Britain	   a	   direct	   credit	   of	   	   $2billion	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   liquidity	   for	   the	   post-­‐war	   system.	  Similarly,	  Winthrop	  Aldrich,	  Chairman	  of	  Chase	  National	  Bank,	  identified	  Britain’s	  need	  for	  dollars	   to	   purchase	   American	   goods	   as	   the	   crux	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   financial	   conundrum,	  arguing	  that	  this	  problem	  ‘should	  be	  faced	  squarely	  because	  it	  would	  be	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  the	  United	  States	  to	  have	  a	  strong	  British	  economy’	  (Hearden,	  2002:	  63).	  Aldrich’s	  critiques	  of	  White’s	  plan	  had	  a	  big	  impact	  and	  forced	  the	  alternative	  proposal	  onto	  the	  policy	  agenda	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(Helleiner,	  1994:	  43).	  These	  plans	  reflected	  continuity	  with	  financial	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  banking	  communities	  during	  the	  1920s.	  Once	  again,	  American	  bankers	  preferred	  an	  international	  monetary	  system	  based	  upon	  a	  cooperative	  axis	  of	  private	  power	  in	   London	   and	   New	   York.	   The	   stance	   of	   the	   New	   York	   banking	   community	   was	   lenient	  compared	   to	   the	   hardball	   tactics	   of	   the	   Treasury	   under	   Morgenthau.	   American	   bankers	  recognised	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   City’s	   role	   as	   a	   key	   nodal	   point	   within	   a	   restored	  international	   monetary	   system.	   Their	   long-­‐term	   plan	   to	   establish	   dominance	   in	  international	  finance	  required	  them	  to	  work	  through	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  breaking	  down	  the	  sterling	   area	   by	   restoring	   the	   convertibility	   of	   sterling	   and	   then	   using	   Britain	   as	   a	   twin-­‐engine,	  alongside	  American	  financial	  power,	  to	  boost	  world	  trade	  and	  foster	  a	  broad	  climate	  of	  multilateral	  trade	  and	  investment.	  The	  strategic	  thinking	  of	  New	  York	  bankers	  attested	  to	  
the	  continuing	  centrality	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics,	  expressed	  through	  the	  
interdependence	   of	   the	   dollar	   and	   sterling,	   alongside	   the	   City	   and	   New	   York.	   Although	  
America’s	   financial	   power	   had	   been	   greatly	   augmented	   by	   its	   participation	   in	   two	   World	  
Wars,	  and	  the	  exhaustion	  of	  British	  power,	  bankers	  in	  New	  York	  still	  depended	  upon	  the	  City’s	  
international	   role	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   their	   long-­‐term	   ambitions.	   This	   pattern	   of	   mutual	  dependence	   would	   continue	   to	   define	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   as	   the	   politics	   of	  globalisation	  began	  to	  unfold	  during	  the	  decades	  that	  followed	  Bretton	  Woods.	  	  Criticisms	  raised	  by	  the	  bankers	  of	  New	  York	  proved	  too	  strong	  for	  White’s	  original	  plan	   to	   survive	   intact.	   Bankers	   voiced	   their	   discontent	  within	   Roosevelt’s	   administration	  and	   Republican	   Congressional	   success	   in	   1942	   further	   strengthened	   their	   hand.	   The	  bankers’	  opposition	  to	  White’s	  plan	  symbolised	  the,	  ‘still	  unresolved	  direction	  of	  New	  Deal	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financial	   politics’.	   Although	   bankers	   had	   initially	   supported	   the	   New	   Deal,	   principally	  because	  they	  saw	  Roosevelt’s	  agenda	  as	  a	  means	  to	  loosen	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan’s	  firm	  grip	  over	   New	   York	   finance,	   their	   appetite	   for	   further	   initiatives	   that	   might	   shake	   up	   the	  American	  financial	  system	  was	  limited	  once	  this	  goal	  had	  been	  achieved.	  	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  43-­‐44).	  	  Their	  lobbying	  efforts	  ensured	  that	  White’s	  revised	  plan	  placed	  a	  greater	  emphasis	  upon	  the	  need	  for	  productive	  capital	  flows.	  Given	  the	  centrality	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  banking	  cooperation	  to	   the	  resuscitation	  of	  the	   gold	   standard,	   one	  might	   have	   expected	   the	   Key	   Currency	   Plan	   outlined	   by	   the	  New	  York	   Fed	   and	   Wall	   Street	   bankers	   to	   have	   received	   a	   welcoming	   reception	   over	   on	  Threadneedle	  street.	  But	  the	  opposite	  was	  in	  fact	  true.	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  actually	  joined	  forces	  with	  the	  British	  Treasury	  in	  order	  to	  resist	  the	  amendments	  to	  White’s	  plan	  that	  had	  been	  driven	  by	   the	  pressure	  of	   the	  New	  York	  bankers.	  The	  Bank	   insisted	   that	   an	   explicit	  guarantee	  of	  the	  right	  to	  use	  exchange	  controls	  in	  order	  to	  limit	  capital	  flows	  be	  included	  in	  the	   final	   agreement.	   Although	   the	   Bank’s	   stance	  was	   undoubtedly	   disturbing	   to	   the	  New	  York	  bankers	  who	  sought	  to	  rekindle	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  axis	  of	  the	  interwar	  years,	  many	  of	   the	   City’s	   bankers	   were	   also	   supportive	   of	   the	   thrust	   of	   Keynes’s	   and	   White’s	   plans	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  45).	  The	  Bank’s	  surprising	  endorsement	  of	  capital	  controls	  was	  explicable	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  reorientation	   towards	   the	   protected	   sterling	   bloc	   during	   the	   1930s	   and	   its	   continued	  concern	  over	  the	  perilous	  state	  of	  Britain’s	  balance	  of	  payments.	  Bank	  officials	  believed	  that	  the	  best	  way	  to	  restore	  sterling’s	   international	  role,	  at	   least	   in	   the	  short	   to	  medium	  term,	  was	  to	  maintain	  and	  extend	  the	  sterling	  bloc.	  Sterling	  was	  too	  weak	  and	  British	  reserves	  far	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too	   low,	   to	   move	   towards	   convertibility	   in	   the	   immediate	   future.	   The	   Bank’s	   preferred	  strategy,	   which	   received	   the	   support	   of	   some	   within	   the	   Treasury,	   was	   to	   continue	   the	  wartime	   sterling	  arrangements,	   to	  maintain	  a	   common	  dollar-­‐saving	   import	  policy	   for	   all	  Sterling	  Area	  countries	  and	  to	  continue	  to	  control	  the	  movement	  of	  capital	  from	  the	  Sterling	  Area	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   world	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   45;	   Newton,	   2004:	   261).	   	   This	   might	   be	  possible,	  the	  Bank	  believed,	  if	  cohesion	  within	  the	  Sterling	  Area	  was	  maintained	  and	  threats	  were	  made	   to	   block	   the	   sterling	   balances	   of	   countries	   that	   threatened	   to	   liberalise	   their	  exchange	   controls	   or	   abandon	   dollar	   discrimination.	   But	   despite	   its	   seemingly	   heterodox	  endorsement	  of	  capital	  controls,	  the	  leopard	  had	  not	  changed	  its	  spots	  entirely.	  	  The	  Bank’s	  plan	   for	   the	  continuation	  of	  a	   restrictive	   currency	  bloc	  would	   require	  domestic	  economic	  policies	  that	  put	  reconstruction	  plans	  on	  hold	  and	  prioritised	  the	  achievement	  of	  external	  balance	  (Newton,	  2004:	  261-­‐262).	  Clearly,	  the	  Bank	  had	  not	  lost	  its	  preference	  for	  austerity.	  	  	  Despite	  its	  appetite	  for	  capital	  controls,	  the	  Bank	  did	  find	  common	  cause	  with	  New	  York	   financiers	   over	   a	   different	   issue.	   Bank	   officials	   shared	   the	   New	   York	   bankers’	  antipathy	  towards	  the	  potential	  for	  multilateral	  oversight	  and	  international	  public	  financial	  institutions.	   The	   American	   bankers	  were	  worried	   that	   public	   financial	   institutions	  might	  reduce	   the	   control	   of	   private	   and	   central	   bankers	   and	   lead	   to	   inflationary	   dynamics	   by	  creating	   too	   much	   policy	   space	   for	   expansionary	   national	   economic	   programmes.	   Their	  preference	  was	  for	  the	  maintenance	  of	  the	  old	  gold	  standard	  system	  of	  financial	  discipline,	  whereby	   capital	   flows	   could	   work	   to	   ensure	   deflationary	   measures	   in	   the	   interest	   of	  maintaining	  convertibility	   (Block,	  1977:	  53).	  These	  concerns	  were	  echoed	  by	   the	  Bank	  of	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England,	  which	  also	   felt	   that	   the	   international	  monetary	   system	  should	  be	   shaped	  by	   the	  action	  of	  bankers.	  The	  agreement	  that	  was	  eventually	  set	  out	  at	  Bretton	  Woods	  reflected	  a	  compromise	  between	   the	   original	   interests	   of	   the	   planners,	   one	   in	   which	   American	   priorities	   were	  clearly	  dominant.	   It	   also	   contained	  amendments	   that	   reflected	   the	   lobbying	  efforts	  of	   the	  bankers.	   Keynes	   wanted	   an	   ‘International	   Currency	   Union’	   in	   which	   international	  transactions	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  surpluses	  and	  deficits	  on	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  would	  be	  settled	  through	  ‘clearing	  accounts’	  held	  by	  major	  central	  banks	  as	  part	  of	  an	  International	  Clearing	  Bank.	  Keynes’s	  plan	  aimed	  to	  maintain	  balance	  of	  payments	  equilibrium	  between	  each	  member	  country	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  and	  allow	  space	  for	  domestic	  policies	  of	  full	  employment	   and	   expansion	  without	   suffering	   from	   the	   intense	   deflationary	   pressures	   of	  the	   gold	   standard	   system	   (Block,	   1977:	   47;	   Skidelsky,	   2000:	   206).32	  Under	   his	   proposed	  system	   there	   would	   be	   pressure	   on	   both	   surplus	   and	   deficit	   countries	   to	   clear	   their	  accounts.	  This	  would	  mean	  revaluing	  their	  currencies	  accordingly.	  The	  plan	  envisaged	  more	  punitive	  consequences	  for	  surplus	  countries	  however,	  and	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  Keynes’s	  target	  here	  was	  the	  United	  States	  (Eichengreen,	  2011:	  46).	  Harry	  Dexter	  White	  wanted	   the	  establishment	  of	   two	   institutions:	  an	   International	  Stabilization	  Fund	  and	  a	  Bank	  For	  Reconstruction	  (Skidelsky,	  2000:	  244).33	  In	  conjunction	  these	  two	  institutions	  would	  prevent	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  monetary	  and	  credit	  system,	  enable	  the	   restoration	   of	   foreign	   trade	   and	   supply	   reconstruction	   capital	   and	   relief	   (Panitch	   &	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Under	   Keynes’s	   scheme	   the	   pre-­‐war	   level	   of	   trade	   would	   determine	   a	   country’s	   borrowing	  capacity.	  This	  would	  suit	  Britain’s	  immediate	  post-­‐war	  needs.	  33	  These	  were	  the	  blueprints	  for	  the	  IMF	  and	  World	  Bank,	  which	  were	  created	  at	  Bretton	  Woods.	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Gindin,	   2012:	   74).	   Under	  White’s	   plan	   for	   an	   International	   Stabilization	   Fund	   there	  were	  limits	  to	  free	  capital	  movement	  internationally,	  and	  the	  Fund	  (which	  eventually	  became	  the	  IMF)	   would	   provide	   financing	   so	   that	   countries	   could	   avoid	   deflationary	   measures	   and	  restore	  external	  balance	  (Block,	  1977:	  41).	  Members	  could	  refuse	   inward	   investment	  and	  requisition	   foreign	   investments	   of	   nationals	   to	   counter	   the	   threat	   of	   capital	   flight	  (Skidelsky,	  2000:	  245).	  But,	  crucially,	  the	  New	  York	  banking	  lobby	  were	  successful	  in	  toning	  down	   the	   commitment	   to	   cooperative	   capital	   controls,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   by	   the	   time	   the	  Joint	  Statement	  was	  announced	  in	  1944,	  ‘almost	  all	  mention	  of	  the	  obligation	  to	  cooperate	  in	  controlling	  undesirable	  flows	  had	  been	  removed’	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  47).	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  cooperation,	   controls	  would	   inevitably	  prove	  much	  harder	   to	  enforce.	   	  Keynes’s	  plans	   for	  the	   ‘bancour’	  credit	  were	  rejected	  in	  preference	  for	  a	  system	  based	  upon	  the	  centrality	  of	  the	   dollar,	   which	  would	   be	   tied	   to	   gold	   (Hudson,	   1972;	   Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   76-­‐77).	  White’s	   plan	   substituted	  Keynes’s	   automatic	   taxes	   on	   surplus	   countries	   for	   a	  much	  more	  vague	   possibility	   of	   penalties	   for	   country’s	   that	   ran	   perennial	   balance	   of	   payments	  surpluses	  (Eichengreen,	  2011:	  46).	  Once	  the	  serious	  discussion	  began,	  it	  was	  White’s	  Plan	  that	  became	   the	   central	   focus,	  with	  America’s	   superior	  power	   reflected	   in	   the	  bargaining	  pattern	  between	  Keynes	  and	  White	  (Block,	  1977:	  48).	  American	   Treasury	   officials	   were	   required	   to	   launch	   a	   campaign	   of	   persuasion	   in	  order	   to	   convince	  Congress	   to	   vote	   for	  Bretton	  Woods	   in	   the	   face	  of	   opposition	   from	   the	  New	  York	  bankers.	  The	  final	  agreement	  departed	  from	  the	  previous	  gold	  standard	  regime	  of	  the	  interwar	  years	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  Although	  fixed,	  exchange	  rates	  were	  now	  made	  adjustable.	   Secondly,	   controls	   were	   now	   accepted	   as	   a	   legitimate	   means	   to	   regulate	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international	  capital	  flows	  and	  provide	  a	  degree	  of	  insulation	  for	  domestic	  policies.	  Finally,	  the	   IMF	   was	   established	   with	   a	   mandate	   to	   conduct	   multilateral	   oversight	   of	   national	  economic	  developments	   and	  provide	  balance	  of	   payments	   financing	   to	   countries	   in	  need.	  But	   the	   final	   agreement	   over	   the	   IMF	   contained	   certain	   ambiguities	   that	   would	   later	   be	  seized	  upon	   to	  push	   the	   remit	  of	   the	  Fund	   far	   away	   from	   the	  original	   emphasis	  of	   either	  Keynes	   or	  White	   (Block,	   1977:	   50).	   The	   new	   regime	   instituted	   at	   Bretton	  Woods	   was	   a	  direct	   response	   to	   the	   challenges	   faced	  during	   the	   1920s	   and	  1930s	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	  91).	   And	   just	   as	  Anglo-­‐American	   dynamics	   had	   been	   central	   to	   the	   interwar	   period,	   they	  were	   now	   institutionalised	   and	   applied	   to	   the	   wider	   international	   political	   economy	  through	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement.	  Having	  examined	  the	  continuity	  between	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  processes	  that	   spanned	   the	   interwar,	   wartime	   and	   post-­‐war	   periods,	   feeding	   into	   the	   creation	   of	  Bretton	   Woods,	   we	   can	   now	   explore	   the	   deficiencies	   of	   the	   two	   predominant	  interpretations	  of	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  dynamics:	  Edward	  Brett’s	   ‘capitulation	  thesis’	  and	  Peter	  Burnham’s	  ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry	  thesis’.	  	  
	  
The	  ‘capitulation	  thesis’	  
	  Edward	  Brett’s	   interpretation	  (1985:	  132)	   identifies	   three	  commitments	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  economic	  strategy,	  established	  as	  part	  of	  a	  national	  consensus	  by	   the	  end	  of	   the	   first	  Labour	   government	   in	   1951.	   Firstly,	   British	   policymakers	   concerned	   with	   avoiding	   the	  mass	   unemployment	   of	   the	   1930s	   committed	   themselves	   to	   Keynesian	   social	   democracy	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and	  full	  employment.	  This	  was	  combined	  with	  an	  export-­‐led	  growth	  strategy	  to	  be	  achieved	  through	   the	   gradual	   liberalisation	   of	   trade	   and	   payments.	   Finally,	   Britain	  would	   accept	   a	  position	  as	  a	  junior	  partner	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  effort	  to	  rebuild	  a	  stable	  global	  economy	  and	  combat	   the	   rising	   Communist	   threat.	   In	   these	   three	   objectives,	   according	   to	   Brett,	   the	  central	  deficiencies	  of	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  strategy	  are	  rooted.	  These	  objectives	  were	  in	  fact,	  ‘neither	  mutually	  compatible	  or	  in	  line	  with	  the	  country’s	  diminished	  economic	  resources’	  (Brett,	  1985:	  133).	  Britain’s	  capitulation	  to	  American	  power	  was	  the	  undergirding	  factor	  in	  the	   adoption	   of	   this	   triad	   of	   deficient	   and	   contradictory	   policy	   objectives.	   The	   seeds	   of	  capitulation	  were	   sown	   during	   the	  war,	   with	   the	   progressive	   financial	   exhaustion	   of	   the	  Exchequer	   delivering	   Britain	   into	   American	   dependence	   through	   Lend-­‐Lease,	   while	   the	  need	   for	  American	   finance	   to	  enable	   reconstruction	   solidified	  dependency	  after	   armistice	  (Brett,	  1985:	  135).	  	  American	  assistance	  however,	  came	  at	  a	  high	  price.	  American	  leaders	  had	  set	  their	  sights	   on	   dismantling	   the	   Sterling	   Area,	   a	   free	   trade	   zone	   based	   around	   sterling	   under	  which,	  ‘dealings	  between	  the	  whole	  Sterling	  Area	  and	  the	  USA	  were	  closely	  controlled	  and	  the	  supply	  of	  dollars	  to	  any	  user	  strictly	  rationed’	  (Brett,	  1985:	  136).	  To	  secure	  American	  assistance,	   Britain	  would	   have	   to	  move	   towards	   full	   convertibility	   of	   sterling	   and	   accept	  American	  opposition	  to	  protectionism.	  This	  would	  be	  disastrous	  for	  Britain’s	  commitment	  to	  full	  employment,	  with	  British	  industry	  unfit	  to	  compete	  with	  its	  American	  counterpart	  on	  equal	  terms.	  Furthermore,	  the	  likely	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficit	  provoked	  by	  competition	  with	  American	  exporters	  would	  necessitate	  domestic	  deflation	  and	  politically	  unpalatable	  cuts	  to	  welfare	  spending.	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This	   was	   the	   context	   within	   which	   Keynes	   headed	   to	   Washington	   in	   1945	   to	  negotiate	   a	   Loan	   Agreement	   with	   the	   U.S.	   According	   to	   Brett	   (1985:	   139),	   British	  negotiators	   were	   cowed	   by	   an	   unexpectedly	   hostile	   American	   stance.	   Keynes	   and	   his	  compatriots	  accepted	  crushing	  concessions,	  agreeing	  to	  full	  convertibility	  of	  sterling	  within	  one	   year	   of	   the	   agreements	   ratification.	   The	   consequences	   of	   this	   were	   twofold.	   Firstly,	  Britain	  would	  have	  to	  enact	  deflationary	  measures	  to	  offset	  pressure	  placed	  on	  sterling	  as	  holders	   rushed	   to	   move	   into	   dollars	   for	   purchasing	   American	   goods.	   Secondly,	   the	   U.S.	  would	  become	  the	  effective	  guarantor	  of	  the	  Sterling	  Area,	  through	  liquidity	  supplied	  by	  the	  loan	   and	   subsequent	   Marshall	   Aid.	   Overall,	   this	   involved	   massive	   erosion	   of	   British	  sovereignty,	  leading	  Brett	  to	  conclude	  (1985:	  139)	  that	  ‘capitulation	  to	  American	  hegemony	  had	  been	  rapid	  and	  complete’.	  Britain’s	   capitulation	   at	   Washington	   had	   dire	   consequences.	   	   Brett	   (1985:	   141)	  suggests	   these	   concessions	   ‘turned	   Britain	   into	   a	   willing	   American	   client’.	   Moreover,	  Washington	   set	   the	   course	   for	   Britain’s	   faltering	   development	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   era.	  Acquiescing	  to	  America’s	  hegemonic	  ambitions,	   ‘allowed	  many	  short-­‐term	  problems	  to	  be	  resolved	  with	  less	  sacrifice	  and	  stress	  than	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  necessary,	  but	  at	  the	  cost	   of	   creating	   conditions	   that	   were	   to	   guarantee	   a	   gradual	   decline	   into	   economic	   and	  political	  mediocrity.’	  	  Subordination	   to	   American	   sponsorship	   caused	   Britain’s	   subsequent	   decline.	   It	  facilitated	   enormous	   British	  military	   spending	   on	   the	   Korean	  War.	   This	   put	   tremendous	  pressure	  on	  the	  British	  balance	  of	  payments	  and,	  under	  conditions	  where	  full	  employment	  had	   already	   been	   achieved,	   diverted	   resources	   away	   from	   much	   needed	   industrial	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The	  ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’	  thesis	  
	  For	  Peter	  Burnham	  (1990:	  5)	  the	  post-­‐war	  relationship	  was	  distinguished	  by	  the	  successful	  subversion	   of	   American	   demands	   by	   British	   policy-­‐makers.	   Reconstruction	   occurred	  through	   the	   prism	   of	   inter-­‐imperial	   rivalry	   rather	   than	   under	   the	   auspices	   of	   American	  hegemony.	   Burnham	   challenges	   (1990:	   8)	   the	   ‘hegemony	   approach’,	   demonstrating	   its	  inability	  to	  explain	  interstate	  relations	  within	  the	  supposed	  hegemonic	  heartland.	  Post-­‐war	  reconstruction	   was	   not	   about	   the	   global	   imposition	   of	   American	   dominance,	   or	   the	  emergent	   interests	   of	   a	   global	   capitalist	   class,	   but	   rather,	   ‘The	   outcome	   of	   an	   uneven	  process	   whereby	   nation-­‐states	   working	   within	   domestic	   political	   constraints	   pursued	  individual	   accumulation	   strategies	   in	   the	   context	   of	   re-­‐establishing	   conditions	   for	   global	  accumulation’.	  This	  uneven	  process,	  of	  different	  national	  strategies,	  produced	  contradictory	  relations	  of	  collaboration	  and	  conflict.	  The	  major	  point	  of	  friction	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  over	  the	  fate	  of	  Western	  European	  integration.	  While	  American	  strategists	  sought	  to	  expand	  through	  trade	  and	  investment	  into	  an	  integrated	  Western	  Europe,	  British	  leaders	  identified	  their	  principal	  interests	  with	  Sterling	  Area	  nations	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  8).	  	  Although	  the	  Americans	  clearly	  harboured	  ambitions	  to	  greatly	  expand	  their	  power	  through	  the	  subordination	  of	  Britain,	  they	  were	  continually	  frustrated	  in	  their	  attempts	  to	  pursue	  these	  objectives.	  	  British	  officials	  played	  a	  clever	  game	  of	  deception:	  subverting	  the	  Washington	   Loan	   Agreement	   obligations	   and	   using	   dollar	   aid	   to,	   ‘restructure	   trade,	  stimulate	  production	  and	  reduce	  the	  dollar	  gap	  to	  gain	  some	  degree	  of	  independence	  from	  the	   United	   States’	   (Burnham,	   1990:	   10).	   The	   British	   Treasury	   in	   particular	   resisted	   the	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more	  vociferous	  American	  ambitions.	   Sterling’s	   role	   as	   an	   international	   currency	  and	   the	  status	  of	  London	  as	  the,	  ‘world’s	  premier	  financial	  centre’,	  gave	  Britain	  bargaining	  strength	  with	   U.S.	   policymakers,	   who	   recognised	   that	   working	   through	   Britain	   was	   crucial	   to	  expanding	  American	  influence	  in	  Europe	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  9).	  	  Rather	  than	  an	  effective	  tool	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  American	  hegemony,	  then,	  the	  Marshall	   Plan	   and	   associated	   attempts	   to	   promote	   European	   integration	   had	   limited	  efficacy	   regarding	   Britain.	   Burnham	   suggests	   that	   the	   Marshall	   Plan,	   ‘simply	   fed	   Britain	  more	  dollars	  without	  achieving	  the	  European	  integration	  which	  was	  its	  political	  rationale’.	  British	   resistance	   dampened	   integrationist	   efforts	   and	   led	   to	   a	   reduced	   form	   of	   ‘non-­‐committal	   coordination’	   (Burnham,	   1990:	   10).	   	   These	   were	   not	   therefore,	   as	   Brett	   had	  suggested,	  signposts	  on	  the	  journey	  towards	  Britain’s	  capitulation	  to	  American	  hegemony.	  	  For	  Burnham,	  contra	  Brett,	  Korean	  rearmament	  did	  not	  exemplify	  British	  pliability	  under	  American	  pressure.	  It	  was	  an	  autonomous	  decision	  taken	  by	  the	  British	  government	  in	  order	  to	  demonstrate	  Britain’s	  independent	  status	  within	  Western	  Europe.	  Rearmament	  did	   not,	   as	   Brett	   suggested,	   have	   a	   serious	   negative	   impact	   on	   the	   British	   economic	  recovery.	  Impacts	  were	  limited	  and	  government	  spending	  actually	  stimulated	  development	  of	  some	  industries	  through	  subsidy	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  12).	  	  All	  of	  these	  points	  of	  contention	  lead	  Burnham	  towards	  very	  different	  conclusions.	  Britain	   trenchantly	   resisted	   the	   hardball	   tactics	   of	   the	   U.S,	   and	   ultimately	   the	   attempted	  imposition	   of	   U.S.	   hegemonic	   ambitions	   was	   blocked	   by	   British	   and	   Western	   European	  resistance.	  The	  pattern	  of	  post-­‐war	  reconstruction	  that	  evolved	  was	  far	  removed	  from	  that	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envisioned	  by	  American	  planners.	  We	  are	  left	  with	  two	  radically	  different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  period.	  	  
	  
Beyond	  the	  capitulation/rivalry	  binary	  
	  The	   ‘capitulation/rivalry’	   binary	   through	  which	  Brett	   and	  Burnham	  explore	   the	  post-­‐war	  period	   is	   gravely	   misleading.	   Regarding	   Brett,	   the	   notion	   of	   ‘capitulation’	   is	   far	   too	  unequivocal	  to	  capture	  the	  complexities	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  jockeying	  for	  power	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war.	  Brett	  overlooks	  the	  rivalry	  and	  contestation	  underway	  during	  the	  war,	  which	  continued	   into	   the	   post-­‐war	   years.	   Focusing	   upon	   the	   ‘post-­‐war’	   era	   as	   an	   analytically	  distinctive	  moment	  is	  useful	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  but	  it	  masks	  the	  continuities	  at	  play	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  preceding	  section,	  many	  of	  Britain	  and	  America’s	  ‘post-­‐war’	   priorities	   were	   actually	   	   	   determined	   either	   before	   or	   during	   the	   war	   (Maier,	  1977;	   607,	   Waddell,	   1999:	   244;	   Cronin,	   1991:	   137;	   Bartlett,	   1977:	   9).	   Terse	   bargaining	  underway	  during	  the	  war	  did	  not	  stop	  afterwards.	  In	   this	   respect,	   Burnham’s	   critiques	   of	   Brett’s	   analysis	   are	  well	   placed.	   	   Burnham	  (1990:	  10)	  correctly	  identifies	  Britain’s	  centrality	  to	  realising	  American	  plans	  for	  European	  integration.	   This	   provided	   leverage	   for	   Britain,	   and	   British	   politicians	  were	   able	   to	   stifle	  American	  ambitions	  for	  an	  integrated	  Europe	  (Cronin,	  1991:	  166;	  Hogan,	  1987:	  21).	  There	  is	   also	   support	   for	   Burnham’s	   claims	   regarding	   Britain’s	   ability	   to	   evade	   responsibilities	  agreed	  to	  in	  negotiations	  with	  the	  U.S.	  (Maier,	  1977:	  621;	  Cronin,	  1991:	  166).	  Clearly	  then,	  Brett’s	  (1985:	  139)	  suggestion	  that	  Britain’s	  capitulation	  to	  American	  hegemony	  had	  been	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‘rapid	  and	  complete’	  is	  misguided.	  Britain	  fought	  to	  maintain	  sterling’s	  international	  status	  and	   entry	   into	   the	   Korean	   War	   was	   consistent	   with	   the	   desire	   of	   British	   leaders	   to	  demonstrate	  their	  commitment	  to	  a	  continuing	  world	  power	  role.	  	  Nonetheless,	   Burnham’s	   alternative	   account	   pushes	   us	   towards	   a	   comparably	  deficient	   extreme.	   Characterising	   the	   post-­‐war	   relationship	   as	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	   rivalry’	  obscures	   more	   than	   it	   reveals.	   Applying	   this	   concept	   to	   the	   post-­‐war	   period	   is	   deeply	  anachronistic.34	  Anglo-­‐American	   relations	   had	   moved	   beyond	   the	   possibility	   of	   armed	  conflict,	   after	   the	  unprecedentedly	   intimate	  wartime	  alliance	  between	   the	   two	   (Ovendale,	  1998:	  47;	  Temperley,	  2002:	  46).	  Negotiations	  occurred	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  militarily	  pacified	  relationship,	  suggesting	  that	  something	  beyond	  ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’	  was	  at	  play.	  There	   was	   rivalry,	   but	   the	   background	   commitment	   to	   partnership	   was	   solid.	   This	   was	  contained	   rivalry;	   the	   parameters	   of	   military	   and	   strategic	   cooperation	   were	   secure	   but	  struggles	   over	   ‘softer’	   political	   issues	   of	   trade	   and	   monetary	   policy	   continued.	   The	  contained	  rivalry	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  symptomatic	  of	  a	  broader	  redefinition	  of	  West	   European	   sovereignty	   under	   the	   global	   ‘Protectorate	   System’	   that	   American	   power	  facilitated	  after	  World	  War	  II,	  with	  the	  Americans	  now	  the	  lead	  and	  exceptional	  players	  in	  defining	   the	   overall	   security	   context	   of	  Western	   Europe	   against	   the	   threat	   of	   the	   Soviet	  Union	  (Gowan,	  2003:	  1).	  	  	  There	  were	  also	  areas	  of	  commonality	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  vision	  for	  the	  post-­‐war	  world	  order.	  Neither	  Britain	  nor	   the	  U.S.	  wanted	   the	  return	  of	   the	  corrosive	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  It	  is	  better	  suited	  to	  the	  pre-­‐	  WW1	  period	  in	  which,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  two,	  the	  unifying	  impact	   of	   German	   bellicosity	   stymied	   strategic	   tensions	   between	   Britain	   and	   America	   that	   had	  threatened	  to	  boil	  over.	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trade	  rivalry	  and	  currency	  instability	  that	  characterised	  the	   inter-­‐war	  years	  (Maier,	  1977:	  619).	  And	  neither	  did	  either	  welcome	  unchecked	  expansion	  of	  Soviet	  power	  in	  Europe	  and	  beyond.	  In	  the	  longer	  term,	  powerful	  interests	  within	  Britain	  and	  America	  wanted	  to	  see	  a	  return	  to	  an	  international	  free	  trade	  order,	  but	  the	  timing	  and	  character	  of	  this	  order	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  considerable	  contention.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	   a	   much	   more	   nuanced	   account	   than	   Burnham’s,	   Michael	   Hogan	   (1987:	   21)	  identifies	  continuity	  between	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  and	  the	  interwar	  years.	  At	  stake	  were	  the	  terms	   and	   conditions	   of	   British	   sovereignty	   as	   the	   transformation	   from	   independent	  Imperialist	  power	  to	  subordinate	  partner	  within	  an	  American-­‐led	  world	  order	  accelerated.	  But	  intrusions	  into	  British	  sovereignty	  were	  tolerated	  because	  of	  the	  desperation	  of	  Britain,	  the	   intensity	   of	   wartime	   collaboration	   and	   because	   both	   states	   had	   a	   commitment	   to	  creating	   a	   more	   liberal	   post-­‐war	   economy	   (Dobson,	   1995:	   90).	   	   Wartime	   exhaustion	   of	  British	   power	   catalysed	   this	   process	   as	   it	   had	   during	   WW1.	   Although	   Brett	   correctly	  identifies	   the	   central	   process	   of	   British	   subordination,	   he	   overstates	   the	   readiness	   and	  comprehensiveness	  with	  which	  Britain	  gave	  up	  independence.	  Ultimately,	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  wanted	  to	  push	  the	  post-­‐war	  international	  economy	  in	  the	  same	  direction	  but	  the	  routes	   that	   they	  envisaged,	  mapped	  out	  by	  distinctive	   interests,	  were	  markedly	  different.	  Only	  by	  examining	  processes	   stretching	  across	   the	  wartime	  and	  post-­‐war	  periods	  are	  we	  able	   to	   escape	   the	   capitulation/rivalry	   binary	   and	   explore	   the	   co-­‐constitutive	   currents	   of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  How	   did	   currents	   of	   institutional	   transformation	   bear	   on	   post-­‐war	   dynamics	  between	  Britain	   and	  America?	  Understanding	   the	   different	   institutional	   priorities	   at	   play	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during	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   negotiations	   at	   Bretton	  Woods	   and	   beyond	   requires	   that	   we	  disaggregate	   the	   national	   interest	   and	   problematise	   its	   formation	   across	   space	   and	   time.	  Processes	   of	   institutional	   transformation	   within	   both	   countries,	   underway	   before	   and	  during	  the	  war,	  were	  key	  to	  the	  tone	  and	  scope	  of	  post-­‐war	  developments.	  	  Indeed,	  many	  of	  the	  questions	  that	  would	  motivate	  the	  post-­‐war	  planners	  who	  drew	  up	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  agreement,	  were	  born	  directly	   from	  the	  troubled	   international	  economic	  developments	  of	  the	   interwar	   years	   and	   the	   way	   that	   state	   institutions	   developed	   in	   response	   to	   these	  challenges.	  What	  emerged	  after	  the	  war,	  then,	  bore	  the	  indelible	  imprint	  of	  the	  legacies	  and	  lessons	  of	   the	   interwar	  political	  economy.	  The	  shadow	  of	   the	  gold	  standard	   loomed	   large	  over	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  blueprints	  for	  international	  economic	  order	  (Pauly,	  1997:	  45).	  Due	  to	  the	  deficiencies	  within	  their	  analytical	  approaches,	  both	  Brett	  and	  Burnham	  overlook	  the	  significance	  of	  these	  diachronic	  developmental	  processes.	  Consequently,	  they	  fail	   to	   identify	   the	   tensions	  within	   the	  British	   state	   and	   the	  bearing	   this	  had	  on	  post-­‐war	  relations	  with	   the	   U.S.	   Brett’s	   (1985:	   133)	   assertion	   that	   a	   national	   consensus	   had	   been	  established	  around	  three	  major	  policy	  objectives	  by	  1951	  obscures	   the	  degree	  of	   internal	  contention	   over	   these	   goals	   and	   exaggerates	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   they	   were	   universally	  accepted.35	  Similarly,	   Burnham	   (1990:	   185)	   rules	   out	   the	   possibility	   of	   divisions	   within	  governmental	  institutions,	  proclaiming	  that,	  ‘the	  role	  of	  the	  capitalist	  state	  is	  to	  express	  the	  ‘general	  interest’	  of	  capital’.	  Rather	  than	  exploring	  formation	  of	  the	  ‘national	  interest’,	  both	  Brett	   and	   Burnham	  deduce	   it	   from	  mechanistic	   conceptions	   of	   uneven	   development.	   For	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  For	   an	   excellent	   analysis	   of	   the	   exaggeration	   of	   consensus	   politics	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   period	   see:	  Peter	  Kerr	  (2001)	  ‘Post-­‐war	  British	  Politics:	  From	  Conflict	  to	  Consensus’,	  London:	  Routledge.	  	  
	  	   131	  
Burnham	   this	   results	   in	   a	   crude	   economic	   determinism	   that	   obscures	   the	   evolution	   of	  institutional	   perspectives	   on	   post-­‐war	   economic	   policy.	   In	   Burnham’s	   mechanistic	  framework,	   increased	   ‘economic’	   cooperation	   gives	   rise	   to	   ‘political’	   consolidation.	  Attempts	   to	   investigate	   tensions	  and	  processes	  at	  work	  within	  the	  state	  are	  dismissed	  as,	  ‘Weberian	   empiricism’	   (1990:	   186).	   This	   dismissal	   is	   unwarranted,	   leading	   Burnham	   to	  exaggerate	   rivalry	   and	   underplay	   the	   development	   of	   complementarity	   between	  institutional	  and	  class	  actors	  within	  Britain	  and	  America.	  	  
The	  restoration	  of	  orthodoxy	  
	  Preoccupied	   with	   questions	   of	   decline,	   hegemony	   and	   inter-­‐imperial	   rivalry,	   Brett	   and	  Burnham	  overlook	  crucial	   facets	  of	   institutional	  development	  within	   the	  British	  state	  and	  the	  interpolation	  of	  these	  processes	  with	  currents	  of	  development	  in	  the	  U.S.	  In	  particular,	  they	  disregard	  the	  manner	   in	  which	  these	  transformations	  and	  tensions	  played	  out	   in	  the	  formulation	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  impact	  that	  this	  had	  upon	  subsequent	  developments.	  Their	   polarised	   interpretations,	   expressed	   in	   terms	   of	   ‘capitulation’	   and	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry’,	   leave	   little	   space	   for	   excavating	   the	   nuanced	   patterns	   of	   institutional	  transformation	   that	   characterised	   the	   post-­‐war	   state.	   These	   patterns	   are	   integral	   to	  understanding	   Britain’s	   development	   within	   the	   context	   of	   the	   common	   interests	   of	  banking	  communities	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  	  Both	   Brett	   and	   Burnham	   chronically	   underestimate	   the	   centrality	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	  England	  and	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  City	  on	  British	  policy.	  Burnham	  (1990:	  180)	  dismisses	  the	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possibility	  of	   a	  divergence	  of	   interests	  within	  British	   capitalism	  out	  of	  hand.36	  	  But	   as	  we	  have	  seen,	  these	  differences	  were	  already	  at	  play	  during	  the	  formulation	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  Burnham’s	   theoretical	   dismissal	   simply	   sidesteps	   the	   large	   body	   of	   literature	   that	  makes	  the	  case	  for	  a	  distinctive	  nexus	  of	  institutional	  power	  within	  the	  British	  state:	  that	  between	  the	  City,	  Treasury	  and	  Bank	  of	  England	   (Ingham,	  1984;	  Green,	  1992;	  Hall,	   1986).	   Inquiry	  into	   the	   historical	   processes	   of	   institutional	   development	   underway	   immediately	   before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war	  reveals	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  dynamic	  nexus.	  The	  shifting	  balance	  of	   power	   between	   these	   institutional	   centres	   of	   power	   within	   the	   British	   state,	   and	   the	  manner	  in	  which	  they	  intersected	  with	  the	  evolving	  balance	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  were	  key	  to	  the	  unfolding	  of	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  	  Despite	  the	  Bank’s	  animosity	  towards	  Keynes,	  the	  predominance	  of	  the	  City	  within	  official	  British	  thinking	  was	  already	  inscribed,	  to	  a	  certain	  degree,	  within	  Keynes’s	  post-­‐war	  objectives.	   Keynes	  was	   committed	   to	   a	   liberal,	  multilateral	   international	   economic	   order	  very	  much	  in	  keeping	  with	  the	  longstanding	  interests	  of	  the	  City	  (Cottrell,	  1995:	  210;	  Green,	  1992:	   198).	   Although	   there	   were	   frictions	   with	   the	   Bank	   over	   the	   timing	   of	   a	   return	   to	  sterling	   convertibility,	  Keynes’s	  ultimate	  ambition	  was	   to,	   ‘recover	   for	  London	   its	   ancient	  prestige	   and	   its	   hegemony’	   (Hall,	   1986:	   211).	   Notwithstanding	   the	   failure	   to	   properly	  institutionalise	   Keynesian	   thinking	   within	   the	   key	   centres	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   British	   state,	  then,	   the	   strategic	   failures	   that	   led	   to	   the	   revitalisation	   of	   the	   City	   and	   undermined	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  For	   Burnham	   the	   capitalist	   state	   is	   a	  monolithic	   form	   that	   expresses	   the	   interests	   of	   capital	   in	  general	   in	  an	  essentially	  negative	  way,	  by	  removing	  barriers	  to	  capital	  accumulation	  and	  ensuring	  the	  sanctity	  of	  private	  property	  and	  the	  stability	  of	  money.	  This	  perspective	  disables	  our	  capacity	  to	  disaggregate	   the	   state	   by	   rejecting	   any	   such	   attempts,	   apriori,	   as	   Weberian	   pluralism	   or	   ‘overt	  empiricism’	  (Burnham,	  1990:	  180).	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Keynesian	  compromise	  within	  Britain	  were	  also	  very	  much	  a	  product	  of	  the	  inconsistencies	  and	  contradictions	  within	  Keynes’s	  own	   thinking.	  There	  was	  substantial	  overlap	  between	  Keynes’s	  post-­‐war	  planning	  and	  Gladstonian	  orthodoxy,	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  London’s	  role	  as	  the	  cornerstone	  of	  the	  international	  economy	  remaining	  central.	  These	   overlapping	   interests	   began	   to	   emerge	   more	   clearly	   after	   1947,	   in	   the	  aftermath	   of	   Britain’s	   disastrous	   attempt	   to	   restore	   sterling	   to	   convertibility	   under	  American	  duress.	  The	  American	  attempt	  to	  corral	  Britain	  into	  convertibility	  was	  in	  itself	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  shifting	  balance	  of	  power	  within	  the	  American	  state	  following	  the	  death	  of	  Roosevelt	  in	  1945.	  	  Roosevelt’s	  death	  brought	  about	  a	  reconfiguration	  of	  the	  power	  balance	  within	  the	  American	  state.	  New	  Deal	  figures	  such	  as	  Morgenthau	  and	  White	  were	  now	  side-­‐lined	   and	   American	   bankers	   took	   up	   important	   roles	   within	   the	   new	   Truman	  administration	   (Helleiner,	  1994:	  52).	  The	  State	  Department	  now	  began	   to	  exert	  a	  greater	  influence	  upon	  American	   foreign	  policy,	  with	  policy-­‐makers	  now	  beginning	   to	   look	  much	  more	   favourably	   upon	   the	   Key	   Currency	   Plan.	   State	   Department	   planners	   had	   been	  unhappy	   with	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   Bretton	   Woods	   had	   departed	   from	   gold	   standard	  principles	   and	  believed	   that	   five-­‐year	   breathing	   space	   granted	   to	  Britain	   before	   it	   had	   to	  restore	  convertibility	  had	  been	  too	  generous.	  Their	  opportunity	  to	  impose	  this	  new	  vision,	  which	   sought	   to	   restore	   sterling	   to	   convertibility	   well	   before	   the	   five-­‐year	   period	   had	  elapsed,	  arose	  during	  the	  Washington	  Loan	  negotiations	  in	  1945.	  The	  Americans	  had	  abruptly	  terminated	  the	  Lend-­‐Lease	  arrangement	  at	   the	  end	  of	  the	  war,	   leaving	  Britain	  desperate	   for	   additional	   dollars	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	  52-­‐53).	  Keynes	  was	   sent	   over	   to	   the	   U.S.	   to	   negotiate	   for	   additional	   funding,	   but	   with	   the	   U.S.	   position	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having	  hardened	  under	  the	  increased	  influence	  of	  the	  State	  Department,	  he	  was	  only	  able	  to	  secure	   funding	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   a	   commitment	   to	   restore	   convertibility	   by	   July	   1947	  (Saville,	  1993:	  150;	  Newton,	  2004:	  260).	  While	  Keynes	  was	  able	  to	  win	  support	  for	  the	  loan	  agreement	  within	  government,	  the	  Bank	  and	  sections	  of	  the	  Treasury	  were	  opposed	  to	  the	  restoration	   of	   convertibility.	   	   Keynes	   had	   proposed	   that	   Britain’s	   military	   expenditure	  should	  be	  cut	  and	  that	  all	  sterling	  balances	  should	  be	  blocked	  for	  five	  years	  in	  preparation	  for	  a	  smooth	  transition	  to	  convertibility	  that	  would	  insulate	  the	  reconstruction	  programme	  from	   currency	   shocks.	   But	   the	   attempt	   to	   block	   the	   sterling	   balances	   was	   a	   failure,	  particularly	  after	  Keynes’s	  death	  in	  1946.	  The	  Bank	  was	  only	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  a	  scaling	  down	  of	  the	  balances	  with	  creditors	  rather	  than	  unilaterally	  blocking	  them,	  as	  Keynes	  had	  wanted.	   The	   Bank	   feared	   bringing	   about	   the	   demise	   of	   the	   sterling	   area	   and	   with	   it	  sterling’s	   status	   as	   an	   international	   currency.	   The	   Bank’s	   refusal	   to	   compromise	   on	   the	  issue	  of	   sterling	  balances	  greatly	  heightened	   the	   risk	  of	   convertibility	   and	  resulted	   in	   the	  disastrous	   flight	   from	   the	   pound	   that	   occurred	   as	   soon	   as	   convertibility	   was	   restored.	  Crucially,	   the	  calamitous	  attempt	  to	  restore	  convertibility,	   ‘meant	  the	  collapse	  of	  Keynes’s	  efforts	   to	   establish	   an	   international	   context	  which	  would	   support	  British	   reconstruction’,	  while	   the	   Bank’s	   role	   in	   the	   failure	   was	   a	   reflection	   of	   its,	   ‘continuing	   dissent	   from	   the	  reconstruction	  consensus	  and	  preoccupation	  with	  the	  external	  status	  of	  sterling’	  (Newton,	  2004:	  265).	  	  After	   the	   failure	   to	   restore	   convertibility,	   a	   consensus	   briefly	   emerged	   around	   the	  need	  to	  maintain	  sterling	  as	  an	  inconvertible	  currency.	  	  The	  maintenance	  of	  inconvertibility	  received	  support	  both	  from	  Keynesians	  and	  officials	  within	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  who	  
	  	   135	  
were	   principally	   concerned	   with	   sterling.	   The	   Bank	   viewed	   the	   continuation	   of	   bilateral	  arrangements	  as	  an	   improvement	   from	  possible	  bankruptcy,	  while	  Keynesians	   supported	  controls	   that	   would	   insulate	   the	   domestic	   economy	   from	   dollar	   shortages.	   But	   this	  consensus	  was	   extremely	   fragile,	   and	   it	   began	   to	   break	   down	  when	   sterling	   came	   under	  renewed	  pressure	  in	  1949.	  	  	  The	  fragility	  of	  Keynesian	  thinking	  in	  planning	  the	  future	  of	  sterling	  was	  reflected	  in	  the	  Treasury’s	  domestic	  strategy	  too.	  Although	  the	  Keynesian	  revolution	  did	  make	  headway	  within	  the	  Treasury’s	  domestic	  strategy,	  it	  was	  met	  with	  resistance	  from	  other	  key	  strategic	  sites	   within	   the	   state.37 	  Brett’s	   (1985:	   133)	   suggestion	   that	   an	   overarching	   national	  consensus	   on	   British	   policy	   had	   been	   reached	   by	   1951	   overly	   simplifies	   complex	   and	  contradictory	  processes.	  As	  Peter	  Kerr	  (2001:	  52)	  notes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remain	  cautious	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  Keynesian	  thinking	  overcame	  the	  longstanding	  liberal	  orthodoxy	  within	   key	   institutions	   of	   the	   British	   state	   as	   ‘Throughout	   the	   post-­‐war	   period,	   pre-­‐Keynesian	  beliefs	  continued	  to	  dominate	  the	  Treasury,	  thereby	  serving	  as	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	   the	   introduction	   of	   an	   effective	   demand-­‐management	   strategy	   for	   achieving	   full	  employment’	   (Kerr,	   2001:	   52).	   The	   variant	   of	   Keynesianism	   that	   became	   tenuously	  consolidated	  displayed	  a	  substantial	  continuity	  with	  previous	  practice.	  An	  ‘oral	  tradition’	  of	  sound	  money	  persisted	  within	  the	  Treasury,	  colouring	  the	  economic	  policies	  of	  all	  post-­‐war	  governments	  (Cronin,	  1991:	  160).	  	  	  After	   1947	   there	  was	   a	   retreat	   from	   the	  wartime	   physical	   controls	   on	   prices	   and	  production.	   These	   were	   substituted	   for	   monetary	   and	   fiscal	   management	   techniques	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  And,	  of	  course,	  from	  within	  the	  Treasury	  itself.	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(Green,	  1992:	  204).	  Abandoning	  physical	  controls	  meant	  that	   the	  Treasury	  re-­‐emerged	  as	  the	   principal	   institutional	   hub	   for	   formation	   of	   economic	   policy.	   This	   restoration	   of	  Treasury	   control	  was	   enormously	  beneficial	   to	   the	  City,	   because	   it	   implicitly	   entailed	   the	  reassertion	   of	   the	   City’s	   privileged	   relationship	  with	   the	  main	   hub	   of	   economic	   decision-­‐making.	   Exclusive	   reliance	   on	   monetary	   and	   fiscal	   methods	   of	   economic	   management	  augmented	  the	  role	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  money	  markets	  in	  shaping	  policy.	  In	  the	  light	  of	   these	  considerations,	   ‘Britain’s	  much-­‐vaunted	   ‘Keynesian	  Revolution’	  begins	   to	   look	   far	  less	   of	   a	   radical	   break	   from	   pre-­‐war	   practice	   than	   has	   generally	   been	   assumed’	   (Green,	  1992:	  204).	  Although	  the	  Treasury	  was	  made	  solely	  responsible	  for	  planning	  from	  1947,	  its	  concern	  with	  industrial	  issues	  extended	  only	  to	  the	  point	  at	  which	  they	  affected	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  and	  the	  status	  of	  sterling	  (Saville,	  1993:	  170).	  	  Substantial	   changes	   did	   nonetheless	   occur.	   Public	   spending	   increased	   massively	  during	  and	  after	  the	  war,	  rising	  from	  14%	  of	  GNP	  in	  1900	  to	  38%	  by	  1961.	  Increased	  state	  involvement	   in	  economic	  development	  had	  qualitative	   impacts	  on	   the	  nature	  of	  Treasury	  control,	  with	  an	  expanded	  institutional	  apparatus	  arising	  in	  order	  to	  meet	  these	  challenges.	  Crucially,	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   Treasury	   underway	   during	   the	   1920s	   and	   30s	  intensified	  after	  the	  war.	  Under	  Cripps’	  chancellorship	  the	  Treasury’s	  international	  section	  expanded	  greatly.	  Expansion	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  enduring	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems	  and	  the	  sterling	  crisis	  of	  1947.	  After	  this	  point,	  ‘the	  centre	  of	  gravity,	  in	  terms	  of	  capacity	  as	  well	  as	  achievement,	  now	  lay	  in	  the	  large	  Overseas	  Finance	  Division	  of	  the	  Treasury’.	  	  This	  section	  of	   the	  Treasury	  dealt	  with	   the	  external	  crises	  of	  1946-­‐51	  and	  was	  responsible	   for	  planning	   around	   the	   formation	   of	   the	   O.E.E.C	   and	   the	   European	   Payments	   Union.	   By	   the	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early	   1950s	   the	  Overseas	   Finance	  Division	   of	   the	   Treasury	  was	   better	   staffed	   and	   better	  equipped	  than	  its	  domestic	  counterpart	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  284-­‐286,	  317).	  The	  post-­‐war	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  Treasury	  reflected	  continuity	  with	  interwar	  dynamics,	   but	   with	   a	   crucial	   difference;	   now	   British	   Treasury	   power	   was	   subordinated	  within	   a	   transatlantic	   network	   linked	   to	   a	   comparably	   internationalising	   American	  Treasury.	   The	   difficult	   negotiations	   between	   the	   two	   Treasuries	   at	   Bretton	   Woods	  demonstrated	  the	  remarkably	  close	  ties	  between	  them	  and	  foreshadowed	  the	  coordinating	  role	   that	   the	   American	   Treasury	   would	   play	   with	   former	   Great	   Powers	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	  world	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  77).38	  	  Labour’s	  inability	  to	  orchestrate	  a	  lasting	  institutional	  transformation	  of	  the	  British	  state	   enabled	   a	   Conservative	   reaction	   in	   1951	   (Cronin,	   1991:	   189).	   Even	   after	  nationalisation	   in	   1946,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   retained	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   operational	  autonomy	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  321;	  Cronin,	  1991:	  168;	  Green,	  1992:	  204).	   	  Under	   the	  Tory	  government	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  regained	  the	  initiative	  in	  monetary	  policy.39	  The	  Bank	  had	  begun	   to	   question	   its	   commitment	   to	   bilateralism	   from	   1949,	   as	   it	   grew	   increasingly	  concerned	   that	   sterling’s	   international	   role	   could	   not	   be	   maintained	   without	   embracing	  convertibility.40	  The	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  requested	  an	  American	   loan	   in	  order	  to	  make	  the	   pound	   rapidly	   convertible.	   They	   were	   supported	   by	   American	   bankers	   in	   the	   U.S.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  American	  officials	  believed	  that	  close	  cooperation	  with	  the	  British	  Treasury	  would	  legitimise	  the	  transition	  in	  international	  currency	  status	  from	  sterling	  to	  the	  dollar	  and	  ingratiate	  American	  aims	  with	  the	  Old	  World	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  77).	  39	  In	   the	   earliest	   post-­‐war	   years,	  much	  decision	  making	   power	   had	   continued	   to	   be	   vested	   in	   the	  wartime	  planning	  committees	  (Cronin,	  1991:	  157;	  Helleiner,	  1994:	  69).	  	  40	  The	   Bank	   was	   worried	   that	   the	   sale	   of	   ‘cheap	   sterling’	   in	   the	   New	   York	   black	   market	   was	  undermining	   the	  status	  of	   sterling	  and	  diverting	  business	  away	   from	  the	   international	  markets	   in	  London	  (Newton,	  2004:	  266).	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Treasury,	  who	  recognised	  an	  opportunity	  to	  restore	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  alliance	  of	   the	   1920s.	   But	   the	   bankers’	   plan	   was	   rejected	   by	   the	   ECA	   (the	   body	   responsible	   for	  administering	   Marshall	   Plan	   aid),	   which	   believed	   that	   a	   return	   to	   sterling	   convertibility	  would	   undermine	   attempts	   to	   promote	   European	   cooperation	   through	   the	   European	  Payments	  Union	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  69).	  Although	  this	  attempt	  to	  restore	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	   axis	   failed,	   it	   foreshadowed	   the	   developments	   that	   would	   occur	   during	   the	  following	  decade	  and	   signalled	   that	  within	  Britain,	   both	   the	  Bank	  and	   the	  Treasury	  were	  now	  interested	  in	  restoring	  convertibility.	  	  With	   the	   Conservatives	   keen	   to	   restore	   the	   City’s	   international	   position	   and	  sterling’s	   international	   role	   from	   1951,	   the	   proponents	   of	   a	   new	   external	   policy	   were	  presented	   with	   an	   opportunity.	   George	   Bolton	   at	   the	   Bank	   advised	   the	   Chancellor	   to	  promote	   ‘progressive	   convertibility’,	   by	   incrementally	   moving	   towards	   full	   convertibility	  (Newton,	  2004:	  270).	  But	  American	  financial	  support	  for	  such	  a	  move	  was	  not	  forthcoming,	  with	  the	  Truman	  administration	  now	  prioritising	  European	  integration	  through	  the	  EPU.	  In	  December	   1951,	   the	   Conservatives	   reopened	   the	   City	   as	   a	   centre	   for	   foreign	   exchange	  dealing	  (Strange,	  1971:	  64).41	  	  By	  early	  1952,	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Overseas	  Finance	  Section	  in	  the	   Treasury	   launched	   ‘Operation	   Robot’:	   attempting	   a	   unilateral	   restoration	   of	  convertibility	   at	   a	   floating	   rate,	   without	   American	   financial	   support.	   The	   plan	   caused	   a	  battle	  within	   the	   government	   and,	   crucially,	   revealed	   a	   deep	   schism	   ‘between	   those	  who	  supported	   the	   aims	   of	   post-­‐war	   reconstruction	   and	   those	   who	   did	   not’.	   Robot	   was	   not	  compatible	  with	  the	  post	  1944	  policy	  consensus,	  as	  its	  implementation	  would	  have	  implied	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Butler,	   the	  new	  Tory	  Chancellor,	  enacted	  all	  of	   the	  Banks	  proposals	   in	  November	  1951,	  when	   it	  called	  for	  a	  rise	  in	  the	  Bank	  Rate	  and	  deflationary	  cuts	  in	  public	  spending	  (Cairncross,	  1995:	  75).	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the	   need	   for	   severe	   deflationary	   measures.	   Tighter	   monetary	   policy	   and	   spending	   cuts,	  proposed	   by	   senior	   Treasury	   officials,	   would	   have	   been	   required	   to	   stabilise	   the	   pound.	  Keynesian	  economists	  within	  the	  civil	  service	  rejected	  the	  plan	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  would	  return	  macro-­‐economic	   policy	   to	   the	   pre-­‐war	   orthodoxies	   (Newton,	   2004:	   271-­‐272).	   The	  plan	  was	  eventually	  rejected,	  but	  it	  demonstrated	  clearly	  the	  growing	  influence	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	   the	   continuity	   of	   pre-­‐war	  policy	  orthodoxy	  both	  within	   the	  Bank	   and	   sections	  of	   the	  Treasury.	  The	  plan	  made	  a	  mockery	  of	  Britain’s	  supposed	  Keynesian	  consensus.	  The	  Bank	  had	  been	  waiting	  for	  its	  opportunity	  to	  restore	  the	  international	  orientation	  of	  the	  City	  and	  the	  pound,	  whatever	  the	  cost	  for	  reconstruction	  efforts	  and	  full	  employment.	  Developments	   within	   Britain	   intersected	   with	   comparable	   processes	   in	   the	   U.S.	  During	  the	  war,	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  was	  restricted	  by	  the	  imperatives	  of	  war	  financing.42	  For	  the	  first	   time	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  Fed,	  elected	  officials	  rather	  than	  unelected	  Federal	  Reserve	  members	  controlled	  monetary	  policy	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	  7).	  This	   ushered	   in	   an	  unprecedented	  phase	   of	   public	   control	   over	   the	   Federal	  Reserve.	   The	  project	   was	   short	   lived	   however;	   by	   1951	   the	   Federal	   Reserve-­‐	   Treasury	   Accord	   had	  restored	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  American	  central	  banking	  system	  and	  freed	  the	  Fed	  from	  the	   obligation	   to	   support	   the	   U.S.	   government	   bond	  market	   by	   ensuring	   that	   it	   could	   be	  financed	   at	   low	   interest	   rates.	   The	   wartime	   arrangement	   had	   facilitated	   massive	   fiscal	  expansion,	  but	  it	  had	  also	  undermined	  the	  Fed’s	  capacity	  to	  control	  inflation	  as	  it	  was	  forced	  to	  buy	  U.S.	  government	  bonds	  every	  time	  long-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  threatened	  to	  rise	  above	  the	   agreed	   level	   (Axilrod,	   2011:	   25-­‐26).	   	   Just	   as	   in	   Britain,	   this	   outcome	   represented	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  The	   central	   issue	   during	   the	   war	   was	   the	   level	   of	   interest	   rates	   for	   U.S.	   Treasury	   bonds.	   The	  Federal	  Reserve	  was	  forced	  to	  accept	  lower	  rates	  than	  it	  had	  wanted	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	  15).	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limitations	   of	   post-­‐war	   Keynesian	   transformation.	   The	   Fed	   had	   been	   worried	   by	   the	  inflationary	  effect	  of	  wartime	  financing	  and	  wanted	  to	  raise	   interest	  rates	   in	  order	  to	  end	  the	  easy	  money	  policies	  of	  the	  wartime	  years	  (Konings,	  2011:	  111).	  It	  successfully	  lobbied	  prominent	  members	  of	   the	  banking	  community	  and	  associated	  business	   interests	   to	  push	  for	   independence	   in	   the	   face	  of	  Truman’s	  administration	  and	   figures	  within	   the	  Treasury,	  who	  had	  sought	  to	  hand	  control	  of	  monetary	  policy	  over	  to	  the	  President	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	   28).43	  By	   winning	   this	   battle,	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   and	   its	   allies	   ushered	   in	   a	  “Conservative	  Keynesian”	  policy	   framework.44	  In	   restoring	   the	   independence	  of	  monetary	  policy	   from	  governmental	  control,	   the	  Accord	  between	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	   laid	  the	   foundations	   for	   the	   tight	  monetary	   policies	   of	   the	   1980s	   and	  1990s,	  which	  would	   be	  used	   to	   restore	   the	  power	  of	   capital	   and	  break	  working	   class	   aspirations	   and	   shatter	   the	  Keynesian	  promise	  of	  full	  employment	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	  28).	   	  The	  Accord	  was	  seen	  as	   	   a	  way	   to	  prevent	   radical	   forces	  within	  any	  government	  administration	   from	  pursuing	  inflationary	  policies,	   in	   this	   sense	   then,	   the	   roots	   of	  monetarism	  were	   actually	   implanted	  during	   the	   1950s,	   with	   macroeconomic	   policy	   priority	   given	   to	   the	   need	   to	   manipulate	  short-­‐term	  interest	  rates	  in	  order	  to	  control	  inflation	  and	  shape	  aggregate	  demand	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  86-­‐87).	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  It	  was	  Russell	  Leffingwell,	  the	  Chairman	  of	  J.P.	  Morgan	  and	  Co.,	  known	  by	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  as	  the,	  ‘dean	  of	  the	  financial	  community’,	  who	  was	  the	  most	  important	  individual	  player	  in	  pushing	  for	  Federal	  Reserve	  independence	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:	  16).	  44	  From	   now	   on,	   an	   independent	   Central	   Bank	   would	   use	   adjustments	   in	   interest	   rates	   as	   the	  primary	  mechanism	  for	  control	  over	  the	  economy.	  Conservative	  Keynesian	  planning	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  lower	  degree	  of,	   ‘intervention	   to	   control	  prices,	  wage	   rates	   and	   resource	   allocation	   in	   the	  private	  sector’	  (Burkhead,	  1971:	  335).	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In	   both	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   then,	   the	   old	   deflationary	   orthodoxies	   entailed	   by	  Central	  Bank	  control	  over	  monetary	  policy	  had	  begun	  to	  reassert	  themselves	  convincingly	  by	  the	  early	  1950s.	  The	  restoration	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  power	  over	  monetary	  policy	  in	  the	   United	   Kingdom	   was	   mirrored	   by	   the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   Federal	   Reserve	  independence	   in	   the	  United	  States.	  This	   represented	   the	   restoration	  of	   banking	  power	   in	  both	  countries	   in	   the	  early	  post-­‐war	  period.45	  As	   the	  1950s	  progressed,	   the	  restoration	  of	  Central	   Bank	   power	   in	   both	   countries	   would	   be	   central	   to	   the	   continuation	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  development	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  Within	  Britain,	  the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  the	  orthodox	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus,	  after	  a	  period	   of	   internal	   contestation	   between	   different	   power	   centres	   within	   the	   state,	   was	   a	  defining	   feature	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   period.	   From	  1947,	   the	   Treasury	  was	   largely	   concerned	  with	  the	  international	  standing	  of	  the	  pound,	  with	  the	  domestic	  economy	  viewed	  largely	  in	  response	   to	   international	  developments	   and	   confidence	   in	   the	  pound	   (Blank,	   1978:	  104).	  The	  restoration	  of	  the	  traditional	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus,	  and	  the	  gathering	  momentum	  towards	  the	  restoration	  of	  convertibility	  within	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  by	  the	  early	  1950s,	   were	   key	   to	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   international	   economy	   around	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   axis	   that	   American	   bankers	   had	  wanted	   since	   before	   Bretton	  Woods.	  During	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s,	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  would	  increasingly	  come	  to	  be	  articulated	  through	  the	  Federal	  Reserve-­‐Wall	  Street-­‐	  Treasury	  nexus	  in	  the	  U.S.	  as	  the	  two	  countries	  played	  central	  and	  interdependent	  roles	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  Epstein	  and	  Schor	  (1995:	  8)	  suggest	  that	  the	  Accord	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  major	  victories	   for	  capital	  against	  labour,	  through	  the	  tight	  monetary	  policy	  of	  the	  1980s	  ad	  1990s.	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The	   reorientation	   of	   state	   institutions	   towards	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   axis	  was	  assisted	  by	  enduring	  ties	  between	  private	  bankers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  Just	  as	  it	  had	  done	  during	  the	  First	  World	  War,	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  once	  more.	  Lamont	   championed	   the	  British	   cause	  during	   the	  war,	  pushing	   for	  Roosevelt	   to	   lift	  the	  arms	  embargo	  on	  Britain	  and	  assisting	   the	  British	  Ambassador	  Lord	  Lothian.	  Morgan	  Grenfell,	  the	  British	  wing	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan,	  was	  depopulated	  during	  the	  war	  as	  many	  of	  its	  senior	  staff	  took	  up	  public	  positions	  within	  government.	  This	  was	  a	  logical	  extension	  of	   the	   bank’s	   pre-­‐war	   role	   as,	   ‘something	   of	   a	   branch	   office	   for	   the	  Bank	   of	   England,	   the	  Treasury,	   and	   the	   Foreign	   Office’.	   Tom	   Catto,	   a	   senior	   Morgan	   Grenfell	   partner,	   was	  appointed	   to	   the	   role	   of	   ‘special	   advisor’	   to	   the	   wartime	   chancellor,	   Kingsley	   Wood.46	  Lamont	   maintained	   a	   distinctive	   diplomatic	   channel	   with	   Catto	   at	   the	   Treasury.	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	  power	  was	   in	   this	  way	   implanted	  within,	   and	   channelled	   through,	   the	  dominant	  institutions	  of	  governance	  (Chernow,	  1990:	  460).	  Undoubtedly	  these	  informal	  channels	  were	  weakened	  by	  the	  growth	  of	  multilateral	  institutions	  and	  the	  new	  climate	  of	  public	  accountability	  that	  followed	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war.	  An	  informal	  partnership	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan,	  which	   had	   virtually	   run	   the	   international	   monetary	   system	   in	   the	   interwar	   years,	   was	  supplanted	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  (Chernow,	  1990:	  486).	  While	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  rival	  investment	   banks	   used	   the	  New	  Deal	   era	   hostility	   towards	   the	   ‘Money	  Trust’	   in	   order	   to	  promote	  reforms	  that	  would	  weaken	  the	  House	  of	  Morgan’s	  control	  over	  American	  finance	  (Konings,	  2011:	  80).	  These	  ambitions	  were	  realised	  with	   the	  passing	  of	   the	  Glass-­‐Steagall	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  Catto	   and	   John	  Maynard	   Keynes	  were	   given	   rooms	   on	   opposite	   sides	   of	   the	   Chancellor’s	   office	  (Chernow,	  1990:	  460).	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Act,	  which	  undermined	  the	  unity	  of	  investment	  and	  commercial	  banking	  functions	  that	  had	  been	  key	  to	  Morgan’s	  dominance	  within	  the	  U.S.	  (Ferguson,	  1995:	  149).	  Nevertheless,	  the	  old	  ties	  still	  mattered.	  Catto	  served	  as	  head	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  from	   1944	   to	   1949,	   an	   appointment	   that	  was	   interpreted	   as,	   ‘underscoring	   the	   need	   for	  close	   post-­‐war	   cooperation	   with	   the	   United	   States’	   (Chernow,	   1990:	   476).	   Although	  Britain’s	   relative	   power	   had	   decreased,	   American	   bankers	   continued	   to	   recognise	   the	  importance	  of	   sterling	   and	   the	  City	   for	   the	   realisation	  of	   their	   ambitions.	   	  New	  York	  was	  undoubtedly	  the	  world’s	  premier	  financial	  centre	  and	  the	  City	  experienced	  only	  stuttering	  recovery	   in	   the	   early	   post-­‐war	   years.	   The	   continuation	   of	   wartime	   controls	   confined	  London	   merchant	   banks	   to	   Sterling	   Area	   loans.	   Members	   of	   the	   banking	   community	   in	  London	  viewed	  these	  controls	  as	  onerous	  impediments	  to	  growth	  (Roberts,	  1992:	  313).	  	  The	   sentiments	   of	   London’s	   merchant	   banking	   community	   towards	   the	   post-­‐war	  international	  monetary	  order	  are	  exemplified	  by	  the	  thoughts	  of	  one	  of	  its	  most	  prominent	  figures-­‐	   Siegmund	  Warburg,	   the	   head	   of	   the	   famous	  Warburg	  merchant	   bank	   that	  would	  later	   play	   a	   key	   role	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Eurobond	   market	   during	   the	   1960s.	   In	   a	  demonstration	  of	  the	  continuing	  importance	  of	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  linkages	  between	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  Warburg	  made	  several	  business	  trips	  to	  New	  York	  from	  February	  1946	  in	  order	  to	  scope	  out	  the	  potential	  for	  business	  ties	  with	  the	  prominent	  New	  York	  investment	  bank	  ‘Kuhn	  Loeb’.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  1948,	  Warburg	  and	  his	  colleagues	  had	  made	  fourteen	  trips	  to	  the	  U.S.	  But	  Warburg	  was	  disappointed	  with	  the	  meagre	  business	  outcomes	  of	  these	  trips	  and	  began	  to	  grow	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  the	  post-­‐war	  order	  (Ferguson,	  2010:	  159-­‐160).	  Warburg	  was	  critical	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  order	  drawn	  up	  at	  Bretton	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Woods	   on	   two	   grounds.	   Firstly,	   he	   opposed	   the	  manner	   in	  which	   gold	   standard	   thinking	  had	  infused	  the	  agreement	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  American	  dollar’s	  fixed	  convertibility	  to	  gold.	  And	   secondly,	  Warburg	   opposed	   the	   restraints	   on	   capital	  mobility	   that	  were	   accepted	   at	  Bretton	   Woods	   as	   a	   necessary	   counterpart	   to	   fixed	   exchange	   rates	   and	   independent	  monetary	   policies.	   	   Warburg	   was	   critical	   of	   the	   early	   termination	   of	   Lend-­‐Lease	   and,	  importantly,	  thought	  that	  Anglo-­‐American	  bankers	  should	  do	  all	  that	  they	  could	  to	  create	  a	  closer	  link	  up	  between	  finance	  and	  industry	  within	  the	  two	  countries	  (Ferguson,	  2010:	  167-­‐169).	   Indeed,	  by	  1950	  Warburg	  was	  calling	   for	  a	   currency	  union	  between	  North	  America	  and	   Western	   Europe	   (Ferguson,	   2010:	   164).	   These	   attempts	   to	   restore	   Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  links	  would	  become	  much	  more	  important	  as	  the	  decade	  wore	  on.	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  In	  the	  face	  of	  enduring	  policy	  orthodoxy,	  centred	  on	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  the	  City	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  Keynesian	  compromise	  never	  stood	  much	  of	  a	  chance.	  By	  the	  early	   1950s,	   the	   old	   forces	   of	   orthodoxy	   were	   in	   the	   ascendancy,	   with	   the	   Conservative	  government	   and	   its	   traditional	   orientation	   towards	   the	   City	   of	   London	   providing	   fertile	  conditions	  for	  the	  reassertion	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  control	  over	  monetary	  policy	  and	  a	  broader	  privileging	   of	   the	  pound	  within	   the	   core	   financial	   nexus	   of	   the	  British	   state.	   The	  limited	  headway	  that	  Keynesian	  thinking	  had	  made	  within	  the	  Treasury	  before	  and	  during	  the	   war	   left	   the	   path	   open	   for	   the	   reassertion	   of	   the	   old	   gold	   standard	   concerns.	   Policy	  became	   increasingly	   focused	   upon	   a	   strong	   pound	   and	   the	   appropriate	   deflationary	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medicine	  required	   to	  achieve	  external	  balance.	  The	  post-­‐war	  Labour	  government,	  despite	  nationalising	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   in	   1946,	   was	   unable	   to	   thoroughly	   institutionalise	   an	  alternative	  set	  of	  economic	  priorities	  within	  the	  key	  institutions	  of	  the	  British	  state.	  	  The	   restoration	   of	   orthodoxy	   within	   Britain	   also	   owed	  much,	   as	   this	   chapter	   has	  demonstrated,	   to	   the	   enduring	   influence	  of	   the	  New	  York	  banking	   community	  within	   the	  U.S.	   Domestically,	   their	   attempts	   to	   bring	   Britain	   and	   sterling	   into	   a	   multilateral	  international	   economic	   order	  were	   at	   first	   thwarted	   by	   the	  more	   gradualist	   approach	   to	  achieving	   British	   convertibility	   endorsed	   by	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   under	   Roosevelt.	  Internationally,	   the	   Bank’s	   commitment	   to	   bilateralism	   in	   the	   early	   post-­‐war	   years	  presented	  a	  major	  obstacle.	  But	  despite	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  New	  York	  bankers	  and	   the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	   to	  restore	  sterling’s	  convertibility	  on	  a	   lasting	  basis	   in	  1947,	   it	  was	  not	  long	  before	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  began	  to	  embrace	  the	  multilateral	  vision	  that	  the	  New	  York	  financial	  community	  and	  the	  American	  state	  had	  sought	  to	  promote	  all	  along.	  Dynamics	   between	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   and	   between	   different	   institutions	   and	  power	   centres	   within	   each	   state,	   were	   central	   to	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   post-­‐war	  international	   economic	   order	   unfolded.	   	   By	   framing	   these	   interactions	   in	   terms	   of	  ‘capitulation’	   and	   ‘inter-­‐imperial	   rivalry’,	   the	   existing	   debate	   has	   understated	   the	   crucial	  way	  in	  which	  the	  working	  out	  of	  competing	  interests	  within	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	   impacted	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  countries	  and	  moulded	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  post-­‐war	  international	   economic	  order	  was	   instituted.	  Only	  by	  disaggregating	   the	  national	   interest	  and	   revealing	   the	   dynamics	   tensions	   both	   within	   and	   between	   states,	   are	   we	   able	   to	  apprehend	  these	  processes.	  	  The	  erosion	  of	  Keynesian	  commitments	  within	  both	  states	  and	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the	  re-­‐emergence	  of	  Central	  Bank	  autonomy,	  already	  underway	  by	  the	  early	  1950s,	  would	  be	   central	   to	   the	   latter	  decomposition	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order	   and	   the	   emergence	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  	  From	  the	   late	  1950s,	   the	  uneven	   interdependence	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  expressed	   itself	   in	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   and	   the	   continued	   interactivity	   of	  sterling	   and	   the	   dollar,	   alongside	   London	   and	   New	   York,	   as	   both	   countries	   struggled	   to	  manage	  their	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits	  under	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order.	  In	  the	  process,	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  dynamics	  played	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  the	  decomposition	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order	  and	  the	  gradual	  rise	  of	  the	  alternative	  monetary	  system	  that	  began	  to	  emerge	  from	  the	  early	  1970s.	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4	  Anglo-­‐American	  Development,	  the	  Euromarkets,	  and	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  Decomposition	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  	  
	  
	  No	  event	  contributed	  more	  to	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  integration	  than	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  As	  the	  Cold	  War	  order	  crystallised	  Soviet	  officials,	  fearing	  seizure	  of	  dollar	  assets	  by	  American	  authorities,	  deposited	  their	  holdings	  with	  European	  banks	  (Burn,	  1999:	  229).	  In	  1955,	  the	  Midland	  Bank	  used	  these	  holdings	  to	  finance	  domestic	  activity	  during	  a	  period	   of	   tight	   money	   in	   the	   UK	   (Schenk,	   1998:	   224).	   So	   began	   the	   most	   important	  development	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	  history	  of	   international	   finance.	  The	  Eurodollar	  market,	  and	  later	  the	  Eurobond	  market,	  became	  the	  crux	  of	  a	  new	  wave	  of	  globalisation.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  this	   process	   lay	   the	   deepening	   integration	   of	   New	   York	   and	   London,	   and	   of	   the	   United	  States	  and	  Britain	  as	  key	  players	  in	  a	  resurgent	  global	  political	  economy.	  	  The	  birth	  and	  rapid	  growth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  exemplifies	  the	  complex	  interactivity	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  It	  ushered	  in	  the	  final	  passing	  of	  sterling’s	  aspirations	  to	  top	   currency	   status,	   cementing	   in	   its	   place	   the	   hegemony	   of	   the	   dollar	   within	   rapidly	  expanding	  global	  capital	  markets.	  It	  was	  the	  locomotive	  that	  drove	  the	  City’s	  revival	  as	  an	  international	   financial	   centre	   of	   the	   first	   rank,	   but	   it	   did	   so	   at	   a	   price.	   No	   longer	   British	  banks	  but	  American	  would	   lead	   the	  way	   in	   international	   banking.	  And	  no	   longer	   sterling	  but	   the	   dollar,	   would	   function	   as	   a	   truly	   international	   currency.	   Not	   least,	   the	   power	   of	  
private	   banks	   would	   be	   further	   entrenched	   within	   the	   British	   state,	   presenting	   a	   major	  obstacle	  to	  democratic	  control	  of	  global	  finance.	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While	   the	   emergence	  of	   the	  Euromarkets	  has	   tended	   to	  be	  understood	  either	   as	   a	  consequence	  of	  the	  changing	  relationship	  between	  states	  and	  markets,	  or	  more	  recently,	  as	  a	   product	   of	   the	   outward	   expansion	   of	   American	   finance,	   this	   chapter	   deploys	   original	  archival	  and	  statistical	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	   interdependence	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  Rather	  than	  emerging	   principally	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   coherent	   state	   strategies,	   or	   through	   the	  spontaneity	   of	   market	   innovators,	   the	   Euromarkets	   developed	   through	   the	   manner	   in	  which	  bankers	  and	  state	  officials	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic	  attempted	   to	  negotiate	   the	  crises	  and	  constraints	  of	   the	  post-­‐war	   international	   financial	  order.	   In	  combination,	   these	  Anglo-­‐American	   strategies	   produced	   outcomes	   that	   were	   often	   unintended,	   but	   which	  nonetheless	   helped	   lay	   the	   basis	   for	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	   Woods.	   For	   Britain,	   the	  Euromarkets	  revitalised	  the	  City	  and	  enabled	  the	  merchant	  banking	  community	  to	  maintain	  influence	  within	  the	  corridors	  of	  power.	  In	  the	  process,	  the	  City	  became	  an	  archipelago	  of	  American	   finance	   and	   the	   British	   state	   was	   drawn	   more	   tightly	   into	   the	   embrace	   of	  globalising	  capital	  markets.	  The	  emergence	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  and	  its	  acceptance	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  represented	   an	   attempt	   to	   restore	   the	   City’s	   international	   pre-­‐eminence.	   	   But	   unlike	   the	  attempts	   to	   restore	   the	   City’s	   role	   in	   the	   1920s,	  with	   the	   failed	   resuscitation	   of	   the	   gold	  standard,	  this	  endeavour	  occurred	  within	  recognition	  of	  the	  preeminent	  power	  of	  American	  
banks	  and	  the	  American	  dollar.	   The	   dollar	   became	   a	   surrogate	   currency	   for	  British	   banks	  that	   could	   no	   longer	   rely	   upon	   sterling.	   British	  merchant	   bankers	   drew	  American	   power	  into	   the	   City	   to	   maintain	   their	   domestic	   dominance	   and	   re-­‐launch	   its	   international	   role.	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States,	  markets	  and	  the	  Euromarkets	  	  Much	   of	   the	   debate	   over	   the	   Euromarkets	   has	   focused	   upon	   identifying	   their	   origins	  (Martenson,	  1964;	  Bell,	  1973;	  Schenk,	  1998).	  These	  scholars	  have	  unearthed	  many	  of	   the	  processes	   that	   spawned	   the	   Euromarkets.	   Alternatively,	   the	   Euromarkets	   have	   been	  explored	   in	   the	   context	   of	   either,	   Britain’s	   national	   development	   (Strange,	   1971;	   Ingham,	  1984;	  Overbeek,	  1991;	  Burn,	  2006),	  or,	   the	   international	   transformations	  associated	  with	  the	   collapse	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   System	   (Block,	   1973;	   Helleiner,	   1994;	   Langley,	   2002;	  Eichengreen:	  2008).	  	  Within	  the	  IPE	  literature,	  another	  grouping	  of	  scholars	  has	  argued	  that	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  was	  functional	  to	  the	  deepening	  of	  American	  structural	  and	  financial	  power	  (Strange,	  1987;	  Gowan,	  1999;	  Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2010	  &	  2012;	  Konings,	  2012).	  	   The	   IPE	   literature	   on	   the	   Euromarkets	   has	   been	   criticised	   for	   reducing	   the	  debate	   to	   a	   simple	   dichotomy	   between	   state	   and	   market.	   	   Responsibility	   for	   the	  development	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   is	   then	   accorded	   either	   to	   state	   agencies	   or	   market	  operators	  (Burn,	  1999:	  227).	  	  In	  reality,	  as	  Gary	  Burn	  has	  shown,	  the	  responsibility	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  is	  hard	  to	  pin	  down	  in	  these	  bifurcated	  terms.	  In	  Britain	  the	  most	  relevant	  state	  institution,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  acted	  as	  an	  interface	  between	  the	  state	  and	   the	  market	   and	  played	   the	   roles	   of	   ‘poacher	   and	   gamekeeper’	   simultaneously	   (Burn,	  1999:	   241).	   Blurring	   the	   boundary	   between	   state	   and	   market	   renders	   some	   of	   the	  conventional	  IPE	  accounts	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  highly	  problematic.	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   But	   there	   is	   a	   further	   deficiency	   within	   the	   IPE	   literature.	   The	   notion	   of	  discreet	  national	   states	   transformed	  by	  globalising	  markets	   that	   are	   somehow	  exterior	   is	  also	   deficient.	   A	   number	   of	   scholars	   have	   challenged	   this	   orthodoxy	  within	   IPE,	   pointing	  towards	   the	   special	   role	   that	   the	   United	   States	   has	   played	   in	   the	   constitution	   of	   global	  capitalism	   (Gowan,	   1999;	   Panitch	   &	   Gindin:	   2010	   &	   2012;	   Konings,	   2012).	   Panitch	   and	  Gindin	   (2012:	   119)	   view	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	  Woods	   and	   the	   emergence	   of	   financial	  globalisation	  not	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  globalising	  markets	  escaping	  the	  control	  of	  national	  states,	  but	  rather	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  international	  expansion	  of	  American	  finance.	  Similarly,	  Konings	  (2012:	  88)	  critiques	  adherents	  of	  the	  ‘states	  versus	  markets’	  approach	  for	  missing	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  globalisation	  of	  finance	  in	  the	  1960s,	  which	  undermined	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  of	  capital	  controls	  and	  fixed	  exchange	  rates,	  was	  an	  outgrowth	  of	  American	  finance.	  These	  accounts	  provide	  an	   indispensable	   tonic	   to	   the	  naïveté	  of	   the	   literature	   that	  viewed	  globalisation	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  ‘retreat	  of	  the	  state’.	  But	  they	  have	  not	  fully	  grasped	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  articulation	  of	  American	  financial	  power	  in	  and	  through	  Britain	  was	  not	  merely	   incidental	   but	   rather	   absolutely	   integral	  to	   the	   reconstitution	  of	   global	   capitalism.	  An	  emergent	  Anglo-­‐American	  field	  of	  developmental	  interactivity,	  which	  became	  increasingly	  important	   during	   the	   late	   1950s	   and	   the	   1960s,	   played	   a	   fundamental	   role	   in	   financial	  globalisation	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  	  	  What’s	   required,	   then,	   is	   a	   synthetic	   approach	   that	   explores	   these	   processes	   of	  Anglo-­‐American	   development	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   the	   constraints	   and	  contradictions	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  This	  chapter	  focuses	  upon	  the	  development	  of	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the	   Euromarkets	   as	   a	   prism	   through	   which	   to	   trace	   both	   the	   patterns	   and	   the	   effects	   of	  Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   interdependence.	   The	   analysis	   builds	   upon	   the	   work	   of	  scholars	  such	  as	  Susan	  Strange	  (1971)	  and	  Henk	  Overbeek	  (1990),	  who	  have	  recognised	  the	  significance	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  for	  Britain’s	  modern	  development	  and	  postulated	  some	  of	  its	  effects,	  without	  substantiating	  these	  claims.	  Gary	  Burn’s	  (1998;	  2006)	  excellent	  work	  on	  the	  Euromarkets	  also	  provides	  an	  important	  reference	  point.	  But	  whereas	  Burn’s	  account	  is	  principally	   concerned	   with	   demonstrating	   how	   little	   the	   Americans	   knew	   about	   the	  Euromarkets	   during	   their	   inception,	   ours	   is	   concerned	   with	   demonstrating	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   dynamics	   that	   brought	   American	   banks	   into	   London	   and	  accelerated	  the	  decomposition	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  	  The	   exact	   origins	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   are	  murky.47	  It	   is	   certainly	   the	   case	   that	   the	  Eurodollar	   market	   preceded	   its	   Eurobond	   counterpart.	   A	   very	   discreet	   Eurocurrency	  market	  began	  during	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  in	  the	  late	  40s	  and	  early	  50s.	  	  Dollar	  deposits	   were	   placed	   with	   banks	   in	   London	   and	   Paris	   by	   the	   Soviet	   and	   Chinese	  governments,	   who	   feared	   that	   American	   authorities	   would	   seize	   their	   assets	   (Higgonet,	  1985:	   27).	   Controls	   on	   sterling’s	   use	   for	   trade	   between	   third	   parties	   and	   as	   refinance	  credits,	  prompted	  by	  British	  concerns	  over	  a	  deteriorating	  balance	  of	  payments,	  as	  well	  as	  the	   return	   to	   convertibility	   of	   Western	   European	   currencies	   from	   1958,	   were	   also	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47 	  The	   term	   ‘Euromarkets’	   applies	   to	   transactions	   in	   two	   distinct	   but	   related	   markets:	   the	  ‘Eurocurrency/Eurodollar’	  and	  ‘Eurobond’	  markets.47	  But	  the	  prefix	  ‘Euro’	  is	  rather	  misleading.	  The	  term	   is	   used	   as	   an	   umbrella	   to	   describe	   transactions	   of	   offshore	   currency	   traded	   outside	   of	  nationally	   prescribed	   banking	   authority	   (Burn,	   1999:	   226).	   Essentially,	   it	   describes	   an	   offshore	  market	   in	   foreign	   currency.	   The	   market	   is	   wholesale,	   predominantly	   comprising	   of	   large-­‐scale	  operators	  such	  as	  commercial	  banks,	  governments	  and	  large	  companies	  (Higgonet,	  1985:	  30).	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contributory	   factors	   to	   the	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	   Eurodollar	   market	   form	   the	   late	   1950s	  (Martenson,	  1964:	  14;	  Bell,	  1973:	  8;	  Schenk,	  1998:	  223;	  Burn,	  1999:	  229).	   	  To	  understand	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  Euromarkets,	  we	  need	  to	  situate	  them	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  British	  state.	  
	  
The	  Bank,	  sterling,	  and	  the	  City’s	  international	  role	  	  During	  the	  post-­‐war	  era	  Britain’s	  place	  in	  the	  world	  was	  rapidly	  and	  radically	  reconfigured.	  As	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  chapter	  three,	  Britain	  was	  levered	  into	  acceptance	  of	  a	  junior	  role	  in	  the	  relationship	  with	  the	  United	  States.	  Bretton	  Woods	  heralded	  the	  dollar’s	  emergence	  as	  the	  key	   international	  currency,	  and	   its	  gradual	  displacement	  of	  sterling	  continued	  throughout	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s.	  Militarily,	  Britain	  had	  also	   to	  adjust	   to	  new	  realities.	  The	  humbling	  abortion	  of	  the	  Suez	  intervention	  in	  1956,	  at	  American	  behest,	  encapsulated	  the	  impotence	  of	  Britain’s	  attempts	  to	  pursue	  independent	  imperial	  objectives.	  	  But	  Britain	  was	  not	  alone	  in	  riding	  a	  rising	  tide	  of	  change.	  By	  the	  1960s	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  framework	  was	  unravelling.	  The	  uneven	  development	  of	  national	  economies	  came	  to	  place	  mounting	   strains	  upon	   the	   international	  monetary	   system.48	  By	  1971	   the	   system	  had	  collapsed	  entirely,	  with	  Nixon	  unilaterally	  delinking	  the	  dollar	  from	  convertibility	  with	  gold.	   It	   was	   within	   this	   context	   of	   international	   tumult	   that	   policy-­‐makers	   within	   key	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  Among	   the	   key	   facets	   of	   this	   period	  were:	   the	   continued	   decline	   of	   sterling	   as	   an	   international	  reserve	   and	   trading	   currency,	   the	   reversal	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   post-­‐war	   surplus	   on	   trade	   and	  invisible	  earnings	  along	  with	  growing	  American	  expenditure	  abroad,	  and	  the	  increasing	  strength	  of	  the	  Japanese,	  German	  and	  other	  major	  economies	  (Jessop,	  1980:	  25).	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institutions	  of	   the	  British	   state	  designed	  and	   implemented	   their	   strategies	   in	   the	  decades	  after	  the	  Second	  World	  War.	  	  After	  surviving	  a	  temporary	  diminishment	  of	  its	  powers	  in	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years,	  the	   Bank	   of	   England	   had	   regained	   its	   former	   pomp	   by	   the	   time	   the	   first	   post-­‐war	  Conservative	   government	   came	   to	   power	   in	   1951.	   The	   Conservatives	   made	   clear	   their	  intention	  to	  revitalise	  the	  City’s	  international	  role.	  Despite	  the	  nationalisation	  of	  the	  Bank	  in	  1946,	  its	  institutional	  autonomy	  had	  been	  left	  virtually	  undisturbed	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  321;	  Green,	   1992:	   205).	   	   There	   was	   also	   continuity	   in	   the	   Bank’s	   principal	   ambitions,	   which	  continued	   to	   focus	   upon	   recovering	   sterling’s	   international	   status	   by	   removing	   exchange	  controls	  and	  promoting	  full	  convertibility	  (Cairncross,	  1995:	  76).	  These	  ambitions	  manifested	  themselves	  in	  the	  ill-­‐fated	  ‘Operation	  Robot’.	  	  Robot	  was	  an	  attempt	  by	  the	  Bank	  to	  create	  a	  currency	  union	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  by	  making	  sterling	   fully	   convertible	   (for	   non-­‐residents)	   with	   the	   dollar	   at	   a	   floating	   exchange	   rate.	  	  Beyond	   attempting	   to	   restore	   sterling’s	   international	   standing,	   Robot	   was	   intended	   to	  reassert	   the	   traditional	  discipline	  of	   sound	  money	  over	   the	  British	  economy	  (Burn,	  2006:	  80).	  The	  creeping	  Keynesianism	  of	  the	  early	  post-­‐war	  years	  provided	  a	  bone	  of	  contention	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  elements	  within	   the	  Treasury,	  with	   the	  Bank’s	  Governor,	  Cameron	  Cobbold,	   highly	   suspicious	   of	   Keynesian	   economics	   (Capie,	   2010:	   44).	   Convertibility	  through	  Robot	  would	  have	  brought	  about	  a	  deflationary	  discipline	  upon	  the	  home	  economy,	  with	   interest	   rate	   hikes	   and	   public	   spending	   cuts	   required	   to	   strengthen	   confidence	   in	  sterling.	  Despite	  having	  momentary	  support	  from	  within	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  plan	  was	  eventually	  rejected.	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Robot	  signalled	  the	  Bank’s	  intention	  to	  reassert	  control	  over	  monetary	  policy,	  which	  had	   been	   threatened	   by	   wartime	   price	   controls.	   	   Just	   as	   it	   had	   done	   with	   the	   re-­‐establishment	   of	   the	   gold	   standard	   in	   the	   1920s,	   the	   Bank	   was	   reverting	   to	   orthodoxy,	  despite	  the	  interruption	  of	  war	  and	  the	  new	  realities	  of	  international	  financial	  power.	  	  	  After	   Robot’s	   failure,	   senior	   officials	   at	   the	   Bank	   continued	   to	   map	   the	   route	   to	  convertibility.	   As	   advisor	   to	   the	   Governor	   of	   the	   Bank,	   George	   Bolton	   had	   worked	   on	  various	  proposals	   for	   the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	   convertibility.	  Bolton	  went	  on	   to	  play	  a	  key	  role	   in	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	   later	   in	  the	  decade.	  By	  March	  of	  1954	  the	  London	  Gold	  Market	  had	  been	  reopened,	  further	  strengthening	  the	  City’s	  international	  role.	  All	  restrictions	  upon	  the	  movement	  of	  non-­‐resident	  sterling	  outside	  of	  the	  dollar	  area	  were	  removed	  as	  sterling	  edged	  closer	  to	  full	  convertibility.	  The	  Bank	  of	  England	  was	  keen	  to	  go	  further	  but	  the	  Government	  opposed	  its	  intentions	  (Burn,	  2006:	  82).	  The	   Bank	   Policy	   Rate	   was	   kept	   high	   from	   1954	   to	   1957	   as	   sterling	   came	   under	  repeated	   speculative	   attack.	   This	   was	   part	   of	   the	   much-­‐maligned	   ‘stop-­‐go’	   cycle	   that	  bedevilled	  British	  policy	  during	  the	  1950s	  and	  60s.	  Periods	  of	  domestic	  expansion	  resulted	  in	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits	   that	  prompted	  speculative	  movements	  against	   the	  pound.	  Fearing	   devaluation,	   policy-­‐makers	   enacted	   deflationary	   measures	   to	   curb	   domestic	  consumption	   and	   expansion	   in	   the	   hope	   of	   restoring	   a	   healthier	   payments	   position.49	  Underlying	   the	   stuttering	   stop-­‐go	   rhythm	   of	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   recovery	   was	   a	   level	   of	  overseas	   spending	   drastically	   out	   of	   kilter	   with	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   capacities.	   Overseas	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  Bank	   feared	   that	  devaluation	  would	  damage	   sterling’s	   international	   credibility	  by	   reducing	  the	  value	  of	  foreign	  holdings	  of	  sterling	  and	  weakening	  its	  role	  as	  an	  international	  reserve	  currency	  (Brittan,	  1964:	  64).	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military	   commitments	   placed	   a	   heavy	   drain	   on	   the	   Exchequer	   and	   pulled	   the	   balance	   of	  payments	   towards	   persistent	   deficits	   (Strange,	   1971:	   180).50	  Throughout	   the	   1950s	   and	  1960s,	   Britain	   experienced	   major	   sterling	   crises.	   The	   decline	   of	   sterling’s	   stability	   and	  appeal	  were	  inextricably	  linked	  to	  the	  general	  waning	  of	  British	  power	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era.	  	  	  The	   continued	   sterling	   crises	   of	   the	   mid-­‐1950s	   produced	   enormous	   tensions	  between	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury.	   When	   the	   Governor	   suggested	   that	   Bank	   Rate	   be	  increased	   to	   7%	   in	   1957,	   Harold	   Macmillan	   and	   his	   Chancellor,	   Peter	   Thorneycroft,	  disagreed	   and	   suggested	   that	   the	   clearing	   banks	   reduce	   their	   lending	   instead.	   The	   banks	  refused	   to	   comply	   and	   Governor	   Cobbold	   refused	   to	   induce	   them	   towards	   accepting	   the	  Government’s	   request.	   	   Thorneycroft	   was	   outraged	   and	   began	   to	   look	   for	   ways	   to	   give	  direct	   instructions	   to	   the	   banks	   and	   enforce	   Treasury	   control	   over	   lending.	   In	   response,	  Cobbold	  effectively	   threatened	   to	  make	   the	  Government	  bankrupt	  by	   refusing	   to	  meet	   its	  cheques.	   After	   this	   fearsome	   restatement	   of	   the	   Bank’s	   independence,	   Thorneycroft	  eventually	  backed	  down	  and	  averted	  a	  major	  crisis	  for	  the	  British	  state.	  	  This	  was	  a	  key	  moment	   in	  the	  post-­‐war	  history	  of	   the	  British	  state.	   In	  winning	  the	  contest	   with	   the	   Treasury	   the	   Bank	   had	   secured	   control	   over	   monetary	   policy	   and	   as	   a	  consequence,	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  and	  the	  City	  more	  broadly	  (Burn,	  2006:	  86).	  This	  control	  was	  a	  vital	  precondition	   for	   the	  Bank’s	   capacity	   to	  control	   the	  environment	  within	  which	  the	  Euromarkets	  would	  take	  root.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  There	   is	  no	  doubting	   that	  American	  pressures	   for	  Britain	   to	  maintain	   a	   global	  presence	  had	  an	  impact	   here.	   But	   Britain’s	   leaders	   were	   themselves	   desperate	   to	   hold	   on	   to	   their	   former	   status	  within	  the	  international	  system.	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Bank	  Rate	  did	  eventually	  rise	  to	  7%,	  but	  Macmillan	  won	  a	  ban	  on	  refinance	  credits	  and	   sterling	   credits	   for	   financing	   international	   trade	   as	   a	   quid	   pro	   quo	   for	   the	   increase.	  These	   dynamics	   fostered	   the	   immediate	   conditions	   within	   which	   the	   Eurodollar	   market	  really	   began	   to	   flourish.	   Raising	   Bank	   Rate	   increased	   the	   cost	   of	   credit	   for	   the	   British	  economy	  while	  the	  ban	  on	  refinancing	  credits	  and	  the	  use	  of	  sterling	  credits	   for	  financing	  third	  party	  trade	  left	  British	  merchant	  banks	  in	  need	  of	  an	  alternative	  medium	  for	  financing	  international	   business	   (Burn,	   2006:	   86).	   The	   measures	   raised	   questions	   about	   how	  financing	   needs	  would	   be	  met	  with	   restrictive	  monetary	   policy	   and	   exchange	   controls	   in	  place.	  The	  answer	  was	  the	  Eurodollar.	  Although	  the	   first	   instance	  of	  Eurodollar	  deposits	  may	  have	  occurred	   in	  mid-­‐1955,	  involving	   the	  Midland	   Bank	   (Schenk,	   1998:	   224),	   the	  market	   really	   gathered	  momentum	  from	   1957	   (Martenson,	   1964:	   14;	   Bell,	   1973:	   8).	   George	   Bolton,	   a	   merchant	   banker	   and	  former	  advisor	  to	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank,	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  this	  regard.	  Bolton	  had	  left	  the	   Bank	   after	   becoming	   dissatisfied	   with	   the	   pace	   of	   movement	   towards	   convertibility.	  Bolton	  became	  Chairman	  of	  BOLSA	  (Bank	  of	  London	  and	  South	  America)	  in	  1957	  and	  once	  there	  he	  imbued	  the	  bank	  with	  the	  belief	  that	  sterling’s	  use	  as	  an	  international	  reserve	  and	  vehicle	  currency	  would	   ‘virtually	  cease’	   in	  the	  near	  future.	  Bolton’s	  convictions	  led	  him	  to	  shift	  BOLSA	  out	  of	  sterling	  business	  and	  into	  dollar-­‐denominated	  activity	  (Burn,	  2006:	  104).	  	  Somewhat	  paradoxically,	  although	  encouraging	  the	  shift	  into	  dollar	  business,	  Bolton	  was	   still	   advocating	   the	   relaxation	  of	   controls	   on	   sterling.	  Despite	  his	   convictions	  Bolton,	  like	  many	  other	  bankers	  in	  the	  City,	  could	  not	  let	  go	  of	  the	  prestige	  and	  principle	  associated	  with	  sterling’s	  role	  as	  an	  international	  currency	  (Burn,	  2006:	  104).	  Indeed,	  it	  was	  not	  until	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the	  landmark	  devaluation	  of	  1967	  that	  it	  really	  became	  clear	  just	  how	  far	  the	  fate	  of	  the	  City	  had	  become	  disentangled	  from	  that	  of	  sterling.	  By	   the	   late	   1950s	   then,	   sterling’s	   perennial	   problems	  had	   lessened	   its	   appeal	   as	   a	  stable	  medium	   for	   international	   exchange.	   In	   this	   context,	   it	   was	   not	   surprising	   that	   the	  dollar,	   now	   the	   lynchpin	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	   system,	   became	   a	   much	   more	  attractive	   vehicle	   for	   financing	   trade.	   It	   is	   in	   this	   light	   that	   the	   domestic	   roots	   of	   the	  Eurodollar	   market	   need	   to	   be	   understood.	   With	   sterling	   weakening	   and	   subject	   to	  restrictive	  controls	  on	  its	  employment	  for	  trade,	  British	  banks	  were	  only	  able	  to	  maintain	  their	   international	   standing	   by	   switching	   into	   the	   dollar.	   Decolonisation	   had	   already	  precipitated	   a	   rapid	   loss	   of	   market	   share	   for	   British	  merchant	   banks	   in	   some	   countries,	  notably	  India,	  where	  whole	  markets	  were	  lost	  due	  to	  nationalisation.	  These	  problems	  were	  rooted	  in	  the	  broader	  decline	  of	  British	  power.	  Banks	  that	  had	  grown	  up	  financing	  British	  overseas	   trade	   now	   found	   themselves	  with	   less	   business	   and	   a	   declining	   customer	   base.	  Their	   status	   as	   sterling	   institutions,	   once	   a	   tremendous	   source	   of	   strength,	   was	   now	  becoming	  a	  weakness	   (Jones,	  1993:	  248-­‐287).	  Not	   surprisingly	   then,	   it	  was	   the	  merchant	  banks	   that	   led	   the	   Euromarkets	   charge	   with	   most	   gusto,	   setting	   the	   stage	   for	   the	   City’s	  rebirth.	  	  The	  ‘offshore’	  status	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  made	  it	  unique.	  An	  informal	  approach	  to	  regulation	  in	  the	  City	  allowed	  the	  Euromarkets	  to	  flourish	  and	  effectively	  split	  the	  British	  banking	   system,	   ‘into	   a	   highly	   regulated	   domestic	   market	   and	   a	   totally	   unregulated	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international	  market’	   (Burn,	   1999:	   226).51	  Ex-­‐patriate	   dollars	  were	   deposited	   on	   a	   short-­‐term	  basis,	  within	  a	  market	  that	  paralleled	  the	  more	  restrictive	  official	  market.	  This	  fertile	  regulatory	   climate	   was	   traceable	   to	   the	   classical	   gold	   standard	   era.	   The	   laissez-­‐faire	  regulatory	   context	   established	   during	   the	   nineteenth	   century,	   defined	   by	   the	   intimate	  relationship	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  City’s	  merchant	  banking	  community,	  was	  left	  intact	  after	  World	  War	  Two	  despite	  Bank	  nationalisation	  (Burn,	  1999:225-­‐228;	  Burn,	  2006:	  16).	  	  But	  to	  explain	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  unique	  regulatory	  context	  of	  the	  City	  and	   the	   demise	   of	   sterling	   is	   insufficient.	   Interactivity	   between	   the	   dollar	   supply,	   U.S.	  monetary	  policy	  and	  the	  status	  of	   the	  City	  as	  an	  entrepot	  centre	  gave	  the	  development	  of	  the	   Eurodollar	   market	   a	   peculiarly	   Anglo-­‐American	   dimension.	   To	   apprehend	   this	  dimension	  we	  need	  to	  turn	  our	  attention	  towards	  American	  financial	  development	  and	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  context.	  
	  
American	  development	  and	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  dimension	  
	  In	  the	  United	  States,	  the	  post-­‐war	  regulatory	  climate	  was	  markedly	  different	  from	  the	  City’s	  permissive	   conditions.	   In	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	   Great	   Depression,	   American	   monetary	  authorities	  introduced	  ‘Regulation	  Q’	  and	  the	  Glass-­‐Stegall	  Act	  (Bell,	  1973:	  9).	  Regulation	  Q	  capped	  the	  interest	  rate	  that	  American	  banks	  could	  offer	  for	  depositors,	  while	  Glass-­‐Stegall	  maintained	   a	   strict	   division	   between	   commercial	   and	   investment	   banking.	   	   Despite	   this	  restrictive	   regulatory	   context,	   and	   partly	   because	   of	   it,	   American	   finance	   experienced	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51 	  Catherine	   Schenk	   (1998:	   233)	   describes	   this	   regulatory	   context	   as	   one	   that,	   ‘encouraged	  innovation	  as	  a	  means	  of	  evading	  controls	  while	  tolerating	  such	  innovations	  ex	  post’.	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prolonged	  period	  of	  growth	  after	  the	  war.	  New	  Deal	  policy	  makers	  promoted	  the	  expansion	  of	  mortgage	  and	  consumer	  lending	  in	  order	  to	  pull	  American	  citizens	  into	  an	  intricate	  web	  of	  financial	  relations	  (Konings,	  2012:	  100).	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  was	  central	  to	  this	  growth	  dynamic.	  After	  the	  Great	  Depression	  and	  during	  the	  War,	   the	  Fed	  played	  second	  fiddle	  to	  the	  Treasury.	   It	   forwent	   its	  status	  as	  the	  ‘banker’s	  bank’,	  to	  directly	  serve	  the	  government’s	  requirements	  (Konings,	  2012:	  101).	  It	  did	  this	  by	  assisting	  the	  Treasury’s	  debt	  funding	  efforts.	  The	  Fed	  agreed	  to	  maintain	  fixed	  interest	   rates	   on	   long-­‐term	   government	   bonds	   while	   limiting	   fluctuations	   in	   short-­‐term	  rates	  in	  order	  to	  finance	  the	  war	  at	  affordable	  rates	  (Epstein	  &	  Schor,	  1995:7;	  Axilrod,	  2011:	  25)).	   In	   doing	   so,	   it	   relinquished	   some	   influence	   over	   liquidity	   creation.	   Because	   banks	  could	  sell	  practically	  any	  amount	  of	  government	  debt	  that	  they	  wanted	  to	  at	  desirable	  rates,	  these	  government	   securities	  became	  highly	   liquid	  assets.	  These	  assets	  were	  put	   to	  use	   in	  the	  expansion	  of	  American	  commercial	  banking	  after	  the	  war.	  By	  the	  later	  1950s	  however,	  American	  banks	  were	  pushing	  against	  the	  limits	  of	  New	  Deal	   regulations.	   Their	   ability	   to	   expand	   their	   base	   of	   profitable	   loans	   was	   increasingly	  constrained	   by	   limited	   funding	   supply.	   Regulations	   limiting	   expansion	   of	   branches	   and	  capping	  interest	  rates,	  made	  these	  obstacles	  hard	  to	  overcome.	  Additionally,	  banks	  faced	  a	  disintermediation	   problem:	   non-­‐bank	   financial	   institutions,	   offering	   higher	   rates,	   were	  drawing	  away	  deposits,	  while	  the	  Federal	  Reserve-­‐Treasury	  Accord	  of	  1951	  freed	  the	  Fed	  from	  its	  obligation	  to	  stabilise	  the	  market	  for	  government	  securities.	  As	  interest	  rates	  rose,	  investors	   shifted	   into	   commercial	   paper	   and	   Treasury	   bonds,	   which	   now	   offered	   higher	  yields	  (Konings,	  2012:	  107).	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American	  banks	  responded	  to	  these	  constraints	  through	  an	  unprecedented	  domestic	  merger	  wave	  between	  1955	  and	  1961.	  The	  Chase	  National	  Bank	  merged	  with	  the	  Bank	  of	  Manhattan	  Co.	   and	  Bronx	  County	  Trust	  Co.	   to	   form	   the	  Chase	  Manhattan	  Bank,	  while	   the	  National	  City	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  took	  over	  the	  first	  National	  Bank	  of	  New	  York.	  In	  1959,	  the	  Guaranty	  Trust	  Co.	  merged	  with	  JP	  Morgan	  Co.	  Inc	  to	  form	  the	  Morgan	  Guaranty	  Trust	  Co	  (de	   Cecco,	   1976:	   386).	   By	   1961,	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   wave,	   a	   massive	   increase	   in	   the	  concentration	   of	   bank	   deposits	   had	   occurred.	   The	   ending	   of	   the	  merger	   wave	   coincided	  with	  the	  appointment	  of	  James	  Saxon	  as	  Comptroller	  of	  the	  Currency.	  Saxon	  enthusiastically	  promoted	  bank	  expansion	  and	  the	  relaxation	  of	  New	  Deal	  era	  restrictions	  (White,	  1992:	  7).	  By	   the	  end	  of	   the	  merger	  wave,	   the	   five	   largest	  banks	   in	  New	  York	  accounted	   for	  75%	  of	  deposits,	   while	   the	   same	   banks	   responsible	   for	   77%	   of	   total	   commercial	   bank	   loans	   (de	  Cecco,	  1976:	  386).	  	  Internationally,	   the	   desire	   to	   support	   the	   rapid	   expansion	   of	   U.S.	   corporations	  overseas	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s	   also	   brought	   banks	   into	   tension	   with	   regulations	  (Cohen,	   1986:	   24;	   Sylla,	   2002:	   54).	   	   The	   Treaty	   of	   Rome	   and	   formation	   of	   the	   European	  Economic	  Community,	  along	  with	  the	  restoration	  of	  full	  currency	  convertibility	  in	  Western	  Europe	  in	  1958,	  signalled	  to	  U.S.	  Multinationals	  that	  Europe	  was	  now	  ripe	  for	  investment.	  U.S.	  MNC’s	  could	  evade	  the	  EEC	  tariff	  barrier	  by	  investing	  inside	  member	  countries,	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	   convertibility	   removed	  obstacles	   to	   repatriating	  profits.	  Between	  1955	  and	  1965	  American	  manufacturing	  FDI	  in	  Europe	  tripled	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  113-­‐114).	  	  By	  the	  late	  1950s	  and	  early	  1960s	  then,	  American	  banks	  were	  pushing	  at	  the	  limits	  of	   New	   Deal	   regulations.	   Although	   this	   framework	   had	   nurtured	   the	   development	   of	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American	   banking,	   it	   had	   become	   an	   obstacle	   to	   further	   growth.	   Regulation	  Q	   acted	   as	   a	  disincentive	  for	  American	  banks	  to	  compete	  with	  their	  European	  counterparts,	  enabling	  the	  Europeans	  to	  attract	  dollar	  holdings	  through	  offering	  higher	  yields.52	  	  While	   the	   expansion	   of	   American	   banking	   encountered	   these	   limitations,	   policy	  makers	  within	  the	  United	  States	  were	  also	  increasingly	  discontented.	  The	  contradictions	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  within	  which	  American	  power	  was	  internationally	  intertwined,	  were	   posing	   a	   mounting	   problem	   and	   threatening	   to	   limit	   U.S.	   freedom	   of	   action	   in	   the	  international	  arena.	  The	   problem	   centred	   on	   the	   role	   of	   the	   dollar	   and	   the	   status	   of	   the	  United	   States	  within	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system.	   During	   the	   1950s	   the	   U.S.	   made	   the	   supply	   of	  international	   liquidity	   a	   cornerstone	   of	   its	   foreign	   economic	   policy	   (Block,	   1977:	   110).	  European	   countries	   suffered	   from	  a	   ‘dollar	   gap’,	  which	   limited	   their	   capacity	   to	  purchase	  the	  much-­‐needed	  American	  imports	  required	  for	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  But	  American	  liquidity	  supply	  was	  not	  an	  act	  of	  benevolence,	  the	  Marshall	  Plan	  Aid	  and	  war	  spending	  on	  Korean	  re-­‐armament	  that	  boosted	  the	  European	  dollar	  supply	  was	  also	   intended	  to	  raise	  demand	  for	  American	  exports	  and	  stimulate	  expansion	  of	  international	  trade.	  	  Boosting	   international	   dollar	   liquidity	   enabled	   European	   countries	   to	   return	   to	  convertibility	  without	  making	  painful	  deflationary	  commitments.	  But	  America’s	  role	  as	  the	  world’s	   central	   banker	   was	   deeply	   contradictory.	   In	   the	   long	   run	   it	   threatened	   to	  undermine	   the	  keystone	  of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	   system:	   the	  dollar’s	   fixed	   convertibility	   to	  gold	  at	  $35.	  By	  the	  late	  1950s	  the	   ‘dollar	  gap’	  had	  been	  transformed	  into	  a	   ‘dollar	  glut’	  as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  52	  Not	  only	  did	  it	  damage	  American	  banks	  international	  competitiveness,	  it	  also	  made	  it	  difficult	  to	  attract	  deposits	  and	  corporate	  customers	  (White,	  1992:	  8).	  
	  	   163	  
European	  recovery	  enabled	  central	  banks	  to	  build	  up	  stockpiles	  of	  dollar	  reserves.	  In	  1958,	  the	  U.S.	   balance	  of	   payments	  deficit	   led	   to	   a	   run	  on	   the	  American	   gold	   stock	   for	   the	   first	  time.	  	   This	   was	   a	   landmark	   moment,	   after	   which	   U.S.	   policy	   began	   to	   shift	   from	   one	   of	  liquidity	  pumping,	  into	  attempts	  to	  strengthen	  their	  payments	  position.	  The	  U.S.	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficit	  became	  the	  dominant	  issue	  of	  international	  monetary	  politics	  for	  the	  next	  fifteen	  years	  (Block,	  1977:	  140).	  The	  problem	  was	  known	  as	  the	   ‘Triffin	  Dilemma’.	  Robert	  Triffin	  had	  identified	  a	  crucial	  weakness	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  Triffin	  realised	  that	  the	   United	   States’	   deficit	   had	   become	   the	   key	   source	   of	   international	   liquidity	   and	   that	  running	   a	   continuous	   deficit	   would	   be	   critical	   to	   supplying	   the	   dollars	   required	   for	  financing	  international	  trade,	  exchange	  and	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  reserves	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  42).	  But	  here	   was	   the	   bind:	   if	   the	   U.S.	   kept	   running	   a	   deficit	   then	   confidence	   in	   the	   dollar’s	  convertibility	  to	  gold	  at	  $35	  per	  ounce	  would	  be	  imperilled.	  This	  could	  lead	  to	  a	  run	  on	  the	  gold	  stocks,	  forcing	  the	  U.S.	  to	  float	  the	  dollar	  and	  terminate	  Bretton	  Woods	  in	  the	  process.	  This	   was,	   of	   course,	   the	   eventual	   outcome	   when	   Nixon	   delinked	   the	   dollar	   from	   gold	  unilaterally	  in	  1971.	  But	  the	  stage	  was	  set	  for	  the	  1960s	  as	  a	  decade	  in	  which	  the	  crisis	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  gathered	  momentum.	  These	  international	  dynamics	  stimulated	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market.	  Flows	  of	   ex-­‐patriot	   dollars	  were	   swollen	  by	   the	   vast	   liquidity	   expansion	  undertaken	  by	   the	  U.S.	  This	   fed	   directly	   into	   the	   capacity	   of	   London	   banks	   to	   absorb	   these	   deposits	   by	   offering	  interest	   rates	  higher	   than	   those	  permissible	  under	  Regulation	  Q.	  But	   the	   existence	  of	   the	  Eurodollar	  market	   provided	   a	   further	  problem.	   It	   limited	   the	   efficacy	   of	   deficit	   reduction	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measures	   that	   the	  U.S.	   introduced	  during	   the	  1960s.	  These	  measures	  would,	   in	  avertedly,	  provide	  a	  massive	  stimulus	  to	  the	  market.	  	  
	  
The	  birth	  of	  the	  Eurobond	  and	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  	  As	  American	  officials	  grappled	  with	  mounting	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems	   in	   the	  early	  1960s,	   they	   started	   to	   lay	   the	   grounds,	   quite	   unintentionally,	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	  second	   component	   of	   the	   Euromarkets;	   the	   Eurobond	   market.	   The	   first	   ever	   Eurobond	  issue	   was	   signed	   in	   July	   of	   1963.	   It	   was	   made	   to	   the	   Italian	   company	   Autostrade	   and	  guaranteed	   by	   the	   IRI,	   a	   financial	   and	   industrial	   holding	   company	   owned	   by	   the	   Italian	  state.	   George	   Bolton,	   so	   influential	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	   Eurodollar	   market,	   was	  involved	  once	  again,	  smoothing	  the	  progress	  of	  this	  landmark	  bond	  issue	  by	  employing	  his	  influence	  with	  the	  Bank	  (Kerr,	  1984:	  14).	  The	   issue	  was	   signed	   by	   S	   G	  Warburg	  &	   Co.,	   the	   British	  merchant	   banking	   house.	  	  	  Siegmund	   Warburg,	   the	   paternalistic	   head	   of	   the	   bank,	   was	   a	   longstanding	   advocate	   of	  European	   integration.	  For	  Warburg	  and	  other	  Eurobond	  pioneers,	   the	  revival	  of	  London’s	  role	   as	   an	   international	   capital	  market	   dealing	   in	   foreign	   currency	  was	   a	  mechanism	   for	  promoting	   British	   entry	   into	   the	   EEC.	   They	   hoped	   that	   this	   would	   enhance	   Britain’s	  membership	   prospects	   by	   turning	   the	   City	   of	   London,	   ‘from	   a	   liability	   into	   an	   asset’	  (Ferguson,	   2010:	   204).	   Unbound	   from	   sterling,	   the	   City	   would	   be	   beneficial,	   not	  burdensome,	  to	  the	  future	  of	  the	  EEC.	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Despite	  Warburg’s	   European	   ambitions,	   the	   roots	   of	   the	   Eurobond	  market	   lay,	   at	  least	   in	   part,	   in	   the	   signals	   given	   out	   by	   U.S.	   Treasury	   Secretary	   Douglas	   Dillon	   and	  American	   reluctance	   to	   capitalise	   on	   the	   international	   bond	  market’s	   shift	   to	   New	   York,	  which	  occurred	  during	  the	  interwar	  years.	  As	  the	  U.S.	  payments	  problem	  deepened,	  Dillon	  began,	  from	  1962,	  to	  encourage	  the	  Europeans	  to	  establish	  their	  own	  international	  capital	  market.53	  His	   remarks	   did	   not	   fall	   on	   deaf	   ears,	   with	   European	   banks	   discussing	   his	  suggestions	  at	   length	  (Kerr,	  1984:	  17).	  Dillon	  did	  not	  realise	  was	   that	  he	  was	  unwittingly	  encouraging	  the	  development	  of	  an	  offshore	  bond	  market	  comprised	  principally	  of	  dollar-­‐denominated	   issues.	   By	   promoting	   a	   European	   capital	   market,	   Dillon	   thought,	   the	   U.S.	  Treasury	  would	  be	  able	   to	   relieve	  pressure	   from	   the	  capital	  outflows	  associated	  with	   the	  New	  York	  bond	  market	  (Burn,	  2006:	  147).	  Rather	  than	  tightening	  controls	  at	  home,	  Dillon	  wanted	  to	  push	  the	  Europeans	  into	  liberalising	  their	  capital	  markets,	  taking	  pressure	  off	  the	  U.S.	  	   Dillon’s	  signals	  encouraged	  both	  Warburg	  and	  Bolton	  to	  travel	  to	  the	  U.S.	  in	  1962,	  in	  order	  to	  gauge	  the	  American	  mood.	  On	  returning	  to	  Britain,	  Bolton	  encouraged	  the	  Bank	  to	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  Eurobond	  issues	  and	  by	  early	  1963	  the	  approval	  of	  the	  Chancellor	  and	  the	  Inland	  Revenue	  were	  secured.	  For	   their	  part	   the	  European	   financial	  community	  had	  been	  keen	   to	   see	   the	   practice	   of	   international	   bond	   issuing	   returning	   to	   London.	   Syndication	  practices	  in	  the	  U.S.	  had	  reduced	  the	  potential	  for	  commissions	  and	  fees	  that	  the	  Europeans	  could	   charge,	   as	   the	   U.S.	   authorities	   had	   insisted	   that	   American	   investment	   houses	  must	  play	  the	  lead	  role	  in	  the	  syndication,	  charging	  accordingly	  (Kerr,	  1984:	  17).	  The	  restoration	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  53	  Dillon’s	  May	  1962	  speech	  in	  Rome	  was	  particularly	  important	  (Burn,	  2006:	  111).	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of	  a	  European	  long-­‐term	  capital	  market	  would	  prove	  crucially	  important	  in	  the	  decades	  to	  come.	   	  By	  the	  early	  1960s,	  the	  Americans	  were	  becoming	  aware	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market.	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  most	   likely	  didn’t	  hear	  about	   it	  until	  1960.	  But	  upon	  discovery	   they	  became	   concerned	   about	   its	   impact	   on	   the	   U.S.	   payments	   position	   and	   the	   international	  financial	  system.	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Bank	  of	  New	  York	  sent	  two	  staff	  members	  to	  London	  in	   1962	   on	   a	   Eurodollar	   fact-­‐finding	  mission.	  When	  American	   bankers	   read	   their	   report,	  they	  lamented	  the	  presence	  of	  Regulation	  Q	  and	  the	  evidence	  that	  the	  locus	  of	  international	  lending	  had	  begun	  to	  shift	  across	  the	  Atlantic	  (Burn,	  2006:	  142-­‐143).	  This	  was	  the	  first	  sign	  that	   the	  Euromarkets	  would	  begin	   to	  have	  a	   feedback	   loop	  with	   the	  regulatory	  context	   in	  the	  U.S.	  The	   Fed’s	   peers	   in	   the	  U.S.	   Treasury	   knew	   even	   less	   about	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	  during	   the	   early	   1960s.	  According	   to	   archival	   evidence,	   the	   term	  wasn’t	   used	  until	   1961.	  And	  President	  Kennedy	  wasn’t	  briefed	  on	  the	  existence	  of	  this	  new	  market	  in	  London	  until	  1963.	  This	  was	  a	  major	  problem,	  as	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  beginning	  to	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  the	  U.S.	  payments	  position	  by	  this	  point.	  Not	  only	  were	  U.S.	  dollar	  outflows	  drawn	  in	  by	  the	  Eurodollar	  markets	  higher	  interest	  rates,	  but	  by	  acting	  as	  a	  transmission	  belt	  between	  the	  U.S.	  and	  European	  money	  markets,	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  undermining	  American	  attempts	  to	  wrestle	  with	  the	  balance	  of	  payments.	  By	  generating	  a	  growing	  pool	  of	  dollars	  that	  could	  quickly	  move	  from	  the	  dollar	  into	  gold	  or	  other	  currencies,	  the	  market	  increased	  the	   dollar’s	   vulnerability	   to	   speculative	   attacks.	   But	   although	   there	   was	   only	   a	   partial	  awareness	   of	   the	   problems	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	   was	   causing,	   there	   was	   an	   increasing	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realisation	  of	  the	  opposite	  effect.	  By	  encouraging	  private	  creditors	  to	  hold	  onto	  their	  dollars	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  keeping	  dollar	  holdings	  out	  of	  official	  central	  bank	  reserves	  and	  preventing	   a	   continuing	   decline	   in	   U.S.	   gold	   reserves,	   thus	   strengthening	   the	   dollar	   and	  keeping	  Bretton	  Woods	  intact	  (Burn,	  2006:	  147).	  	  This,	  then,	  was	  the	  paradox	  of	  the	  Eurodollar.	  The	  Euromarkets	  were	  simultaneously	  intensifying	  the	  vulnerability	  of	  the	  dollar	  to	  speculative	  attacks,	  while	  also	  contributing	  to	  the	   deepening	   of	   dollar	   hegemony	   by	   massively	   expanding	   the	   scope	   for	   dollar-­‐denominated	   business.	   This	   paradox	   would	   serve	   as	   a	   major	   contributory	   factor	   to	   the	  demise	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  By	  cementing	  the	  dominance	  of	  the	  dollar	  as	  the	  world’s	  premier	  international	   currency,	   the	  Euromarkets	  paved	   the	  way	   for	  Nixon’s	  unilateral	  break	   from	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  dollar	  standard.	  
	  
The	  parallel	  of	  deficits	  	  During	   the	   1960s,	   monetary	   policy	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   became	   increasingly	  concerned	   with	   fighting	   a	   rear-­‐guard	   action	   against	   the	   pressures	   and	   contradictions	  threatening	   to	   undermine	   Bretton	   Woods.	   There	   was	   a	   peculiar	   symmetry	   between	   the	  position	   of	   the	  U.S.	   and	   that	   of	   Britain,	   as	   the	   two	  major	   deficit	   countries	  within	  Bretton	  Woods.	  Both	  countries	  suffered	  chronic	  payments	  deficits,	  and	  both	  were	  issuers	  of	  major	  reserve	   currencies,	   with	   high	   exposure	   to	   external	   liabilities.	   Not	   surprisingly	   then,	   the	  1960s	  witnessed	  a	  series	  of	  measures,	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic,	   to	  prop	  up	   the	  ailing	  Bretton	  Woods	  framework.	  Through	  this	  process,	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  central	  bank	  cooperation	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emerged,	  particularly	  between	   the	  Fed	  and	   the	  Bank,	  as	   it	  became	   increasingly	  clear	   that	  collaborative	  action	  was	  required	  to	  reinforce	  the	  system.	  Through	  this	  interaction	  too,	  the	  Euromarkets	  received	  a	  major	  impetus.	  As	  the	  Americans	  arrived	  at	  a	  fuller	  recognition	  of	  the	  gravity	  of	  the	  problems	  facing	  Bretton	  Woods	  they	  began	  to	  embark	  upon	  concerted	   international	  action	  to	  stabilise	   the	  system.	  Robert	  Roosa,	  the	  U.S.	  Undersecretary	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  organised	  a	  series	  of	  swap	  arrangements	  between	  central	  banks	  and	  made	  efforts	  to	  expand	  the	  IMF’s	  resources.	  Swap	  arrangements	  provided	  standby	  credit	  lines	  that	  could	  be	  used	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  existing	  exchange	   rate	   parities.	   Roosa	   also	   introduced,	   ‘Roosa	   Bonds’:	   non-­‐negotiable	   U.S.	  government	   bonds	   denominated	   in	   foreign	   currencies	   and	   sold	   to	   foreign	   central	   banks.	  These	   were	   intended	   to	   transform	   excess	   dollar	   holdings	   of	   foreign	   central	   banks	   into	  longer-­‐term	  debt,	  reducing	  the	  level	  of	  liquid	  funds	  that	  could	  be	  mobilised	  in	  speculation	  against	  the	  dollar	  (Block,	  1977:	  179-­‐180).	  	  The	   establishment	   of	   the	   ‘London	   Gold	   Pool’	   in	   late	   1961	   was	   another	   crucial	  development.	   The	   pool	  was	   formed	   in	   response	   to	   the	   1960	   “dollar	   crisis”,	   during	  which	  speculation	  in	  the	  private	  gold	  market	   in	  London	  had	  pushed	  the	  price	  of	  gold	  to	  $40	  per	  ounce,	   jeopardising	   confidence	   in	   the	   dollar’s	   convertibility	   to	   gold	   at	   $35	   per	   ounce	  (Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   123).	   Under	   the	   gold	   pool,	   a	   number	   of	   countries	   agreed	   to	  intervene	   to	   stabilise	   gold	   prices	   around	   the	   $35	   per	   ounce	   commitment	   enshrined	   at	  Bretton	   Woods.	   This	   multilateral	   action	   reduced	   pressure	   on	   the	   U.S.	   gold	   stock	   and	  stabilised	  gold	  prices	  (Block,	  1977:	  178).	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In	   Britain,	   the	   worsening	   fate	   of	   sterling	   and	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	   was	  increasingly	   apparent	   by	   the	   early	   1960s.	   In	   March	   of	   1961,	   European	   central	   banks	  intervened	   heavily	   in	   foreign	   exchange	  markets	   on	   behalf	   of	   sterling,	  while	   Britain	   drew	  $1.5	   billion	   from	   the	   IMF,	   with	   a	   further	   $500	   million	   made	   available	   under	   a	   standby	  arrangement	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   123).	   By	   the	   summer	   of	   that	   year,	   the	   Chancellor	   had	  announced	  plans	  to	  restrict	  private	  investment	  outside	  the	  Sterling	  Area.	  This	  was	  a	  highly	  significant	  step,	  as	  it	  broke	  from	  the	  recent	  trajectory	  of	  exchange	  control	  liberalisation.	  The	  Bank’s	  monetary	  policy	  during	  the	  early	  1960s	  was	  focused	  principally	  upon	  defending	  the	  pound,	  with	   the	   central	   goal	   of	  maintaining	   parity	  with	   the	   dollar	   at	   $2.80	   (Capie,	   2010:	  193).	  	   By	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic,	   the	   problems	   were	   intensifying.	  Successive	   U.S.	   administrations	   attempted	   stopgap	   measures	   to	   rectify	   the	   balance	   of	  payments	   deficit	   and	   stabilise	   confidence	   in	   the	   dollar.	   	   The	   outgoing	   Eisenhower	  Administration	   had	   already	   issued	   an	   executive	   order	   that	   prohibited	   U.S.	   citizens	   from	  collecting	   gold	   coins	   along	  with	  measures	   to	   boost	   exports	   and	   increase	   tourist	   receipts	  (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   126).	   President	   Kennedy	   then	   further	   intensified	   restrictive	  measures.54	  The	  ‘Interest	  Equalization	  Tax’,	  introduced	  in	  1964,	  imposed	  a	  one	  per	  cent	  tax	  on	  foreign	  security	  issues	  in	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  tax	  was	  strongly	  opposed	  by	  investment	  bankers,	  stockbrokers	  and	  Republican	  Congressmen,	  but	  was	  passed	  into	  law	  nonetheless	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  55).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  This	  was	  a	  departure	  from	  the	  pattern	  of	  United	  States’	  macroeconomic	  policy	  that	  had	  emerged	  after	  World	  War	  Two.	  Generally,	  macroeconomic	  policy	  was	  conducted	  with	   indifference	   towards	  balance	  of	  payments	  considerations	  and	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  50).	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Efforts	  at	  restraining	  capital	  outflows	  under	  Kennedy	  were	  extended	  by	  the	  Johnson	  Administration.	  By	  1965	   inflation	  was	  on	  the	  rise	  as	   Johnson	  attempted	  to	   fund	  his	  Great	  Society	   project	   in	   conjunction	   with	   increased	   spending	   on	   the	   Vietnam	   War,	   without	  introducing	   corresponding	   tax	   increases.	   The	   war	   was	   having	   a	   sustained	   inflationary	  impact	   upon	   the	   global	   economy	   and	   shaking	   confidence	   in	   the	   dollar.	   Vietnam	   forged	   a	  clear	   link	   between	   the	   fate	   of	   American	   foreign	   policy	   and	   the	   sustainability	   of	   the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  As	  the	  payments	  problem	  intensified	  in	  synchronicity	  with	  the	   war	   effort,	   Johnson’s	   Administration	   introduced	   the	   ‘Voluntary	   Credit	   Restraint	  Program’	   in	   1965.	   The	   Fed’s	   Board	   of	   Governors	   oversaw	   its	   management,	   with	   the	  mandate	  to	  ensure	  that	  corporations	  and	  banks	  did	  not	  substantially	  increase	  their	  export	  of	   funds	   (Gowa,	  1983:	  56).	   	   Johnson	   further	  requested	   that	   the	  Department	  of	  Commerce	  steer	  the	  repatriation	  of	  overseas	  American	  investment.	  Meanwhile	   in	   Britain,	   the	   election	   of	   Harold	   Wilson’s	   1964	   Labour	   government,	  within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   deteriorating	   balance	   of	   payments,	   had	   spooked	   the	   markets,	  bringing	  speculation	  against	   the	  pound	  to	  a	  new	   level	  of	   intensity.	  The	  previous	  year	  had	  been	  marked	  by	  an	  extremely	  harsh	  winter,	  de	  Gaulle’s	  veto	  of	  British	  EEC	  membership	  and	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  pre-­‐election	  uncertainty	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  125).	  These	  factors	  combined	  to	  produce	  an	  extremely	  challenging	  context	  for	  Wilson’s	  new	  government.	  In	  August	  1964,	  an	   additional	   $1	   billion	   standby	   credit	   was	   arranged	   with	   the	   IMF	   and	   a	   further	   $500	  million	  of	  funds	  were	  secured	  from	  various	  foreign	  central	  banks.	  	  This	   was	   not,	   however,	   a	   challenge	   that	   the	   new	   government	   faced	   alone.	   The	  Americans	  were	  increasingly	  drawn	  in	  to	  the	  management	  of	  Britain’s	  monetary	  policy.	  The	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U.S.	  had	  long	  recognised	  the	  significance	  of	  sterling	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  system	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  123).	  Although	  the	  dollar	  was	  the	  world’s	  dominant	  currency	  by	  1945,	  sterling	  was	  still	  its	  major	  rival	  and,	  as	  such,	  a	  pillar	  of	  the	  international	  currency	  markets	  whose	  price	  fluctuation	  would	  inevitably	  have	  systemic	  ramifications.	  But	  it	  was	  clearly	  an	  increasingly	  fragile	  pillar	  at	  its	  $2.80	  parity	  with	  the	  dollar,	  and	  from	  1964	  supporting	  the	  existing	   rate	   became	   a	   fundamental	   component	   of	   U.S.	   international	   monetary	   policy.	  	  Sterling	  was	  the	  first	  line	  of	  defence	  in	  maintaining	  the	  integrity	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  stability	   of	   the	   dollar.	   While	   the	   pound	   was	   weak	   it	   was	   certain	   to	   draw	   some	   of	   the	  speculative	  pressure	  away	  from	  the	  dollar,	  but	  if	  the	  pound	  were	  devalued	  then	  the	  dollar	  would	  undoubtedly	  be	  subjected	  to	  firmer	  scrutiny	  (Block,	  1977:	  185).	  For	  his	  part,	  Wilson	  was	  an	  advocate	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  relationship.	  He	  feared	  that	   any	   devaluation	   of	   the	   pound	   would	   be	   viewed	   as	   an	   abdication	   of	   Britain’s	  international	  obligations	  (Block,	  1977:	  188).	  The	  rise	  in	  Bank	  Rate	  undertaken	  in	  1964	  was	  a	  landmark	  event;	  it	  was	  the	  first	  time	  that	  there	  had	  been	  open	  consultation	  with	  American	  monetary	   authorities	   in	   the	   run	   up	   to	   a	   rate	   adjustment	   (Capie,	   2010:	   193).	   Already	   in	  1963,	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  had	  consulted	  Bill	  Martin,	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Fed,	  on	  the	  need	  to	  coordinate	  future	  Anglo-­‐American	  rate	  changes	  so	  as	  to	  minimise	  the	  impact	  of	  interest	  rate	  differentials	  (which	  would	  inevitably	  lead	  to	  destabilising	  capital	  flows).	  	  These	   interactions	   were	   a	   symptom	   of	   a	   deepening	   Anglo-­‐American	   monetary	  
cooperation.	  But	  they	  were	  also	  a	  symptom	  of	  the	  broader	  intensification	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Fed	   and	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   in	   managing	   international	   monetary	   affairs	   during	   the	   1960s	  (Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   123).	   Private	   central	   bank	   power	   was	   dramatically	   restored	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during	   the	   1960s,	   in	   what	   was	   in	   many	   ways	   the	   post-­‐war	   heyday	   of	   Central	   Bank	  cooperation.	   The	   Fed	   set	   about	   activating	   and	   energising	   the	   international	   network	   of	  central	  bankers.	  	  	  From	  December	  1960,	  the	  Fed’s	  staff	  participated	  in	  monthly	  meetings	  of	  the	  Bank	  for	  International	  Settlements	  (BIS)	  in	  Basle.	  While	  the	  Treasury	  had	  formerly	  opposed	  this,	  it	  was	  now	   supportive,	   thanks	   in	  no	   small	   part	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   had	  undergone	   its	   own	  aggrandisement	  of	  international	  influence.	  The	  Treasury	  was	  becoming	  the	  ‘pivot’	  in	  a	  new	  institutional	   apparatus	   to	   accommodate	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   advanced	   capitalist	  states.	  It	  did	  so	  through	  taking	  a	  much	  more	  active	  role	  in	  international	  dealings	  of	  dollars	  and	  gold.	  Both	   the	  Fed	  and	   the	  Treasury	  were	  active	   in	  weaving	  a	  web	  of	   currency	  swap	  arrangements	   between	   Central	   Banks	   in	   order	   to	   provide	   the	   ammunition	   required	   to	  defend	  against	  speculative	  attacks	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  124).	  American	   institutions	  were	  not	  alone	   in	   leading	   the	   intensification	  of	   international	  financial	   cooperation.	   The	  Bank	   of	   England	   also	   played	   an	   active	   role.	   Indeed,	   it	  was	   the	  
Anglo-­‐American	  coordination	  of	  monetary	  policy	  during	  the	  1960s	  that	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  broader	   network	   of	   cooperation	   between	   Central	   Banks	   and	   finance	   ministries.	   The	  connectivity	  between	  British	  and	  American	  monetary	  policy	  prompted	  Humphrey	  Minors,	  the	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank,	  to	  remark	  in	  a	  letter	  to	  Bill	  Martin	  that,	  ‘what	  when	  I	  was	  a	  boy	  was	  a	  purely	  domestic	   concern	  of	   this	   institution,	  now	   looks	   like	  being	  a	  matter	  of	  argument	  not	  merely	  between	  the	  City	  and	  its	  West	  end	  Branch,	  but	  even	  between	  our	  two	  governments’	   (Capie,	   2010:	   194).	   The	   Bank’s	   international	   significance	   was	   further	  amplified	  by	  the	  staggering	  growth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.	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It	   was	   within	   this	   transatlantic	   context	   of	   balance	   of	   payments	   crises,	   policy	  transformations	   and	   growing	   Anglo-­‐American	   coordination	   of	   monetary	   policy	   that	   the	  next	  stage	  in	  the	  development	  of	  Euromarkets	  got	  underway.	  It	  did	  so	  as	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  transformation	  in	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  that	  saw	  intensifying	  cooperation	  and	  attempts	  at	  coordination	  as	  the	  crisis	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  deepened.	  	  
The	  Americans	  arrive	  in	  the	  City	  
	  A	  perfect	  storm	  of	  domestic	  accumulation	  dynamics	  and	  regulatory	  arbitrage	  pushed	  and	  pulled	   American	   banks	   into	   the	   Eurodollar	   market	   during	   the	   1960s.	   After	   rubbing	   up	  against	  New	  Deal	  legislation	  and	  undergoing	  an	  unprecedented	  merger	  wave,	  they	  began	  to	  arrive	  in	  the	  City	  en	  masse	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  accommodating	  regulatory	  climate	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  By	  1975,	  no	  less	  than	  58	  U.S.	  bank	  branches	  had	  been	  established	  in	  the	  City	   (Sylla,	   2002:	   66).	   	   The	   same	   massive	   banks	   that	   dominated	   the	   New	   York	   money	  market	  after	  the	  merger	  wave	  of	  the	  1950s	  and	  1960s	  now	  arrived	  in	  the	  City.	  The	   American	   takeover	   offered	   both	   a	   challenge	   and	   an	   opportunity	   for	   policy-­‐makers	  and	  bankers	  alike	  in	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain.	  For	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  their	  arrival	  raised	   crucial	   questions	   about	   responsibility	   and	   sovereign	   authority	   for	   foreign	   banks.	  While	  for	  British	  bankers,	  their	  arrival	  presented	  a	  potential	  competitive	  challenge.	  But	  for	  both	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  bankers,	  their	  arrival	  was	  also	  a	  major	  opportunity.	  By	  invigorating	  and	   expanding	   the	   scope	   and	   depth	   of	   the	   Euromarkets,	   the	   American	   invasion	   offered	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British	   bankers	   the	   chance	   to	   take	   a	   bigger	   slice	   of	   a	   rapidly	   growing	   pie,	   even	   if	   their	  relative	  share	  was	  declining.	  	  For	   the	   Bank,	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   Americans	   was	   a	   boon	   for	   the	   status	   of	   the	  Euromarkets.	   This	   would	   inevitably	   be	   reflected	   in	   the	   status	   and	   standing	   of	   the	   Bank	  itself,	  as	  the	  epistemological	  authority	  on,	  and	  gatekeeper	  to,	  the	  Euromarkets.	  The	  arrival	  of	   the	  Americans,	   then,	   brought	   a	  momentum	   that	   the	  Bank	   rode	   in	   order	   to	   reassert	   its	  centrality	   and	   significance	   within	   the	   British	   state	   and	   the	   wider	   international	   financial	  community.	   But	   their	   arrival	   also	   raised	   troubling	   questions	   about	   the	   status	   of	   British	  merchant	   banks	   and	   rendered	   Britain	   more	   sensitive	   to	   the	   shifting	   sands	   of	   American	  economic	  policy.	  So	  too	  for	  the	  Americans	  the	  expansion	  of	  U.S.	  banks	  beyond	  their	  parochial	  fetters	  represented	  both	  a	  challenge	  and	  an	  opportunity.	   	  American	  banks	  established	  a	   foothold	  within	  the	  offshore	  enclave	  of	  the	  Euromarkets,	  circumventing	  Regulation	  Q	  and	  tapping	  in	  to	  the	  vast	  pool	  of	  offshore	  dollars.	  But	  the	  quid	  pro	  quo	  of	  this	  regulatory	  liberation	  was	  dependence	   upon	   the	   sovereign	   authority	   of	   a	   foreign	   Central	   Bank.	   One	   that	   would	  naturally	  be	  expected	  to	  hold	  closer	  ties	  to	  the	  old	  order	  of	  the	  City’s	  banking	  elite	  than	  to	  the	  American	  interlopers.	  	  For	   the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	   the	  Fed,	   the	  American	   takeover	  of	   the	  Euromarkets	  was	  similarly	   Janus-­‐faced.	   By	   escaping	   the	   New	   Deal	   regulatory	   parameters	   and	   dependence	  upon	  the	  domestic	  dollar	  supply,	  the	  American	  banks	  had	  gravely	  undermined	  the	  capacity	  of	  American	  fiscal	  and	  monetary	  policy	  to	  control	  banking.	  This	  would	  become	  all	  too	  clear	  from	  the	  mid-­‐1960s.	  But	  they	  had	  also	  alleviated	  some	  of	  the	  pressure	  on	  the	  U.S.	  balance	  of	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payments,	  by	  tapping	  in	  to	  offshore	  dollar	  flows,	  and	  intensifying	  the	  global	  standing	  of	  the	  dollar	  as	  a	  vehicle	  currency.	  All	  of	  this	  during	  a	  period	  in	  which	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order	  looked	  increasingly	  primed	  to	  implode.	  	  The	  scale	  and	  pace	  of	   the	  American	  capture	  of	   the	  Eurodollar	  market	   in	  particular	  was	   breath-­‐taking.	   Figure	   1.1	   below	   depicts	   this.	   Current	   account	   deposits	   of	   overseas	  residents	   represent	   Eurodollar	   market	   deposit-­‐taking	   and	   increased	   dollar	   deposits	  account	  for	  the	  increase	  overwhelmingly.	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Source:	  Bank	  of	  England	  Quarterly	  Bulletin	   Statistical	   Annex	   1962-­‐1970.	   Yearly	   values	   from	   1965-­‐1967,	  quarterly	  values	  thereafter.	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  We	   can	   see	   in	   figure	   1.1	   that	   British	   Overseas	   and	   Commonwealth	   Banks	   experienced	   a	  major	  loss	  of	  relative	  market	  share,	  with	  their	  share	  of	  Eurodollar	  deposits	  dropping	  from	  c.40%	  in	  1962,	  to	  c.25%	  in	  1970.	  Accepting	  houses	  also	  experienced	  a	  severe	  contraction	  of	  their	  market	   share,	   from	  20%	  down	   to	  8%	  between	  1962-­‐1970.	  For	  American	  banks	   the	  story	  was	   very	   different.	   Their	   share	   of	   Eurodollar	   deposits	   rose	   precipitously,	   from	   just	  over	  20%	  in	  1962,	  to	  around	  55%	  in	  1970.	  By	  disaggregating	  deposits	  into	  sterling	  and	  non-­‐sterling	  we	  get	  a	  clearer	  picture	  of	  the	  vast	  take-­‐off	  in	  Eurodollar	  deposits	  from	  figure	  1.2.	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American	  Banks,	  1965-­‐1970	  Total	  Current	  Account	  Deposits	  of	  Overseas	  Residents	  	  	  
















Source:	   	   Bank	   of	   England	   Quarterly	  Bulletin	   Statistical	   Annex	   1962-­‐1970.	  Yearly	   values	   from	   1965-­‐1967,	   quarterly	  values	  thereafter.	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overseas	  non-­‐sterling	  deposits	  between	  1965-­‐1970,	  British	  Overseas	   and	  Commonwealth	  banks	   experienced	   a	   threefold	   increase.	   But	   despite	   the	   paucity	   of	   their	   gains	   in	   relative	  terms,	   overall	   British	   banks	   participated	   in	   a	   level	   of	   market	   expansion	   unimaginable	  without	  the	  influx	  of	  American	  banks	  and	  the	  enormous	  U.S.	  corporate	  client	  base	  that	  they	  brought	  with	  them.	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  Overseas	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Source:	   Bank	   of	   England	   Quarterly	  Bulletin	   Statistical	   Annex	   1962-­‐1970.	   Yearly	   values	   from	   1965-­‐1967,	  quarterly	  values	  thereafter.	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corridors	   of	   the	  City.	   The	  Bank	   really	   took	  notice	   of	   the	  American	  banks	   from	  1963.	  The	  regular	   meeting	   of	   Euro-­‐currency	   experts	   at	   the	   BIS	   provided	   a	   forum	   where	   the	  Euromarkets	   were	   discussed.	   Reporting	   on	   the	   1963	   BIS	   meeting,	   Bank	   officials	  acknowledged	   that	  London	  branches	  of	  American	  banks	  were	  more	  active	   than	  before	   in	  the	  Eurodollar	  market,	  with	  U.S.	  businesses	  borrowing	  there	  rather	  than	  New	  York	  (BofE,	  1963:	  6A123/1).	  55	  Correspondence	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Bank	  provided	  the	  primary	  channel	  of	   policy	   formulation	   around	   the	   Euromarkets.	   Bank	   officials	   outlined	   the	   parameters	   of	  their	   responsibility	   for	  Eurodollar	   activity	   in	   these	  exchanges.	  The	  archival	   record	  makes	  clear	  that	  the	  Bank	  was	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  official	  epistemic	  authority	  on	  the	  subject	  of	  the	   Eurodollar	  market.	   	   The	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Cabinet	  Office	  would	   turn	   to	   the	   Bank	   for	  information	  and	  advice	  about	  the	  burgeoning	  offshore	  trade.5657	  	  In	   correspondence	   between	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury,	   Bank	   officials	  made	   clear	  that	  what	  applied	  for	  British	  banks,	  regarding	  the	  Bank	  stepping	  in	  as	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  ‘cannot	  be	  held	  to	  apply	  in	  the	  same	  measure	  at	  all	  to	  the	  London	  branches	  or	  subsidiaries	  of	   foreign	   banks’	   (BofE,	   1964:	   6A123/1). 58 	  It	   was	   concluded	   by	   officials	   that	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  55	  Bank	  of	  England	  Archives	  6A123/1	  ‘Economic	  Intelligence	  Department	  Files:	  Euro	  Currencies-­‐	  Including	  Euro	  Dollars	  and	  Euro	  Bonds	  1/1/65-­‐31/7/64’,	  Report	  on	  Meeting	  of	  Experts	  on	  the	  Euro-­‐currency	  Markets	  at	  the	  BIS,	  November	  9th	  -­‐11th	  1963.	  56	  In	   1968	   the	   Treasury	   requested	   information	   from	   the	   Bank	   in	   order	   to	   prepare	   the	   Prime	  Minister’s	  annual	  speech	  at	  the	  Lord	  Mayor’s	  banquet,	  specifically	  asking	  for	  guidance	  over	  what	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	   stance	   should	   be	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	   City	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Eurodollar	  market	  (BofE,	  1968:	  6A123/5).	  57	  	   Bank	  of	   England	  Archives	   6A123/5	   ‘Economic	   Intelligence	  Department	   Files:	   Euro	  Currencies-­‐	  Including	   Euro	   Dollars	   and	   Euro	   Bonds	   1/1/68-­‐31/5/69’,	   Memo	   from	   Treasury	   to	   the	   Bank	   of	  England	  requesting	  Prime	  Ministerial	  brief	  on	  the	  Eurodollar	  market,	  October	  22nd	  1968.	  58	  Letter	   regarding	   document	   to	   be	   prepared	   by	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   in	   response	   to	   a	   Treasury	  request	  for	  information	  of	  the	  standing	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market,	  March	  6th	  1964.	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responsibilities	   in	   times	   of	   crisis	   should	   not	   extend	   beyond	   supporting	   British	   banks.	  London	   branches	   of	   foreign	   banks	   were	   not	   viewed	   as	   the	   responsibility	   of	   British	  authorities	  but	  rather	  those	  of	  their	  head	  offices.	  Beyond	  the	  head	  offices,	  national	  Central	  Banks	   from	   the	   originating	   country	   would	   take	   ultimate	   responsibility.	   This	   discussion	  occurred	  within	  a	  context	  whereby	  London	  branches	  of	  American	  banks	  now	  accounted	  for	  30%	  of	  deposits	  in	  the	  Eurodollar	  market.	  Crucially	  then,	  the	  City’s	  hosting	  of	  foreign	  banks	  and	  Eurodollar	  business	  did	  not	  entail	  a	  corresponding	  globalisation	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  function	  as	   lender	   of	   last	   resort.	   As	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   international	   financial	   system	  accelerated,	   the	   Bank	   was	   right	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	   process,	   carefully	   navigating	   its	   way	  through	  these	  uncharted	  territories	  through	  processes	  of	  institutional	  learning.	  	  As	   monetary	   conditions	   tightened	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	   increased	   rapidly.	   Between	   1965	   and	   1966	   a	   credit	   squeeze	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	  introduction	  of	  the	  ‘Voluntary	  Foreign	  Credit	  Restraint’	  programme	  lead	  New	  York	  banks	  to	  turn	  to	  their	  London	  branches	  for	  a	  supply	  of	  funds.	  The	  Bank	  was	  fully	  aware	  of	  this	  and	  noted	   that	   this	   dynamic	   was	   practically	   ‘inevitable’	   given	   that	   the	   traditional	   sources	   of	  liquidity	   within	   the	   U.S.	   had	   dried	   up.	   In	   fact,	   monetary	   conditions	   in	   the	   U.S.	   were	   so	  difficult	  that	  when	  a	  Bank	  official	  met	  with	  a	  senior	  member	  of	  the	  Chase	  Manhattan	  bank	  on	   a	   visit	   to	   the	   U.S.	   in	   early	   1966,	   the	   Chase	   employee	   suggested	   that	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	  had	  been	  so	  important	  for	  improving	  reserve	  positions	  that,	   ‘without	  it,	  we’d	  have	  been	   dead’	   (BofE,	   1966:	   6A123/3).59	  The	   Bank’s	   own	   statistics	   on	   lending	   from	   London	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives	   6A123/3	   ‘Economic	   Intelligence	   Department	   Files:	   Euro	   Currencies-­‐	  Including	  Euro	  Dollars	  and	  Euro	  Bonds	  1/8/65-­‐31/10/66’,	  Memo	  from	  Bank	  of	  England	  Overseas	  Office	  charting	  U.S.	  banks	  drawing	  dollars	  through	  London	  branches,	  August	  22nd	  1966.	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branches	  of	  American	  banks	  to	  their	  New	  York	  counterparts	  suggest	  that	  in	  the	  first	  seven	  months	   of	   1966,	   the	   figure	   stood	   at	   £500	  million,	  with	   a	   staggering	   £230	  million	   of	   that	  lending	   occurring	   in	   July	   alone.	   Bank	   officials	   also	   noted	   that	   American	   banks	   had	   been	  prepared	   to	   pay,	   ‘somewhat	   over	   the	   market	   rate’	   for	   money	   in	   order	   to	   attain	   funding	  (BofE,	  1966:	  6A123/3).60	  	  Johnson’s	   restrictive	   measures	   and	   the	   credit	   crunch	   implemented	   by	   the	   Fed	   in	  1966	  marked	   a	   watershed	   in	   the	   orientation	   of	   American	   banks	   towards	   the	   Eurodollar	  market.	  Prior	  to	  this	  American	  banks	  had	  only	  borrowed	  passively,	  with	  overseas	  branches	  placing	  excess	  deposits	  with	  their	  head	  office.	  Now	  U.S.	  banks	  borrowed	  actively,	  with	  their	  foreign	   branches	   soliciting	   deposits	   to	   finance	   domestic	   operations	   (Kane,	   1981:	   13).	   No	  longer	   taking	   only	   a	   passing	   interest	   in	   the	   market,	   they	   now	   identified	   Eurodollar	  expansion	  as	  integral	  to	  their	  business	  strategy.61	  The	   Bank’s	   position	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   City	   enabled	   it	   to	   effectively	   gauge	   the	  intensity	  with	  which	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  being	  shaped	  by	  changes	  in	  U.S.	  monetary	  policy.	  As	  more	  American	  banks	  set	  up	  shop	  in	  London,	  their	  role	  in	  funnelling	  funds	  back	  to	  their	  American	  head	  offices	  led	  to	  an	  increasing	  interactivity	  of	  interest	  rates	  on	  each	  side	  of	   the	   Atlantic.	   	   As	   we	   can	   see	   in	   figure	   2.1	   below,	   a	   triadic	   interaction	   of	   interest	   rates	  evolved	   during	   the	   1960s:	   that	   between	   Bank	   Rate,	   the	   Eurodollar	   Rate	   and	   the	   Federal	  Funds	  Rate.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Internal	  memo,	  Bank	  of	  England-­‐	  ‘Eurodollar	  Lending	  to	  the	  U.S.’,	  August	  9th,	  1966.	  61	  Richard	   Sylla	   (2002:	   62)	   describes	   this	   transformation	   aptly,	   suggesting	   that	   while	   American	  banks	  gave	  little	  consideration	  to	  operations	  in	  Europe	  before	  1963	  they,	  ‘thought	  about	  little	  else	  in	  the	  decade	  thereafter’.	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Source:	  Global	  Insight	  Database,	  IMF	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  UK	  Interest	  Rates	   Central	   Bank	   Policy	   Rate	   Per	   cent	   Per	   Annum	   (1948-­‐2011)	   IMF	   code:	  11260ZFHS52;	  IMF	  International	  Financial	  Statistics	  UK	  Interest	  Rates	  Euro	  Dollar	  London	   Rate	   Per	   cent	   Per	   Annum	   (1957-­‐2011)	   IMF	   code:	   11260DZFHA52;	   IMF	  International	   Financial	   Statistics	   United	   States	   Central	   Bank	   Policy	   Interest	   Rate	  Per	  cent	  Per	  Annum	  (1948-­‐2011)	  IMF	  code:	  11160ZFHS52	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  Authorities	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic	  were	  aware	  of	  this	  dynamic	  early	  on.	   	  Already	  in	  April	   1963	   during	   a	   U.S.	   Treasury	  meeting,	   Robert	   Roosa	   expressed	   discontent	   with	   the	  British	  monetary	  authorities,	  which	  he	  suggested	  had	  pushed	  up	  Bank	  Rate	  in	  order	  to	  keep	  ahead	  of	   the	  Eurodollar	  Rate.	  While	   in	   the	  past	  a	   rising	   rate	   for	   sterling	  would	  only	  have	  been	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  effect	  in	  drawing	  money	  out	  of	  dollars	  and	  into	  sterling,	   it	  was	   now	   understood	   that	   the	   British	   action	   might	   also	   push	   up	   the	   Eurodollar	   Rate,	  aggravating	   U.S.	   balance	   of	   payments	   difficulties	   through	   the	   resultant	   capital	   outflow	  (Burn,	  2006:	  158).	  This	  dynamic	  is	  clearly	  evidenced	  in	  figure	  2.1,	  which	  shows	  that	  Bank	  Rate	  was	  the	  highest	  rate,	  with	  the	  Eurodollar	  Rate	  beneath	   it	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Funds	  Rate	  consistently	  the	  lowest	  of	  the	  three.	  Apart	  from	  a	  three-­‐year	  period,	  between	  1968	  and	  1971,	  the	  British	  Bank	  Rate	  was	  continuously	  the	  highest	  rate.	  	  During	  the	  mid-­‐1960s	  this	  relationship	  intensified.	  As	  figure	  2.2	  below	  shows,	  there	  was	  a	  strong	  correlation	  between	  the	  Eurodollar	  Rate	  and	  the	  US	  Federal	  Funds	  Rate.	  This	  graph	   shows	   clearly	   that	   whilst	   during	   the	   early	   1960s	   the	   Eurodollar	   Rate	   was	   kept	  marginally	  above	  the	  Federal	  Funds	  Rate	  in	  order	  to	  draw	  money	  away	  from	  the	  U.S.	  capital	  market,	   from	  the	  mid	  1960s	  as	  the	  U.S.	  tightened	  its	  monetary	  policy,	  the	  Eurodollar	  Rate	  spiked	  in	  response	  to	  a	  massive	  surge	  in	  demand.	  This	  was	  a	  result	  of	  precisely	  the	  factors	  that	  the	  Bank	  had	  recognised;	  by	  drawing	  funds	  from	  their	  London	  branches	  the	  New	  York	  banks	  were	  pushing	  up	  the	  price	  of	  Eurodollar	  borrowing	  (BofE:	  6A	  123/3).	  We	  can	  see	  this	  clearly	  in	  figure	  2.2,	  with	  the	  two	  spikes	  in	  the	  Eurodollar	  Rate	  that	  pushed	  it	  well	  over	  the	  Federal	  Funds	  Rate	  from	  1965	  to	  1967	  and	  then	  again	  from	  1968	  to	  1971.	  
	  	   184	  
By	  this	  point	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  and	  American	  economic	  policy	   was	   complex	   and	   reciprocal.	   Eurodollar	   movements	   were	   beginning	   to	   exert	  sustained	   pressure	   upon	   the	   international	   monetary	   system.	   Large-­‐scale	   American	  borrowing	   introduced	   a,	   ‘permanent	   element	   of	   demand’	   shaped	   by	   economic	   conditions	  within	  the	  U.S.	  (Kane,	  1983:	  13).	  This	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  integrating	  the	  U.S.,	  Eurodollar	  and	  European	  markets	  much	  more	  tightly.	  As	  a	  result	  European	  capital	  markets	  became	  more	  exposed	   to	   fluctuations	   in	   U.S.	   monetary	   policy,	   creating	   a	   form	   of	   hub	   and	   spokes	  relationship	   (Bell,	   1973:	   62;	   Kane,	   1983:	   13).	   These	   developments	   contributed	   to	   the	  increasing	  international	  monetary	  disorder	  of	  the	  later	  1960s	  and	  early	  1970s,	  the	  twilight	  years	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.62	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  The	  ‘Eurodollar	  slop’,	  an	  expanding	  pool	  of	  ex-­‐patriate	  dollars	  that	  tended	  to	  move	  predominantly	  back	   and	   forth	   across	   the	   Atlantic,	   was	   the	   underlying	   root	   of	   the	   dollar	   crisis	   of	   1970/71	   that	  preceded	   Nixon’s	   delinking	   from	   gold	   and	   the	   de	   facto	   termination	   of	   Bretton	   Woods	   (Strange,	  1972:	  198).	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Sources:	   Global	   Insight	   Database,	   IMF	   International	   Financial	   Statistics	   United	   Kingdom	   Interest	  Rates	  Euro	  Dollar	  London	  Rate	  Per	  cent	  Per	  Annum	  (1957-­‐2011)	  IMF	  code:	  11260DZFHA52;	   IMF	  International	   Financial	   Statistics	   United	   States	   Central	   Bank	   Policy	   Interest	   Rate	   Per	   cent	   Per	  Annum	  (1948-­‐2011)	  IMF	  code:	  11160ZFHS52	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Tax	  (BofE,	  1966:	  6A123/3).63	  When	  asked	  about	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  U.S.	  authorities	  towards	  this	  borrowing,	  given	  that	  it	  weakened	  the	  impact	  of	  U.S.	  monetary	  restraint,	  Samuel	  Katz	  of	  the	   Fed	   replied	   that	   the	   borrowing	   was	   not	   a	   serious	   problem	   given	   its	   small	   size.	  Significantly,	  Katz	  added	  that	  these	  borrowings	  were	  in	  fact	  ‘welcome’	  given	  that	  they	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  strengthening	  the	  dollars	  position	  and	  easing	  the	  U.S.	  balance	  of	  payments.	  But	  as	   the	  Eurodollar	  market’s	   integration	  with	   the	  U.S.	  money	  market	   intensified	  during	   the	  latter	  1960s,	  the	  American	  attitude	  hardened.	  	  The	  American	  position	  was	  detailed	  by	  Andrew	  Brimmer,	  a	  member	  of	  Fed’s	  Board	  of	  Governors,	  in	  a	  presentation	  at	  the	  LSE	  in	  November	  1969.	  Brimmer’s	  talk	  came	  after	  a	  period	  of	  chaos	  in	  the	  international	  gold	  market	  in	  1968	  had	  drawn	  even	  more	  restrictive	  responses	   from	   Johnson	   in	   order	   to	   prevent	   capital	   outflows:	   further	   investments	   in	  Western	  Europe	  were	  banned,	  tighter	  constraints	  imposed	  upon	  bank	  lending,	  suggestions	  to	   limit	  American	  travel	  abroad	  and	  reduce	   foreign	  exchange	  costs	   incurred	  as	  a	  result	  of	  overseas	  military	   expenditures.	  Although	   these	  measures	  did	  nothing	   to	   curb	   the	   longer-­‐term	  weakness	  of	  the	  U.S.	  balance	  of	  payments,	  American	  banks	  keenly	  felt	  their	  effects.	  	  In	  response	  to	  the	  surge	  of	  American	  bank	  borrowing	  from	  their	  London	  branches	  in	  1968,	  Brimmer	  suggested	  that	  while	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  based	  in	  London,	  ‘its	  basic	  driving	   force	  during	   the	   last	  year	  has	  centred	   in	  about	  a	  dozen	   large	  banks	   in	   the	  United	  States’	  (BofE,	  1969:	  6A123/6).64	  These	  banks	  had	  turned	  to	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  in	  order	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives	   6A123/6	   ‘Economic	   Intelligence	   Department	   Files:	   Euro	   Currencies-­‐	  Including	  Euro	  Dollars	  and	  Euro	  Bonds	  1/6/69-­‐31/3/70’,	  Report	  on	  the	  ‘Meeting	  of	  Experts	  on	  the	  Euro-­‐Currency	  Market’,	  July	  12th,	  1966.	  64	  Transcript	  of	  presentation	  given	  by	  Andrew	  Brimmer,	  ‘The	  Eurodollar	  Market	  and	  the	  US	  Balance	  of	  Payments’,	  November	  17th	  1969.	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to	   compensate	   for	   the	   loss	  of	  domestic	  deposits.	  Brimmer	  acknowledged	   that	  bidding	   for	  Eurodollar	   funds	   by	   American	   banks	   had	   pushed	   up	   the	   Eurodollar	   Rate	   and	   made	  monetary	  management	  in	  the	  U.S.	  more	  difficult.	  	  These	  dynamics	  were	  also	  beginning	  to	  have	  an	  effect	  upon	  the	  regulatory	  stance	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve.	  In	  August	  of	  1969,	  the	  Fed	  introduced	  a	  10	  per	  cent	  marginal	  reserve	  requirement	   for	   U.S.	   bank	   liabilities	   to	   overseas	   branches	   and	   on	   funds	   acquired	   by	  overseas	   branches	   from	   their	   U.S.	   head	   offices	  while	   also	   adjusting	   the	   required	   reserve	  level	  for	  other	  channels	  of	  offshore	  funding.	  	  The	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  driving	  regulatory	  transformations	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic	  as	  authorities	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  attempted	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  shifting	  architecture	  of	   international	   finance.	   For	   their	  part	  American	  officials	   allowed	  Eurodollar	  expansion,	   but	   they	   certainly	   did	   not	   devise	   it	   as	   a	   strategy	   for	   augmenting	   American	  financial	  power.	  Any	  benefit	  they	  eventually	  derived	  was	  unintended	  at	  the	  outset.	  	  Battilosi	   (2002:	   16)	   suggests	   that	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   adopted	   a	   ‘permissive’	  approach,	  with	  foreign	  expansion,	  ‘accommodated,	  if	  not	  actively	  encouraged’,	  while	  Schenk	  (2002:	   89)	   concludes	   that	   there	  was	   a	   ‘passive	   acceptance’	   of	   the	  multinationalisation	   of	  American	   banks.	   Kennedy’s	   administration	   had	   certainly	   understood	   that	   borrowing	  through	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  would	  be	  beneficial	   to	   the	  balance	  of	  payments	  (de	  Cecco,	  1976:	  390).	  But	  Helleiner	  (1994:	  89)	   is	  an	   isolated	  voice	  when	  he	  asserts	   that	  Eurodollar	  market	  expansion	  was	  ‘actively	  encouraged’	  by	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  the	  Treasury.	  	  Nevertheless,	  there	  were	  certain	  regulatory	  changes	  undertaken	  in	  the	  United	  States	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  internationalisation	  (Brimmer	  &	  Dahl,	  1975:	  343).	  But	  on	  balance	  the	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regulatory	   and	   policy	   context	  within	   the	  U.S.	  was	  more	   disabling	   than	   encouraging,	  with	  tight	  money	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  attempts	  to	  restrict	  lending	  from	  domestic	  offices	  the	  principal	  policy	   catalysts	   for	   international	   expansion	   (Battilosi,	   2002:	   62;	  Misrachi	   &	   Davis,	   2004:	  118).	  But	  once	  the	  market	  emerged,	  American	  policy	  makers	  certainly	  did	  seek	  to	  make	  use	  of	   it	   in	   order	   to	   promote	   their	   perceived	   national	   interests.	   In	   this	   respect	   then,	   both	  Panitch	  and	  Gindin,	  and	  Strange,	  are	  right	  to	  highlight	  its	  functionality	  to	  American	  power.	  American	   monetary	   authorities	   were	   coming	   to	   terms,	   in	   a	   complex	   and	   contradictory	  
fashion,	   with	   an	   enormously	   fluid	   period	   in	   the	   history	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	  system	  as	  the	  crisis	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  intensified.	  For	  the	  Bank,	  the	  regulatory	  pressure	  emanated	  from	  the	  arrival	  of	  American	  banks	  with	   large	   deposit	   bases	   and	   a	   desire	   to	   push	   against	   the	   dealing	   limits	   put	   in	   place	   for	  British	   banks.	   Bank	   officials	   were	   keen	   to,	   ‘forestall	   any	   Treasury	   worrying’,	   regarding	  dealing	   limits	   (BofE,	  1969:	  EID4/113).65	  As	  American	  banks	  entered	   the	  market	   they	  had	  the	   effect	   of	   pushing	   up	   the	   level	   of	   dealing	   limits.	   	   It	  was	   thought	   that	   an	   attack	   on	   the	  policy	   of	   limits	   would	   be	   an	   embarrassment	   to	   British	   banks,	   which	   needed	   them	   to	  effectively	  conduct	   their	  operations.	  The	  Bank’s	  adoption	  of	  a	  new	  policy,	   allowing	   larger	  dealing	  limits,	  was	  seen	  as,	  ‘a	  purely	  defensive	  one	  forced	  on	  us	  by	  the	  very	  large	  number	  of	  American	  banks	  now	  coming	  to	  London’	  (BofE,	  1969:	  EID4/113).	  But	  in	  insisting	  upon	  the	  maintenance	   of	   dealing	   limits	   Bank	   officials	   also	   believed	   that	   they	   were	   acting	   in	   the	  interests	  of	   the	  Americans,	  by	  preventing	   them	  from	  being	  associated	  with	  any	  decline	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  65	  Bank	  of	  England	  Archives	  EID4/113	  ‘Home	  Finance:	  Banking-­‐	  General	  Papers	  7/12/64-­‐17/11/66’,	  Internal	  memo,	  Bank	  of	  England-­‐	  ‘New	  American	  Banks	  in	  London-­‐	  Dealing	  Limits’,	  March	  5th	  1969.	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sterling’s	  position	  (BofE,	  1969:	  EID4/113).	  	  By	  this	  point	  then,	  the	  Bank	  had	  already	  begun	  to	  act	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  American	  banks.	  There	  was	  general	  concern	  about	  the	  American	  arrivals	  too.	  Bank	  officials	  reflected	  that	   people	   were,	   ‘constantly	   wondering	   aloud	   whether	   the	   large	   and	   seemingly	   never-­‐ending	   influx	   of	   American	   banks	   into	   London	   is	   an	   unalloyed	   benefit’	   (BofE,	   1969:	  EID4/113).	   Regarding	   competition	  with	  British	   banks,	   it	  was	   inferred	   that	   British	   banks’	  willingness	   to	   help	   their	   American	   counterparts	   suggested	   that	   the	   newcomers	  were	   not	  viewed	   as	   an	   existential	   threat.	   Where	   competition	   for	   clients	   did	   appear	   likely,	   it	   was	  anticipated	   that	   the	   greater	   impact	   would	   be	   upon	   the	   UK-­‐	   based	   American	   subsidiary	  clients	   of	   other	   American	   banks	   (BofE,	   1969:	   EID4/113).	   In	   fact,	   the	   inflationary	   impact	  upon	  City	  rents	  generated	  by	  the	  Americans	  was	  viewed	  as	  potentially	  beneficial.	  It	  might	  push	  more	   peripheral	   players	   to	   relocate	   away	   from	   the	   City,	   freeing	   up	   space	   for	  more	  substantial	  businesses	  to	  move	  in	  (BofE,	  1969:	  EID4/113).	  	  On	  balance	  then,	  the	  Americanisation	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  appears	  not	  to	  have	  been	   viewed	   as	   a	   major	   concern	   for	   the	   Bank	   in	   terms	   of	   any	   perceived	   threat	   to	   the	  profitability	  of	  British	  banking	  interests.	  Where	  concern	  did	  arise,	  it	  was	  more	  a	  question	  of	  how	  the	  Bank	  ought	  to	  adapt	  its	  regulatory	  stance	  and	  continue	  to	  safeguard	  sterling.	  Both	  on	  the	  question	  of	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  responsibility	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  dealing	  limits,	  it	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  Bank	  was	  rapidly	  recalibrating	  its	  policy.	  	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  Bank	  was	  adapting	  to	  the	  Euromarkets	  and	  creating	  a	  new	  form	  of	  international	   financial	   sovereignty.	   A	   form	   of	   splintered	   sovereignty	   constituted	   through	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  Although	  hosting	  a	  growing	  number	  of	  foreign	  banks,	  a	  key	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component	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  institutional	  functions,	  its	  role	  as	  a	  lender	  of	  last	  resort,	  remained	  exclusively	  national.	  Simultaneously,	  the	  presence	  of	  American	  banks	  brought	  the	  lender	  of	  last	  resort	  responsibility	  of	  the	  Fed	  into	  London.	  The	  Euromarkets	  produced	  a	  fracturing	  of	  
jurisdictional	  authority	  that	  spawned	  ambiguity	  over	  regulatory	  responsibility	  and	  spurred	  the	   evolution	   of	   regulatory	   regimes	   to	   clarify	   the	   situation	   in	   the	   following	   decades.	  Clarification	   required	   Central	   Bank	   cooperation	   and	   appreciation	   of	   the	   increased	  interdependence	   of	   transatlantic	   monetary	   policy.	   But	   it	   also	   had	   much	   broader	  ramifications	  for	  the	  development	  of	  international	  financial	  supervision.	  	  The	   Bank’s	   experience	   with	   the	   Eurodollar	   market	   and	   its	   discussion	   as	   early	   as	  1964	   of	   the	   limits	   to	   jurisdictional	   authority	   over	   foreign	   bank	   branches	   during	   times	   of	  crisis,	   were	   the	   progenitors	   of	   the	   ‘home	   country	   rule’	   (BofE,	   1964:	   6A123/1).	   Home	  country	  rule	  attributed	  the	  responsibility	   for	  defining	  and	  regulating	   financial	   institutions	  to	  the	  state.	  States	  would	  look	  to	  one	  another,	  rather	  than	  to	  supranational	  organisations,	  in	  order	  to	  legislate	  and	  enforce	  collective	  agreements	  on	  supervision	  (Kapstein,	  1996:	  9).	  Not	  only	  did	  the	  Bank	  stumble	  across	  this	   innovatory	  principle	  in	  responding	  to	  the	  problems	  raised	  by	  the	  Euromarkets,	  it	  also	  led	  the	  development	  of	  this	  principle	  internationally.	  The	  regulatory	  challenge	  provided	  by	  the	  Euromarkets	  and	  a	  series	  of	  major	  banking	  crises	  during	  the	  1970s	  led	  to	  an	  acceleration	  in	  the	  development	  of	  international	  banking	  supervision	   (Capie,	   2010:	   588;	   Goodhart,	   2011:	   4).66	  As	   the	   banking	   crises	   of	   the	   early	  1970s	  unfolded	  the	  Governors	  of	  the	  G10	  Central	  Banks	  met	  to	  hammer	  out	  proposals	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  66	  The	  most	  prominent	   crises	   in	   this	   respect	  were	   the	  major	   losses	   of	   Lloyds’	   Lugano	  branch,	   the	  collapse	   of	   the	   Israel	  British	  Bank	   in	  Tel	  Aviv,	   the	   Franklin	  National	  Bank	   in	  New	  York	   and	  most	  notably	  of	  all	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  West	  German,	  Bankhaus	  Herstatt	  (Capie,	  2010:	  625).	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international	   supervision.	   These	   meetings	   produced	   the	   ‘Basle	   Concordat’,	   which	   was	  circulated	  widely	   amongst	   Central	   Banks	   and	   supervisory	   authorities	   (Capie,	   2010:	   627).	  The	  Bank	  played	  the	  lead	  role	  in	  these	  discussions,	  providing	  the	  first	  two	  chairmen	  of	  the	  committee.	   The	  Basle	   Committee	   on	  Banking	   Supervision,	   as	   it	   came	   to	   be	   known,	   had	   a	  strong	   British	   makeup	   from	   the	   start	   (Goodhart,	   2011:	   44).	   This	   reflected	   the	   Bank’s	  unparalleled	  epistemic	  authority	  in	  these	  matters.	  In	   addition	   to	   the	   increasingly	   active	   stance	   taken	   by	   American	   authorities	   in	  managing	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  therefore,	  we	  must	  also	  acknowledge	  that	  the	  Bank	   of	   England	  was	   fundamentally	   important	   to	   developing	   the	   supervisory	   framework	  required	   to	   keep	   pace	   with	   financial	   globalisation.	   Key	   developments	   like	   the	   Basle	  Committee	   of	   Bank	   Supervisors	   stemmed	   from	   the	   initiative	   of	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   and	  drew	   upon	   the	   institutional	   learning	   that	   it	   underwent	   during	   the	   1960s.	   New	   York	   and	  London	  were	   functioning	   as	   the	   twin	  pivots	  of	   financial	   globalisation	  and	   their	   attendant	  monetary	  authorities	  played	  an	  integral	  role	  in	  laying	  the	  institutional	  groundwork	  for	  this	  process.	  The	  Fed-­‐Wall	  Street-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  was	   increasingly	  articulated	  through	  and	  with	  
the	  Bank-­‐City-­‐Treasury	  nexus	   as	   part	   of	   an	  Anglo-­‐American	   twin-­‐engine	   room	  of	   financial	  globalisation.	  Geographically,	   the	   City	   of	   London	   became	   central	   to	   the	   interaction	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   dynamics.	   	   This	   was	   part	   of	   a	   transatlantic	   paradox:	   sterling’s	  decline	   was	   accompanied	   the	   City’s	   rebirth,	   while	   the	   dollar’s	   ascent	   led,	   counter-­‐intuitively,	   to	   the	   diminishment	   of	   New	   York’s	   status.	   Offshore	   was	   a	   distorting	   mirror	  through	  which	  transatlantic	  development	  was	  reflected.	  	  
	  	   192	  
	  This	  was	  a	  major	  departure	  from	  the	  sheltered	  politics	  of	  the	  interwar	  years,	  where	  the	   restrictive	   Sterling	   Area	   had	   been	   assembled	   as	   a	   bulwark	   for	   British	   trade	  predominance	  within	  the	  Commonwealth.	  Now	  sterling	  was	  no	  longer	  the	  centrepiece	  of	  a	  rival	   currency	   block	   and	   foundation	   of	   British	   banking	   dominance,	   but	   an	   increasingly	  marginal	  component	  of	  a	  rapidly	  expanding	  international	  financial	  system	  hinging	  upon	  the	  dollar.	  In	  a	  matter	  of	  several	  decades,	  the	  financial	  markets	  of	  Britain	  and	  America	  had	  been	  integrated	  more	  completely	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  Eurodollar	  business	  restored	   the	  City’s	  centrality	  within	   the	   international	   financial	  system.	   But	   it	  was	  now	  a	  nodal	   point	   in	   the	   global	   extension	   of	  American	   capital	  markets,	  
American	  banking	  and	  the	  hegemony	  of	  the	  dollar.	  The	  City	  had	  become	  the	   ‘banker	   to	   the	  dollar’,	   and	   was	   now	   increasingly	   defined	   by	   its	   ‘enclave	   function’	   within	   the	   British	  economy	   (Coakley	   &	   Harris,	   1983:	   23).	   It	   was	   once	   again	   a	   mediator	   between	   the	  borrowers	   and	   lenders	   of	   the	  world,	   but	   unlike	   the	   nineteenth	   century	   the	   business	  was	  denominated	   in	   dollars	   not	   sterling	   and	   the	   major	   players	   were	   American	   banks,	   not	  British.	  And	  crucially,	   the	  City	   could	   continue	   to	  play	   this	   role	   regardless	  of	   the	  health	  of	  British	  factories,	  British	  merchants	  and	  sterling	  (Coakley	  &	  Harris,	  1983:	  23).67	  68	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  In	   his	   1968	   speech	   at	   the	   Lord	  Mayor’s	   banquet,	   after	   the	   devaluation	   of	   1967,	   Harold	  Wilson	  proudly	   spoke	   of	   the	   ‘Europeanization	   of	   the	   City’	   (BofE,	   1968:	   	   6A123/5).	  Wilson’s	   speech	  was	  informed	  by	  the	  experts	  at	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  who	  had	  earlier	  been	  asked	  to	  provide	  a	  summary	  of	  London’s	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  (BofE,	  1968:	  6A123/5).	  	  In	  an	  implicit	  recognition	  of	  the	  City’s	  growing	  entrepot	  status,	  Wilson	  commented	  that	  despite	  the	  decreased	  role	  of	   sterling	   as	   an	   international	   reserve	   currency	   and	   continuing	   balance	   of	   payments	   problems,	  London	  was	  maintaining	   and	   in	   fact	   increasing	   its	   role	   as	   an	   international	   financial	   centre	   (BofE,	  1968:	  6A123/5).	  68	  Harold	  Wilson’s	  speech	  to	  the	  Lord	  Mayor’s	  banquet,	  November	  11th	  1968.	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The	   evolution	   of	   the	   City’s	   role	  was	   not	  without	   consequence	   for	   British	   banking.	  American	   banks	   brought	   new	  management	   techniques	   and	   financial	   innovation	   into	   the	  London	  market.	   Most	   notably,	   the	   introduction	   of	   Certificates	   of	   Deposit	   in	  May	   1966,	   a	  move	  that	  was	  mirrored	  by	  the	   issuing	  of	  sterling	  CD’s	  by	  British	  banks	   from	  1968.69	  The	  negotiability	   of	   CD’s,	   pioneered	   in	   the	  U.S.	  money	  markets	   earlier	   in	   the	   decade,	   enabled	  them	  to	  function	  as	  liquid	  assets	  (BofE,	  1966:	  	  398;	  Oxford,	  2008:	  75).	  	  American	  banks	  also	  introduced	   the	   ‘going-­‐concern’	   approach	   to	   lending,	  with	   future	  expected	  earnings	   rather	  than	  the	  resale	  value	  of	  their	  assets	  now	  the	  principal	  criteria	  for	  evaluating	  a	  borrower’s	  creditworthiness.	   Covenants	   imposed	  by	  American	  banks,	   through	  which	   they	  monitored	  the	   profitability	   of	   borrowing	   businesses,	   led	   to	   an	   intensified	   role	   for	   banks	   in	  restructuring	  business	   operations	   in	   periods	   of	   crisis	   (Coakley	  &	  Harris,	   1983:	   138-­‐140).	  The	  growth	  of	  offshore	  banking	  increased	  competition	  for	  deposits	  denominated	  in	  major	  currencies,	   with	   the	   American	   banks	   competing	   for	   sterling	   deposits	   after	   establishing	   a	  foothold	   in	   London.	   This	   had	   the	   effect	   of	   increasing	   the	   competitiveness	   of	   the	   sterling	  deposit	  market	  (Aliber,	  1985:	  83;	  Jones,	  1991:	  125).	  British	   banks	   were	   forced	   to	   respond	   to	   the	   competitive	   challenge	   posed	   by	   the	  Americans.	  While	   the	  merchant	   banks	  were	   prominent	   players	   in	   the	   first	   decade	   of	   the	  Euromarkets,	   their	   limited	   deposit	   bases	   restricted	   their	   capacity	   to	   compete	   as	   the	  markets	  grew	   in	   size	   (Jones,	  1993:	  326).	  The	  British	   clearing	  banks,	  which	  didn’t	  make	  a	  sustained	  entry	  into	  the	  Euromarkets	  until	  the	  1970s,	  had	  been	  sheltered	  from	  competition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  69	  Certificates	  of	  Deposit	  are	  negotiable	  certificates	  received	  by	   the	  depositor	   in	  return	   for	  a	   time-­‐deposit	   placed	  with	   a	   bank.	   	   A	   large	   secondary	   inter-­‐bank	  market	   for	   CD’s	   developed	   during	   the	  1960s.	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through	  their	  cosy	  relationship	  with	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	   interest	  rate	  cartel	   that	  they	   had	   long	   maintained	   (Jones,	   1991:	   135).	   The	   entry	   of	   the	   Americans	   provided	   a	  competitive	  jolt	  to	  the	  British	  banks,	  shaking	  them	  out	  of	  their	  torpor	  (Moran,	  1986:	  22).	  	  	  With	   international	   banking	   rapidly	   reconfigured,	   the	   national	   regulatory	  frameworks	   within	   which	   it	   was	   embedded	   were	   placed	   under	   mounting	   strain.	   A	  
transatlantic	   regulatory	   feedback	   loop	   emerged	   during	   the	   1960s	   and	   stimulated	   the	  processes	   of	   financial	   deregulation	   that	   gathered	   pace	   in	   the	   following	   decades.	   By	  increasing	  the	  competitive	  pressure	  on	  British	  banks,	  the	  American	  influx	  destabilised	  the	  prevailing	   regulatory	   order	  within	   the	   City.	   	   In	   the	   post-­‐war	   period,	   the	   Bank	   had	   relied	  upon	   its	   relationship	   with	   a	   concentrated	   and	   cartelised	   banking	   sector	   to	   manage	  monetary	   policy	   and	   control	   credit	   levels.	   As	   the	   number	   of	   foreign	   banks	   operating	   in	  London	   grew	   it	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   the	   Bank	   to	   rely	   on	   its	   traditional	  relationship	   with	   a	   closed	   network	   of	   dominant	   British	   banks	   (Moran,	   1986:	   2;	   Michie,	  2004:	  44).	  Economic	  planning	  and	  government	  management	  of	   financial	  markets	  became	  much	  harder.	   Credit	  markets	  were	   increasingly	   responsive	   to	   global	  demand	   fluctuations	  rather	  than	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  British	  government.	  To	  compete	  with	  their	  well	  capitalised	  American	  counterparts,	  British	  banks	  moved	  towards	   universal	   banking	   and	   away	   from	   traditional	   divisions	   between	   merchant	   and	  commercial	   banking	   (Battilossi,	   2002:114-­‐116).	   These	   transformations	   required	   a	  corresponding	   regulatory	   recalibration	   and	   the	   Conservative	   government’s	   ‘Competition	  Credit	   and	   Control’	   policy	   offered	   exactly	   that.	   It	   broke	   from	   the	   moves	   towards	   credit	  rationing	  by	  administrative	  decree,	  which	  had	  proliferated	  during	  the	  tight	  money	  policy	  of	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the	  1960s,	  freeing	  up	  credit	  markets	  by	  substituting	  price	  levels	  for	  government	  controls	  as	  the	  decisive	  determinant	  of	   credit	   levels	   (Moran,	  1986:	  30).	  As	  we	  shall	   see	   in	   chapter	  5,	  this	  had	  serious	  implications	  for	  the	  stagflationary	  crisis	  of	  the	  1970s.	  In	  fact	  then,	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  deregulatory	  dynamics	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  can	  be	  located	   within	   the	   transformation	   of	   financial	   markets	   during	   the	   1950s	   and	   1960s.	  	  Mirroring	  the	  imperatives	  of	  Competition	  Credit	  and	  Control	  and	  increasingly	  conscious	  of	  the	   competitive	   challenge	   that	   the	  City	   posed	   to	  New	  York,	   deregulation	  began	   to	   gather	  pace	   in	   the	  U.S.	  Nixon	   called	   for	   the	   gradual	  phasing	  out	  of	   interest	   rate	   ceilings	   in	  1973	  while	  the	  SEC	  brought	  about	  New	  York’s	  ‘Big	  Bang’	  in	  1975,	  breaking	  from	  its	  longstanding	  support	   for	   the	   cartel-­‐like	   organisations	   that	   had	   dominated	   American	   capital	   markets	  since	  the	  1930s	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  149).	  Regulatory	  transformations	  in	  the	  U.S.	  then	  fed	  back	  into	  Britain,	  with	  the	  further	   liberalisation	  during	  the	  1980s	  and	  Thatcher’s	  own	  ‘Big	  Bang’	  carried	  out	  after	  British	  officials	  had	  visited	   the	  U.S.	   in	  order	   to	   learn	   from	  the	  American	  regulatory	  apparatus	  (Moran,	  1994:	  168).	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  fiscal	  basis	  of	  the	  British	  state	  
	  Not	   only	   did	   the	   Euromarkets	   recalibrate	   regulatory	   frameworks	   and	   integrate	   Anglo-­‐American	  monetary	   policy,	   they	   also	   fed	   back	   into	   the	   domestic	   foundations	   of	   Britain’s	  political	   economy	   by	   reconfiguring	   the	   fiscal	   basis	   of	   the	   British	   state.	   British	   merchant	  bankers	  were	  able	   to	  use	   the	  momentum	  generated	  by	  the	  Euromarkets	   to	   leverage	  their	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own	  power	  and	  influence	  within	  government.	  In	  the	  process	  they	  helped	  steer	  Britain	  down	  a	  developmental	  path	  corresponding	  to	  their	  interests.	  As	  Britain’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems	  intensified	  during	  the	  1960s	  the	  coalition	  of	   forces	   behind	   stop-­‐go	   unravelled	   and	   support	   for	   alternatives	   gathered	   momentum.	  Opponents	   of	   stop-­‐go	   called	   for	   domestic	   expansion,	  modernisation	   and	   a	  move	   towards	  indicative	  planning	   (Jessop,	   1980:	   32).	   Crucially,	   the	  Conservative	  Party	  began	   to	   rethink	  their	  stance	  on	  state	  intervention.	  In	  the	  early	  1960s	  the	  Conservatives	  began	  to	  enact	  their	  plans.	  They	  established	  the	  National	  Economic	  Development	  Council	  (NEDC),	  which	  served	  as	  a	  tripartite	  medium	  for	  national	  planning.	  The	  Conservatives	  encouraged	  rationalisation	  and	  modernisation,	  introducing	  an	  incomes	  policy	  and	  applying	  for	  British	  membership	  of	  the	  European	  Economic	  Community	  (Jessop,	  1980:	  33).	  Labour	   began	   to	   give	   planning	   increased	   priority	   under	   Wilson’s	   administration	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  326;	   Jessop,	  1980:	  39;	  Overbeek,	  1990:	  7).	  This	  was	  part	  of	  the	  Labour	  government’s	  broader	  economic	  strategy	   for	   raising	   investment	   levels,	   increasing	  exports	  and	   replacing	   imports	   deemed	   inessential	   (Roseveare,	   1969:	   343).	   Labour’s	   newfound	  commitment	   to	   planning	   was	   embodied	   in	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   Department	   of	  Economic	   Affairs	   (DEA)	   in	   1964,	   along	   with	   the	   establishment	   of	   the	   ‘Industrial	  Reorganization	  Corporation’,	  which	  was	   formed	   in	  1966	   in	   order	   to	   intervene	  directly	   in	  the	  rationalisation	  of	  industry	  and	  accelerate	  the	  process	  of	  merging	  and	  regrouping	  among	  British	  companies	  (Brittan,	  1971:	  319).	  The	  DEA	  took	  responsibility	  for	  prices,	  incomes	  and	  industrial	  policies,	  and	  was	  primarily	  responsible	  for	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  National	  Plan	  and	  regional	  policy	  (Brittan,	  1971:	  315).	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But	   the	   development	   of	   the	   new	   planning	   apparatus	   was	   doomed	   from	   the	  beginning.	  The	  new	  agencies	  were	  separate	  from	  the	  ‘central	  axis’,	  of	  state	  power	  (the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury),	  and	  the	  division	  of	  responsibility	  between	  the	  DEA	  and	  the	  Treasury	  was	  ambiguous	   (Jessop,	   1980:	   40;	   Brittan,	   1971:	   312).	   	   Economic	   planning	   in	   Britain	   had	  traditionally	  been	  constrained	  by	  the	  domineering	  power	  of	  the	  Treasury-­‐Bank	  relationship	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  DEA	  was	  unable	  to	  overcome	  this.	  The	  DEA	  was	  involved	  in	  a	  losing	  struggle	   for	   supremacy	   with	   the	   Treasury,	   which	   retained	   primary	   control	   over	   public	  expenditure	   and	   public	   investment	   (Roseveare,	   1969:	   	   344).	   The	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury	  were	  able	  to	  maintain	  the	  traditional	  priority	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  and	  the	  reserves	  over	  and	  against	   the	  commitment	   to	  growth	  and	   full	  employment	  entailed	  by	  support	   for	  planning	  (Jessop,	  1980:	  40).	  The	  indicative	  nature	  of	  the	  new	  planning	  was	  a	  serious	  limitation.	  When	  the	  NEDC	  and	  the	  DEA	  drew	  up	  their	  proposals	  there	  were	  no	  specific	  policy	  tools	  for	  securing	  either	  direct	  or	   indirect	  compliance	  with	   the	  specified	  growth	   targets	   (Jessop,	  1980:	  41).	   	  When	  Wilson’s	  government	  was	  faced	  with	  the	  choice	  between	  devaluation,	  as	  a	  precondition	  of	  planned	  growth,	  and	  deflation	  to	  safeguard	  the	  reserves,	  they	  opted	  for	  the	  latter	  (Jessop,	  1980:	   40).70	  The	  modernisation	   efforts	   of	   the	   1960s	   failed	   to	   restore	   competitiveness	   to	  British	  business	  (Gamble,	  1990:	  119).	  Even	  after	  the	  devaluation	  of	  1967,	  which	  effectively	  ended	   sterling’s	   international	   role,	   the	   government	   continued	   to	   prioritise	   deflationary	  measures	  (Jessop,	  1980:	  40;	  Cassis,	  2010:	  202).	  This	   failure	  was	  in	  no	  small	  part	  down	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	  Gamble	  (1990:	  120)	   identifies	   this	   failure	   to	  challenge	   the	   internationalist	  orientation	  of	  British	  economic	  policy	  and	  break	  out	  of	  the	  stop-­‐go	  cycle	  as	  the	  key	  reason	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  modernisation	  attempts	  during	  the	  1960s.	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the	   Labour	   government’s	   fear	   of	   alienating	   the	   American’s	   through	   devaluation	   (Brittan,	  1971:	   292).	   With	   the	   dollar	   under	   increased	   pressure	   during	   the	   1960s,	   the	   Americans	  feared	  that	  a	  British	  devaluation	  would	  dent	   the	  market’s	  confidence	   in	   the	  dollar	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  39).	  As	  the	  relentless	  stop-­‐go	  cycle	  deepened	  Britain’s	  industrial	  crisis,	  the	  Euromarkets	  increasingly	   shaped	   the	   fiscal	   strategy	   of	   the	   British	   state.	   The	   Eurobond	   market	   in	  particular	   became	   highly	   significant.	   With	   an	   intensifying	   fiscal	   crisis,	   Eurobond’s	   were	  touted	  as	  a	  potential	  source	  of	   funds.	   	  Already	   in	  1961,	   the	  White	  Paper	  on	  the	   ‘Financial	  Objectives	  of	  the	  Nationalised	  Industries’	  suggested	  that	  nationalised	  industries	  needed	  to	  make	   a	   reasonable	   rate	   of	   return	   on	   the	   capital	   invested.	   Nationalised	   industries	   would	  have	  to	  contribute	  to	  their	  own	  capital	  needs,	  charging	  prices	  that	  were	  in	  realistic	  relation	  to	   the	   underlying	   costs.	   These	   were	   more	   demanding	   objectives	   than	   the	   prior	   goal	   of	  simply	   breaking	   even	   (Brittan,	   1964:	   96).	   It	   was	  within	   this	   context	   of	   transforming	   the	  raison	  d’être	  of	   the	  nationalised	   industries	  that	   the	  question	  of	  Eurobond	  borrowing	  took	  centre	  stage.	  Within	   the	   Treasury,	   the	   possibility	   of	   easing	   access	   to	   Euromarket	   funds	   was	  discussed	   at	   length.	   This	   followed	   hot	   on	   the	   heels	   of	   the	   renewed	   sense	   of	   crisis	   that	  swamped	   Britain	   after	   devaluation	   in	   1967.	   	   The	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Inland	   Revenue	  discussed	   the	   possibility	   of	   easing	   access	   to	   the	   Eurodollar	   market	   for	   UK	   traders.	   The	  motivation	  here	  was	  the	  perceived	  benefit	  to	  the	  British	  balance	  of	  payments	  with	  reserves	  to	  be	  strengthened	  if	  U.K.	  traders	  borrowed	  outside	  of	  the	  Sterling	  Area	  in	  order	  to	  finance	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domestic	   investment	   (Treasury,	   1968:	   IR40/16006).71	  	   In	   order	   to	   encourage	   Eurodollar	  borrowing,	  the	  Bill	  proposed	  to	  make	  more	  interest	  on	  foreign	  borrowing	  tax	  deductible.	  These	   proposals	   were	   not	   well	   received	   by	   the	   Inland	   Revenue,	   who	   expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  potential	  impact	  of	  a	  relaxation	  of	  borrowing	  controls	  upon	  offshore	  tax	  havens.727374	  But	  the	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Bank	  overrode	  the	  Inland	  Revenue’s	  concerns.	   In	  a	  meeting	  between	  Treasury	  and	  Bank	  officials	   the	   increased	  balance	  of	  benefits	  payments	  post-­‐devaluation	   were	   stressed.	   With	   confidence	   in	   sterling	   low,	   it	   was	   felt	   that	   any	  measures	   that	   could	   help	   bolster	   the	   U.K.’s	   reserve	   position	   were	   to	   be	   encouraged	  (Treasury,	   1968:	   IR40/16006).75	  The	  move	   towards	   greater	   Eurodollar	   borrowing	  would	  have	   an	   additional	   benefit.	   It	  was	   in	   fact	   partially	   devised	   as	   a	  means	   to	   reduce	  Britain’s	  exposure	  to	  destabilising	  short-­‐term	  capital	  movements.	  	  By	   expanding	   the	   financing	  options	   available	   to	   firms,	   the	  proposal	  would	   lead	   to,	  ‘the	  average	  lengthening	  of	  our	  borrowing	  abroad’,	  a	  step	  which	  was	  seen	  as	  a,	  ‘modest	  but	  significant	  step	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Government’s	  policy	  of	  reducing	  the	  country’s	  sensitivity	  to	  short-­‐term	  flights	  of	  funds’.	  	  Increases	  in	  reserves	  derived	  from	  this	  practice	  would,	  it	  was	  understood,	  be	  a,	  ‘very	  real	  gain’,	  and,	  ‘would	  be	  recognised	  as	  such	  in	  every	  financial	  centre	  in	  the	  world’	  (Treasury,	  1968:	  IR40/16006).76	  The	  Bank	  firmly	  supported	  the	  proposal	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  71	  Treasury	  File	  National	  Archives	  IR40/16006	  ‘Discussions	  with	  Financial	  Secretary,	  Treasury	  and	  Revenue	  on	  whether	  companies	  should	  be	  encouraged	  to	  borrow	  on	  Eurodollar	  market	  1966-­‐1978’,	  Memo	  from	  Treasury	  to	  Inland	  Revenue,	  Undated.	  72	  This	  was	  hugely	  ironic	  given	  that	  London	  was	  already	  the	  offshore	  haven	  par	  excellence.	  73	  The	  Revenue	  argued	  that	  dismantling	  the	  regulations	  around	  Eurodollar	  borrowing	  could	  have	  a	  knock	  on	  effect	  upon	  tax	  avoidance	  (Treasury,	  1968:	  IR40/16006).	  74	  Memo	  from	  Inland	  Revenue	  to	  Treasury	  Officials,	  29th	  May	  1968.	  75	  	  Meeting	  between	  Financial	  Secretary,	  Treasury	  and	  Bank	  of	  England	  Officials,	  17th	  May	  1968.	  76	  Note	  by	  the	  Financial	  Secretary	  on	  Eurodollar	  Borrowing,	  May	  1968.	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the	   Treasury	   agreed	   that	   the	   Inland	   Revenue’s	   tax	   objections	   were,	   ‘insubstantial’	  (Treasury,	  1968:	   IR40/16006).	  By	   the	  end	  of	  May	  1968,	   the	  Chancellor	  of	   the	  Exchequer	  had	   concluded	   that	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	   benefits	   outweighed	   the	   tax	   difficulties	  (Treasury,	  1968:	  IR40/16006).77	  Quite	   perversely	   then,	   the	   growing	   offshore	   market	   that	   had	   enabled	   vast	  movements	  of	  hot	  money	  previously	  unseen	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  period	  was	  now	  viewed	  as	  the	  most	   viable	  means	   to	   insulate	  Britain	   from	  speculative	  movements.78	  Capital	   controls	  were	   ruled	   out	   and	   the	   solution	   appeared	   to	   be	   an	   even	   tighter	   integration	   with	   the	  vicissitudes	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  The	  Euromarkets	  were	  both	  the	  malady	  and	  cure.	  And	  in	  a	  peculiar	  Anglo-­‐American	  parallel,	   the	   Euromarkets	   had	   begun	   to	   serve	   as	   a	   key	   strategic	  arena	  for	  the	  management	  of	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  in	  both	  countries.	  	  The	   increased	   appeal	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   as	   a	   source	   of	   funds	   was	   not	   purely	  circumstantial.	   From	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   merchant	   bankers	   began	   to	   actively	   press	   the	  government	   to	   promote	   Eurodollar	   borrowing.	   Treasury	   officials	   reported	   to	   the	   Inland	  Revenue	  that,	  ‘merchant	  bankers	  at	  home	  and	  abroad	  have	  been	  urging	  for	  some	  time	  that	  if	   certain	   tax	   impediments	  were	   removed	   U.K.	   firms	   and	   public	   bodies	  would	   be	   able	   to	  raise	   large	   sums	   in	  medium	   and	   long	   term	   issues	   of	   Eurodollar	   bearer	   bonds’	   (National	  Archives,	   1967:	   IR	   40/16006).79	  Foremost	   among	   these	  merchant	   banker	   advocates	  was,	  unsurprisingly,	  Siegmund	  Warburg	  himself.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  77	  Memo	  from	  Inland	  Revenue	  to	  Treasury	  Officials,	  29th	  May	  1968.	  78	  This	  is	  hugely	  ironic,	  given	  that	  the	  ease	  of	  switching	  out	  of	  sterling	  and	  into	  dollars	  through	  the	  Eurodollar	   market	   played	   a	   major	   role	   in	   destabilising	   capital	   flows	   in	   1966	   and	   1967	   (Brittan,	  1971:	  329).	  79	  Treasury	  letter	  to	  the	  Inland	  Revenue-­‐	  ‘Draft	  paper	  on	  Eurodollar	  borrowing’,	  October	  4th	  1967.	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In	  1965	  Warburg’s	  had	  joined	  with	  Hambros	  and	  Rothschild’s	   in	  order	  to	  push	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  to	  exempt	  foreign	  bonds	  issued	  in	  London	  from	  paying	  stamp	  duty.	  They	  also	  pressed	  the	  Treasury	  to	  lift	  the	  requirement	  that	  income	  tax	  be	  deducted	  from	  interest	  on	  bonds	  issued	  by	  companies	  based	  in	  the	  U.K.	  (Ferguson,	  2010:	  225).	  Warburg	  was	  keen	  to	  accelerate	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  London’s	  services	  for	  international	  investors,	  viewing	  this	  as	   essential	   to	   achieving	   European	   integration.	   Harold	  Wilson	   had	   come	   to	   lean	   heavily	  upon	   Warburg	   for	   financial	   advice	   during	   the	   1960s. 80 	  And	   although	   Warburg	   had	  vociferously	   lobbied	   Wilson	   to	   avoid	   devaluation,	   the	   firm	   nonetheless	   ‘stood	   ready	   to	  advise	   the	   government	   not	   only	   on	   currency	   questions	   but	   also	   on	   the	   finances	   of	  nationalised	  entities	  like	  the	  National	  Coal	  Board’	  (Ferguson,	  2010:	  285).	  Long	   term	  borrowing	   requirements	  of	   the	  nationalised	   industries	  had,	   since	  1956,	  been	   financed	   wholly	   through	   the	   Exchequer	   (National	   Archives,	   1967:	   IR	   40/16006).81	  This	   meant	   that	   their	   borrowing	   requirements	   were	   aggregated	   with	   other	   government	  borrowing.	   Between	   1962	   and	   1967	   the	   funds	   required	   for	   borrowing	   had	   grown	   from	  £432	  million	  to	  £1.1	  billion.	  	  The	  problem	  then	  became	  one	  of	  financing	  investment	  without	  further	  weakening	  Britain’s	   balance	   of	   payments.	  Within	   this	   context,	   the	   intervention	   of	  two	  different	  interests	  was	  crucial.	  	  Firstly,	   the	   IMF	   recommended	   in	   the	   summer	   of	   1967	   after	   agreeing	   to	   loan	   to	  Britain,	  that	  the	  nationalised	  industries,	  ‘be	  required	  to	  make	  a	  greater	  contribution	  to	  their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  Niall	  Ferguson	  (2010:	  276)	  suggests	  that,	  ‘In	  the	  early	  1960s	  it	  was	  S.G.	  Warburg	  &	  Co.	  more	  than	  any	  other	  City	  firm	  that	  appeared	  capable	  of	  helping	  British	  governments	  to	  address	  their	  recurrent	  financial	  problems’.	  81	  Memo	   from	   the	   Chancellor	   of	   the	   Exchequer	   to	   the	   Treasury-­‐	   ‘Financing	   National	   Investment’,	  September	  13th	  1967.	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own	  requirements	  so	  as	  to	  reduce	  the	  burden	  of	  the	  Exchequer’	  (National	  Archives,	  1967:	  IR	   40/16006).	   The	   IMF	   was	   beginning	   to	   have	   the	   sort	   of	   transformative	   impact	   upon	  British	  development	  that	  it	  would	  exert	  more	  strenuously	  during	  the	  1970s.	  Concurrently,	  the	   merchant	   bankers	   and	   Warburg	   in	   particular	   were	   continuing	   to	   advocate	   greater	  Euromarket	   borrowing	   for	   the	   government,	   local	   authorities	   and	   the	   nationalised	  industries.	  Warburg	  declared	   to	   the	  Exchequer,	   rather	  ambiguously,	   that	  borrowing	   from	  the	  Euromarkets	  would	  be	  “good	  for	  the	  credit”	  (National	  Archives,	  1967:	  IR	  40/16006).82	  He	  subsequently	  raised	   the	   issue	  with	   the	  Minister	  of	  Power	  and	  commented	  that	  Britain	  was	  making	  less	  use	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  than	  Germany	  and	  France.	  An	  unholy	  and	  unwritten	  alliance	  between	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  City’s	  merchant	  bankers	  was	  pushing	  Britain	  deeper	   into	  the	  embrace	  of	  private	  capital	  markets	  and	  transforming	  the	   fiscal	   basis	   of	   the	   British	   state.	  Whereas	   past	   studies	   had	   concluded	   that	   the	   overall	  benefits	   of	   increased	   Eurodollar	   borrowing	   would	   be	   negligible,	   the	   deteriorating	   fiscal	  climate	   and	   the	   intensive	   lobbying	   campaign	   of	   the	   merchant	   banks,	   aided	   by	   IMF	  prescriptions,	   proved	   game	   changing.	   The	   lobbying	   efforts	   of	   Warburg	   and	   others	   bore	  fruit:	   in	   1969	   the	   Gas	   Council	   raised	   £31	   million	   through	   deutschmark	   denominated	  Eurobond	   issues,	   and	   by	   October	   of	   1971	   British	   public	   sector	   agencies	   had	   raised	   £51	  million	  through	  this	  channel	  (Ferguson,	  2010:	  285).	  The	   Euromarkets	   had	   intensified	   banking	   power	   in	   Britain,	   not	   only	   by	   pulling	  American	  banks	  into	  Britain	  en	  masse,	  but	  also	  by	  energising	  City	  merchant	  banker’s	  efforts	  to	   use	   their	   privileged	   access	   to	   the	   Treasury-­‐Bank	   nexus	   to	   render	   government	   fiscal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  82	  Treasury	  paper	  on	  the	  possibility	  of	  borrowing	  abroad	  to	  finance	  the	  nationalised	  industries	  and	  local	  authorities,	  May	  25th	  1967.	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policy	   compatible	   with	   their	   interests.	   Borrowing	   costs	   were	   higher	   for	   individual	  Eurobond	   issues	   offered	   by	   public	   sector	   agencies	   than	   for	   the	   Exchequer	   borrowing	  through	   its	   own	   aggregate	   account.	   No	   wonder	   Warburg	   and	   his	   kin	   were	   so	   keen	   to	  advocate	   this	   course	   of	   action.	   Their	   presence	  helped	   ensure	   that	   financing	  public	   sector	  utilities	  was	  achieved	  not	  through	  progressive	  taxation	  or	  government	  management	  of	  the	  banks,	  but	  through	  the	  embrace	  of	  private	  capital	  markets.	  Within	  a	  Bank	  of	  England	  that	  had	   long	   stood	   for	   the	   traditional	   Gladstonian	   orthodoxy	   of	   balanced	   budgets	   and	   a	  Treasury	   that	   had	   been	   converted	   to	   Keynes	   only	   in	   technique,	   not	   thought,	   they	   found	  fertile	  soils	  for	  their	  arguments	  to	  be	  implanted	  (Roseveare,	  1969:	  325).	  	  By	   the	   late	   1960s	   a	   creeping	   monetarist	   influence	   was	   exerting	   itself	   within	   the	  Treasury.	  Whereas	   the	   initiative	  on	  monetary	  policy	  had	   traditionally	  been	   left	   up	   to	   the	  Bank	  until	   the	  1960s,	   the	  Treasury	  now	  became	  more	   involved	  with	   the	  measurement	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  (Brittan,	  1971:	  80).	  Geoffrey	  Bell,	  a	  leading	  advocate	  of	  the	  new	  quantity	  theory	   of	   money,	   took	   a	   position	   within	   the	   Treasury’s	   Finance	   division.	   Bell	   and	   other	  officials	  began	   to	   take	  an	   interest	   in	   the	   flow	  of	  money	   throughout	   the	  economy	  and	  had	  begun	  to	  calculate	  figures	  for	  Domestic	  Credit	  Expansion	  by	  the	  beginning	  of	  1969	  (Brittan,	  1971:	  81).	   	  From	  the	  mid-­‐1960s,	   the	  Finance	  side	  of	   the	  Treasury	  began	   to	  recover	  some	  initiative	   on	   overseas	   matters	   from	   the	   Bank.	   Sterling’s	   problems	   could	   no	   longer	   be	  remedied	  with	  short-­‐term	  credits	  from	  other	  Central	  Banks	  but	  needed	  regular	  recourse	  to	  the	   IMF	   instead.	   Increasing	   contact	  with	   the	   IMF,	  which	  dealt	   directly	  with	   the	  Treasury,	  augmented	  Treasury	  influence	  (Brittan,	  1971:	  80).	  With	  Roy	  Jenkins	  as	  Chancellor	  after	  the	  devaluation	   of	   1967,	   IMF	   prescriptions	   were	   enacted	   through	   attempts	   to	   control	   the	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money	  supply	   in	  order	   to	   limit	   consumption	  and	  restrain	   imports	   (Panitch	  &	  Leys,	  1997:	  109).	  These	  foretastes	  of	  monetarism	  inspired	  by	  the	  IMF	  would,	  as	  we	  shall	  see	  in	  chapters	  five	  and	  six,	  develop	  a	  much	  fuller	  flavour	  in	  the	  following	  decades.	  
	  
Anglo-­‐American	  finance	  and	  the	  crisis	  of	  Keynesianism	  
	  The	  birth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  represented	  a	  defining	  moment	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  history	  of	  the	  British	  state.	  By	  hosting	  a	  financial	  market	  that	  transformed	  the	  landscape	  of	  international	  finance,	   critically	   undermining	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   order,	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	  placed	  British	  chips	   firmly	   in	   the	  hat	  of	  a	  rapidly	  globalising	  world	  economy.	   	  But	  Britain	  did	  not	  move	  in	  this	  direction	  independently.	  The	  power	  of	  American	  finance	  was	  crucial	  in	  giving	   the	   required	  weight	   and	   depth	   to	   the	   Euromarkets.	   It	  was	   a	   truly	  Anglo-­‐American	  
process	  that	  would	  have	  been	  impossible	  without	  the	  interaction	  between	  their	  differential	  developmental	   processes.	   Static	   typologies	   of	   hegemony	   miss	   the	   significance	   of	   this	  expression	   of	   American	   power	   within	   the	   institutional	   fabric	   of	   Britain.	   By	   focusing	  predominantly	   upon	   America’s	   post-­‐war	   power,	   scholars	   have	   neglected	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  Britain’s	   role	   as	   a	  key	  nodal	  point	   in	   the	  articulation	  of	   financial	   globalisation	  was	  fundamental	   to	   the	   collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	   the	  birth	  of	   a	  new	  order	  of	   globalised	  finance.	   American	   ascendancy	   was	   articulated	   in	   and	   through	   British	   decline,	   as	   their	  developmental	  paths	  occasioned	  a	  constitutive	  interaction	  within	  the	  City.	   It	  was	  Britain’s	  peculiar	  imperial	  history	  and	  long-­‐standing	  commitment	  to	  an	  open	  international	  financial	  order,	   in	   contrast	   to	   the	   controls	   put	   in	   place	   by	   other	   European	   states,	   which	   enabled	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American	  banking	  to	  break	  through	  its	  national	  boundaries,	  reconfiguring	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  in	  the	  process.	  We	   can	   only	   understand	   the	   Euromarkets	   through	   this	   Anglo-­‐American	   lens.	   By	  neglecting	  this	  kind	  of	  analysis,	  scholars	  of	  British	  development	  have	  often	  understated	  its	  significance.	  Arrival	  of	  American	  banks	  en	  masse	  into	  the	  Euromarkets	  meant	  that	  decisions	  taken	  about	  the	  City	  were	  inevitably	  also	  decisions	  taken	  about	  American	  banking.	  Hosting	  the	   Euromarkets	   became	   a	   serious	   constraint	   upon	   the	   policy	   autonomy	   of	   the	   British	  state.83	  Crucially,	   discussions	   about	   the	   nationalisation	   of	   key	   City	   institutions,	   which	  gathered	   momentum	   during	   the	   1970s,	   would	   unavoidably	   become	   discussions	   that	  threatened	  the	  position	  of	   internationalised	  American	  banks	  in	  London.	  The	  United	  States	  had	  a	  more	  obvious	  and	  active	  stake	  in	  Britain’s	  political	  economy	  than	  ever	  before.	  	  The	   Eurodollar	   embrace	   was	   a	   constraint	   that	   fatally	   undermined	   the	   Keynesian	  experiment	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   British	   state.	   Britain	   willingly	   subjected	   itself	   to	   market	  discipline	  that	  weakened	  the	  pound	  and	  intensified	  the	  disastrous	  stop-­‐go	  cycle	  of	  post-­‐war	  recovery.	  As	  the	  City	  became	  ever	  more	  multinationalised	  and	  banks	  began	  to	  push	  against	  the	   existing	   regulatory	   framework,	   it	   became	   increasingly	   difficult	   for	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	  government	   to	   control	   credit	   to	   the	   extent	   required	   for	   a	  Keynesian	  growth	   strategy	  and	  economic	  planning.	  The	  growth	  of	  financial	  power	  brought	  about	  through	  the	  Euromarkets	  would	  be	  foundational	  to	  the	  development	  of	  neoliberal	  policies	  that	  gathered	  momentum	  during	  the	  crisis	  years	  of	  the	  later	  1970s.	  	  But	  to	  state,	  as	  does	  Burn,	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  lies	  ultimately	  in,	  ‘the	  resurrection	  of	  an	  institutional	  state	  structure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  83	  Andrew	   Gamble	   (1990:	   121)	   in	   particular,	   is	   culpable	   of	   neglecting	   this	   crucial	   factor	   in	   his	  analysis	  of	  British	  decline.	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reminiscent	  of	   that	  which	  defined	   the	  pre-­‐1931	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus’,	   is	   to	  overlook	  the	   centrality	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   dimension	   (Burn,	   1999:	   227).	   Power	   did	   remain	  concentrated	   within	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus,	   yet	   it	   was	   articulated	   through	   and	  embedded	  within	  a	  new	  order	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  integration.	  	  Through	   the	   Euromarkets	   and	   the	   entrenchment	   of	   dollar	   hegemony,	   the	   Fed’s	  global	  role	  was	  augmented.	  This	  was	  evidenced	  by	  effect	  the	  Fed’s	  policies	  had	  in	  pushing	  up	  interest	  rates	  in	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  and	  shaping	  the	  geographical	  flow	  of	  Eurodollar	  funds	  from	  the	  miid-­‐1960s.	  The	  City	  had	  recovered	  its	  role	  only	  through	  the	  acceptance	  of	  a	  particular	  place	  within	  an	  American-­‐led	  and	  American	  dominated	  world	  order.	  It	  had	  become	  and	  archipelago	  into	  Europe	  and	  the	  wider	  world	  for	  American	  capital	  markets,	  a	  key	  nodal	  point	  in	  the	  articulation	  of	  financial	  globalisation.	  We	  need	  not	  explain	  Britain’s	  acceptance	  of	   this	  role	  as	  a	  result	  of	   ‘hegemonic	   lag’	  as	  Helleiner	  (1994:	  99)	  erroneously	  proposes.	   It	  was	  in	  fact	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  active	  lobbying	  and	  business	  practice	  of	  the	  City’s	  merchant	  bankers	   who	   successfully	   innovated	   to	   create	   the	   Euromarkets.	   They	   then	   waged	   an	  effective	  campaign	  to	  pull	  Britain	  deeper	  into	  the	  clutches	  of	  the	  Euromarkets,	  transforming	  the	  fiscal	  basis	  of	  the	  state.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  excluded	  potential	  alternatives	  for	  the	  post-­‐war	  state	  and	  guaranteed	  that	  Britain	  would	  recover	  its	  traditional	  orientation	  to	  international	  finance,	  albeit	  in	  a	  qualitatively	  different	  form.	  But	   the	   story	   of	   the	   Euromarkets’	   origins	   is	   also	   one	   of	   the	   decomposition	   of	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	   order.	   	   As	   both	   countries	  wrestled	  with	   the	   crises	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	  system	   during	   the	   1960s,	   they	   responded	   to	   these	   challenges	   in	   a	   way	   that,	   often	  unintentionally,	   spurred	   the	   further	   growth	   of	   the	   Euromarkets.	   In	   pursuing	   their	   own	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distinctive	  strategies	  of	  national	  development,	  and	   through	   the	  constitutive	   interaction	  of	  these	   strategies,	   Britain	   and	   the	   United	   States	   sowed	   the	   seeds	   for	   a	   new	   order	   of	  liberalised	   international	   finance.	   The	   flows	   of	   hot	   money	   unleashed	   by	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	   were	   destabilising	   both	   to	   sterling	   and	   the	   dollar	   during	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	  (Strange,	   1972:	   198;	   Bell,	   1973:	   67;	   Higonnet,	   1985:	   36;	   Overbeek,	   1990:	   109).	   By	  increasing	  the	  exposure	  of	  these	  two	  key	  currencies	  to	  speculative	  attacks,	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  played	  a	  central	  role	  in	  the	  collapse	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  and	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  	  During	  the	  1970s,	  as	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  continued	  to	  unravel,	  a	  new	  era	   of	   financial	   discipline	   was	   born.	   Floating	   exchange	   rates	   began	   to	   exert	   the	   kind	   of	  disciplinary	   pressure	   towards	   balanced	   budgets	   that	   had	   not	   been	   effectively	   enforced	  under	  Bretton	  Woods.84	  The	  Oil	   crisis	   of	   1973	   combined	  with	   a	   crisis	   of	   profitability	   and	  increased	  working	   class	  militancy	   to	   spark	   a	  world	   crisis	   and	   years	   of	   stagflation	   in	   the	  West	   (Glyn	   &	   Harrison,	   1980:	   21;	   Brenner,	   2002:	   18).	   Britain	   felt	   these	   pressures	  more	  acutely	   than	  any	  other	  developed	  nation.	  When	   the	  Labour	  government	  was	   forced	   to	  go	  cap	  in	  hand	  to	  the	  IMF	  once	  more	  in	  1976,	  the	  Americans	  seized	  the	  opportunity	  to	  impose	  discipline	   upon	   what	   they	   viewed	   as	   a	   spendthrift	   Britain	   living	   beyond	   her	   means.	   As	  Britain’s	  Keynesian	  compromise	  entered	  its	  death	  throes,	  Anglo-­‐American	  dynamics	  would	  be	  central	  once	  again.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  84	  Under	  Bretton	  Woods,	  the	  proposed	  system	  of	  adjustable	  pegs	  had	  in	  effect	  become	  a	  system	  of	  rigidly	   fixed	   exchange	   rates.	   Within	   this	   system,	   both	   devaluations	   and	   revaluations	   became,	  ‘politically	  untouchable’	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  37-­‐38).	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5	  Britain	  and	  America	  in	  the	  Eye	  of	  the	  Storm	  
	  	  	  From	  the	  Breakdown	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  to	  the	  IMF	  Crisis	  of	  1976	  
	  
	  The	   international	  monetary	   system	  designed	  at	  Bretton	  Woods	   finally	  burst	   apart	  during	  the	  early	  1970s.	  The	  terminal	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  which	  had	  dominated	  the	  international	  monetary	  politics	  of	  the	  1960s,	  reached	  their	  day	  of	  reckoning.	   America’s	   eventual	   answer	   to	   the	   Triffin	   dilemma	  was	   the	   closing	   of	   the	   gold	  window,	  which	  jolted	  the	  world	  onto	  an	  impromptu	  dollar-­‐standard	  and	  restored	  American	  policy	  autonomy.	  Without	  the	  power	  to	  enact	  similar	  unilateral	  measures,	  Britain’s	  status	  as	  a	   tottering	   key	   currency	   component	   of	   Bretton	   Woods	   produced	   much	   graver	  consequences.	   Facing	   a	   sterling	   crisis	   of	   unprecedented	   proportions,	   Britain	   became	   the	  first	  major	   casualty	   of	   the	  post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	   financial	   order	   of	  which	  America	  was	   the	  chief	  architect.	  	  As	   it	  had	  done	   throughout	   the	  1960s,	  Britain	  drew	  on	   IMF	   financing	  once	  again	   in	  1976.	  But	  the	  rules	  of	  the	  game	  had	  now	  been	  rewritten.	  Britain	  could	  no	  longer	  draw	  on	  the	   Fund	  with	   the	   leniency	   and	  privilege	   it	   had	  been	   accustomed	   to.	   The	   costs	   of	  British	  borrowing,	  through	  the	  severe	  conditionality	  imposed	  in	  chief	  by	  the	  American	  moneymen	  at	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	   Treasury,	   would	   be	   sufficiently	   severe	   as	   to	   provoke	   a	   humbling	  curtailment	   of	   national	   sovereignty	   and	   rapidly	   accelerate	   the	   decomposition	   of	   Britain’s	  Keynesian	  compromise.	  	  Britain’s	   1976	   bailout	   was	   a	   crucial	   moment	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   globalisation	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  128).	  Had	  the	  restrictive	  measures	  that	  some	  within	  the	  Labour	  Party	  and	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Cabinet	  advocated	  actually	  been	  adopted,	  the	  trend	  of	  further	  financial	  liberalisation	  of	  the	  global	   economy	  would	   have	   been	   drastically	   arrested	   by	   a	   state	   that	   had	   formerly	   been	  central	   to	   its	   progression.	   That	   this	   did	   not	   occur	  was	   in	   part	   due	   to	   the	   resistance	   that	  these	  proposals	  met	  from	  opponents	  within	  the	  Cabinet,	  the	  Treasury,	  Bank	  and	  City.	  But	  it	  was	  also	  due	  to	  the	  persistent	  pressure	  exercised	  by	  key	  officials	  within	  the	  American	  state.	  As	   American	   power	   pushed	   in	   on	   Britain	   through	   the	   disciplinary	   stance	   of	   the	   U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Fed,	  refracted	  through	  the	  power	  of	  the	  IMF,	  British	  officials,	   the	  Tories	  and	  the	  bankers	  of	  the	  City	  also	  drew	  American	  discipline	  in	  onto	  what	  they	  understood	  as	  an	  outmoded	  and	  fiscally	  reckless	  Labour	  Government.	  	  This	  chapter	  challenges	   the	  dominant	  political	  economy	   interpretation	  of	   the	  1976	  crisis.	   I	   argue	   that	   analyses	   of	   the	   crisis	   have	   fallen	   into	   an	   either/or	   approach	   to	  understanding	   the	   relationship	   between	   national	   and	   international	   development.	   Within	  this	   framework,	   the	   predominant	   concern	   is	   to	   clearly	   establish	   a	   privileged	   level	   of	  causality	  that	  explains	  the	  events	  in	  order	  to	  explain	  the	  abandonment	  of	  Keynesianism	  by	  the	   Labour	   government.	   Setting	   the	   1976	   crisis	  within	   the	   context	   of	   longer-­‐term	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  processes	  reveals	  a	  more	  complex	  picture	  of	  the	  events.	  The	  crisis	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  negotiations	  between	  Britain,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  U.S.	  during	   which	   Britain’s	   deepening	   financial	   dependence	   drew	   it	   ever	   closer	   to	   the	  disciplinary	  power	  of	   the	  U.S.	   and	   the	   IMF.	   	  Once	   again	   the	   interaction	  between	   the	  Fed-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	  Street	  nexus	  and	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  was	  crucial.	  The	  American	  stance	  taken	  in	  1976	  needs	  to	  be	  viewed	  as	  part	  of	  a	  continuum	  that	  stretches	   back	   at	   least	   as	   far	   as	   the	   1967	   sterling	   devaluation	   and	   IMF	   drawing	   (Burk	  &	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Cairncross,	  1992:	  12).	  That	  stance,	  and	  the	   impact	   that	   it	  had	  upon	  British	  sovereignty,	   is	  explicable	   only	   as	   the	   result	   of	   nearly	   a	   decade	   of	   growing	   American	   impatience	   with	  Britain’s	   balance	   of	   payments	   crises	   and	   the	   chronic	   weakness	   of	   sterling.	   By	   1976,	   the	  Americans	  had	  run	  out	  of	  patience	  with	  Britain	  and	  were	  considering	  direct	  supervision	  of	  the	   British	   Treasury	   by	   its	   American	   counterpart,	   had	   Britain	   failed	   to	   meet	   IMF	  conditionality.	  	  Fearing	   that	   the	   British	   might	   jeopardise	   the	   future	   of	   the	   liberal	   international	  economic	  order	  that	  had	  been	  reconstructed	  after	  the	  war,	  the	  Americans	  used	  their	  power	  to	   steer	   the	   development	   of	   the	   British	   state	   away	   from	   strategies	   that	   might	   have	  challenged	   that	   order.	   For	   Britain,	   this	   represented	   a	   key	   moment	   in	   the	  ‘internationalisation’	  of	  the	  state,	  with	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  channelling	  pressure	  onto	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and,	  with	  even	  greater	   intensity,	   the	  Treasury,	   in	  order	   to	  alter	  the	  priorities	  of	  the	  British	  state.	  That	  pressure	  was	  resisted	  by	  some	  elements	  within	  the	  British	  state	  and	  society,	  but	  others,	  who	  were	  hostile	  to	  British	  social	  democracy,	  willingly	  drew	  it	  in.	  The	   first	   section	   of	   this	   chapter	   critically	   reviews	   Robert	   Cox	   and	   Eric	   Helleiner’s	  analyses	   of	   the	   global	   political	   economy	   during	   the	   1970s.	   I	   argue	   that	   both	   scholars	  provide	   interpretations	   that	  are	  unable	   to	  capture	   the	  specificity	  of	   the	   transformation	  of	  Britain’s	  political	  economy	  during	  the	  period	  and	  underplay	  the	   impact	  of	  American	  state	  power	  in	  reconstituting	  the	  British	  state	  through	  Anglo-­‐American	  development.	  I	  then	  show	  how	  similar	  conceptual	   failings	   influence	  studies	  of	  Britain’s	  1976	  IMF	  crisis.	  The	  chapter	  then	   develops	   an	   alternative	   account	   of	   the	   1976	   crisis	   by	   tracing	   Anglo-­‐American	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development	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  growing	  crisis	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  during	  the	   1960s	   and	   early	   1970s.	   In	   the	   third	   section,	   I	   demonstrate	   how	   continuing	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   and	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	  Woods	   fed	   into	   the	   reconstitution	   of	  British	  capitalism	  and	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  consensus.	  In	  the	  process,	  forces	  hostile	  to	   the	   Keynesian	   state	   were	   able	   to	   exert	   a	   growing	   influence	   and	   the	   transatlantic	  ideological	  ascendancy	  of	  monetarism	  was	  deployed	  to	  further	  their	  interests.	  In	  the	  fourth	  section,	   I	   explore	   the	   immediate	   political	   economic	   context	   of	   the	   crisis,	   tracing	   the	   key	  events	   and	   demonstrating	   the	   way	   in	   which	   American	   disciplinary	   power	   was	   exerted	  upon,	  and	  drawn	  into,	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  British	  state	  during	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  globalisation.	  	  
	  
The	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  state	  
	  The	   global	   political	   economy	   underwent	   a	   period	   of	   profound	   transformation	   during	   the	  1970s.	   The	   Bretton	  Woods	   order	   unravelled	  with	   astonishing	   rapidity.	   The	   era	   of	   cheap	  energy,	  which	  had	  facilitated	  the	  post-­‐war	  boom,	  appeared	  to	  have	  run	  its	  course.	  The	  OPEC	  oil	   price	   hike	   of	   1973	   spectacularly	   highlighted	   this.	   Transnational	   corporations	   grew	   in	  power	   and	   rapidly	   globalised	   their	   production	   networks,	   while	   newly	   industrialising	  countries	   contributed	   to	   the	   disruption	   of	   the	   existing	   international	   division	   of	   labour.	  Within	   capitalist	   states,	   the	   Keynesian	   compromise	   between	   capital	   and	   labour	   eroded	  under	   the	   conditions	   of	   shrinking	   profits,	   rising	   inflation	   and	   increasing	   union	  militancy.	  The	  massive	  growth	  in	  the	  scale	  and	  power	  of	  international	  finance	  undercut	  the	  potential	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for	   nationally	   autonomous	   growth	   strategies	   and	   exposed	   governments	   to	   increasing	  speculative	  pressure	  (Gill,	  1992:	  160).	  	  Within	  this	  shifting	  international	  context	  the	  purposes,	  practices	  and	  priorities	  of	  the	  state	  were	   transformed	   through	   the	   ‘internationalisation	   of	   the	   state’.	   Under	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   system	   states	   were	   accountable	   to	   external	   agencies	   associated	   with	   the	  international	   economic	   order.	   Agencies	   such	   as	   the	   IMF,	   the	   World	   Bank	   and	   GATT,	  supervised	   the	   management	   of	   trade	   liberalisation,	   exchange-­‐rate	   stability	   and	  convertibility.	   But	   although	   they	   were	   subject	   to	   the	   need	   to	   achieve	   harmony	   with	   the	  dictates	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  regime,	  nation	  states	  were	  also	  allowed	  facilities	  and	  space	  to	  adjust	   their	   national	   economies	   without	   having	   to	   sacrifice	   domestic	   welfare	   objectives.	  From	   the	   late	  1960s	  however,	   the	  breathing	   space	   for	   adjustment	   and	   the	   importance	  of	  preserving	  the	  welfare	  of	  domestic	  groups	  within	  a	  framework	  of	  national	  policy	  autonomy	  came	  under	  sustained	  pressure	  (Cox,	  1992:	  27-­‐28).	  	  A	  series	  of	  structural	  transformations	  within	  the	  global	  political	  economy,	  pertaining	  to	  the	  shift	  from	  Fordist	  to	  Post-­‐Fordist	  production,	  the	  increased	  reliance	  of	  governments	  and	   corporations	   upon	   debt	   and	   the	   intensified	   structural	   power	   of	   capital,	   collectively	  undermined	   the	   former	   conditions	   of	   national	   development.	   Alongside	   these	   structural	  transformations,	  Cox	  suggested	  that	  opinion	  formation	  had	  become	  increasingly	  centralised	  within	  an	  elite	  coterie	  of	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  BIS,	  G7,	  IMF,	  OECD,	  Bilderberg	  and	  Mont	  Pelerine	   society.	   	   Through	   these	   agencies,	   a	   consensual	   plan	   for	   the	  management	   of	   the	  global	   economy	  was	   established.	   The	   emergent	   policy	   consensus	   resulted	   in	   a	   structural	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‘internationalisation’	   of	   the	   state	   that	   occurred	   as	   part	   of	   a	   general	   reconfiguration	   of	  sovereignty	  within	  the	  global	  economy:	  	  ‘The	   state	   becomes	   a	   transmission	   belt	   from	   the	   global	   to	   the	   national	   economy,	   where	  heretofore	  it	  had	  acted	  as	  the	  bulwark	  defending	  domestic	  welfare	  from	  external	  disturbances’	  (Cox,	  1992:	  30).	  	  As	  the	  state	  is	  internationalised	  the	  hierarchy	  of	  power	  within	  it	  is	  also	  reconfigured,	  with	  those	  agencies	  most	  closely	  interconnected	  to	  the	  global	  economy,	  such	  as	  Treasuries,	  Central	   Banks	   and	   Prime	   Ministerial	   offices,	   accorded	   greater	   primacy	   while	   more	  domestically	  oriented	  institutions	  experience	  a	  related	  demotion.	  	  Although	   the	   Coxian	   conception	   captures	   important	   facets	   of	   state	   development	  under	  conditions	  of	  globalisation,	  the	  notion	  of	  the	  state	  as	  a	  ‘transmission	  belt’,	  relies	  upon	  an	  excessively	  formal	  delineation	  between	  the	  global	  and	  national	  economy	  (Panitch,	  1994:	  71).	  By	   focusing	   too	  much	  upon	   the	  decline	   of	  U.S.	   hegemony,	   it	   also	  underestimates	   the	  continuing	   role	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   driving	   processes	   of	   state	   internationalisation	   through	  cooperation	  with	   foreign	  Central	  Banks	  and	  Treasuries,	   and	   the	  particular	  ways	   in	  which	  American	   power	   was	   drawn	   into	   national	   development.	   Despite	   conditions	   of	   global	  economic	  crisis,	  American	  networked	  state	  power,	  drawing	  upon	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	   Fed	   and	   the	   Treasury	   during	   the	   attempts	   to	  maintain	   Bretton	  Woods	   in	   the	   1960s,	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  vital	  role	  during	  the	  1970s.	  This	  was	  not	  a	  case	  of	  the	  return	  to	  inter-­‐imperial	  rivalry,	  or	  American	  free-­‐market	  ideals	  against	  the	  interventionist	  preferences	  of	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Europe	  and	   Japan,	  but	   rather	   the	  continued	  and	  deepening	   integration	  of	  major	  capitalist	  states.	  The	  U.S.	  played	   the	   central	   role	   in	  maintaining	   the	   international	  dominance	  of	   the	  dollar	   during	   the	   1970s,	   by	   promoting	   a	   common	   purpose	   and	   direction	   among	   major	  capitalist	  states	  through	  forums	  such	  as	  the	  G7	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  134).	  Eric	  Helleiner’s	  portrayal	  (1994:	  101-­‐102)	  of	  the	  period	  in	  terms	  of	  American	  free-­‐market	   initiatives	   in	   opposition	   to	   West	   European	   and	   Japanese	   demands	   for	   capital	  controls	  overstates	   the	  degree	  of	  opposition	  and	  understates	   the	  high	   level	  of	   integration	  between	   states	   that	   had	   already	   occurred.	   In	   reality,	   the	   Americans	   recognised	   the	   deep	  interconnections	   of	   state	   and	   market	   power.	   Even	   the	   most	   avowed	   proponents	   of	  neoliberal	   ideology	   within	   the	   American	   administration,	   such	   as	   Treasury	   Secretary	   Bill	  Simon,	  understood	  the	  need	  for	  state	  intervention	  to	  underpin	  the	  globalisation	  of	  financial	  markets.	  Simon	  announced	  at	  the	  annual	  IMF	  meeting	  in	  Washington	  in	  1974	  that,	   ‘we	  do	  not	   believe	   in	   an	   attitude	   of	   laissez-­‐faire,	   come	   what	   may.	   If	   there	   is	   a	   clear	   need	   for	  additional	  lending	  mechanisms,	  the	  United	  States	  will	  support	  their	  establishment’	  (Panitch	  &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   146).	   Furthermore,	   Helleiner’s	   failure	   to	   examine	   the	   links	   between	  capitalist	   interests	  within	   different	   states,	   in	   preference	   for	   a	   focus	   on	   the	   role	   of	   states,	  leads	   him	   to	   underplay	   the	   level	   of	   capitalist	   integration	   and	   the	   degree	   of	   business	  opposition	  to	  capital	  controls	  within	  Europe	  and	  Japan	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  146).	  To	  read	  the	  international	  monetary	  politics	  of	  the	  1970s	  as	  a	  case	  of	  an	  increasingly	  neoliberal	  American	  administration	   foisting	   its	   ideas	  upon	  Western	  Europe	  and	   Japan,	   as	  Helleiner	   does,	   exaggerates	   the	   degree	   of	   ‘laissez-­‐faire’	   conviction	   within	   the	   U.S.	  administration	   and	   underplays	   the	   support	   for	   further	   liberalisation	   within	   Western	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European	  states.	  Indeed,	  Britain’s	  position	  was	  much	  more	  complex	  and	  contradictory.	  The	  City	   now	   hosted	   the	   Euromarkets	   and	   depended	   upon	   an	   open	   international	   financial	  system.	  Britain	  therefore	  had	  to	  balance	  between	  European	  initiatives	  for	  controls,	  within	  a	  context	   where	   Britain	   was	   keen	   to	   secure	   membership	   of	   the	   EEC	   under	   Ted	   Heath’s	  government,	  and	  the	  need	  to	  maintain	  freedom	  of	  financial	  flows	  as	  a	  precondition	  for	  the	  further	  growth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  and	  the	  City.	  Within	  West	  Germany,	  those	  who	  wanted	  temporary	   capital	   controls	   were	   actually	   some	   of	   the	  most	   conservative	   and	  monetarist	  figures	  and	  were	  very	  much	  opposed	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  146).	  Cox’s	  notion	  of	  the	  shift	  in	  the	  state’s	  role	  from	  a	  ‘bulwark’	  against	  the	  exigencies	  of	  the	  global	  economy,	  towards	  a	  ‘transmission	  belt’	  for	  them,	  is	  particularly	  inappropriate	  for	  understanding	   British	   development,	   while	   Helleiner’s	   inattentiveness	   to	   a	   specifically	  Anglo-­‐American	   field	   of	   capitalist	   development,	   grounded	   in	   the	   interdependence	   of	   the	  City	  and	  New	  York,	  leads	  to	  a	  failure	  to	  correctly	  identify	  Britain’s	  orientation	  towards	  the	  international	   monetary	   politics	   of	   the	   1970s.	   As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	  Britain’s	   hosting	   of	   the	  Euromarkets	   had	  drawn	  American	  power	   into	   the	   constitution	  of	  British	  capitalism	  and	  the	  accumulation	  strategy	  of	  banks	   in	  the	  City.	   In	  seeking	  to	  regain	  international	   pre-­‐eminence,	   the	   City	   opened	   itself	   up	   to	   transatlantic	   integration.	   	   Cox’s	  ‘outside-­‐in’	  approach	  to	  causality	  obscures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  ‘inside’	  had	  already	  been	  constituted	   through	   its	   external	   orientation	   to	   American	   power	   as	   part	   of	   an	   emergent	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  sphere	  centred	  upon	   the	   interactive	  relationship	  between	  the	   financial	   communities	   in	   London	   and	   New	   York.	   Instead,	   I	   argue	   in	   this	   chapter,	   we	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need	   to	   think	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   co-­‐constitutive	   and	   uneven	   interaction	   of	   national	   and	  international	   developmental	   force	   fields,	   emphasising	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   vector	   of	  capitalist	  development.	  American	  power	  exerted	  pressure	  upon	  Britain,	  but	  it	  was	  also	  very	  much	   a	   case	   of	   powerful	   class	   interests	  within	  Britain,	   particularly	   in	   the	   City,	   pulling	   in	  American	   discipline	   by	   voraciously	   attacking	   the	   foundations	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   consensus	  through	  the	  frequent	  pro-­‐monetarist	  salvos	  launched	  in	  the	  financial	  press.	  The	  1976	  IMF	  crisis	   exemplifies	   the	   problem	   of	   national	   development	   within	   the	   context	   of	   a	   global	  political	  economy	  dominated	  by	  American	  power.	  	  The	   outside-­‐in	   pattern	   of	   causality	   advanced	   by	   Cox	   and	   the	   prevailing	   either/or	  analytical	  binary	  associated	  with	  the	  debate	  over	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  state,	  have	  influenced	  interpretations	  of	  Britain’s	  1976	  IMF	  crisis.	  Andrew	  Baker	  critiques	  (1999:	  83)	  Cox’s,	   ‘vague,	   ambiguous	   and	   empirically	   deficient’	   understanding	   of	   the	  internationalisation	   of	   the	   state	   and	   argues	   that	   the	   demise	   of	   Keynesianism	   and	  within	  Britain	  should	  be	  understood	  not	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  climate	  of	  international	  opinion	  but	  rather	  in	   regard	   to	   ‘changes	   in	   the	   social	   basis	   of	   the	   state,	   national	   economic	   problems	   and	   a	  domestic	  climate	  of	   ideas	  and	  opinion	  that	  reflected	  this’.	   	  According	  to	  Baker	  (1999:	  83),	  the	  negotiations	  with	  the	  IMF	  had	  only	  a,	   ‘very	  limited	  role’	  in	  this	  transformation,	  merely	  accentuating	   the	   size	   of	   public	   spending	   cuts	   that	   were	   already	   underway	   without,	   ‘any	  lasting	  or	  profound	  effect	  on	  British	  policy’.	  Chris	  Rogers’	  analysis	  (2009:	  972)	  follows	  Baker’s	  privileging	  of	  the	  national	  level	  of	  determination,	   suggesting	   that	   the	   IMF’s	   intervention	   did	   not	   act	   as	   a	   catalyst	   for	   ‘social	  learning	  or	  disciplinary	  constraint’,	  but	  rather	  merely,	   ‘provided	  the	  government	  with	  the	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room	   for	   manoeuvre	   to	   implement	   its	   established	   preferences	   by	   altering	   perceptions	  about	   the	   range	   of	   policies	   effectively	   within	   its	   scope	   for	   discretionary	   action’.	   In	   this	  explanation	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	   IMF	   is	   understood	   to	   have	   had	   no	   significant	  consequences	  for	  the	  outcomes	  of	  Britain’s	  break	  with	  Keynesianism	  other	  than	  enabling	  a	  shrewd	  government	  to	  pass	  off	  their	  own	  political	  priorities	  of	  austerity	  as	  the	  dictates	  of	  an	  external	  agency.	  Rogers’s	  analysis	   is	  based	  on	  a	  crude	  severance	  of	   the	  conjuncture	  of	  1976	   from	   the	   broader	   historical	   context.	   By	   isolating	   the	   synchronic	   conditions	   of	   1976	  from	   the	   preceding	   diachronic	   developmental	   processes,	   Rogers	   unduly	   privileges	   the	  national	   level	   of	   determination	   and	   overstates	   British	   autonomy	  within	   the	   international	  system,	  while	  grossly	  understating	  the	  centrality	  of	  American	  power	  to	  the	  outcomes	  of	  the	  IMF	  negotiations.	  We	  see	  a	  similar	  concern	  to	  state	  the	  primacy	  of	  national	  determination	  in	  shaping	  the	  transition	  away	  from	  Keynesianism	  exhibited	  in	  Steve	  Ludlam’s	  account,	  which	  seeks	  to	  debunk	  myths	   about	   the	   IMF	   deal.	   Running	   through	   a	   list	   of	   policy	   outcomes	   that	   were	  supposedly	  resultant	  from	  the	  engagement	  with	  the	  IMF,	  such	  as	  enacting	  public	  spending	  cuts	  and	   introducing	  monetary	   targets,	  Ludlam	  argues	   (1992:	  715)	   that	   in	  each	  case,	   ‘the	  policy	  shift	  identified	  with	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  IMF	  preceded	  the	  settlement	  of	  December	  1976’.	  By	   focusing	  on	  the	  degree	   to	  which	  the	   intervention	  of	   the	   IMF	  and	  the	  Americans	  was	  responsible	   for	  the	  break	  from	  Keynesian	  policy	  priorities,	  accounts	  have	  overlooked	  the	   importance	   of	   disciplinary	   and	   supervisory	   processes	   and	   their	   centrality	   to	   the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  British	  state.	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Mark	   Harmon	   (2008:	   1-­‐2)	   provides	   a	   more	   nuanced	   account	   of	   the	   crisis,	   which	  delineates	   different	   phases	   during	   which	   the	   level	   of	   determination	   shifted	   from	   one	  determined	   primarily	   by	   national	   priorities	   (1974	   to	   early	   1975),	   to	   being	   shaped	   by	  international	  pressures	  and	  priorities	  (late	  1975	  to	  1976).	  Harmon’s	  analysis	  focuses	  upon	  the	   role	   of	   American	   ‘structural	   power’,	   but	   neglects	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   social	   forces	  within	  Britain,	  which	  were	  hostile	  to	  the	  Labour	  government	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  state,	  drew	  in	  American	  power.	  Overall,	  accounts	  of	  the	  crisis	  succumb	  to	  a	  politics	  of	  chronology	  that	  counterpoises	  an	  apparently	  pristine	  trajectory	  of	  ‘national’	  development	  and	  ‘national’	  priorities	  against	  the	  incursion	  of	  ‘international’	  pressures,	  represented	  by	  the	  IMF.	  In	  doing	  so	  they	  neglect	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Britain’s	  national	  priorities	  had	  been	  shaped	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system	  and	  the	  conditioning	  force	  field	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  in	  particular.	   The	   role	   of	   American	   disciplinary	   power	   as	   an	   active	   process	   central	   to	  reconstituting	   the	   British	   state	   has	   been	   understated.	   The	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury	   were	  already	  deeply	  embedded	  within	  the	  network	  connections	  that	  had	  been	  constructed	  by	  the	  American	  state	  during	   the	  attempts	   to	   forestall	   the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  during	   the	  1960s,	   and	   promote	   collective	   adjustment	   to	   financial	   globalisation	   during	   the	   1970s.	  Indeed,	  the	  Bank	  itself	  played	  a	  prominent	  role	  here	  in	  its	  role	  within	  the	  BIS	  and	  the	  Basle	  Committee.	  	  Through	   incursion	   into	   British	   sovereignty,	   the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   IMF	   were	   able	   to	  internationalise	  Britain’s	   policy	   objectives	   and	   render	   them	  amenable	   to	   the	   priorities	   of	  global	   capital.	   American	   state	   power	   was	   deployed	   in	   conjunction	   with	   private	   market	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power	  in	  order	  to	  steer	  Britain	  away	  from	  a	  radicalisation	  of	  social	  democracy	  and	  towards	  a	   neoliberal	   abandonment	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   consensus.	   Beginning	   from	  Britain’s	  mounting	  balance	   of	   payments	   problems	   during	   the	   latter	   1960s,	   we	   can	   clearly	   see	   the	   events	   of	  1976	  as	  the	  outcome	  of	  long	  term	  interaction	  between	  Britain,	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  U.S.	  in	  which	  the	  disciplinary	  pressure	  on	  Britain	  gradually	  rose	  until	  reaching	  a	  crescendo	  in	  1976.	  	  
	  
The	  death	  throes	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  	  The	  roots	  of	  the	  1976	  crisis	   lay	   in	  the	  persistent	  British	  balance	  of	  payments	  problems	  of	  the	  1960s,	  during	  which	  the	  Americans	  grew	  increasingly	  frustrated	  with	  British	  profligacy.	  Lyndon	  Johnson’s	  administration	  was	  exasperated	  by	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  Wilson	  government	  to	  arrest	  the	  decline	  of	  sterling	  and	  forestall	  market	  fears	  of	  devaluation.	  The	  acceleration	  of	  Britain’s	  balance	  of	  payments	  crisis	  during	  Wilson’s	  government	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  process	   that	   gradually	  drew	  Britain	   closer	   into	   the	  disciplinary	  orbit	   of	  American	  power.	  The	   head	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve,	   Bill	   Martin,	   took	   an	   increasingly	   firm	   stance	   towards	  Britain	   from	   1965,	   urging	   much	   sharper	   cuts	   to	   public	   spending	   in	   order	   to	   calm	   the	  markets	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  161).	  	  	  With	   Britain	   in	   dire	   need	   of	   funding	   to	   support	   sterling,	   Martin	   and	   Johnson	  appeared	  to	  have	  reached	  the	  end	  of	  their	  tether.	  Martin	  proposed	  that	  massive	  pressure	  be	  put	  on	  the	  British	  to	  introduce	  a	  much	  more	  comprehensive	  package	  of	  spending	  restraint,	  if	  that	  failed,	  sterling	  should	  be	  abandoned	  altogether,	  with	  the	  U.S.	   instead	  turning	  to	  the	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IMF	  to	  construct	  a	  package	  to	  protect	  the	  dollar.85	  Johnson,	  for	  his	  part,	  described	  Wilson	  as	  a	  ‘drunk	  and	  reckless	  boy’,	  writing	  checks	  on	  his	  father,	  but	  unable	  to	  honour	  them	  (Schenk,	  2010:	   162).	   The	   impression	   of	   a	   fiscally	   incontinent	   Labour	   government	   was	   becoming	  deeply	  entrenched.	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Fowler	  did,	  however,	  temper	  Martin	  and	  Johnson’s	  plans.	  Fowler	  knew	  that	   the	  actual	   costs	  of	  abandoning	  sterling	  would	  be	  very	  high,	  with	  the	   resultant	   termination	   of	   Bretton	  Woods.	   Instead,	   it	   made	  more	   sense	   for	   the	   U.S.	   to	  continue	  to	  contribute	  to	  multilateral	  support	  for	  Britain.	  The	   negotiations	   from	   1965	   exhibited	   important	   precursors	   to	   the	   austerity	  measures	  imposed	  in	  1976,	  with	  conditions	  stipulated	  on	  action	  over	  wage	  restraint,	  prices	  and	  government	  expenditure	  (Capie,	  2010:	  207).86	  	  During	  this	  period,	  sterling’s	  weakness	  exposed	   Britain	   to	   the	   American	   plan	   for	   rebalancing	   the	   international	   economy.	   The	  American	  vision	  emphasised	  restrictive	  monetary	  policy	  and	  credit	  control	  rather	  than	  the	  industrial	  policy	  favoured	  by	  the	  Labour	  government	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  190).	  During	   the	   1960s	   Britain	   held	   the	   bargaining	   power	   of	   a	   key	   currency	   country	  central	   to	  maintaining	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order.	  That	  power	  enabled	  Britain	   to	  resist	   the	  implementation	  of	  American	  austerity	  measures	  during	  negotiations	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  204).	  But	  this	  power	  was	  diminished	  under	  the	  system	  of	  floating	  rates	  that	  followed	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  The	  consequences	  of	  this	  were	  significant	  for	  1976.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  Writing	   to	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   Governor,	   Lord	   Cromer,	   in	   1965,	  Martin	   stressed	   the	   need	   for	  dramatic	  measures	  to	  restore	  market	  confidence	  in	  sterling	  and	  suggested	  that	  “a	  wages	  and	  prices	  freeze	  would	  probably	  do	  this”	  (Capie,	  2012:	  214).	  86	  The	  Martin-­‐Cromer	  plan	  is	  an	  important	  example	  of	  these	  creeping	  austerity	  demands.	  The	  plan	  was	   created	   by	   Bill	  Martin	   and	   involved	   the	   employment	   of	   a	   syndicate	   of	   countries	  who	  would	  support	   the	   sterling	  exchange	   rate	   through	   concerted	  market	   intervention.	  But	   in	  order	   to	   access	  the	  support,	  the	  British	  government	  would	  have	  to	  agree	  to	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  wage,	  price	  and	  dividend	  freeze	  in	  order	  to	  boost	  market	  confidence	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  165).	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Already	  during	  the	  1960s,	  then,	  many	  of	  the	  patterns	  of	  the	  1970s	  negotiations	  were	  discernible.	  As	  they	  would	  be	  in	  1976,	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  notably	  more	  receptive	  to	  IMF	  calls	  for	  austerity	  than	  the	  British	  government.	  As	  Britain	  drew	  upon	  the	  IMF	  again	  and	  again	  during	  the	  1960s,	  the	  surveillance	  and	  conditionality	  attached	  grew	  incrementally,	  with	  a	  particular	  focus	  upon	  the	  imposition	  of	  monetary	  and	  fiscal	  restraint	  through	   the	  use	  of	  quantitative	   targets.	  These	   conditions,	  despite	   their	   limited	  efficacy	   in	  practice,	   represented	   an	   important	   departure	   from	  Britain’s	   traditional	   dealings	  with	   the	  Fund.	   Britain	  was	  the	  heaviest	  drawer	  on	  the	  Fund’s	  resources	  during	  the	  first	  25	  years	  of	  the	  IMF’s	  life.	  As	  a	  powerful	  key	  currency	  country,	  Britain	  was	  able	  to	  make	  drawings	  with	  scant	   oversight	   or	   conditionality.	   Britain’s	   heavy	   and	   regular	   use	   of	   IMF	   funding	   began	  before	   the	   conditionality	   principles	   of	   the	   Fund’s	   lending	   were	   firmly	   established.	  Discussions	   over	   the	   conditionality	   of	   IMF	   lending	   had	   been	   an	   important	   aspect	   of	   the	  post-­‐war	  Anglo-­‐American	  discussions	  on	   international	  monetary	  politics.	  Whereas	  Britain	  had	  wanted	  IMF	  funding	  to	  be	  delivered	  without	  insistence	  upon	  deflationary	  measures,	  the	  Americans	  were	   keen	   on	   deflationary	   stipulations.	   American	   proposals	   for	   amending	   the	  IMF	  Articles	  of	  Agreement,	  to	  include	  a	  statement	  that	  balance	  of	  payments	  financing	  was	  not	   an	   unqualified	   right,	   were	   initially	   resisted	   by	   the	   other	  members.	   But	   by	   1950,	   the	  Americans	   had	   successfully	   campaigned	   for	   the	   acceptance	   of	   a	   conditionality	   principle	  linked	  to	  IMF	  funding.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  that	  decade,	  the	  major	  elements	  of	  conditionality	  were	  in	   place,	   but	   the	   conditions	   tended	   to	   be	   used	   only	   in	   negotiations	   with	   developing	  countries	  (Harmon,	  1997:	  21-­‐27).	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Conditionality	  emerged,	  then,	  as	  a	  consequence	  of	  American	  power	  and	  the	  desire	  to	  use	  the	  Fund	  as	  a	  source	  of	  disciplinary	  control	  over	  countries	  facing	  balance	  of	  payments	  difficulties.	  The	  IMF	  existed	  only	  in	  a	  relationship	  of	  limited	  independence	  from	  American	  power.	  	  The	  U.S.	  was	  the	  largest	  single	  contributor	  of	  funds	  to	  the	  IMF	  and	  it	  also	  wielded	  an	  exclusive	   veto	   vote	   over	   Fund	   policies.	   Added	   to	   this,	   the	   Fund’s	   basis	   in	   Washington	  ensured	   a	   spatial	   and	   symbolic	   proximity	   to	   the	   power	   and	   priorities	   of	   the	   U.S.	   (Burk,	  1994:	   354).	   From	   the	   mid-­‐1960s,	   Britain	   was	   drawn	   progressively	   deeper	   into	   this	  disciplinary	  trap,	  having	  to	  accept	  an	  ever-­‐higher	  degree	  of	  conditionality	  and	  surveillance	  as	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	  for	  the	  support	  of	  sterling.	  Tense	  Anglo-­‐American	  negotiations	  and	  the	  increasing	  British	  dependence	  upon	  IMF	  funding	  were	  precursors	   the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  during	   the	  early	  1970s.	  Once	   the	  pound	   had	   been	   devalued	   in	   November	   1967,	   speculative	   pressure	   turned	   almost	  immediately	  towards	  the	  dollar	  (Block,	  1977:	  193).	  Britain	  and	  America	  were	  now,	  for	  very	  different	  reasons,	  centre	  stage	  during	  a	  defining	  period	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  globalisation.	  The	  dollar	  came	  under	  renewed	  strain	  between	  1970	  and	  1971.	  On	  coming	  into	  office	  Nixon	  had	  sought	  to	  curb	  inflation,	  which	  had	  risen	  steadily	  during	  the	  1960s,	  by	  raising	  interest	  rates,	  with	  the	  federal	  funds	  rate	  hitting	  9%.	  However,	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  rate	  rise	  created	  instability	  within	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  system,	  provoking	  a	  crisis	  within	  the	  commercial	  paper	  market	  and	  leading	   to	   the	   insolvency	   of	   Penn	   Central,	   one	   of	   the	   largest	   corporations	   in	   the	   U.S.	   In	  response,	   the	   Nixon	   Administration	   began	   to	   reduce	   interest	   rates	   and	   suspended	  regulation	  Q	   ceilings	   in	   order	   to	   boost	   liquidity	   for	   the	   banking	   system	   (Kane,	   1983:	   51;	  Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  138-­‐139).	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Nixon’s	   administration	   were	   forced	   to	   pull	   back	   from	   their	   efforts	   to	   choke	   off	  inflation,	  but	   the	  Fed’s	  behaviour	  here	   foreshadowed	   the	  more	  sustained	  effort	   to	   reduce	  inflation	  under	  the	  stewardship	  of	  Paul	  Volcker.	  The	  Fed’s	  U-­‐turn	  in	  1970	  demonstrated	  the	  impact	  of	  financial	  market	  developments,	  which	  had	  been	  sponsored	  by	  Central	  Banks,	  on	  restricting	   the	   scope	   for	   Central	   Bank	   action.	   With	   more	   and	   more	   businesses	   now	  entangled	   in	  expanding	   financial	  markets,	   tight	  money	   threatened	   to	   spark	  off	   a	   financial	  crisis.	  The	  Fed	  was	  forced	  to	  negate	  its	  efforts	  to	  control	  inflation,	  by	  prioritising	  its	  lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	  and	  pumping	  liquidity	  into	  the	  markets.	  As	  financial	  globalisation	  accelerated,	  the	  Fed’s	  crisis	  management	  role	  would	  become	  increasingly	  important	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	   138-­‐139).	  More	   immediately,	   the	   Fed’s	  measures	   had	   a	  major	   effect	   on	  Eurodollar	  flows	  as	  American	  banks	  became	  less	  dependent	  upon	  Eurodollar	  borrowing	  and	  began	  to	  unwind	  their	  Eurodollar	  positions.	  The	  availability	  of	  low	  cost	  funds	  led	  to	  large	  European	  capital	   inflows,	  which	  contributed	   to	  crises	  of	   the	  deutsche	  mark	  and	   the	  dollar	   (Strange,	  1972:	   198;	   Block,	   1977:	   197).	   The	   failure	   to	   arrest	   the	   dollar’s	   travails	   through	   the	  imposition	  of	  tight	  money	  at	  home	  also	  ensured	  that	  other	  solutions	  would	  have	  to	  be	  found	  in	  response	  to	  the	  problems	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  	  This	   period	   of	   instability	   in	   the	   money	   markets	   had	   major	   consequences	   for	   the	  international	   monetary	   system.	   	   In	   response,	   West	   European	   and	   Japanese	   monetary	  authorities	   began	   to	   push	   for	   cooperative	   capital	   controls	   and	   the	   regulation	   of	   the	  Euromarkets.	   The	   trend	   towards	   financial	   liberalisation	   was	   now	   under	   scrutiny	   from	  countries	   increasingly	   dissatisfied	   with	   monetary	   instability	   (Helleiner,	   1994:	   101-­‐105).	  But	  this	  was	  not,	  as	  Helleiner	  erroneously	  suggests	  (1994:	  116-­‐117),	  a	  case	  of	  a	   fervently	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neoliberal	  U.S.	  administration	  bent	  on	  pushing	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  towards	  further	  liberalisation.	   	  Nixon’s	  approach	  to	  Bretton	  Woods	  was	  much	  more	  pragmatic	  and	  was	  guided,	  above	  all,	  not	  by	  ideological	  commitments	  to	  monetarism	  but	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  preserve	   American	   national	   policy	   autonomy	   precisely	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   the	   domestic	  imposition	   of	   monetarist	   precepts	   favouring	   domestic	   deflation	   and	   increased	  unemployment.	   This	   was	   a	   long	   way	   from	   the	   genuinely	   neoliberal	   principles	   that	   were	  later	  enacted	  by	  Paul	  Volcker	  and	  Ronald	  Reagan.	  Indeed,	  for	  much	  of	  the	  1970s,	  American	  monetarists	  did	  not	  enjoy	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  power	  or	   influence	  (Johnson,	  1998:	  145).	  When	  the	  American’s	  did	  finally	  delink	  from	  gold	  unilaterally,	  it	  was	  only	  after	  they	  felt	  that	  they	  had	  exhausted	  all	  multilateral	  options	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  79).	  In	  his	  attempt	  to	  clearly	  delineate	  an,	   ‘us	  and	  them’	  schism	  between	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  one	   side,	   and	   Western	   Europe	   and	   Japan,	   on	   the	   other,	   Helleiner	   overlooks	   Britain’s	  contradictory	   position	   on	   the	   issue	   of	   capital	   controls.	   British	   authorities	   shared	   the	  broader	  West	  European	  commitment	  to	  the	  maintaining	  the	  system	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates,	  but	  they	  were	  very	  hesitant	  to	  countenance	  any	  restrictive	  measures	  that	  might	  imperil	  the	  future	   of	   the	   Euromarkets.	   In	   defending	   the	   Euromarkets,	   British	   authorities	   were	  protecting	   the	   major	   channel	   through	   which	   disruptive	   capital	   flows	   could	   occur,	  imperilling	   the	   system	   of	   fixed	   exchange	   rates	   in	   the	   process.	   Throughout	   1971,	   British	  Treasury	  officials	  closely	  monitored	  the	  emerging	  position	  of	  the	  international	  community	  with	  regard	  to	   the	  Euromarkets,	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to	   the	   increasingly	   important	  bilateral	   discussions	   between	   the	   U.S.	   and	   West	   Germany	   (National	   Archives,	   1971:	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T312/3106).87	  The	   pressure	   over	   the	   Euromarkets’	   apparent	   culpability	   for	   international	  financial	   instability	  grew	  to	  such	  a	  degree	  that	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  felt	   it	  necessary	  to	  dedicate	  his	  speech	  to	  the	  Bankers’	  Club	  of	  Chicago	  to	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  role	  of	  the	   Euromarkets	   and	   a	   cautioning	   against	   measure	   to	   regulate	   Euromarket	   activity	  (National	  Archives,	  1971:	  T312/3106).88	  	  In	   a	   testament	   to	   just	   how	   important	   the	   Euromarkets	   had	   become	   for	   Britain’s	  international	  economic	  policy,	  the	  concern	  for	  their	  defence	  from	  regulatory	  encroachment	  was	  articulated	  at	  the	  highest	  level	  of	  British	  government.	  Briefing	  Prime	  Minister	  Edward	  Heath	  for	  his	  meeting	  with	  the	  French	  President	  Pompidou,	  Treasury	  officials	  stressed	  that	  although	   the	   British	   preference	   was	   for	   the	   maintenance	   of	   the	   Bretton	   Woods	   system,	  Heath	   should	   be,	   ‘defensive	   if	   Pompidou	   complains	   of	   the	   Euro-­‐dollar	   market	   as	   an	  amplifier	   of	   the	   US	   deficit’.	   Although	   Britain	   should	   express	   support	   for	   international	  discussions	  over	  ways	  and	  means	  to	  curb	  excessive	  Eurodollar	  flows,	  which	  were	  underway	  through	   the	   BIS,	   OECD	   and	   EEC,	  Heath	  was	   instructed	   to	  make	   clear	   that	   the	   Eurodollar	  market	  was	  not	  the	  source	  of	  the	  trouble	  (National	  Archives,	  1971:	  T312/3106).89	  	  The	   Americans,	   for	   their	   part,	   attempted	   to	   muddle	   through	   the	   international	  monetary	   discussions	   of	   the	   early	   1970s.	   The	   Nixon	   administration	   prioritised	   national	  autonomy	   above	   the	  maintenance	   of	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   regime.	   They	  were	   unwilling	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  87	  Treasury	   File	   National	   Archives	   T312/3106	   ‘U.S.A	   Balance	   of	   Payments	   Deficit	   and	   Eurodollar	  Outflow	  5/4/71-­‐	  3/72’,	  Address	  by	  Leslie	  O’Brien,	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  to	  the	  Bankers’	  Club	  of	  Chicago,	  April	  27th	  1971.	  88	  Address	  by	  Leslie	  O’Brien,	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	  to	  the	  Bankers’	  Club	  of	  Chicago,	  April	  27th	  1971.	  89	  Passage	  to	  be	  inserted	  for	  Treasury	  brief	  for	  Prime	  Minister’s	  meeting	  with	  President	  Pompidou	  of	  France,	  May	  14th	  1971.	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countenance	   the	   sort	   of	   subordination	   of	   domestic	   economic	   priorities	   to	   international	  imperatives	   that	  had	   led	  Britain	   into	   the	  disastrous	  stop-­‐go	  cycle	   in	  an	  effort	   to	  maintain	  the	  value	  of	  the	  pound.	  Ultimately,	  the	  rules	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  were	  viewed	  as	  a	  potential	  limitation	  to	  the	  management	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  Within	  the	  calculations	  of	  the	  U.S.	  policy	  elite,	  Bretton	  Woods	  would	  only	  be	  maintained	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  impinge	  upon	  America’s	  capacity	  to	  set	  domestic	  economic	  policy	  and	  foreign	  policy	  autonomously	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  13-­‐22).	   Nixon’s	  administration	  was	  unwilling	  to	  endorse	  international	  monetary	  reform	  and	  held	   a	   principled	   opposition	   to	   the	   extension	   of	   capital	   controls.90But	   despite	   these	  convictions,	   they	  adopted	  a	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  policy,	  maintaining	  the	  existing	  capital	  controls	   into	   the	   early	   1970s	   and	   implementing	   wage	   and	   price	   controls	   as	   part	   of	   the	  package	   that	   delinked	   the	   dollar	   from	   gold	   in	   august	   1971.	   These	   policies	  were	   far	   from	  neoliberal,	  instead	  they	  reflected	  the	  acknowledgement,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  disastrous	  attempt	  at	  hiking	  interest	  rates,	  that	  monetary	  policy	  couldn’t	  yet	  work	  to	  stem	  inflation	  in	  the	  way	  that	  monetarists	  hoped	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  141).	  	  During	  the	  Nixon	  administration,	  the	  power	  to	  shape	  international	  monetary	  politics	  rested	   overwhelmingly	   with	   the	   Treasury	   and	   in	   the	   committee	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Volcker	  Group’	  after	  its	  chairman	  Paul	  Volcker,	  the	  Undersecretary	  of	  Treasury	  for	  monetary	  affairs	  who,	   ‘for	   all	   practical	   purposes	   was	   Treasury’.91	  The	   Volcker	   Group	   was	   united	   in	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90 	  The	   opposition	   was	   partly	   a	   response	   to	   those	   who	   complained	   that	   capital	   controls	  disproportionately	  affected	  small	  banks	  and	  corporations	  that	  could	  not	  operate	  in	  the	  Euromarkets	  with	  the	  ease	  of	  their	  larger	  competitors	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  84).	  91	  The	  Federal	  Reserve	  Board	  were	  not	  heavily	   involved	  in	  the	  planning	  of	  the	  Volcker	  Group.	  The	  New	  York	  branch	  of	  the	  Fed,	  known	  as	  a	  staunch	  defender	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  that	  was	  more	  likely	  to	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commitment	   to	   prioritise	   national	   interests	   over	   the	  wider	   interests	   of	   the	   international	  system.	  In	  policy	  terms,	  their	  consensus	  ensured	  that	  devaluation,	  deflation	  and	  constraints	  upon	   American	   foreign	   policy	   (all	   measures	   that	   might	   have	   prolonged	   Bretton	  Woods)	  were	  foreclosed	  as	  potential	  options	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  62-­‐99).	  Mirroring	  its	  centrality	  in	  the	  construction	  of	  Bretton	  Woods,	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  was	  now	  central	  to	  its	  dismantling.	  But	  this	  was	  not	  part	  of	  a	  conscious	  design	  of	  grand	  strategy.	  It	   was,	   in	   fact,	   a	   ‘tentative	   and	   uncertain’,	   decision	   to	   break	   the	   dollar’s	   link	   with	   gold	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  130).	  The	  Nixon	  Administration	  closed	  the	  gold	  window	  over	  the	  weekend	  of	  August	   13th	   1971,	   imposing	   a	  10%	   import	   surcharge	  onto	  other	   countries	   in	  order	   to	   push	   them	   towards	   a	   revaluation	   of	   their	   currencies	   and	   saving	   the	   U.S.	   the	  humiliation	  of	  having	  to	  devalue	  the	  dollar	  (Eichengreen,	  2008:	  131).	  As	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	  for	  the	   currency	   realignments,	   the	  Western	   Europeans	   did	  manage	   to	   secure	   a	   commitment	  from	  the	  U.S.	  to	  retain	  its	  controls	  on	  capital	  exports	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  104).	  	  But	   that	   commitment	   was	   to	   be	   short	   lived.	   The	   U.S.	   wanted	   to	   make	   sure	   that	  despite	   the	   ending	   of	   Bretton	  Woods,	   American	   deficits	   could	   still	   be	   covered	   by	   foreign	  capital	   inflows	  while	   the	   private	   outflows	   of	   American	   investors	  would	   continue	   to	   have	  access	  to	  foreign	  capital	  markets.	  The	  retreat	  from	  Bretton	  Woods	  could	  not	  mean	  a	  retreat	  from	   the	   openness	   of	   international	   financial	   markets	   upon	   which	   American	   economic	  strategy	  so	  depended	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  130-­‐131).	  By	  1974,	  the	  U.S.	  would	  announce	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  gear	   domestic	   policy	   towards	   balance	   of	   payments	   concerns,	  was	   excluded	   from	   the	  negotiations	  and	  was	  more	  generally	  maligned	  within	   the	  Nixon	  Administration	  due	   to	   its	   support	   for	  Bretton	  Woods	  (Gowa,	  1983:	  112-­‐113).	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that	  the	  program	  of	  capital	  controls	  in	  place	  since	  the	  1960s	  would	  be	  abolished,	  reversing	  the	  commitments	  made	  at	  the	  Smithsonian	  agreement	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  110)	  In	   effect,	   the	   U.S.	   had,	   reluctantly	   and	   after	   what	   it	   felt	   was	   the	   exhaustion	   of	  multilateral	   solutions,	   pushed	  other	   states	   onto	   a	  dollar	   standard	  by	  breaking	   the	   link	   to	  gold.	  They	  had	   then	   encouraged	   the	  major	   capitalist	   states	   to	   accept	  new	  exchange	   rates	  with	   the	   Smithsonian	   Agreement	   of	   December	   1971.	   Although	   the	   West	   Europeans	   and	  Japanese	  were	  reluctant	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  system	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates,	  there	  was	  a	  widespread	   recognition	   that	   maintaining	   fixed	   rates	   was	   simply	   too	   difficult	   within	   a	  context	   of	   liberalised	   financial	   markets	   and	   speculative	   capital	   flows.	   Furthermore,	   the	  adoption	  of	  permanent	  and	  rigid	  exchange	  controls	  was	  never	  given	  serious	  consideration,	  and	   by	   1973,	   controls	  were	   only	   countenanced	   on	   a	   temporary	   basis	   and	   for	   balance	   of	  payments	  purposes	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  145-­‐146).	  	  Instead	  of	  actively	  addressing	  the	  U.S.	  payments	  deficit,	  as	  had	  been	  unsuccessfully	  attempted	  during	  the	  previous	  decade,	  the	  Americans	  now	  adopted	  a	  more	  passive	  strategy	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods;	  pushing	  for	  a	  realignment	  of	  exchange	  rates	  from	   other	   countries	   that	   was	   intended	   to	   boost	   U.S.	   competitiveness	   in	   foreign	   trade	  (Block,	   1977:	   198).	   This	   new	   strategy	   was	   born	   out	   of	   a	   growing	   awareness	   of	   the	  spectacular	  structural	  power	  of	  the	  U.S.	   	  The	  construction	  of	  a	  dollar	  standard,	  untethered	  from	   the	   obligation	   to	   honour	   convertibility	   to	   gold,	   gave	   the	   Americans	   unprecedented	  power	  to	  shape	  the	  flow	  of	  world	  credit	  by	  controlling	  the	  supply	  and	  availability	  of	  dollars	  (Strange,	  1987:	  586-­‐589).	  	  Within	  a	  liberal	  international	  system,	  U.S.	  policy	  autonomy	  could	  be	  maintained	  despite	  growing	  internal	  and	  external	  deficits.	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The	  breakdown	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  consensus	  	  
	  Britain	  suffered	  under	   the	  new	   international	   financial	  order	   that	  gradually	  emerged	   from	  the	  ruins	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	  This	  was	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  world	  recession	  experienced	  from	  1970-­‐71	   as	   governments	   sought	   to	   contain	   rising	   inflation	   by	   implementing	   austerity	  measures	  and	  tight	  monetary	  policy.	  That	  recession	  was	  the	  precursor	  to	  nearly	  a	  decade	  of	  international	  economic	  instability	  and	  rising	  class	  conflict	  as	  workers	  took	  to	  the	  streets	  in	  order	  to	  defend	  their	  living	  standards	  in	  the	  face	  of	  rapidly	  rising	  inflation	  and	  low	  growth	  (Glyn	   &	   Harrison,	   1980:	   1).	   By	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   decade,	   Britain	   lagged	   behind	   other	  advanced	  industrialised	  capitalist	  states,	  with	  industrial	  productivity	  only	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  U.S.	   level	  and	  roughly	  two-­‐thirds	  of	  the	  French	  and	  West	  German	  levels	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  36).	  The	  long-­‐term	  post-­‐war	  decline	  of	  British	  capitalism,	  particularly	  with	  regard	  to	  industrial	  production,	  was	  coming	  to	  a	  head	  by	  the	  1970s	  as	   the	  golden	  age	  of	  capitalism	  underpinned	  by	  Bretton	  Woods	  gradually	  expired.	  	  Britain’s	  plight	  during	  the	  early	  1970s	  was	  not,	  however,	  purely	  a	  consequence	  of	  an	  increasingly	  challenging	  capitalist	  world	  market.	   It	  was	  also	  a	  direct	   result	  of	   the	  policies	  enacted	  by	  the	  Conservative	  government	  of	  Edward	  Heath.	  Heath’s	  government	  enacted	  a	  radical	  market-­‐centred	  policy	  of	   revitalisation	   for	  British	   capitalism	   in	  anticipation	  of	   the	  full-­‐blooded	   monetarist	   programme	   that	   Thatcher	   would	   implement	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	  decade.	  Heath’s	  government	  gave	  a	  new	  priority	   to	   the	   fight	  against	   inflation	  and	  viewed	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the	  disciplining	  impact	  of	  market	  forces,	  rather	  than	  an	  interventionist	  industrial	  strategy,	  as	  the	  best	  route	  to	  more	  competitive	  capitalism	  (Clarke,	  1987:	  406).	  	  	  A	   cornerstone	   of	   the	   Heath	   government’s	   strategy	   to	   combat	   inflation	   was	   the	  implementation	  of	   restrictive	   trade	  union	   legislation	   through	   the	   Industrial	  Relations	  Act.	  Heath’s	  policies	  set	  the	  tone	  for	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  distributional	  struggles	  of	  the	  1970s,	  between	   capital	   and	   labour	   in	   the	   context	   of	   low	   growth	   and	   high	   inflation,	   would	  repeatedly	   be	   conducted	   through	   state	   policies	   that	   sought	   to	   impose	   the	   costs	   of	   the	  economic	  difficulties	  upon	  the	  living	  standards	  of	  British	  workers.	  Alongside	  the	  restrictive	  policy	  on	  the	  unions,	  the	  Heath	  government	  attempted	  to	  rationalise	  British	  capitalism	  by	  allowing	  bankruptcies	   for	  uncompetitive	   industries,	  cherry	  picking	  efficient	  sectors	  of	   the	  nationalised	  industries	  to	  be	  handed	  over	  to	  private	  control	  and	  pushing	  membership	  of	  the	  EEC	  as	  a	  means	  to	  subject	  British	  firms	  to	  the	  panacea	  of	  European	  competition.	  	  The	   impact	  of	   these	  policies	  was	  an	  unqualified	  disaster.	  The	   restrictive	   strategies	  that	  comprised	  the	   first	  phase	  of	   the	  Heath	  government	   ‘ran	   into	  severe	  difficulties	  on	  all	  fronts’.	   The	   rationalisation	   measures	   did	   not	   restore	   competitiveness	   but	   did	   provoke	   a	  period	   of	   economic	   stagnation.	   Heath’s	   anti-­‐union	   measures	   were	   even	   less	   effective.	  Rather	   than	   demoralising	   and	   debilitating	   the	   labour	   movement,	   Heath’s	   new	   Industrial	  Relations	   Act	   galvanised	   union	   solidarity	   and	   sparked	   a	  wave	   of	   political	   strikes.	   Soured	  relations	  with	  the	  union	  movement	  eventually	  led	  to	  the	  downfall	  of	  the	  Heath	  government	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  57-­‐68).	  Perhaps	  the	  most	  disastrous	  innovation	  of	  all	  under	  the	  Heath	  government	  however,	  came	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  In	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  Tories	  longstanding	  role	  as	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champions	  of	  financial	  power	  in	  Britain,	  which	  had	  begun	  its	  post-­‐war	  incarnation	  with	  the	  City’s	  re-­‐launch	  as	  an	  international	  financial	  centre	  under	  the	  Conservative	  governments	  of	  the	   1950s,	   the	   Heath	   government	   sought	   to	   unshackle	   British	   banks	   from	   restrictive	  constraints	  on	  lending	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  ‘Competition,	  Credit	  and	  Control’	  (CCC).	  The	   introduction	   of	   this	   policy	   framework	   came	   as	   a	   direct	   response	   to	   the	   changing	  landscape	   of	   international	   banking	   and	   finance	   of	   which	   the	   development	   of	   the	  Euromarkets	   in	   the	   City	   had	   been	   by	   far	   the	   greatest	   catalyst.	   Anglo-­‐American	  
developmental	  dynamics	  that	  had	  been	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Euromarkets’	  emergence	  were	  now	  
feeding	   back	   into	   the	   disintegration	   of	   traditional	  monetary	   policy	   and	   the	   construction	   of	  
new	  regimes	  of	  monetary	  control,	  inspired	  by	  the	  intellectual	  ascendancy	  of	  monetarism,	  that	  
began	  its	  first	  phase	  in	  1971	  but	  reached	  full	  maturity	  under	  Margaret	  Thatcher.	  	  In	   response	   to	   the	   intensification	   of	   international	   competition	   in	   banking	   brought	  about	  by	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Euromarkets,	  British	  Clearing	  banks	  pushed	  for	  the	  unravelling	  of	  quantitative	  restrictions	  over	  their	  lending	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  with	  their	  better-­‐capitalised	  international	   rivals.	   During	   the	   1960s,	   the	   London	   clearing	   banks	   had	   been	   specifically	  targeted	   for	   the	   adoption	   of	   interest	   rate	   limits	   and	   portfolio	   controls.	   They	   were	   also	  subject	   to	   a	   ‘Special	   Deposits’	   scheme	  whereby	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   could	   call	   in	   special	  deposits	  to	  be	  frozen	  as	  part	  of	  efforts	  to	  control	  the	  flow	  of	  credit	  through	  administrative	  decree.	   These	   restrictions	   hampered	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   clearers	   to	   compete	   with	  international	   banks	   and	   the	   new	  building	   societies.92	  As	   the	  market	   share	   of	   the	   clearers	  contracted,	   the	   efficacy	   of	   a	   monetary	   policy	   framework	   based	   upon	   regulating	   their	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  92	  Accepting	   houses,	   international	   banks	   and	   non-­‐clearing	   institutions	   such	   as	   secondary	   banks	  benefited	  differentially	  from	  this	  policy	  framework.	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intermediation	  decreased	  accordingly	  (Artis	  &	  Lewis,	  1981:	  1-­‐6).	  	  Lending	  ceilings	  had	  been	  removed	  in	  April	  1967	  but	  were	  reinstated	  around	  the	  time	  of	  devaluation,	  in	  a	  move	  that	  was	   met	   by	   a	   furious	   response	   from	   the	   clearers.	   Ceilings	   had,	   in	   any	   case,	   become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  enforce	  given	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  development	  of	  offshore	  had	  punctured	  the	  national	  regulatory	  system.	  CCC	  arose	  out	  of	  a	  growing	  dissatisfaction	  with	  controls	  over	  lending	  and	  a	  concern	  within	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  that	  British	  banking	  needed	   to	   be	   made	   more	   competitive	   (Capie,	   2010:	   427-­‐437).	   The	   transformations	  associated	  with	  the	  globalisation	  of	  banking,	  hosted	  in	  the	  City,	  were	  rapidly	  corroding	  the	  foundations	  of	  British	  monetary	  policy.	  CCC	  sought	  to	  transform	  monetary	  policy	  by	  removing	  quantitative	  restrictions	  upon	  bank	   advances	   and	   abolishing	   the	   cartel	   arrangements	   that	   controlled	   clearing	   bank	  interest	  rates.	  Where	  controls	  did	  remain,	  they	  were	  either	  reduced	  or	  extended	  universally	  to	   level	   the	   playing	   field.	   Crucially,	   the	   new	   policy	   hinged	   upon	   a	   commitment	   to	   the	  primacy	  of	  competition	  and	  market	  forces	  as	  the	  means	  to	  achieve	  credit	  control	  objectives.	  Under	   the	   new	   policy,	   monetary	   aggregates	   were	   attributed	   greater	   significance	   than	  before,	  with	  their	  rate	  of	  growth	  now	  controlled	  through	  the	  market	  mechanism	  of	  interest	  rates,	   influenced	  by	  the	  Bank’s	  open	  market	  operations	  (Artis	  &	  Lewis,	  1981:	  7-­‐8;	  Moran,	  1986:	  30;	  Capie,	  2010:	  500-­‐507).	  The	  focus	  that	  CCC	  attributed	  to	  monetary	  aggregates	  was	  evidence	  of	  the	  creeping	  advancement	  of	  monetarist	   ideas	  within	  the	  British	  state.	  The	  rise	  of	  monetarism	  was	  the	  key	  policy	   strut	   of	   the	   fight	   against	   inflation	   that	   gathered	  momentum	  during	   the	  1970s.	  Intellectually,	  it	  was	  rooted	  in	  a	  conviction	  in	  the	  quantity	  theory	  of	  money,	  while	  in	  policy	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terms	  it	  was	  centred	  upon	  a	  preoccupation	  with	  control	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  as	  the	  surest	  means	  to	  contain	  inflation	  and	  promote	  orderly	  growth.	  But	  the	  more	  general	  significance	  of	  monetarism	  lay	  in	  its	  vehement	  opposition	  to	  state	  intervention,	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  need	  to	  subordinate	  political	  choice	  to	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  market	  (Clarke,	  1987:	  393).	  	  	  Monetarist	   ideas	   in	  Britain	  had	  hitherto	   largely	  been	  confined	  to	  an	  ostracised	  and	  marginal	  group	  of	  academic	  economists.	  But	  the	  rise	  of	  monetarism	  within	  Britain	  from	  the	  late	  1960s	  had	  much	  to	  do	  both	  with	  rising	  inflation	  and	  a	  growing	  transatlantic	  intellectual	  synthesis.	  The	  interrelated	  decomposition	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  nation	  state	  underpinning	  it	  opened	  spaces	  for	  an	  epistemic	  shift	  in	  economic	  thought,	  with	  monetarist	  thinkers	   waging	   war	   against	   Keynesian	   orthodoxy.	   	   Milton	   Friedman	   and	   the	   Chicago	  School	   of	   economists	   led	   the	   attacks	   against	   Keynesianism.93	  Friedman’s	   1963	   book,	   ‘A	  
Monetary	   History	   of	   the	   United	   States’	   was	   the	   definitive	   text	   of	   the	   monetarist	  counterrevolution.	  The	  book	  criticised	   the	   role	  of	   the	  Fed	  during	   the	  Great	  Depression	   in	  the	   first	   salvo	   of	   a	   sustained	   campaign	   against	   the	   policies	   of	   the	   Fed	   that	   gathered	  momentum	  during	  the	  1970s	  (Smith,	  1987:	  17-­‐21).	  Britain	  proved	  a	  fertile	  ground	  for	  Friedman’s	  theory.	  The	  devaluation	  of	  1967	  and	  general	   awareness	   of	   economic	   decline	   produced	   a	   climate	   of	   dissatisfaction	   with	   the	  Keynesian	   consensus	   that	   had	  prevailed	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	   era.	   Indeed,	   the	   advancement	  of	  monetarism	  moved	  almost	  in	  step	  with	  the	  disintegration	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  steady	  rise	  of	  inflation	  and	  stagnant	  growth	  known	  as	  ‘stagflation’.	  At	  the	  Financial	  Times,	  Samuel	  Brittan	  became	  an	  influential	  champion	  of	  monetarism,	  helping	  to	  achieve	  a	  major	  shift	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	  Cf:	   Smith	   (1987:	   3-­‐16)	   For	   a	   detailed	   analysis	   of	   the	   major	   theoretical	   differences	   between	  monetarism	  and	  Keynesianism.	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thinking	  within	  the	  financial	  community	  of	  the	  City	  from	  1968.	  Peter	  Jay	  of	  The	  Times	  also	  began	   to	   champion	   the	  monetarist	   cause	   around	   this	   time,	   with	   a	   leading	   article	   in	   The	  
Times	   entitled,	   ‘Understanding	   the	   Role	   of	   the	   Money	   Supply’.	   The	   influential	   City	  mouthpiece,	   The	   Banker,	   then	   took	   up	   the	   monetarist	   cause	   in	   December	   1968	   with	   a	  contribution	   from	   Friedman	   himself.	   The	   Institute	   of	   Economic	   Affairs,	   a	   think-­‐tank	  established	  to	  counter	  state	  control	  of	  the	  economy,	  also	  began	  to	  trumpet	  the	  monetarist	  cause	  (Smith,	  1987:	  35-­‐36;	  Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  139-­‐144).	  	  Despite	  the	  increasing	  interest	  in	  monetarism	  from	  the	  City	  and	  the	  financial	  press,	  its	  roots	  within	  the	  thinking	  of	  British	  state	  officials	  in	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  not	  primarily	  or	  exclusively	  endogenous.	  The	   initial	   impetus	   for	   the	  emergence	  of	  monetarist	  thinking	  and	   techniques	  within	   the	  Treasury	  and	   the	  Bank	  actually	  came	   through	  contact	  with	   the	   IMF	   in	   1965	   (Capie,	   2010:	   450;	   Schenk,	   2010:	   189).	   During	   the	   1960s,	   British	  monetary	  policy	  was	  principally	  concerned	  with	  maintaining	  the	  fixed	  exchange	  rate	  and	  up	  until	  1965,	  voices	  within	  the	  Bank	  in	  support	  of	  control	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  were,	  ‘few	  and,	  when	  heard,	  quietly	  ignored	  or	  put	  down’	  (Capie,	  2010:	  450).	  	  Within	  the	  Treasury,	  a	  1965	  draft	  document	  on	  credit	  control	  had	  explicitly	  rejected	  consideration	   of	   the	   quantity	   of	  money	   and	   the	   role	   of	   interest	   rates.	   In	   that	   same	   year	  however,	  the	  Letter	  of	  Intent	  to	  the	  IMF	  required	  Britain	  to	  commit	  to	  quantitative	  targets	  relating	   to	   credit	   policy	   including	   estimates	   for	   increases	   in	   bank	   lending	   to	   the	   private	  sector	   (Schenk,	   2010:	   189).	   	   This	   was	   the	   first	   instance	   in	   which	   external	   pressure	   was	  exerted	   upon	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury	   to	   make	   commitments	   on	   monetary	   growth.	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Despite	   the	   exertions	   of	   the	   IMF,	   the	   attitudes	   of	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Bank	   towards	  monetary	  control	  were	  ambivalent	  	  When	  Britain	  was	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  IMF	  again	  between	  1967-­‐68,	  the	  pressure	  on	  monetary	  targets	  was	  much	  greater	  and	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  pushed	  to	  accept	  that	  there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  and	  successful	  attempt	  to	  contain	  monetary	  growth.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  IMF’s	  conditions,	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  began	  conducting	  joint	  exercises	  on	  the	  issue	   of	   the	  money	   supply.	   These	   discussions	  were	   reinforced	  by	   an	   IMF	   seminar	   on	   the	  subject	  of	  domestic	  credit	  supply	  held	  in	  Washington	  in	  1970,	  at	  which	  Bank	  and	  Treasury	  officials	  were	  in	  attendance.	  The	  discussions,	  began	  in	  1968,	  were	  to	  carry	  on	  over	  the	  next	  decade	   before	   reaching	   their	   fullest	   expression	   under	   the	   Thatcher	   government	   (Capie,	  2010:	  451-­‐463).	  	  The	  impacts	  of	  Heath’s	  policies	  and	  of	  CCC	  in	  particular,	  were	  shambolic,	  leading	  to	  a	  recession	   that	   brought	   about	   the	   infamous	   ‘U-­‐turn’	   in	   government	   policy.	   Taking	   its	   cue	  from	  a	  similar	  change	  in	  tack	  from	  Nixon’s	  administration	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  Heath	  government	  shifted	  from	  an	  emphasis	  upon	  market	  discipline	  to	  Keynesian	  reflation	  through	  the	  ‘Barber	  Boom’	  from	  1972-­‐73	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  72;	  Gamble,	  1991:	  125;	  Overbeek,	  1990:	  159).	  The	  Barber	  boom	  relied	  upon	  massive	  tax	  cuts,	  a	  continued	  expansion	  of	  the	  money	  supply	  and	   increased	   public	   spending	   to	   provide	   a	   temporary	   boost	   to	   productivity.	   But	   the	  investment	   was	   largely	   channelled	   into	   a	   speculative	   property	   and	   stock	   market	   boom,	  which	   fuelled	   inflation	   and	   further	   aggravated	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	   deficit	   by	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stimulating	   imports	   (Anderson,	  1992:	  175).94	  These	  dynamics	  were	   further	   intensified	  by	  the	  inflationary	  impact	  of	  CCC,	  with	  the	  removal	  of	  quantitative	  lending	  restrictions	  rapidly	  leading	  towards	  an	  unprecedented	  expansion	  in	  the	  money	  supply,	   followed	  by	  a	  massive	  financial	   collapse	  during	   the	   secondary	  banking	   crisis	   of	   1972,	  which	   required	   concerted	  action	  between	  the	  major	  Clearing	  banks	  and	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  to	  launch	  the	   ‘Lifeboat’	  rescue	  operation	  (Capie,	  2010:	  525).	  	  The	  Bank’s	  Minimum	  Lending	  Rate	  rose	  from	  7.5%	  in	  July	   1973,	   to	   13%	   by	   the	   end	   of	   the	   year,	   as	   the	   government	   attempted	   to	  wrestle	  with	  rising	   inflation	  and	  a	  deteriorating	  balance	  of	  payments	  (Capie,	  2010:	  531).	  But	   just	  as	   in	  the	  U.S.,	   the	   Bank	  was	   forced	   to	   pull	   back	   from	   tight	  money	   due	   to	   the	  massive	   banking	  crisis	   that	   the	   interest	  rate	  hikes	  helped	  provoke.	  The	  conditions,	  both	   in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  U.K.	  were	  not	  yet	  in	  place	  for	  the	  high	  interest	  rate	  regimes	  that	  would	  be	  enacted	  during	  the	  1980s.	   Just	   as	   it	  had	  done	   for	   the	  Fed	  during	   the	   commercial	  paper	   crisis,	   the	  Bank’s	  lender-­‐of-­‐last-­‐resort	   function	   trumped	   its	   capacity	   to	   tighten	   the	   monetary	   supply	   and	  forced	  it	  to	  inject	  liquidity	  into	  the	  system	  or	  face	  a	  widespread	  collapse.	  	  	  As	   the	   British	   economy	   spiralled	   out	   of	   control,	   the	   pound	   came	   under	   sustained	  attack	   in	   the	   international	   financial	   markets,	   with	   domestic	   and	   international	   financial	  instability	   increasingly	   interactive.	  Britain	  was	   forced	   to	   float	   the	  pound	  out	  of	   the	  parity	  agreed	   at	   the	   Smithsonian	   meeting,	   causing	   exit	   from	   the	   European	   currency	   snake	   of	  which	   it	   had	   briefly	   been	   a	   part	   (Eichengreen,	   2008:	   131;	   Schenk,	   20120:	   356).	   With	  sterling	   under	   attack	   again,	   the	   dollar	   followed	   shortly	   after	   with	   a	   renewed	   wave	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  94	  The	  money	  supply	  was	  growing	  at	  an	  annual	  rate	  of	  31	  per	  cent	  by	   the	  second	  quarter	  of	  1972	  while	   bank	   lending	   to	   individuals	   rose	   by	   175	  per	   cent	   between	   July	   1971	   and	   July	   1973(Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  77).	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speculative	   activity	   against	   the	   greenback	   in	   1973,	   as	   contagious	   currency	   instability	  spread	   under	   conditions	   of	   mounting	   international	   monetary	   disorder.	   By	   1974,	   a	   four-­‐week	  miner’s	  strike	  has	  brought	  the	  Heath	  government	  to	  an	  ignominious	  end	  (Overbeek,	  1990:	  161).	   	  The	  policies	  of	  the	  Heath	  government	  were	  indicative	  of	  the	  way	  in	  which	  Britain’s	  fragile	   Keynesian	   compromise	  was	   creaking	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	   growing	   class	   conflict	  and	   a	   deteriorating	   international	   economic	   climate.	   In	   response,	   new	   policy	   strategies	  emerged,	   from	  both	   left	  and	  right,	  which	  began	   to	  move	  beyond	   the	  confines	  of	   the	  post-­‐war	  consensus.	  The	  early	   free	  market	  radicalism	  of	   the	  Heath	  government	  was	  paralleled	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Alternative	  Economic	  Strategy	  within	  the	  Labour	  Party	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  Party’s	  left	  wing.95	  The	  failed	  modernisation	  programmes	  of	  the	  1960s	  opened	  spaces	  for	   more	   radical	   responses	   to	   the	   malaise	   of	   British	   capitalism,	   with	   socialist	   industrial	  programmes	  increasingly	  popular	  within	  the	  Labour	  Party	  membership	  and	  the	  trade	  union	  movement.	   Key	   figures	   on	   the	   Labour	   Left	   believed	   that	   social	   democracy	   had	   failed	   to	  deliver,	  with	  a	  strategy	  to	  transform	  the	  economy	  in	  a	  socialist	  direction	  the	  only	  remaining	  option	  for	  the	  left	  (Gamble,	  1991:	  172-­‐177).	  	  	  Labour	  won	   the	  1974	   election	  on	   the	  promise	  of	   a	  more	   conciliatory	   relationship	  with	   the	  unions	   than	   the	  Conservatives	   had	  been	   able	   to	   deliver	   (Harmon,	   2008:	   5).	   The	  central	   policy	   platform	   for	   this	   promise	  was	   the	   ‘Social	   Contract’;	   a	   policy	   framework	   in	  which	  the	  TUC	  agreed	  to	  wage	  restraint	  in	  exchange	  for	  welfare	  concessions,	  with	  pension	  increases	   central.	   Given	   the	   upsurge	   of	   trade	   union	   power	   that	   had	   toppled	   the	   Heath	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  The	  key	  positions	  held	  by	   the	   left	  were	  Tony	  Benn’s	   role	  as	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   Industry	  and	  Michael	  Foot’s	  appointment	  as	  Employment	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Employment.	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government,	   the	  demands	  of	   the	  TUC	  were	  actually	   incredibly	  modest.	  They	  reflected	   the	  long-­‐standing	   timidity	   of	   the	   British	   working	   classes,	   as	   they	   continued	   to	   embrace	   the	  consensus	  politics	  of	  labourism	  (Anderson,	  1992:	  177).	  Alongside	  the	  pact	  with	  the	  unions,	  Labour’s	  election	  manifesto	  promised	  to	  deliver	  the	  most	  radical	  upheaval	  in	  British	  industrial	  policy	  since	  1945.	  The	  Alternative	  Economic	  Strategy	  hinged	  upon	  the	  proposal,	  made	  by	  Benn	  and	  Stuart	  Holland,	  to	  form	  a	  major	  state	  holding	  company	  and	  undertake	  a	  compulsory	  nationalisation	  of	   twenty	   to	   twenty-­‐five	  of	  the	   largest	  manufacturing	   companies.	   	   	   Compulsory	  planning	  agreements	  would	   facilitate	  an	  expansion	  of	  state	  control	  over	  private	  capital	  and	  a	  major	  programme	  of	  redistribution	  was	  to	  be	  undertaken	  with	  income,	  wealth	  and	  social	  service	  provision	  adjusted	  in	  favour	  of	  the	   working	   class.	   Trade	   union	   power	   would	   be	   augmented,	   through	   the	   repeal	   of	   the	  Industrial	  Relations	  Act	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  worker	  control	  over	  industrial	  activity	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  91-­‐96).	  	  The	  actual	  policy	  delivered	  by	  the	  Labour	  government	  in	  power	  broke	  sharply	  with	  the	  promises	  of	  the	  manifesto.	  That	   it	  did	  so	  was	  down	  to	  the	  effective	  marginalisation	  of	  the	   Labour	   left,	   and	   Benn	   in	   particular,	   by	   the	   right	   wing	   of	   the	   Party,	   with	   Wilson,	  Callaghan	  and	  Healey	  the	  chief	  architects.	  It	  was	  also	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  overall	  weakness	  of	   a	  minority	  government	   in	  Westminster.	  Resistance	   to	   the	   radicalism	  of	   the	  Alternative	  Economic	   Strategy	   also	   came	   from	   officials	   within	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	  hostility	  of	  the	  City	  to	  plans	  for	  radical	  reorganisation	  of	  British	  capitalism.	  But	  the	  Labour	  strategy	  was	  further	  limited	  by	  the	  broader	  international	  context	  and	  the	  hardening	  stance	  of	  an	  American	  administration	   increasingly	  comprised	  by	   right	  wing	  Wall	  Street	  affiliates	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who	   were	   hostile	   to	   social	   democratic	   welfare	   states	   and	   staunchly	   anti-­‐communist	  (Panitch	  &	  Leys,	  1997:	  107).	  	  Labour	   entered	   office	   faced	   with	   rapidly	   rising	   inflation,	   the	   aftermath	   of	   the	  secondary	   banking	   crisis,	   a	   liquidity	   crisis	   in	   industry,	   and	   a	   slump	   in	   the	   stock	  market	  alongside	   a	   rapidly	   deteriorating	   balance	   of	   payments.	   These	   difficulties	   were	   partly	   a	  legacy	  of	  the	  Tory’s	  catastrophic	  policy	  experimentations,	  but	  they	  were	  also	  in	  large	  part	  the	  product	  of	  a	  growing	  crisis	  of	  global	   capitalism.	  On	   top	  of	   the	   international	  monetary	  disorder	   resulting	   from	   the	  Americans’	   termination	   of	   Bretton	  Woods	   and	   the	   onset	   of	   a	  world	  recession	  sparked	  by	  stagflation,	  oil	  prices	   rose	  by	   four	  hundred	  per	  cent	  between	  1973	  and	  1974	  as	  major	  oil	  producing	  countries	  formed	  the	  OPEC	  cartel	  	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  20;	  Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  xiii).	  By	  1974,	  Britain	  was	  paying	  £2.5	  billion	  more	  for	  five	  per	  cent	  less	  oil	  than	  had	  been	  imported	  during	  1973	  (Dell,	  1991:	  9).	  For	   Britain,	   the	   consequences	   of	   the	   oil	   crisis	   were	   particularly	   acute.	   The	   crisis	  transformed	  the	  status	  of	  sterling	  as	  a	  reserve	  currency	  by	  leading	  to	  the	  build-­‐up	  of	  large	  sterling	   reserve	  positions	  by	  oil-­‐producing	  countries	  whilst	   traditional	  holders	  of	   sterling	  unwound	   their	   reserve	   positions	   (Schenk,	   2010:	   357).	   After	   the	   devaluation	   of	   1967,	   the	  BIS	  had	   led	  multilateral	   action	   to	   rebuild	  Britain’s	   reserves	  and	  stabilise	   sterling	   through	  encouraging	  countries	  to	  hold	  sterling	  balances.	  The	  problem	  was	  that	  the	  addition	  of	  OPEC	  balances	  on	   top	  of	   the	  multilateral	   rebuilding	  effort	  now	  meant	   that	   the	  sterling	  balances	  were	   much	   larger	   than	   before,	   rather	   than	   gradually	   being	   wound	   down	   in	   an	   orderly	  fashion	   as	   had	   been	   planned.	   The	   build	   up	   of	   large,	   liquid	   sterling	   reserves	   renewed	   the	  pound’s	   vulnerability	   to	   sudden	   movements	   in	   currency	   markets.	   By	   1976,	   the	   official	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sterling	  balances	  were	  over	   twice	   as	   large	   as	   they	  had	  been	   in	  1968	   (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  12).	  	  	  It	  was	  this	  dynamic	  around	  sterling	  after	  the	  crisis	  that	  would	  draw	  Britain	  into	  the	  disciplinary	  orbit	  of	  American	  power.	  Although	  the	  1976	  crisis	  was	  the	  product	  of	  a	  specific	  historic	   conjuncture,	   then,	   it	  was	   also	   a	  product	  of	   the	   longstanding	  weakness	  of	   sterling	  that	   had	   been	   such	   a	   pronounced	   trait	   of	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   development.	   Just	   as	   the	  
weakness	   of	   sterling	   had	   led	   British	   bankers	   to	   draw	   in	   the	   dollar	   and	   American	   financial	  
power	   through	   the	   Euromarkets,	   it	   would	   now	   draw	   together	   a	   much	   less	   welcome	  
intersection	   between	   British	   development	   and	   American	   power.	   What	   followed	   was	   a	  
reconfiguration	  of	  British	  sovereignty	  that	  involved	  a	  much	  more	  direct	  relationship	  between	  
the	  state	  agencies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Britain	  than	  had	  been	  the	  case	  with	  the	  Euromarkets,	  where	  
the	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  the	  Treasury	  would	   intervene	  to	  reorder	   the	  priorities	  of	   the	  Bank-­‐
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Internationalising	  the	  British	  state	  	  The	  1976	  crisis	  was	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  prolonged	  post-­‐war	  demise	  of	  sterling.	  Britain’s	  eventual	   appeal	   to	   the	   IMF	   for	   financing	   was	   both	   preceded	   and	   succeeded	   by	   broader	  multilateral	   negotiations	   over	   the	   future	   of	   sterling	   (Schenk,	   2010:	   369).	   The	   crisis	   was	  differentiated	  from	  prior	  episodes	  by	  the	  views	  of	  the	  foreign	  interests	  involved,	  principally	  the	  Americans,	  that	  this	  should	  be	  the	  last	  sterling	  crisis	  and	  that	  all	  pressure	  necessary	  to	  guarantee	   this	   should,	   and	   could,	   be	   exerted	   (Burk	   &	   Cairncross,	   1992:	   3).	   In	   1974,	  Chancellor	   Barber	   had	   warned	   Heath	   that	   massive	   sums	   would	   be	   required	   to	   defend	  sterling	  at	  its	  existing	  exchange	  rate.	  	  With	  the	  oil	  crisis	  feeding	  into	  the	  existing	  inflationary	  dynamics	  within	  Britain	  and	  a	  worsening	  balance	  of	  payments	  position,	   sterling	  began	   to	  depreciate	  in	  a	  sustained	  fashion	  from	  April	  1975	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  369).	  	  Wages	  were	  now	  rising	  at	  over	   thirty	  per	   cent	  per	  year	  and	  Dennis	  Healey’s	  April	  1975	   budget	   provided	   a	   record	   £9	   billion	   public	   sector	   borrowing	   requirement	   that	  was	  met	  with	  a,	  ‘chorus	  of	  dismay’	  from	  the	  financial	  press,	  prompting	  international	  markets	  to	  rapidly	   lose	   confidence	   in	   the	   government’s	   wages	   and	   spending	   policy.	   Financial	  commentators	  denounced	  profligate	  and	  inflationary	  borrowing,	  while	  The	  Economist	  went	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  the	  official	  estimates	  of	  public	  spending	  were	  now	  viewed	  as	  ‘works	  of	   fiction’.	  These	   sentiments	  were	   shared	  by	   the	  Wall	  Street	   Journal	   in	   an	   article	   entitled,	  ‘Goodbye,	  Great	  Britain’,	  which	  argued	   that	   the	  British	  government	  was	   so	   clearly	  headed	  towards	   a	   policy	   of,	   ‘total	   confiscation’,	   that	   anybody	   with	   assets	   in	   Britain	   was	   left,	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‘discounting	  furiously	  at	  any	  chance	  to	  get	  it	  out	  of	  the	  country’	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  xiii).	   Hysterical	   responses	   by	   the	   financial	   media	   fed	   into	   the	   behaviour	   of	   capitalist	  investors	  and	  market	  operators	  who	  began	  to	  speculate	  heavily	  against	  the	  pound.	   	  In	  the	  City,	  the	  climate	  of	  opinion	  was	  increasingly	  hostile	  to	  the	  Labour	  government.	  The	  banks	  and	   financial	   institutions	   in	   the	  City	  had	  become	   increasingly	  concerned	  with	   the	  state	  of	  the	   public	   finances	   during	   the	   1970s.	   As	   the	   crisis	   worsened	   from	   1974,	   the	   continued	  budget	  deficits	  produced	  a	  situation	  whereby,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  potential	  lenders	  were	  no	  longer	   confident	   of	   the	   capacity	   of	   the	   British	   government	   to	   service	   its	   debts.	   	   The	  government	   was	   now	   forced	   to	   pay	   higher	   interest	   rates	   than	   before	   and	   to	   orient	   its	  borrowing	   more	   towards	   the	   requirements	   of	   investors	   and	   creditors.	   This	   was	   a	  watershed	   in	   the	  post-­‐war	   relationship	  between	   the	  City	  and	   the	  government,	  which	  had	  largely	   been	   characterised	   by	   mutually	   beneficial	   cooperation	   up	   to	   this	   point.	   For	   the	  financiers	  of	   the	  City,	   the	  1974	  Labour	  government	  was	  viewed	   in	  very	  unfavourable	  and	  oppositional	  terms	  (Michie,	  2004:	  47).	  	  Within	   this	   climate	   of	   distrust,	   long	   simmering	   dissatisfactions	   with	   government	  policy	  reached	  boiling	  point,	  particularly	  from	  those	  interests	  within	  the	  City	  that	  depended	  upon	  the	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  faltering	  domestic	  economy.	  For	  the	  offshore	  sector	  of	  the	  City	  however,	  which	  had	  grown	  rapidly	   through	   the	  Euromarkets,	   the	   instability	  of	   the	  1970s	  represented	   a	   boom,	   as	   financial	   innovations	   such	   as	   derivatives	   created	   profitable	  opportunities	   for	   benefiting	   from	   currency	   instability	   (Michie,	   2004:	   47-­‐49).	   But	   despite	  their	   booming	   trade	   in	   hedging	   against	   currency	   movements	   and	   recycling	   petrodollars	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emerging	  from	  the	  OPEC	  country	  surpluses,	  the	  offshore	  interests	  of	  the	  City	  had	  reasons	  to	  be	   fearful	   of	   the	   Labour	   government	   too.	   The	   Alternative	   Economic	   Strategy,	   with	   its	  emphasis	   upon	   exchange	   controls,	   import	   restrictions	   and	   selective	   insulation	   from	   the	  world	   economy,	   constituted	   a	   direct	   threat	   to	   the	   climate	   of	   international	   financial	  openness	   upon	   which	   the	   Euromarkets	   were	   so	   dependent.	   These	   threats	   increased	   as	  Benn	   and	   other	   members	   of	   the	   Labour	   left	   began	   to	   formulate	   alternatives	   to	   the	  acceptance	   of	   IMF	   conditionality	   that	   would	   challenge	   the	   sanctity	   of	   private	   financial	  power	  in	  the	  City.	  	  As	   the	  Bretton	  Woods	   order	   collapsed	   and	   the	   crisis	   of	  Keynesianism	   accelerated,	  the	   lines	   between	   public	   power	   and	   private	   capitalist	   power	   were	   rendered	   uncertain.	  Concerns	  over	  the	  intentions	  of	  the	  government	  combined	  with	  the	  rising	  tide	  of	  monetarist	  critique	  of	  Keynesian	  policy	  and	   the	  vociferous	  attacks	  of	   the	   financial	  press	   to	   create	  an	  increasingly	  oppositional	  climate.	  One	  in	  which	  the	  government	  appeared	  increasingly	  to	  be	  a	   threat	   to	   private	   finance.	   This	   climate	   of	   distrust	   was	   a	   major	   contributor	   to	   the	  immediate	  crisis	  of	  1976,	  forcing	  the	  government	  to	  go	  to	  the	  IMF,	  both	  for	  financing	  and	  to	  restore	  credibility	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  financial	  markets	  which	  now	  held	  so	  much	  power.	  With	  sterling’s	  plight	  worsening,	  Britain	  turned	  towards	  the	  IMF	  for	  funding	  under	  the	   special	   oil	   facility	   that	   had	   been	   established	   in	   response	   to	   the	   OPEC	   price	   hikes.	  Throughout	  1975,	  British	  Treasury	  officials	  worked	  out	  strategic	  responses	  to	  the	  growing	  economic	  crisis	  faced	  by	  Britain	  and	  began	  to	  work	  on	  drafting	  applications	  to	  the	  Fund	  for	  drawings	  from	  the	  oil	  facility	  and	  the	  first	  credit	  tranche.	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From	  late	  October	  1975,	  the	  Treasury	  began	  to	  formulate	  a	  position	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  drawing	  from	  the	  Fund.	  The	  principal	  consideration	  related	  to	  whether	  Britain	  should	  draw	  from	   the	   IMF	   oil	   facility,	   from	   the	   first	   credit	   tranche	   or	   from	   both	   simultaneously.	  Countries	  that	  drew	  from	  the	  facility	  would	  have	  to	  commit	  to	  the	  maintenance	  of	  an	  open	  trade	  policy	  and	  would	  not	  be	  allowed	  to	  undertake	   import	  restrictions.	  At	  this	  point,	   the	  Treasury	   was	   giving	   serious	   consideration	   to	   the	   imposition	   of	   import	   controls	   as	   a	  temporary	   corrective	   to	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	   problems.	   This	   was	   the	   strategy	  formulated	   by	   Tony	   Benn	   and	   the	   Labour	   left,	   which	   would	   have	   meant	   a	   reduction	   in	  Britain’s	   openness	   to	   the	   international	   economy.	   	   Treasury	   officials	   anticipated	   that	   the	  proposal	   would,	   however,	   be	   opposed	   by	   the	   Fund	   staff,	   even	   if	   it	   were	   made	   on	   a	  temporary	  basis.	  In	  a	  revealing	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  predominance	  of	  American	  power	  within	  the	  IMF,	  Treasury	  officials	  suggested	  that	  in	  practice,	  ‘the	  decision	  of	  the	  Fund	  Board	  must	   ultimately	   depend	   on	   the	   views	   of	   the	  major	   countries	   and,	   in	   particular,	   the	   USA’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).96	  It	   was	   hugely	   improbable	   that	   the	   Americans	  would	   look	   kindly	   upon	   a	   potential	  British	   turn	   to	   import	   controls.	   Americans	   officials	   were	   now	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   system	   of	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  that	  would	  rely	  upon	  the	  disciplinary	  affect	  of	  market	  forces	  upon	  national	  currency	  values.	  These	  principles	  were	  endorsed	  in	  an	  agreement	  reached	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  French	  finance	  ministry	  officials	  at	  the	  Rambouillet	  summit	  in	  November	  1975.	  The	  Rambouillet	  meeting	  was	  a	  product	  of	   the	   linkages	  between	   finance	  ministries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Treasury	  File	  National	  Archives	  T385/30	  ‘International	  Monetary	  Fund:	  applications	  for	  drawings	  by	   the	   UK	   1/1/75-­‐31/12/75’,	   Undated	   Treasury	   document,	   ‘Implications	   of	   a	   Fund	   Drawing	   in	  Relation	  to	  Policy	  Options’,	  from	  October	  20th	  to	  November	  4th	  1975.	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that	   the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  had	  developed	  during	   the	  1960s.	  This	  multilateral	   infrastructure	  of	  linkages	  between	  major	  capitalist	  states	  formed	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  development	  of	  the	  Group	  of	   Six,	   which	   convened	   for	   the	   first	   time	   at	   Rambouillet,	   as	   the	   focus	   was	   now	   turned	  towards	   creating	   the	   institutional	   and	   legal	   basis	   for	   floating	   exchange	   rates. 97 	  The	  Rambouillet	   agreement	   suggested	   that	   stable	   currency	  values	  would	  be	  derived	   from	   the	  operation	  of	  market	   forces	   in	   response	   to	   evidence	  of	  domestic	  price	   stability.	  As	  part	  of	  this	  transformation	  of	  the	  governing	  principles	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system,	  away	  from	  the	  politically	  negotiated	  values	  of	  Bretton	  Woods,	  the	  IMF’s	  role	  would	  be	  extended	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  its	  capacity	  for	  surveillance	  over	  the	  policies	  of	  individual	  states,	  who	  were	   expected	   to	   demonstrate	   commitment	   to	   facilitating	   market	   discipline	   (Panitch	   &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  145-­‐155).	  	  The	   new	   policy	   stance	   of	   the	   U.S.	   towards	   the	   IMF	   reflected	   of	   the	   growing	  momentum	  of	   financial	   liberalism	  within	  the	  U.S.	  and	  the	  commitment	  to	  an	  international	  monetary	  system	  that	  would	  maximise	  U.S.	  policy	  autonomy.	  In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1973	  oil	   crisis,	   the	   Americans	   opposed	   plans	   that	   would	   have	   seen	   the	   OPEC	   petrodollars	  recycled	   through	   IMF	   channels.	   The	  Americans	  made	   clear	   that	   private	   financial	  markets	  should	  be	  the	  beneficiaries	  of	  these	  flows.	  They	  then	  abolished	  their	  programme	  of	  capital	  controls	  in	  December	  1974,	  breaking	  the	  commitment	  made	  at	  the	  Smithsonian	  agreement	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  110-­‐112).	  In	  doing	  so,	  the	  American	  administration	  was	  moving	  towards	  a	  firmer	  advocacy	  of	   liberal	   international	   finance.	  That	  position	  had	  been	  advocated	  by	   the	  Republican	  government	  of	  the	  early	  1920s,	  who	  were	  intent	  on	  restoring	  the	  gold	  standard	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	  The	   ‘Group	  of	  Six’	  was	  comprised	  of	  France,	  West	  Germany,	  Britain,	   the	  U.S.,	   Italy,	  and	   Japan.	   It	  later	  became	  the	  G7,	  with	  the	  addition	  of	  Canada	  in	  1976.	  
	  	   246	  
in	   the	  wake	   of	   the	   First	  World	  War.	   It	   was	   a	   stance	   that	   had	   also	   been	   favoured	   by	   the	  bankers	  of	  Wall	  Street	  after	  WW2,	  keen	  for	  a	  market	  based	  international	  monetary	  system	  in	  which	  private	  capital	  flows	  would	  exert	  discipline	  over	  government	  policy.	  	  In	   the	  wake	   of	  Bretton	  Woods’	   collapse,	   a	  market-­‐oriented	   approach	   to	   reforming	  the	   international	   monetary	   system	   could	   preserve	   American	   policy	   autonomy	   and	   the	  primacy	   of	   the	   dollar.	   The	   capacity	   to	   attract	   foreign	   investment	   was	   enhanced	   by	   the	  deregulation	   of	   Wall	   Street	   brought	   about	   by	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   Securities	   and	  Exchange	  Commission’s	   (SEC)	  oversight	   of	  Wall	   Street	   in	  1975.	  Under	   these	   changes,	   the	  SEC	   broke	   from	   its	   traditional	   support	   for	   the	   cartelised	   relationships	   between	   brokers,	  investment	   bankers	   and	   corporate	   managers.	   The	   SEC	   dismantled	   obstacles	   to	   price	  competition	  and	  market	  entry	  but	  also	  gained	  new	  powers.	  It	  was	  now	  able	  to	  impose	  debt-­‐capital	   ratios	   on	   investment	   banks,	   make	   sure	   that	   competitive	   market	   practices	   were	  upheld	   and	   intervene	   in	   patterns	   of	   self-­‐regulation.	   Deregulation	   occurred	   alongside	  market	   innovation,	   with	   the	   rapid	   growth	   of	   the	   derivatives	   business	   within	   American	  financial	  markets	  and	  an	  increasing	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  American	  bond	  market	  that	  facilitated	  greater	  inward	  investment	  into	  the	  U.S.	  	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  149-­‐151).	  	  As	   had	   been	   the	   case	   with	   CCC	   in	   Britain,	   the	   American	   regulatory	   order	   was	  unravelling	   and	   being	   reconstituted	   in	   step	   with	   the	   broader	   transformation	   of	   the	  international	  monetary	   system	  after	   the	   collapse	  of	  Bretton	  Woods.	   In	  both	  countries,	   the	  
changes	  were	   also	   a	   reflection	   of	   the	   competitive	   dynamics	   between	   London	  and	  New	  York	  
and	  the	  attempts	  of	  policy	  makers	  to	  gain	  advantage	  by	  creating	  the	  conditions	  required	  for	  
market	   growth	   as	   the	   transatlantic	   regulatory	   feedback	   loop	   set	   in	   motion	   by	   the	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Euromarkets	   gathered	  momentum	   during	   the	   1970s.	   The	   reconfigurations	   of	   the	   American	  
money	   market	   facilitated	   the	   international	   financial	   liberalism	   advocated	   by	   the	   U.S.	  
Treasury.	  For	  Britain,	  the	  U.S.	  stance	  imposed	  serious	  limitations	  upon	  the	  space	  available	  for	  policy	   manoeuvre.	   But	   it	   appears	   that	   some	   within	   the	   Treasury	   were	   unaware	   of	   the	  degree	   to	   which	   American	   thinking	   had	   shifted,	   with	   officials	   rather	   optimistically	  suggesting	   that	   recent	  U.S.	   legislation	   in	   favour	  of	  domestic	  protection	  and	  Congressional	  pressure	   in	   this	   direction	  meant	   that	   Britain,	   ‘might	   reasonably	   expect	   support	   from	   the	  USA	   for	   the	   right	   of	   member	   countries	   to	   take	   genuinely	   selective	   protective	   action’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).	  	  Treasury	  officials	  did	  recognise	  that	  support	  from	  the	  IMF	   for	   import	   restrictions	  would	   only	   be	   forthcoming	   if	   it	  was	  made	   explicit	   that	   these	  restrictions	  would	  be	  temporary	  and	  that	  associated	  measures	  would	  be	  taken	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  public	  sector	  borrowing	  requirement	  (PSBR)	  and	  questions	  of	  monetary	  policy.	  	  Crucially,	   action	  on	   cutting	   the	  PSBR	  and	   imposing	  monetary	   restraint	   in	   order	   to	  satisfy	  the	  IMF	  was	  not	  viewed	  as	  a,	  ‘major	  new	  constraint	  on	  policy’	  by	  Treasury	  officials,	  as	  it	  was	  assumed	  that	  the	  Chancellor	  had	  already	  rejected	  a	  reflationary	  strategy	  and	  was	  aiming	  at	  reducing	  the	  PSBR	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).	   	  This	  evidence	  supports	  the	   arguments	  made	  by	   Ludlam,	  Rogers	   and	  Baker	   that	   deflationary	  policies	   had	   already	  been	   decided	   upon	   prior	   to	   the	   first	   appeal	   to	   borrow	   from	   the	   IMF.	   However,	   it	   was	  recognised	  that	  appeal	  to	  the	  oil	  facility	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  great	  intensification	  of	  international	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pressure	  on	  Britain	  if	  a	  policy	  of	  import	  restriction	  was	  subsequently	  introduced	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).98	  	  Import	  controls	  were	  further	  considered	  in	  a	  draft	  Treasury	  document	  dealing	  with	  the	   international	   repercussions	   of	   their	   implementation.	   If	   Britain	   were	   to	   unilaterally	  impose	   import	   restrictions	   for	   one	   to	   two	   years,	   this	   would	   likely	   run	   the	   risk	   of,	  ‘retaliation,	  emulation,	  denial	  of	   international	   financial	  assistance	  and	  invalidation’.	   It	  was	  now	   considered	   that	   the	   reactions	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Congress	   and	   American	   industry	   might	  generate	  pressures	  for	  emulation	  that	  the	  administration,	   ‘would	  find	  it	  difficult	   to	  resist’.	  The	  full	  gravity	  of	  the	  implications	  of	  import	  controls	  were	  then	  laid	  out	  in	  stark	  terms,	  ‘if	  our	  action	  were	  copied	  by	  any	  other	   important	   country,	   the	  whole	  world	  could	   rush	   into	  protectionism,	   with	   great	   damage	   to	   economic	   activity	   everywhere,	   including	   the	   UK’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).99	  These	   comments	   demonstrate	   the	   Treasury’s	   awareness	   of	   the	   massive	  consequences	  that	  introduction	  of	  import	  controls	  might	  have,	  not	  just	  for	  Britain	  but	  also	  for	  the	  international	  economy.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  winning	  over	  international	  opinion,	  the	  views	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  Germany	  and	  France	  were	  understood	  to	  be	  crucial	   to	  successfully	   implementing	  this	  strategy.	  Significantly	  however,	   the	  strategy	  of	   import	  controls	  was	  not	  considered	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  broader	  strategy	  of	  reflationary	  expansion.	   	  This	  is	  where	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  Rogers	   and	   Baker	   prioritise	   national	   determination	   becomes	   highly	   problematic.	   Import	  controls	  would,	  it	  was	  felt,	  have	  to	  be	  implemented	  alongside	  curbing	  of	  public	  expenditure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Letter	   from	  Principal	  Private	  secretary	  of	   the	  Treasury	   to	  other	  Treasury	  Officials,	   ‘Outstanding	  Questions	  Concerning	  a	  Fund	  Drawing’,	  October	  21st	  1975.	  99	  Undated	  Draft	  Treasury	  Document,	  ‘International	  “Negotiation”	  of	  Import	  Controls’,	  from	  October	  20th	  to	  November	  4th	  1975.	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and	  action	   to	   control	   the	  money	  supply.	  Officials	  noted	   that	   some	  of	   the	  countries	  whose	  agreement	  would	  be	   key	  were	   in	   a,	   ‘critical	  mood’,	   and	   that	   other	   countries	  would	   likely	  press	   for	   greater	   domestic	   control	   over	   the	   money	   supply	   and	   public	   expenditure.	   This	  demonstrates	  that	  the	  climate	  of	  opinion	  among	  the	  major	  capitalist	  states	  was	  hardening	  against	  Britain’s	  economic	  strategy	  by	  1975	  and	  that	  these	  considerations,	  and	  not	  simply	  predetermined	  ‘national’	  priorities,	  were	  factored	  into	  Treasury	  strategy,	  	  ‘Whereas	  a	  combination	  of	  some	  temporary	  import	  control	  with	  a	  significant	  attack	  on	  the	  public	   sector	   deficit	   or	   money	   supply	   in	   the	   short-­‐term	   would	   strike	   chords	   of	   sympathy	   and	  provide	  useful	  debating-­‐points,	   the	  argument	  over	   the	  combination	  of	  exchange	   rate	  depreciation	  and	  import	  controls	  must	  be	  an	  uphill	  battle’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).	  	   The	  implications	  of	  borrowing	  from	  the	  IMF	  and	  implementing	  import	  controls	  were	  not	  considered	  simply	  in	  terms	  of	  ‘depoliticising’	  existing	  priorities,	  then,	  but	  were	  actually	  being	   factored	   into	   the	   formulation	  of	  national	  economic	  strategy.	  Treasury	  officials	  were	  clear	   that	   out	   of	   the	   two	   available	   strategies	   for	   responding	   to	   the	   balance	   of	   payments	  crisis,	  austerity	  and	  monetary	  restraint	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  import	  controls	  and	  exchange	  rate	   depreciation	   on	   the	   other;	   the	   former	   would	   be	   much	   easier	   to	   sell	   to	   the	   wider	  international	   community	  and	   to	   the	  French,	  Germans	  and	  Americans	   in	  particular.	  As	   the	  crisis	   of	   the	   1970s	   intensified	   and	   British	   dependency	   upon	   external	   financial	   support	  deepened,	   national	   economic	   strategies	   were	   increasingly	   interactive	   with	   the	   broader	  climate	   of	   international	   opinion	   and	   preference	   over	   economic	   strategy.	   British	   policy	  makers	   were	   actively	   internalising	   the	   international	   context.	   Indeed,	   the	   argument	   for	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seeing	   the	   role	   of	   the	   IMF	   as	   a	   mere	   stooge	   for	   the	   depoliticisation	   of	   British	   policy	   is	  further	  undermined	  by	  Chancellor	  Dennis	  Healey’s	  acknowledgment	  that	   it	  might	  well	  be,	  ‘politically	  counter-­‐productive’,	   if	   too	  close	  a	   link	  were	  made	  between	   the	   IMF	  borrowing	  and	  cuts	  in	  public	  spending	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).100	  Talk	  of	  a	  British	  turn	  towards	  import	  controls	  was	  extremely	  concerning	  to	  Johannes	  Witteveen,	   the	  Managing	   Director	   of	   the	   IMF.	   In	   a	   letter	   to	   Chancellor	   Dennis	   Healey	   on	  October	   26th,	   Witteveen	   warned	   that	   import	   controls	   should	   be	   avoided	   and	   that	   the	  government	  should	  adopt	  other	  policies	  to	  achieve	  a	  viable	  balance	  of	  payments	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).101	  The	  Fund’s	  tough	  stance	  over	  British	  import	  controls	  filtered	  through	   to	   the	   Treasury,	   where	   officials	   concluded	   by	   the	   end	   of	   October	   that	   British	  controls	  would	   face	   severe	   opposition	   because	   of	   Britain’s	   size	   and	   importance	   to	  world	  trade	  and	   the	   serious	   concerns	  of	   the	   IMF	   (National	  Archives,	   1975:	  T385/30).102	  Talk	  of	  import	   controls	   also	   met	   a	   hostile	   reception	   from	   the	   Americans	   who	   viewed	   their	  implementation	  as	  contravening	  the	  agreements	  devised	  at	  Rambouillet	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/33).103	  By	   late	   November	   Dennis	   Healey	   informally	   approached	   Witteveen	   to	   borrow	   1	  billion	  Special	  Drawing	  Rights	   ($1.2	  billion)	   from	  the	  oil	   facility	  and	  a	   stand-­‐by	  credit	   for	  700	  million	  SDR	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  16).	  Healey	  had	  suggested	  that	  a	  simultaneous	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Undated	  Treasury	  Memorandum	  circulated	   to	   the	  Bank	  of	  England,	   ‘IMF	  Drawing:	  Chancellor’s	  Dinner	  with	  Dr.	  Witteveen’,	  	  101	  Memorandum	  from	  Johannes	  Witteveen,	  Managing	  Director	  of	   the	   IMF	   to	  Dennis	  Healey	  of	   the	  Treasury	  (Chancellor	  of	  Exchequer)	  October	  26th	  1975.	  102	  Internal	  Treasury	  Memo,	  ‘IMF	  Oil	  Facility	  and	  Import	  Restrictions’,	  October	  27th	  1975.	  103 	  Treasury	   File	   National	   Archives	   T385/33	   ‘International	   Monetary	   Fund	   Applications	   for	  Drawings	   by	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   9/11/75-­‐12/12/75’,	   Treasury	   Memorandum,	   ‘IMF	   Drawing:	  American	  Reaction	  to	  Import	  Controls’,	  November	  27th	  1975.	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drawing	   from	   both	   the	   oil	   facility	   and	   the	   first	   credit	   tranche	   would	   be	   a	   good	   way	   of	  demonstrating	   that	   Britain	   was,	   ‘firmly	   embedded	   within	   the	   international	   monetary	  system’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/30).104	  Healey’s	  thinking	  here	  attests	  to	  a	  growing	  international	   climate	   of	   doubt	   over	   whether	   Britain’s	   actions	   would	   contravene	   the	  principles	   of	   the	   international	   monetary	   system	   through	   the	   use	   of	   import	   controls	   or	  devaluation.	  In	  the	  end,	  import	  controls	  were	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  viable	  corrective	  for	  the	  balance	  of	  payments	  in	  1975.	  The	  decision	  was	  made	  both	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  likely	   inflammatory	  consequences	   that	   such	   a	  measure	  would	  bring	   about	   internationally	   and	  because	   it	  was	  felt	   that	   import	   controls	  were	  a	   form	  of	  protectionism	   that	  would	   insulate	  business	   from	  exposure	  to	  the	  modernising	  catalyst	  of	  international	  competition	  (Wass,	  2008:	  92).	  Within	  the	  Labour	  Party,	  the	  outmanoeuvre	  of	  the	  left	  over	  the	  referendum	  on	  membership	  of	  the	  EEC	  greatly	  diminished	  the	  power	  of	  leading	  left	  figures	  to	  turn	  Britain	  away	  from	  the	  IMF	  and	  austerity	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  15).	  A	   formal	   approach	   to	   the	   IMF	  was	  made	   in	   December,	   and	   by	   the	   end	   of	   January	  1976	  Britain	  had	  borrowed	  all	  of	  the	  money	  available	  under	  the	  oil	  facility,	  the	  gold	  tranche	  and	  the	  stand-­‐by	  credit.	  In	  doing	  so	  it	  had	  now	  exhausted	  the	  borrowing	  potential	  under	  the	  more	   lenient	   first	   tranche	  credit	  conditions	  (Wass,	  2008:	  161).	  Firmer	  conditionality	  now	  lay	  just	  around	  the	  corner.	  In	   March	   1976,	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   was	   detected	   selling	   pounds	   even	   though	  sterling’s	  exchange	  rate	  against	  the	  dollar	  was	  already	  falling.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  sustained	  period	  of	  speculation	  against	  the	  pound.	  During	  the	  following	  three	  months	  the	  rate	  fell	  from	  $2.02	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Note	  of	  a	  working	  dinner	  at	  No.	  11	  Downing	  Street	  with:	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer,	  Mr.	  C.	  W.	  France,	  Dr	  H.	  J.	  Witteveen-­‐	  Managing	  Director	  IMF,	  Mr.	  D.	  Green.	  	  Monday	  November	  3rd	  1975.	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to	   the	  pound	  to	  around	  $1.70,	  despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  Bank	  had	  expended	  $1.5	  billion	   in	  reserves	   to	   support	   the	   rate	  over	   the	   first	  night	   and	  a	   full	   thirty	  per	   cent	  of	   the	   reserves	  between	  February	  and	  April	  (Burk,	  1994:	  358).	  By	  June,	  Britain	  had	  been	  forced	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  U.S.	  for	  support,	  beginning	  a	  process	  of	  negotiations	  that	  would	  seriously	  compromise	  British	   financial	   sovereignty	   and	   rapidly	   accelerate	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   the	  British	  state	  under	  the	  auspices	  of	  American	  disciplinary	  power.	  The	   Republican	   Administration	   in	   Washington	   was	   increasingly	   frustrated	   with	  British	  policy.	  	  This	  was	  not	  helped	  by	  the	  conservative	  disposition	  of	  key	  figures	  involved	  in	  negotiations	  with	  Britain.	  William	  Simon,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  was	  a	  New	  York	  bond	   dealer	   with	   a	   fervent	   conviction	   in	   market	   forces.	   Simon’s	   Undersecretary	   of	   the	  Treasury,	   Edwin	   Yeo,	   was	   a	   banker	   hailing	   from	   Pittsburgh	   who	   believed	   in	   balanced	  budget	   orthodoxy.	   	   The	   staffing	   of	   these	   key	   positions	   within	   the	   Treasury	   by	   private	  financiers	  was	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  intimate	  relationship	  between	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  Wall	  Street.	  The	  influential	  head	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  Arthur	  Burns,	  referred	  to	  himself	  as	  a,	  ‘Neanderthal	  conservative’,	  who	  thought	  that	  the	  Labour	  Government	  was	  ‘profligate’	  (Dell,	  1991:	  220;	  Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  37;	  Panitch	  &	  Leys,	  1997:	  116).	  	  Both	   Simon	   and	   Yeo,	   in	   a	   sign	   of	   the	   hardening	   of	   the	   American	   position	   on	   the	  management	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system,	  now	  advocated	  a	  policy	  whereby	  access	  to	  deficit	  financing	  was	  to	  be	  curtailed	  for	  chronic	  deficit	  countries.	  This	  was	  intended	  as	  a	  strategy	   to	   push	   them	   towards	   adjustment.	   For	   their	   part,	   the	  West	   Germans	   adopted	   a	  similar	  stance	  to	  the	  Americans	  between	  1975-­‐76,	  but	  with	  less	  severity	  (Harmon,	  2008:	  7).	  The	   hardening	   position	   of	   the	   U.S.	   and	   West	   Germany	   represented	   a	   broader	   shift	   in	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international	  opinion	  between	  1975-­‐1976.	  Whereas	   in	   the	   immediate	  aftermath	  of	   the	  oil	  shock	   the	   emphasis	   had	   been	   placed	   on	   accommodating	   the	   financing	   needs	   of	   deficit	  countries,	   the	   tide	   had	   now	   turned	   in	   the	   opposite	   direction,	   with	   the	   market-­‐centred	  approach	   of	   the	   Americans	   steering	   the	   international	   community	   towards	   accepting	   the	  need	   for	   adjustment	   by	   deficit	   countries.	   By	   1976,	   then,	   the	   Americans	   were	   intent	   on	  depriving	  countries	  of	  financing	  by	  any	  other	  means	  than	  through	  the	  IMF.	  If	  the	  necessary	  steps	  towards	  domestic	  retrenchment	  were	  not	  undertaken,	  countries	  would	  be	  drawn	  into	  the	  conditionality	  and	  austerity	  ordained	  by	  the	  IMF.	  In	   general,	   the	   American	   moneymen	   adopted	   a	   very	   firm	   stance	   towards	   Britain.	  Edwin	  Yeo	  believed	  that	  the	  role	  of	  the	  U.S.	  was	  to	  convince	  the	  British	  that	  the,	  ‘game	  was	  over’	   and	   they	  had,	   ‘run	  out	  of	   string’.	  Other	  members	  of	   the	  U.S.	   central	  banking	   system	  believed	  that	  they	  had	  given	  over	  far	  too	  much	  time	  in	  shoring	  up	  the	  pound.	  After	  over	  a	  decade	  of	  propping	  up	  the	  ailing	  pound,	  the	  Americans	  were	  finally	  running	  out	  of	  patience	  with	  Britain’s	  chronic	  balance	  of	  payments	  deficits.	  But	   the	   firm	  stance	  taken	  by	  key	  staff	  within	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  was	  not	  mirrored	  throughout	  all	  core	  components	  of	  the	   American	   state.	   The	   State	   Department	   and	   to	   a	   certain	   degree	   the	   President	   and	   his	  staff,	  were	   opposed	   to	   the	   hard-­‐line	   taken	   by	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	   Treasury.	   Throughout	   the	  crisis	   of	   1976,	   Kissinger,	   attempted	   to	   mediate	   the	   pressure	   applied	   to	   Britain	   and	  Callaghan	   and	   viewed	   President	   Ford	   as	   an	   ally.	   Brent	   Scowcroft,	   the	   National	   Security	  Advisor	  to	  Ford,	  was	  also	  more	  sympathetic	  towards	  Britain	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  38).	  Divisions	  between	  different	  components	  of	  the	  American	  state,	  delineated	  in	  terms	  of	  differences	  between	  the	  Treasury	  and	  Fed	  on	  one	  side,	  and	  the	  executive	  and	  the	  State	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Department	   on	   the	   other,	   were	   reflective	   of	   a	   broader	   pattern	   of	   institutional	   relations	  between	   finance	  ministries,	   Central	   Banks	   and	   executive	   power	   during	   the	   crisis.	   In	   the	  cases	  of	  all	  of	   the	  major	  players	   involved,	   the	  U.S.,	  West	  Germany	  and	  Britain,	   there	  were	  tensions	   between	   the	   treasuries	   and	   Central	   Banks	   vis-­‐a-­‐vis	   their	   affiliated	   political	  authorities	   (Burk,	   1994:	   352).	   In	   each	   case,	   the	   Treasuries	   and	   Central	   Banks	   showed	   a	  stronger	  commitment	  to	  the	  implementation	  of	  austerity	  and	  market	  discipline.	  	  The	   leaders	   of	   major	   American	   corporations,	   creating	   a	   formidable	   alignment	   of	  public	   and	   private	   power,	   mirrored	   the	   stance	   of	   the	   American	   administration.	   In	  September	  1975	  the	  leaders	  of	   large	  American	  transnational	  corporations	  were	  invited	  to	  Britain	   in	   order	   to	   make	   an	   assessment	   over	   the	   investment	   climate.	   Twenty-­‐one	   chief	  executives,	  responsible	  for	  annual	  sales	  of	  $26	  billion,	  arrived	  in	  the	  country.	  This	  was	  an	  enormously	  influential	  group	  of	  visitors,	  with	  many	  serving	  on	  Government	  Committees	  or	  holding	  other	  Directorships.	  In	  general,	  the	  visitors	  had	  reported	  upon	  arrival	  that	  Britain	  was	   perceived	  within	   the	  American	   business	   community	   to	   have	   slipped	   from	   its	   former	  ‘unquestioned’	   standing	   as	   an	   attractive	   location	   for	   investment	   to	   a	   situation	   in	   which	  ‘other	  locations	  now	  appeared	  more	  attractive’.	  The	  more	  extreme	  views	  within	  the	  party	  suggested	  that	  Britain	  was	  now	  a	  ‘high-­‐risk,	  low	  reward	  location’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/29).105	  Sentiments	   of	   this	   kind	   would	   have	   frightened	   the	   government,	   with	   American	  foreign	  investment	  a	  major	  ingredient	  within	  British	  capitalism	  that	  they	  could	  ill-­‐afford	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  105	  Treasury	   File	  National	   Archives	   T385/29	   ‘Visits	   of	   United	   States	  Ministers	   and	  Officials	   to	   the	  United	  Kingdom	  21/10/75-­‐5/11/76’,	  Letter	  from	  G	  Booth,	  Director	  General	  Trade	  Development,	  to	  Sir	   Peter	   Ramsbotham,	   Ambassador	   British	   Embassy	  Washington,	   ‘The	  US	   Investment	  Mission	   to	  Britain	  18-­‐27	  September	  1975’	  September	  1975.	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lose.	  The	   changing	   conditions	  of	  Britain’s	  political	   economy	  were	  now	  repelling	  potential	  American	   investment.	   Britain’s	   social	   democratic	   compromise	   with	   the	   unions,	   and	   the	  agenda	  laid	  out	  in	  the	  Alternative	  Economic	  Strategy,	  were	  anathema	  to	  U.S.	  investors	  who	  were	  all	  ‘believers	  in	  a	  vigorous	  free	  enterprise	  system’	  and	  were	  described	  as	  ‘quick	  to	  re-­‐act	   when	   they	   consider	   that	   the	   free	   enterprise	   system	   is	   under	   challenge’.	   Although	  reassured	   by	   their	   visit	   to	   Britain,	   the	   investors	   still	   expressed	   discontent	   with	   British	  capitalism	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  neoliberal	  critiques.	  The	  public	  sector	  was	  seen	  to	  be	  too	  large	  as	   a	   percentage	   of	   GDP,	   while	   the	   idea	   of	   government-­‐run	   businesses	   was	   criticised	  alongside	  planning	  agreements.	  Britain’s	   level	  of	  personal	  taxation	  was	  attacked	  for	  being	  too	  high	  while	  it	  was	  suggested	  that	  a	  higher	  income	  gap	  between	  managers	  and	  workers	  would	  help	   release	   the	   talents	  of	  Britain’s	  managers	   (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/29).	  These	  sentiments,	   from	  the	  captains	  of	  American	   industry,	  added	  weight	   to	   the	  pressures	  emanating	  from	  the	  American	  administration.	  An	  appeal	  by	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  for	  financing	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Reserve	   presented	   the	   key	   moment	   for	   the	   Americans	   to	   begin	   the	   enactment	   of	   their	  strategy	  to	  enforce	  adjustment.	   	  Arthur	  Burns’s	  response	  to	  the	  request	  was	   initially	  cool.	  Burns	  believed	  that	  the	  right	  course	  was	  for	  Britain	  to	  focus	  upon	  cutting	  the	  fiscal	  deficit	  rather	  than	  arranging	  bilateral	   financing	  with	  the	  U.S.	  Burns	  eventually	  agreed	  to	  provide	  the	   requested	   financing,	   but	   only	   under	   the	   condition	   that	   the	   UK	   make	   an	   associated	  commitment	   to	   go	   to	   the	   IMF	   for	   a	   drawing	   if	   it	   were	   required	   to	   repay	   the	   swap	  arrangement.	   To	   make	   this	   much	   more	   likely,	   the	   swap	   arrangement	   was	   limited	   to	   an	  usually	  short	  three	  month	  period.	  Indeed,	  Burns	  acknowledged	  in	  his	  notes	  to	  the	  members	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of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve’s	  Open	  Market	  Committee	  that	  the	  U.S.	  had	  set	  out	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  using	   the	   swap	  arrangement	   to	   force	  Britain	   to	   change	   its	  policies	   (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  40).	  The	  Americans	  were	  aligning	  their	  sovereign	  power	  directly	  behind	  the	  IMF	  in	  order	  to	  push	  Britain	  into	  conditionality.	  	  The	   agreement	   was	   signed	   on	   the	   sixth	   of	   June	   and	   was	   made	   between	   the	   U.S.	  Treasury	   Exchange	   Stabilization	   Fund	   and	   the	   Bank	   of	   England	   for	   $	   1billion,	   with	   the	  NYFRB	   acting	   as	   agent	   (National	   Archives,	   1976:	   T381/76).106	  Crucially,	   the	   Treasury	  provided	   part	   of	   the	   funding	   rather	   than	   the	   Fed	   supplying	   all	   of	   it	   as	  was	   customary	   in	  bilateral	  swap	  arrangements.	  It	  seems	  likely	  here	  that	  the	  Treasury	  was	  ensuring	  that	  the	  question	  of	  renewal	  of	  the	  funding	  should	  be	  in	  its	  hands	  rather	  than	  under	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  Federal	   Reserve	   (Wass,	   2008:	   198).	   Although	   there	   was	   no	   explicit	   connection	   made	  between	  this	  swap	  arrangement	  and	  a	  borrowing	  from	  the	  second	  credit	  tranche	  of	  the	  IMF,	  the	   connection	  was	   implicitly	   acknowledged	   as	   a	   central	   part	   of	   the	   agreement.	   The	   key	  factor	  here	  was	  the	  six-­‐month	  (after	  a	  three	  month	  extension)	  time	  limit	  on	  the	  repayment	  of	   the	   swap.	   When	   Yeo	   had	   arrived	   in	   London	   to	   finalise	   the	   details	   of	   the	   swap	  arrangement,	   Callaghan	   fiercely	   opposed	   the	   suggestion	   of	   a	   six-­‐month	   time	   limit.	   In	   the	  end	   however,	   Britain’s	   desperation	   led	   Callaghan	   to	   accept	   the	   six-­‐month	   limit.	   Over	   the	  weekend	   following	   the	   negotiation	   of	   the	   swap	   arrangement	   Chancellor	   Dennis	   Healey	  wrote	  to	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Simon	  acknowledging	  the	  six-­‐month	  limit	  and	  confirming	  that	  Britain	  would	  turn	  to	  the	  IMF	  if	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  pay	  back	  the	  funds	  within	  that	  period.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  106	  Treasury	  File	  National	  Archives	  T381/76	  ‘Swap	  Facility	  with	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  and	  the	  United	  States	  Treasury	  December	  1976,	  6/6/76-­‐5/1/78’,	  ‘Swap	  Agreement	  between	  US	  Treasury	  and	  Bank	  of	  England’,	  June	  6th	  1976.	  
	  	   257	  
Alongside	  the	   formal	  swap	  agreement,	  other	   informal	  agreements	  were	  made	  with	  the	  Americans	  according	  to	  which	  the	  government	  promised	  to	  reduce	  public	  expenditure	  and	  reign	  in	  excess	   liquidity	   in	  the	  economy	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  42).	  As	  a	  quid	  pro	  quo	   for	   the	   financing	   from	   the	  Americans,	  which	  was	  part	  of	   a	   larger	  $5.3	  billion	  Central	  Bank	  package	  from	  the	  G10,	  Callaghan	  was	  forced	  to	  publicly	  announce	  in	  parliament	  that	  Britain	  would	  accept	  IMF	  conditionality	  if	  the	  six	  month	  repayment	  could	  not	  be	  met.	  Edwin	  Yeo	   later	   characterised	   the	   June	   1976	   swap	   arrangement	   as	   ‘bait’	   that	   was	   designed	   to	  ‘hook	   the	  UK	  economy	   into	   IMF	  control	  when	   the	   loan	  had	   to	  be	   repaid’	   (Harmon,	  2007:	  10).	   In	  response	  to	  the	  cuts	  agenda	  pushed	  by	  the	  Americans	  and	  increasingly	  accepted	  by	  the	  government,	  Tony	  Benn	  and	  Francis	  Cripps	  began	  work	  on	  an	  alternative	  anti-­‐cuts	  strategy.	  Benn	  recognised	  that	  the	  government	  would	  have	  to	  maintain	  a	  relationship	  both	  with	  the	  TUC	  and	  the	  IMF.	   It	  was	  very	  unlikely	  that	  Britain	  could	  repay	  the	  Americans	  by	  December	   without	   recourse	   to	   the	   IMF,	   as	   the	   markets	   were	   likely	   to	   take	   further	  speculative	  action	  against	  the	  pound	  in	  the	  interim.	  Benn	  believed	  that	  Britain	  was	  actually	  in	   a	  much	   stronger	   bargaining	   position	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   the	   IMF	   than	   Callaghan	   and	   the	   Cabinet	  suggested.	  Britain’s	  importance	  within	  the	  global	  economy	  and	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Labour	  government	  may	  weaken	  control	  over	  the	  union	  movement,	  thus	  imperilling	  Britain’s	   role	   within	   the	   international	   monetary	   system,	   were	   sources	   of	   considerable	  leverage	  over	   the	  Americans	   and	   the	   IMF	   (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	   1992:	  48).	  Benn’s	  hunches	  about	  American	  fears	  over	  the	  British	  political	  situation	  were	  well	  placed.	  	  	  
	  	   258	  
Those	   fears	   existed	   at	   the	  highest	   levels	   of	   the	  American	  administration	  and	  were	  understood	  by	  senior	  British	  officials.	  During	  a	  meeting	  with	  an	  American	  Embassy	  official	  in	  May	  1976,	  Derek	  Mitchell	  of	  the	  Treasury	  told	  the	  official	  that	  although	  he	  did	  not	  foresee	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  political	  collapse	  in	  Britain	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  Communist	  Government	  but	   that	   he	   suspected	   that	   Yeo	   certainly	   did	   entertain	   that	   worry	   as	   part	   of	   a	   potential	  “domino”	   chain	   involving	   the	   collapse	   of	   governments	   in	   Italy	   and	   France	   too	   (National	  Archives,	   1976:	   T385/29).	   The	   document	   shows	   the	   degree	   of	   American	   fears	   over	   the	  future	   of	   the	   international	   economy	   at	   this	   time,	   and	   the	   concerns	   about	   the	   stability	   of	  liberal	   capitalist	   governance	  within	   the	  West.	   Yeo	   later	   recalled	   that,	   ‘we	   feared	   that	   if	   a	  country	   like	  Britain	  blew	  up,	  defaulted	  on	   its	   loans,	   introduced	   foreign	  exchange	  controls	  and	  froze	  convertibility,	  we	  could	  have	  a	  real	  world	  depression’	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  4).	  	   Other	   U.S.	   officials,	   such	   as	   the	   National	   Security	   Advisor,	   Brent	   Scowcroft,	   also	  feared	  that	  a	  left-­‐wing	  government	  that	  would	  push	  for	  withdrawal	  from	  NATO	  and	  Europe	  might	   run	   Britain.	   While	   the	   Germans	   considered	   these	   fears	   to	   be	   groundless,	   the	  Americans	  were	  not	  so	  easily	  assuaged	  (Burk,	  1994:	  353).	  The	  existence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  
and	  American	  banking	  within	  the	  City,	  sterling’s	  role	  as	  a	  major	  international	  currency,	  and	  
the	   importance	   of	   Britain’s	   role	   as	   a	   historical	   supporter	   of	   an	   open	   liberal	   international	  
capitalist	   economy	   all	   made	   what	   happened	   in	   Britain	   very	   significant	   for	   America’s	  
management	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  	  Given	  the	  degree	  of	   integration	  between	  Britain	  and	  America,	   the	  Americans	  could	  legitimately	  fear	  the	  feedback	  effects	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  capitalist	  governance	  in	  Britain	  and	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the	   ways	   in	   which	   it	   might	   translate	   into	   the	   political	   economy	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Had	   Britain	  chosen	   to	   impose	   import	   controls	   and	   exchange	   controls,	   then	   the	   trajectory	   towards	  globalisation	  would	  have	  been	  halted	  by	  the	  reversal	  of	  what	  had	  formerly	  been	  one	  of	  its	  foremost	  proponents.	  American	  fears	  must	  have	  been	  greatly	  heightened	  when	  the	  National	  Executive	  Council	  of	  the	  Labour	  Party	  endorsed	  the	  statement	  on	  ‘Banking	  and	  Finance’	  in	  August	   1976.	   The	   statement	   called	   for	   the	   nationalisation	   of	   the	   big	   four	   clearing	   banks	  alongside	  the	  seven	  largest	  insurance	  companies,	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  platform	  for	  financial	  planning.	  The	  statement	  was	  then	  subsequently	  endorsed	  at	   the	  Labour	  Party	  Conference	  later	   in	   the	   summer	   (Panitch	   &	   Leys,	   1997:	   124).	   Widespread	   support	   for	   such	   radical	  measures	  to	  challenge	  major	  elements	  of	  private	  control	  over	  the	  British	   financial	  system	  would	   have	   seriously	   threatened	   the	   City’s	   international	   role	   and	   imperilled	   American	  financial	  interests	  in	  London.	  	  Had	   Britain	   adopted	   policies	   that	   substantially	   veered	   from	   the	   path	   of	   further	  liberalisation,	  the	  risk	  of	  emulation	  by	  other	  countries	  would	  have	  been	  substantial.	  In	  fact,	  these	  fears	  were	  explicitly	  voiced	  during	  the	  major	  investment	  mission	  in	  1975,	  when	  the	  CEO’s	   of	   major	   American	   TNC’s	   recognised	   how	   important	   the	   revitalisation	   of	   liberal	  democratic	  capitalism	  in	  Britain	  was	  for	  their	  interests,	  both	  abroad	  and	  at	  home,	  	  ‘We	  want	   Britain	   to	   succeed;	  more-­‐	  we	   need	   you	   to	   succeed;	   if	   Britain,	   as	   one	   of	   the	   few	  remaining	  democracies	  fails,	  then	  the	  challenge	  to	  us	  in	  the	  USA	  will	  not	  be	  long	  delayed’	  (National	  Archives,	  1975:	  T385/29).	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These	  sentiments,	  prevalent	  within	  both	  the	  private	  and	  public	  power	  bases	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  go	  a	  long	  way	  to	  explaining	  why	  the	  Americans	  took	  such	  a	  firm	  stance	  with	  Britain	  during	  the	  negotiations.	  For	  the	  Americans,	  then,	  the	  international	  and	  domestic	  contexts	  had	  become	  highly	  interactive	  during	  the	  crisis	  years	  of	  the	  1970s.	  For	  the	  Fed	  in	  particular,	  the	  need	  to	  be	  firm	  with	  Britain	  was	  also	  a	  product	  of	  the	  growing	  politicisation	  of	  monetary	  policy	  within	  the	  U.S.	   as	   the	   monetarist	   counterrevolution	   gathered	   momentum.	   The	   rise	   of	   monetarism	  within	   the	   U.S.	   preceded	   its	   development	   in	   Britain.	   By	   the	   early	   1970s,	   the	   monetarist	  offensive	   was	   slowly	   gathering	   momentum	   in	   the	   U.S.	   although	   it	   had	   yet	   to	   achieve	  considerable	   institutional	   influence	   (Johnson,	  1998:	  145).	   Its	  advancement	  moved	   in	   step	  with	   the	   recognition	   that	   the	   U.S.	   was	   witnessing	   a	   period	   of	   sustained	   inflationary	  pressure.	   By	   1969,	   the	   annual	   rate	   of	   price	   increases	   was	   over	   %6,	   but	   by	   1974,	   the	  consumer	  price	  index	  was	  rising	  at	  a	  staggering	  %12.2	  per	  year.	  For	  Milton	  Friedman,	  the	  source	   of	   this	   inflation	   was	   easily	   identifiable:	   it	   was	   the	   result	   of	   the	   Fed’s	   wayward	  monetary	  policy	  (Greider,	  1987:	  88).	  Mounting	   inflationary	  pressures	   fed	   into	   the	   transformation	  of	   institutional	  power	  within	   the	   U.S.	   Inside	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   system,	   the	   St	   Louis	   Fed	   had	   become	   a	  government	   funded	   bastion	   of	   monetarist	   thinking	   and	   research,	   with	   its	   monthly	  publication	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  the	  debate	  between	  monetarists	  and	  their	  detractors.	  Within	  the	  American	   business	   and	   banking	   community	   too,	   monetarism	   had	   started	   to	   take	   hold.	  Within	  this	  climate,	  the	  operations	  of	  the	  Fed	  were	  placed	  under	  a	  degree	  of	  public	  scrutiny	  and	  debate	  never	  before	  witnessed	  in	  the	  post-­‐war	  era.	  It	  was	  debate	  in	  which	  monetarist	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economists	   like	   Milton	   Friedman	   were	   setting	   the	   agenda	   (Woolley,	   1984:	   99;	   Greider,	  1987:	  97).	  In	  1973,	  Friedman	  and	  other	  leading	  monetarist	  economists	  began	  meeting	  as	  a	  ‘Shadow	  Open	  Market	  Committee’,	  which	  shadowed	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  Open	  Market	  Committee	  (responsible	  for	  monetary	  policy),	  and	  poured	  scorn	  upon	  what	  they	  viewed	  as	  the	  Fed’s	  archaic	  and	  misguided	  practices	  (Woolley,	  1984:	  99).	  Under	  these	  conditions,	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  Fed	  were	  brought	  into	  the	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  public	  eye	   like	  never	  before.	   	  And	  as	   inflation	  mounted,	   the	  credibility	  of	   the	  Fed’s	  sound	  money	  credentials	   steadily	  eroded.	   In	   response	   to	   the	  pressure	   from	  the	  monetarists,	   the	  Fed	   was	   forced	   to	   make	   piecemeal	   concessions	   on	   the	   techniques	   of	   monetary	   control,	  agreeing	  to	  focus	  more	  upon	  the	  monetary	  aggregates	  as	  a	  guideline	  for	  policy.	  This	  was	  in	  contrast	   to	   the	   Fed’s	   traditional	   approach	   to	   monetary	   policy,	   which	   arrived	   at	   target	  interest	   rates	   based	   upon	   the	   consideration	   of	   multiple	   factors.	   For	   the	   Fed’s	   Chairman,	  Arthur	  Burns,	   the	  challenging	  domestic	  context	  was	  reinforced	  by	  downward	  pressure	  on	  the	   dollar	   from	   the	   international	   markets,	   which	   further	   intensified	   the	   United	   States’	  inflationary	  dynamics	  (Axilrod,	  2011:	  55-­‐71).	  Given	  these	  conditions	  it’s	  hardly	  surprising	  that	   Burns	   and	   the	   Fed	   adopted	   a	   firm	   stance	   towards	   Britain	   throughout	   the	   crisis,	  insisting	  upon	  the	  need	  to	  control	  monetary	  expansion	  before	  any	  more	  support	  could	  be	  secured	  from	  the	  U.S.	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  375).	  	  The	  Fed	  had	  to	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  taking	  a	  firm	  line	  with	   Britain	   and	   not	   handing	   over	   promises	   of	   American	   financial	   support	   without	  something	   in	   return.	   Burns	  made	   his	   commitment	   to	   fighting	   inflation	   clear	   on	   a	   visit	   to	  Britain	  in	  shortly	  before	  the	  June	  swap	  agreement	  (National	  Archives,	  1976:	  T385/29).107	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  107	  Internal	  Treasury	  Memo,	  ‘Visit	  of	  Dr.	  Burns’,	  May	  17th	  1976.	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Developments	   in	   Britain	   paralleled	   the	   rise	   of	   monetarism	   and	   the	   growing	  discontent	  with	  the	  unravelling	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  order	  in	  the	  U.S.	  This	  was	  not	  just	  a	  case	  of	  
American	  power	  pushing	  in	  on	  Britain,	  but	  also	  a	  case	  of	  interests	  within	  Britain,	  who	  had	  lost	  
faith	  with	   the	  post-­‐war	  Keynesian	   class	   compromise,	   drawing	   in	   the	  disciplinary	  dictates	   of	  
the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   IMF.	   Drawing	   upon	   American	   power	   and	   attacking	   the	   Keynesian	  welfare	  
state	  enabled	   these	   forces	   to	   steer	  British	  development	  away	   from	  radical	   social	  democracy	  
and	   towards	   neoliberalism.	   Cox’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   1970s	   in	   terms	   of	   a	   transnational	  ‘nebuleuse’	   driving	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   state	   is	   clearly	   inadequate	   to	  understanding	  Britain’s	  transformation,	  while	  Helleiner’s	  notion	  of	  American	  neoliberalism	  imposed	   from	   without	   is	   equally	   inappropriate.	   Social	   forces	   within	   Britain,	   embedded	  within	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   and	   Atlantic	   integration,	   were	   actively	   drawing	   in	  American	   discipline.	   This	   was	   a	   case	   of	   push	   and	   pull,	   not	   purely	   the	   transmission	   of	  external	   interests	  upon	   the	  British	  state.	  The	  high	  degree	   to	  which	  British	  capitalism	  had	  already	  been	  Atlanticised,	  meant	  that	  distinctions	  between	  external	  and	  internal	  pressures	  driving	  the	  transition	  away	  from	  Keynesianism	  were	  difficult	  to	  maintain.	  From	  1975,	  when	  Margaret	   Thatcher	   became	   leader,	   the	   Conservative	   Party	   began	   to	   give	   increasing	  attention	  and	  support	  to	  monetarist	  ideas.	  The	  Tories	  were	  very	  keen	  to	  reduce	  borrowing	  and	   slash	   public	   spending.	   In	   October	   1976,	   as	   the	   crisis	   gathered	  momentum,	   Thatcher	  announced	   that	   the	   budget	   deficit	   could	   be	   halved	   without	   causing	  much	   harm	   (Burk	   &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  158).	  	  Within	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Bank,	   there	   were	   similar	   pro-­‐austerity	   interests	  supportive	  of	  Britain’s	  need	  to	  accept	  discipline.	  When	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England,	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Gordon	  Richardson,	   approached	   the	   Fed	   to	   arrange	   the	   June	   swap,	   Callaghan	  was	   highly	  suspicious.	   Callaghan	   believed	   that	   the	   swap,	   negotiated	   between	   the	   two	   Central	   Banks	  and	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury,	  ‘seemed	  simply	  designed	  to	  embroil	  the	  Government	  with	  the	  IMF	  for	  the	  specific	  purpose	  of	  enabling	  them	  to	  impose	  cuts	  in	  public	  expenditure’	  (Schenk,	  2010:	  372).	  Callaghan’s	  suspicions	  over	  the	  Bank’s	  intentions	  were	  well	  founded.	  In	  a	  memo	  to	  Kit	  Mcmahon,	  the	  Deputy	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank,	  a	  Bank	  official	  lamented	  the	  disappearance	  of	  the	   ‘disciplinary	  virtues’	  of	  the	  fixed	  parities	  system	  and	  suggested	  that	  stable	  rates	  could	  only	  be	   recovered	  once	  price	   stability	  was	   restored.	  Price	   stability	  was	   the	  objective	   that	  ‘has	  always	  been	  sacrificed’	  in	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  economic	  strategy	  and	  the	  official	  opined	  that,	   ‘all	  but	  the	  French	  now	  seem	  to	  realise	  that	  stable	  exchange	  rates	  will	  not	  guarantee	  price	  stability,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  other	  way	  round’	  (BofE,	  1975:	  OV38/117).108	  	  	  Clearly	  then,	  the	  need	  to	  achieve	  domestic	  price	  stability	  had	  begun	  to	  attract	  more	  concern	   within	   the	   Bank	   in	   the	   context	   of	   increased	   international	   monetary	   disorder.	  Implementing	  austerity	  was	  the	  most	  obvious	  way	  to	  achieve	  this.	  Inside	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  view	  was	  split	  between	  those	  who	  favoured	  Keynesian	  proposals	  for	  escaping	  the	  crisis	  and	  those	   in	   favour	  of	  deflationary	  measures	  (Dell,	  1991:	  248).	  Chancellor	  Healey	  himself	  had	  been	   a	   keen	   supporter	   of	   austerity	   prior	   to	   the	   crisis	   and	  many	   officials	  within	   both	   the	  Treasury	   and	   the	   Bank	   were	   supportive	   of	   the	   position	   taken	   by	   the	   IMF	   and	   the	   U.S.	  Treasury	  (Helleiner,	  1994:129).	  	  During	  the	  height	  of	  the	  crisis,	  officials	  from	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  met	   clandestinely	  with	   Simon	  and	  Yeo	   at	   a	   London	   tailor.	   It	  was	   likely	   that	  Simon	   was	   seeking	   an	   inside	   scoop	   on	   the	   proceedings	   here,	   and	   the	   meeting	   gave	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Bank	  of	  England	  Archives	  OV38/117	   ‘International	  Monetary	  Fund	  1/9/75-­‐30/11/75’,	   Internal	  Bank	  Memo,	  ‘The	  Exchange	  Rate	  Regime’,	  October	  20th	  1975.	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Americans	  a	  clear	  picture	  of	  the	  different	  positions	  taken	  by	  the	  IMF	  and	  Chancellor	  Healey	  (Harmon,	  1997:	  194).	  The	  Americans	  also	  had	  direct	  linkages	  to	  the	  banks	  and	  financial	  institutions	  within	  the	  City.	   Indeed,	  American	  banks	  were	  now	  a	  major	   force	  within	   the	  City	  of	  London,	   and	  during	  1976	   the	  Chancellor	  and	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  both	  held	  meetings	  with	   the	  heads	  of	  major	  American	  banks.	  The	  Chancellor	  met	  with	   the	  President	  of	  Chase	  Manhattan	  Bank,	  while	   the	  Prime	  Minister	  met	  with	   the	  Chairmen	  of	  Citibank	  and	  Morgan	  Guaranty	  Trust	  (National	   Archives,	   1976:	   T385/29).109	  Although	   the	   minutes	   of	   these	   meetings	   were	  largely	   unrecorded,	   one	   can	   easily	   anticipate	   the	   pro-­‐austerity	  message	   that	  would	   have	  been	  put	  across	  to	  the	  government.	  Throughout	  1976,	  the	  stockbrokers	  W.	  Greenwell	  &	  Co.,	  provided	   the	   American	   Embassy	   in	   London	  with	   daily	   reports	   on	   the	   gilt-­‐edged	  market,	  which	  could	  be	  digested	  by	  Simon,	  given	  his	  expertise	  as	  a	  bond	  dealer.	  It’s	  likely	  that	  other	  City	   institutions	   were	   also	   involved	   in	   supplying	   information	   about	   the	   markets	   to	   the	  Americans	  (Dell,	  1991:	  221).	  	  These	  connections	  were	  a	  testament	  to	  the	  linkages	  brought	  about	  through	  Anglo-­‐American	  developmental	  interdependence.	  The	  final	  decision	  to	  go	  to	  the	  IMF	  was	  prompted	  by	  the	  concerted	  action	  of	  bankers	  and	  investors	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  who	  anticipated	  that	  the	  UK	  would	  have	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  IMF	  and	  pay	  higher	  interest	  rates	  on	  gilts.	  Bankers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  refused	  to	  buy	  government	  gilts	  in	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  IMF	  appeal	  because	  they	  knew	  that	  they	  would	  receive	   higher	   returns	   afterwards	   (Burk	   &	   Cairncross,	   1992:	   52).	   When	   asked	   by	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  109	  Internal	  Treasury	  Memo,	  ‘Visit	  of	  Mr	  Butcher’	  (President	  of	  Chase	  Manhattan	  Bank),	  August	  13th	  1976;	   Internal	   Treasury	  Memo,	   ‘Prime	  Minister’s	  Meeting	  with	  Mr.	  Walter	  Wriston	   (Chairman	   of	  Citibank),	  May	  26th	  1976;	   Internal	  Treasury	  Memo,	   ‘Invitation	   to	   the	  Prime	  Minister	   from	  Morgan	  Guaranty’,	  November	  2nd	  1976.	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Chancellor	  whether	  he	  believed	   that	   the	  markets	  had	  already	  discounted	  a	  Fund	  drawing	  into	   their	   assessments,	   Yeo	   replied	   that	   he	   was	   ‘partly	   responsible	   for	   the	   idea	   that	   a	  drawing	  from	  the	  Fund	  would	  be	  a	  good	  housekeeping	  seal	  for	  the	  UK’	  (National	  Archives,	  1976:	  T385/29).110	  Indeed,	  when	  Britain	  looked	  to	  American	  banks	  to	  finance	  its	  deficits	  in	  early	  autumn,	   the	   leading	  players	   fell	   into	   line	  with	   the	  American	  administration	  and	   the	  Fund	   by	   stating	   that	   they	   would	   not	   participate	   in	   further	   financing	   for	   Britain	   until	  negotiations	  with	  the	  IMF	  had	  been	  completed	  (Wass,	  2008:	  219).	  The	  actions	  of	  private	  and	  
public	   actors	   during	   the	   crisis	   were	   highly	   interactive,	   with	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   central	   to	  
orchestrating	  operations	   in	  order	   to	  bring	  maximum	  pressure	   to	  bear	  and	  shoehorn	  Britain	  
into	  IMF	  conditionality.	  When	  Callaghan	  made	  his	   famous	  speech	  signalling	  Britain’s	  break	  with	  Keynesian	  policy	   on	   September	   28th,	   the	   Americans	  were	   cock-­‐a-­‐hoop.	   	   Much	   to	   the	   chagrin	   of	   the	  Labour	  left,	  Callaghan	  denounced	  Keynesian	  demand	  management	  and	  publicly	  signalled	  a	  shift	   in	   the	   government’s	   policy	   orientation.	   The	   speech	   came	   shortly	   before	   Britain’s	  formal	   approach	   to	   the	   IMF	   and	   was	   intended	   to	   signal	   the	   government’s	   austerity	  credentials	   in	   the	  run	  up	  to	  an	  approach	  to	   the	   IMF.	  Despite	  Callaghan’s	  speech	  however,	  the	   government	   were	   still	   confident	   that	   they	   could	   apply	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   third	   tranche	  conditionality	   without	   having	   to	   substantially	   amend	   their	   existing	   policies.	   They	   were	  hoping	   that	   the	   IMF	  would	  merely	   rubber	   stamp	   the	   UK’s	   economic	   credibility	   with	   the	  effect	  of	  restoring	  gilt	  sales,	  stabilising	  the	  exchange	  rate	  and	  allowing	  interest	  rates	  to	  fall	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  59).	  But	  they	  were	  in	  for	  a	  much	  rougher	  ride	  than	  expected.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  110	  Note	  of	  a	  meeting	  held	  at	  NO.11	  Downing	  Street,	  with	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer,	  Sir	  Douglas	  Wass	  and	  Mr	  Edwin	  Yeo-­‐	  Undersecretary	  of	  the	  US	  Treasury,	  August	  5th	  1976.	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October	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   very	   significant	   month	   in	   the	   unfolding	   of	   the	   crisis.	  Callaghan	  grew	  increasingly	  concerned	  by	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  conspiracy	  by	  the	  U.S.	  and	  U.K.	  treasuries	   to	   use	   the	   Fund	   in	   order	   to	   foist	  more	   severe	   retrenchments	   upon	   Britain.	   In	  order	   to	   circumvent	   the	   finance	  ministries	   and	   the	   IMF,	   Callaghan	   began	   to	  make	   direct	  approaches	   to	   President	   Ford	   and	   German	   Chancellor	   Schmidt.	   Although	   Ford	   was	  sympathetic	  to	  Callaghan’s	  plight,	  he	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  override	  the	  wishes	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	   and	   the	   Fed.	   With	   Burns,	   Simon	   and	   Yeo	   all	   convinced	   of	   the	   need	   to	   change	  Britain’s	  ways	   through	  the	  pressure	  of	   the	  Fund,	   ‘they	  were	  unlikely	   to	   transmit	  requests	  from	  the	  President	  or	  his	  advisers	   to	   the	   IMF	  to	   lessen	  this	  pressure’	   (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  62-­‐64).	  	  The	  inefficacy	  of	  Callaghan’s	  efforts	  to	  go	  over	  the	  head	  of	  the	  Fund	  to	  the	  executive	  power	  centres	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany	  demonstrate	  just	  how	  limited	  executive	  power	  was	  during	   the	   crisis.	   It	   was	   the	   Treasuries	   and	   Central	   Banks	   that	   were	   endowed	   with	   the	  institutional	   power	   and	   expertise	   to	   push	   through	   the	   internationalisation	   of	   the	   British	  state	  and	  undermine	  the	  foundations	  of	  Keynesian	  welfarism.	  In	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany,	  Central	   Banks	   enjoyed	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   constitutional	   independence	   from	   the	   executive	  branch,	   while	   Ford’s	   power	  was	   further	   limited	   by	   his	   status	   as	   an	   unelected	   President.	  	  Although	   Schmidt	   took	   a	  more	   sympathetic	   stance	   towards	   Callaghan,	   by	   offering	   to	   use	  Germany’s	   dollar	   reserves	   to	   help	   solve	   British	   problems	   with	   the	   sterling	   balances,	   his	  power	  to	  do	  so	  was	  extremely	  limited.	  As	  Schmidt’s	  State	  Secretary	  in	  the	  Finance	  Ministry,	  Karl-­‐Otto	  Pohl,	  pointed	  out,	  Schmidt	  was	  not	  constitutionally	  empowered	  to	  dispose	  of	  the	  Bundesbank’s	  reserves	  in	  this	  fashion	  (Burk	  &	  Cairncross,	  1992:	  66).	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British	  officials	  from	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  left	  with	  no	  doubts	  about	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  Americans	  to	  enforced	  conditionality	  when	  they	  attended	  the	  IMF	   conference	   in	   Manilla.	   Bank	   officials	   reported	   that	   Arthur	   Burns’s	   stringency	   was	  widely	   shared	  within	   the	   international	   community	   and	   that	   the	   Labour	   government	   had	  frequently	   been	   arraigned	   for	   placating	   its	   left	   wing	   rather	   than	   taking	   the	   necessary	  measures	   to	   restore	   economic	   balance.	   In	   summary,	   Bank	   officials	   suggested	   that	   the	  ‘general	   climate	   of	   opinion	   towards	   the	   UK	   is	   not	   propitious’.	   When	   the	   prospect	   of	   an	  agreement	   to	   stabilise	   the	   pound	  by	   alleviating	   the	   problem	  of	   the	   sterling	   balances	  was	  discussed,	   it	   was	   concluded	   that	   ‘among	   the	   people	   who	   count’,	   the	   Americans	   and	  Germans,	   there	   was	   no	   appetite	   for	   discussing	   the	   sterling	   balances	   until	   the	   UK	   had	  enacted	   austerity	   and	   drawn	   from	   the	   Fund	   (BofE,	   1976:	   G1/210).111	  Financial	   officials	  from	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany	  were	  determined	  not	  to	  let	  the	  U.K.	  off	  the	  hook.	  By	   late	   1976	   the,	   the	   international	   climate	   of	   opinion	   towards	   Britain	   had	   clearly	  hardened.	  But	   although	   the	   growing	   consensus	   around	   the	  need	   for	  British	   restructuring	  was	  crucially	   important,	   it	  was	  not	  principally	  from	  the	  policy	   ‘nebuleuse’	  that	  the	  agency	  involved	  in	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  British	  state	  stemmed.	  The	  U.S.	  Treasury	  played	  the	  definitive	  role.	  The	  disciplinary	  approach	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  proved	  to	  be	  unwavering.	  Crucially,	   it	  was	  the	  process	  of	  disciplinary	  supervision	  enacted	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Fed	  that	  steered	  Britain	  into	  the	  clutches	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  away	  from	   the	   post-­‐war	   class	   compromise.	   This	  was	   not	   simply	   a	   case	   of	   American	   structural	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111 	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives	   G1/210	   ‘Governor’s	   File:	   The	   IMF	   and	   International	   Bank	   of	  Reconstruction	   and	   Development-­‐	   Christopher	   William	   Mcmahon’s	   Impressions	   of	   the	   Annual	  General	   Meetings	   10/76-­‐10/79’,	   Internal	   Bank	   Memo	   to	   the	   Governors,	   ‘Manila	   Impressions’,	  October	  11th	  1976. 
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power,	  then,	  but	  an	  active	  process	  of	  discipline	  through	  which	  the	  Americans	  steered	  British	  development	  during	  a	  definitive	  moment	  of	  crisis.	  	  The	   full	   degree	   of	   disciplinary	   supervision	   over	   Britain	   is	   revealed	   in	   a	   Treasury	  document	  that	  outlines	  a	  proposed	  bilateral	  swap	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  at	  the	  height	  of	   the	  crisis	   in	  December	  1976.	   	  The	  swap	  was	  valued	  at	  $500	  million,	  with	  $250	  million	  each	  from	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	  the	  Fed.	  Crucially,	  the	  swap	  was	  explicitly	  tied	  to	  approval	  of	  IMF	  standby	  credit,	  	  ‘Drawings	  and	  renewals	   for	  additional	   three-­‐month	  periods	  shall	  only	  be	  agreed	  if	   the	  U.S.	  Treasury-­‐Secretary,	  having	  consulted	  with	   the	  Managing	  Director	  of	   the	  Fund,	   is	  satisfied	   that	   the	  Government	   of	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   is	   following	   appropriate	   economic	   and	   financial	   policies,	  including	   policies	   that	   permit	   the	   sterling	   exchange	   rate	   to	   reflect	   underlying	   economic	   and	  financial	  conditions,	  and	  that	  all	  conditions	  and	  performance	  criteria	  specified	  in	  the	  IMF	  stand-­‐by	  arrangement	  are	  being	  fulfilled	  by	  the	  United	  Kingdom’	  (National	  Archives,	  1976:	  T381/76).112	  	  	  	  By	  explicitly	  linking	  their	  funding	  package	  with	  the	  IMF	  negotiations,	  the	  Americans	  were	   aligning	   themselves	   with	   the	   IMF	   and	   pooling	   their	   sovereign	   power	   with	   the	  authority	  of	  the	  Fund.	  The	  text	  referring	  to	  the	  requirement	  for	  the	  sterling	  exchange	  rate	  to	  reflect	  ‘underlying	  economic	  and	  financial	  conditions’	  embodied	  the	  American	  commitment	  to	  an	  international	  monetary	  system	  based	  upon	  the	  primacy	  of	  market	  forces	  and	  internal	  price	   stability.	   The	   negotiations	   over	   the	   December	   swap	   demonstrate	   how	   tightly	  American	  strategic	  priorities	  were	  imbricated	  with	  those	  of	  the	  IMF.	  Discussing	  the	  details	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  112	  Internal	  Treasury	  Memo,	  ‘U.S.	  Swaps:	  Draft	  Agreement’,	  December	  21st	  1976.	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of	   the	  swap,	  a	  Treasury	  official	   commented	   that	   ‘no	  process	  of	  examination	  of	   the	  British	  economy	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	   is	  contemplated	  so	   long	  as	  the	  programme	  agreed	  with	  the	  Fund	   is	   proceeding	   satisfactorily’	   (National	   Archives,	   1976:	   T381/76).113 	  Had	   Britain	  accepted	   this	   swap	   agreement	   along	   these	   terms,	   violation	   of	   the	   IMF	   conditions	   would	  have	   led	   to	   direct	   supervision	   of	   the	   British	   Treasury	   by	   its	   American	   counterpart.	   This	  would	  have	  amounted	  to	  a	  humiliating	  curtailment	  of	  British	  sovereignty	  and	  it	  showed	  the	  degree	   to	   which	   the	   U.S.	   was	   intent	   on	   using	   IMF	   conditionality,	   and	   failing	   that	   direct	  American	   supervision,	   to	   shape	   British	   economic	   policy.	   The	   draft	   agreement	   shows	   the	  centrality	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  Treasuries	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  crisis	  and	  the	  internationalisation	  of	  the	  British	  state.	  In	  the	  end,	  Chancellor	  Healey	  decided	  that	  the	  second	  swap	  agreement	  with	  the	  U.S.	  was	  not	  required.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  the	  IMF	  funds	  were	  sufficient,	  and	  there	  would	  likely	  also	  have	  been	  concerns	  about	  entering	   into	  an	  agreement	  with	   the	  Americans	   that	  contained	  the	  potential	   for	  direct	   supervision.	  After	  much	  debate	  within	   the	  Cabinet,	  Dennis	  Healey	  announced	   to	   the	   Commons	   on	   December	   15th	   that	   large	   cuts	   would	   be	   made	   in	   public	  expenditure	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  Britain’s	  drawing	   from	  the	  IMF.	   	  The	  package	   involved	  a	  £1	  billion	   reduction	   of	   public	   spending	   from	   1977-­‐78	   and	   the	   sale	   of	   £500	   million	   of	   the	  Government’s	   shares	   in	   BP.	   There	  would	   be	   a	   further	   £1.5	   billion	   reduction	   of	   spending	  from	  1978-­‐79	  and	  then	  £500	  million	  for	  1978-­‐79.	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  113	  Foreign	   Office	   and	   Commonwealth	   Office	   Telegram	   No.4025	   for	   Mrs	   Hedley-­‐Miller	   of	   the	  Treasury	  from	  Bridges,	  ‘Swap	  Agreement’,	  December	  17th	  1976.	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A	  prelude	  to	  Thatcherism	  
	  The	   events	   of	   1976	  were	   a	   key	  moment	   in	   the	  modern	  development	   of	   the	  British	   state.	  American	   disciplinary	   power	   played	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   steering	   Britain	   away	   from	   a	  radicalisation	   of	   social	   democracy	   and	   towards	   a	   form	   of	   neoliberal	   development	  compatible	  with	   American	   priorities.	   The	   central	   role	   of	   the	   U.S.	   during	   the	   negotiations	  exemplified	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   U.S.	   in	   coordinating	   the	   international	   response	   to	   the	  collapse	   of	   Bretton	   Woods.	   The	   networked	   power	   of	   the	   American	   state,	   which	   had	  internationalised	   key	   functions	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   forestall	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	  Woods	  during	  the	  1960s,	  continued	  to	  play	  a	  key	  coordinating	  role	  during	  the	  transition	  to	  floating	  exchange	  rates.	  While	   the	  crisis	  did	  not	  represent	   the	  beginning	  of	   the	  drive	   for	  austerity	  and	   the	   abandonment	   of	   Keynesianism,	   which	   had	   already	   developed	   momentum	   from	  within	  Britain	  (albeit	  through	  processes	  of	  international	  development),	  it	  certainly	  did	  do	  a	  great	   deal	   to	   encourage	   and	   accentuate	   these	   processes	   as	   a	   key	   moment	   in	   the	  internationalisation	   of	   the	   British	   state.	   	   The	   interaction	   between	   the	   Fed-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	  Street	  nexus	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	  on	  the	  other,	  mediated	  by	  and	  through	  the	  IMF,	  was	  central	  to	  this	  process.	  	  The	  crisis	  of	  1976	  reflected	  the	  outcome	  of	   more	   than	   a	   decade	   of	   developmental	   interaction	   between	   Britain	   and	   America	   that	  centred	  upon	  the	  dynamics	  of	  sterling	  and	  the	  dollar	  under	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system.	  This	  was	  not	   a	   case	  of	   internationalisation	   according	   to	   the	   interests	   of	   a	   transnational	   policy	  ‘nebuleuse’,	   or	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   American	   neoliberalism	   imposed	   upon	   Britain	   from	  outside.	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   produced	   a	   situation	   whereby	   social	   forces	   that	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benefited	   from	  Atlantic	   integration	   drew	   in	  American	   disciplinary	   power	   to	   further	   their	  domestic	  ambitions.	  	  By	  focusing	  upon	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  foreign	  states	  determined	   the	   break	   from	   Keynesianism,	   analyses	   of	   the	   crisis	   have	   obscured	   the	  importance	   of	   the	   disciplinary	   processes	   involved	   and	   their	   role	   in	   rearticulating	   British	  sovereignty.	   This	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   case	   of	   American	   structural	   power,	   but	   rather	   the	  initiation	  of	  active	  processes	  of	  disciplinary	  power	   by	   the	  U.S.,	   in	   conjunction	  with	   the	   IMF	  and	  the	  international	  community,	  that	  were	  exercised	  in	  order	  to	  promote	  a	  redefinition	  of	  British	  policy	  priorities,	   and	   those	  of	   the	  Treasury	  and	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	   in	  particular.	  The	   intention	  was	   to	  make	   those	   priorities	  more	   compatible	  with	   the	   interests	   of	   global	  financial	  markets.	   Far	   from	  witnessing	   a	   retreat	   of	   American	   power	   over	   the	   conduct	   of	  major	  capitalist	  states	  during	  the	  1970s	  then,	  the	  British	  case	  demonstrates	  the	  continued	  centrality	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  managing	  the	  crises	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  Without	   the	   crisis	  of	  1976	  and	   the	   failure	  of	   the	  Labour	  government	   to	  deliver	   its	  manifesto	   commitments,	   the	   Thatcherite	   transformation	   that	   followed	   may	   never	   have	  occurred.	  By	  steering	  Britain	  away	  from	  policy	  options	  that	  would	  have	  severely	  challenged	  the	   liberal	   international	   economic	   order	   and	   threatened	   to	   halt	   the	   forward	   march	   of	  financial	  liberalisation,	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  IMF	  and	  Britain’s	  domestic	  opponents	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  welfare	  state	  established	  the	  preconditions	  for	  Thatcher’s	  radical	  break	  from	  the	  post-­‐war	  consensus.	  As	  American	  power	  pushed	  in	  upon	  Britain,	  social	  forces	  that	  were	  amenable	  to	  American	  priorities	  pulled	  in	  American	  discipline	  and	  endorsed	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  IMF.	  The	  network	   linkages	   that	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Fed	   had	   developed	   with	   other	   finance	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ministries	  and	  Central	  Banks	  during	  the	  1960s	  meant	  that	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Treasury	  were	  already	   entangled	   with	   American	   power	   and	   complicit	   with	   the	   agenda	   of	   promoting	  further	  liberalisation	  and	  undermining	  Keynesianism.	  	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  consensus	   fractured	   in	  synchronicity	  with	   the	  decomposition	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  order,	  as	  the	  frameworks	  of	  instituted	  power	  unravelled	  nationally	  and	  internationally	   in	   a	   highly	   interactive	   fashion.	   Within	   that	   unravelling	   and	   the	  reconstitution	  that	  began	  to	  emerge	  in	  place	  of	  Bretton	  Woods	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  state,	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	   channel	   of	   development	   played	   a	   crucial	   role.	   Not	   only	   in	   shaping	   the	  future	  of	  British	  development	  but	  also	   in	  enabling	  globalisation	  to	  continue	  apace,	  during	  the	  crisis	  decade	  of	  the	  1970s.	  The	  Labour	  government’s	   implementation	  of	   incomes	  policy	  and	   the	  acceptance	  of	  IMF	   austerity	   weakened	   Labour’s	   relationship	   with	   the	   unions	   and	   culminated	   in	   the	  ‘winter	  of	  discontent’,	  which	  was	  sparked	  by	  public	  sector	  unions	  in	  August	  1978	  (Glyn	  &	  Harrison,	  1980:	  118).	  	  Labour	  missed	  the	  opportunity	  to	  implement	  the	  AES	  and	  break	  from	  the	  dictates	  of	   the	  financial	  markets.	  By	  pushing	  the	  costs	  of	   the	  stagflationary	  crisis	  onto	  workers,	   the	   Labour	   government	   destroyed	   the	   political	   basis	   for	   a	   socialist	   strategy	   in	  Britain	  and	  ‘prepared	  the	  political	  conditions	  for	  the	  right’	  (Clarke,	  1987:	  418).	  	  But	   Labour	   did	   not	   arrive	   at	   that	   endpoint	   independently.	   The	   power	   of	   the	   U.S.,	  exerted	   through	   IMF	  conditionality,	  played	  a	  key	  steering	  role.	  That	   role	  was	  made	  much	  easier	  by	  the	  endorsement	  of	  monetarism	  and	  the	  rejection	  of	  Keynesian	  economic	  strategy	  by	  the	  City,	  the	  Tory	  Party	  and	  those	  within	  the	  government	  and	  the	  state	  who	  wanted	  to	  restructure	  Britain’s	  social	  democratic	  state.	  During	  the	  defining	  rule	  of	  Margaret	  Thatcher	  
	  	   273	  

















	  	   274	  
6	  	  	  Internalising	  Discipline	  
	  	  	  	  	  The	  Bank,	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Price	  Stability	  
	  
	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  election	  victory	   in	  May	  1979	  represented	  a	  definitive	  moment	   in	   the	  evolution	   of	   British	   politics.	   During	   her	   eleven	   years	   in	   office,	   Thatcher	   presided	   over	   a	  radical	   break	   from	   Britain’s	   post-­‐war	   consensus.	   Continuing	   what	   Callaghan	   had	   begun	  under	   the	   duress	   of	   the	   IMF,	   Thatcher	   signalled	   her	   intent	   to	   abolish	   the	   foundations	   of	  post-­‐war	  Keynesianism	  and	  usher	  in	  a	  new	  world	  of	  freer	  markets	  and	  monetarist	  theory.	  Thatcher’s	  political	  project,	  alongside	   the	  comparable	  policy	  programme	  of	  Ronald	  Reagan	   in	   the	   U.S.,	   was	   central	   to	   the	   ‘neoliberal’	   transformation	   of	   capitalism	   that	   got	  underway	   in	   earnest	   from	   the	   late	   1970s.	   	   Broadly	   defined,	   neoliberalism	   rests	   upon	   a	  commitment	   to	   the	   maximisation	   of	   human	   well-­‐being	   through	   enlarging	   the	   scope	   for	  individual,	   entrepreneurial	   freedoms	   and	   skills	   inside	   an	   institutional	   framework	  defined	  by,	   ‘strong	   private	   property	   rights,	   free	   markets,	   and	   free	   trade’	   (Harvey,	   2005:	   2).	   In	  Britain,	  neoliberalism	  was	  underpinned	  by	  a	  set	  of	  closely	  interrelated	  policy	  commitments,	  which	  were	  designed	  to	  roll	  back	  the	  social	  democratic	  welfare	  state	  and	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  market	  power	  through	  selective	  pro-­‐market	  state	  interventions	  and	  the	  restoration	  of	  a	  virile	   sense	   of	   law	   and	   order.	   The	   key	   policy	   measures	   included	   the	   re-­‐imposition	   of	  employers	   ‘right	   to	  manage’	   their	   employees,	   the	   strategic	   engagement	   and	  defeat	   of	   the	  labour	   movement,	   high	   interest-­‐rates	   to	   defeat	   inflation	   and	   restructure	   domestic	  manufacturing,	  the	  abolition	  of	  corporatist	  institutions,	  cuts	  to	  personal	  taxation	  rates,	  the	  privatisation	   of	   nationalised	   industries	   and	   the	   deregulation	   of	   other	   economic	   sectors	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(Peck	   &	   Tickell,	   2007:	   28).	   In	   the	   United	   States,	   Ronald	   Reagan’s	   Republican	   policies	  followed	   a	   remarkably	   similar	   pattern.	   Neoliberal	   ideology	   would	   go	   on	   to	   become	   the	  dominant	   framework	   through	   which	   capitalist	   globalisation	   was	   intensified	   during	   the	  1990s,	  under	  the	  rubric	  of	  the	  ‘Washington	  Consensus’	  (Gamble,	  2001:	  130).	  Trans-­‐Atlantic	  dynamics	  were	  essential	  to	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  British	  capitalism	  in	  the	   neoliberal	   era.	   Thatcher’s	   project,	   resting	   on	   the	   twin	   ideological	   pillars	   of	   the	   ‘free	  economy’	   and	   the	   ‘strong	   state’	   (Gamble,	   1994:	   6),	   occurred	   in	   a	   highly	   interactive	  synchronicity	   with	   the	   transformation	   of	   the	   American	   political	   economy	   under	   the	  stewardship	   of	   Paul	   Volcker	   at	   the	   Fed,	   and	   Ronald	   Reagan	   in	   the	   White	   House.	   The	  reconfiguration	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   capitalism	   along	   neoliberal	   lines	   sent	   shockwaves	  through	  the	  entire	  global	  political	  economy	  and	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  the	  dominance	  of	  neoliberal	   ideology	   and	   financial	   deregulation	   that	   defined	   the	   trajectory	   of	   global	  capitalism	   in	   the	   decades	   after.	   The	   increased	   financialisation	   of	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	  economies,	  and	  the	  decrease	  in	  wages	  associated	  with	  staunch	  anti-­‐inflationary	  politics,	  laid	  the	   foundations	   for	   the	   dependence	   on	   consumer	   borrowing	   and	   housing	   price	   inflation	  that	   would,	   in	   the	   longer	   term,	   sow	   the	   seeds	   for	   the	   global	   financial	   crisis	   of	   2008	  (Montogmerie,	   2006:	   122;	   Gamble,	   2009:	   453;	   Hay,	   2011:	   1). 114 	  Furthermore,	   the	  financialisation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy	  led	  to	  the	  massive	  capital	  inflows	  that	  underpinned	  U.S.	  fiscal	   policy	   during	   the	   Reagan	   era	   and	   beyond,	   as	   foreign	   investors	   reacted	   to	   the	   high	  interest	   rates	  and	   liberalised	  markets	   in	   the	  U.S.	   (Krippner,	  2012:	  104).	  The	   interest	   rate	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  By	  financialisation	  I	  here	  refer	  to	  the	  processes	  by	  which	  more	  and	  more	  aspects	  of	  social	  life	  and	  economic	   activity	   are	   drawn	   into	   the	   orbit	   of	   credit-­‐debtor	   relations	   centred	   upon	   liberalised	  financial	  markets	  which	  promote	  the	  deepening	  and	  extension	  of	  these	  relations.	  
	  	   276	  
shocks	   imposed	   by	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	  Bank	   also	   had	   an	   important	  North-­‐South	   dimension,	  producing	   a	   disastrous	   increase	   in	   borrowing	   costs	   for	   debtor	   countries	   from	   the	   Global	  South	   (Kiely,	   2007:	   202).	   An	   Anglo-­‐American	   heartland	   of	   debt-­‐driven	   consumption	   and	  financialisation	  would	   underpin	   the	   neoliberal	  model	   that	   imploded	   spectacularly	   during	  the	  2000s.	  	  Despite	   the	   interactivity	   of	   neoliberal	   political	   economy	   in	   both	   countries,	   the	  interconnections	   between	   monetary	   dynamics	   in	   Britain	   and	   America	   during	   the	   early	  years	   of	   the	   Thatcher-­‐Reagan	   era	   have	   scarcely	   been	   analysed.115	  The	   links	   between	  developments	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   have	   tended	   to	   be	   treated	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	  ideological	  synchronicity	  rather	  than	  institutional	  symbiosis.	  Consequently,	  although	  many	  accounts	   of	   the	   development	   of	   neoliberalism	   point	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   the	   ideological	  similarities	   between	  Thatcherism	  and	  Reaganism	   (Krieger,	   1986:	   17;	  Gamble,	   2001:	   129;	  Harvey,	  2005:	  22;	  Peck	  &	  Tickell,	  2007:	  28),	  there	  has	  been	  much	  less	  attention	  given	  to	  the	  fundamental	   interdependence	   and	   interconnectivity	   of	   the	   monetary	   policy	   regimes	  adopted	  in	  the	  early	  neoliberal	  period.	  	  What	  we	  are	  left	  with,	  then,	  is	  a	  notion	  of	  neoliberal	  synchronicity	   without	   an	   understanding	   of	   the	   underpinning	   processes	   of	   institutional	  symbiosis.	  It	  is	  these	  neglected	  symbiotic	  aspects	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  revolution	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  that	  this	  chapter	  highlights,	  by	  focusing	  upon	  the	  principal	  dynamics	  and	  consequences	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  115	  The	  notable	  exception	  here	   is	   a	  brief	  but	   revealing	  discussion	  of	   the	   impact	  of	   the	  adoption	  of	  monetary	   targeting	  within	   the	  Fed	  and	  the	   IMF	  upon	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	  the	  City’s	  attitudes	  towards	   monetarism	   and	   the	   eventual	   adoption	   of	   ‘technical	   monetarism’	   during	   the	   Callaghan-­‐Healey	   administration	   in:	   Bob	   Jessop,	   Kevin	   Bonnett,	   Simon	   Bromley,	   Tom	   Ling	   (1984)	  ‘Authoritarian	  Populism,	  Two	  Nations,	  and	  Thatcherism’,	  44,	  New	  Left	  Review	  I/147:	  32-­‐60.	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of	   financial	   liberalisation,	  monetarism	  and	  monetary	  policy	  between	  1979-­‐1982:	   the	   first	  phase	   of	   the	   Thatcher	   government’s	   economic	   strategy	   and	   the	   key	   period	   in	   which	   the	  ‘Volcker	  shock’	  was	  implemented	  in	  the	  U.S.	  I	  argue	  that	  by	  situating	  these	  processes	  within	  the	   broader	   lineage	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   and	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   transatlantic	  regulatory	  feedback	  loop	  identified	  in	  chapter	  four,	  we	  are	  able	  to	  identify	  key	  institutional	  complementarities	  which	  help	  account	  for	  the	  synchronicity	  of	  the	  simultaneous	  adoption	  of	  extreme	  tight	  money	  policies	  and	  financial	  liberalisation	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  America.	  The	  first	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  briefly	  examines	  the	  developing	  post	  Bretton-­‐Woods	  monetary	  system	  and	  its	  impact	  upon	  the	  strategic	  calculations	  of	  central	  bankers.	  I	  then	  examine	  the	  1979	   abolition	   of	   exchange	   controls	   in	   Britain,	   situating	   the	   process	   within	   the	   broader	  context	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   competition	   and	   integration,	   arguing	   that	   the	  liberalisation	   of	   exchange	   controls	   was	   a	   key	   component	   of	   an	   emerging	   form	   of	  ‘coordinated	  competition’	  between	  British,	  American	  and	  European	  monetary	  authorities.	  The	  third	  section	  of	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  political	  predominance	  of	  monetarism	  and	  its	  selective	   adoption	   by	   central	   bankers.	   In	   particular,	   I	   suggest	   that	   where	   monetarist	  methods	   of	   central	   banking	  were	   adopted,	   they	  were	   utilised	   in	   a	   pragmatic	   sense,	  with	  both	  the	  Fed	  and	  the	  Bank	  having	  to	  resist	  attempts	  by	  doctrinal	  monetarists	  within	  their	  respective	   governments	   who	   felt	   that	   more	   radical	   measures	   needed	   to	   be	   taken.	   The	  successful	  defence	  of	  Central	  Bank	  autonomy	  in	  the	  period	  was	  a	  key	  precondition	  for	  the	  increased	  significance	  and	  independence	  of	  Central	  Banks,	  which	  has	  defined	  the	  monetary	  politics	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Finally,	  the	  chapter	  explores	  the	  enabling	  preconditions	  of	  the	  early	   neoliberal	   Anglo-­‐American	   tight	   money	   regimes	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   development	   of	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financial	  markets	  and	  the	  transformation	  of	  financial	  regulations	  that	  was	  supported	  by	  the	  banks.	   The	   differential	   impacts	   of	   neoliberal	   central	   banking,	   upon	   banks,	  manufacturers	  and	  workers,	  are	  then	  briefly	  mapped	  out.	  The	   first	   phase	   of	   Thatcher’s	   premiership	   was	   defined	   by	   the	   commitment	   to	  implement	  monetarist	  policy	  techniques	  in	  order	  to	  squeeze	  inflation	  out	  of	  the	  economy,	  with	  the	  intention	  of	  restoring	  price	  stability	  by	  reducing	  inflationary	  expectations	  (Gamble,	  1994:	  101).	  Early	  Thatcherite	  policies	  corresponded	  with	  a	  related	  attempt	  by	  Paul	  Volcker,	  the	  newly	  appointed	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve,	  to	  stamp	  out	  inflation	  in	  the	  U.S.	  by	  adopting	   a	   monetarist	   approach	   to	   central	   banking	   and	   allowing	   interest	   rates	   to	   reach	  record	  levels.	  In	  both	  countries,	  monetarist	  ideas	  and	  techniques	  were	  embraced	  in	  order	  to	  provide	   an	   epistemic	   justification	   for	   the	   break	   from	   post-­‐war	   orthodoxy.	   And	   in	   both	  countries,	   tensions	  arose	  between	  the	  Central	  Bank	  and	  the	  executive,	  as	  monetary	  policy	  was	  accorded	  an	  unprecedented	  priority	  in	  the	  management	  of	  the	  economy.	  Both	  the	  Bank	  and	   the	   Fed	   adopted	   new	   approaches	   to	   the	   exercise	   of	  monetary	   policy	   and	   prioritised	  anti-­‐inflationary	   objectives	   above	   the	   pursuit	   of	   economic	   growth.	   In	   the	   process,	   they	  sparked	   off	   deep	   recessions	   that	   strengthened	   the	   power	   of	   their	   respective	   financial	  sectors,	  accelerated	  regressive	  wealth	  redistribution	  and	  damaged	  their	  manufacturing	  and	  export-­‐led	   sectors.	   Under	   the	   tight	   money	   regimes	   of	   the	   early	   neoliberal	   period,	   the	  Keynesian	   compromise,	   with	   its	   commitment	   to	   full	   employment	   and	   rising	   living	  standards,	  was	  torn	  apart	  in	  favour	  of	  anti-­‐inflationary	  politics	  and	  induced	  recession.	  As	   hosts	   to	   major	   international	   financial	   centres,	   Britain	   and	   America	   were	  particularly	   sensitive	   to	   the	   need	   to	   restore	   price	   stability	   and	   reverse	   the	   inflationary	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trend	  of	  the	  1970s,	  which	  had	  posed	  a	  major	  challenge	  to	  the	  profitability	  of	  bankers	  and	  investors,	  with	  inflation	  tending	  to	  damage	  creditor	  institutions	  (who	  saw	  the	  value	  of	  their	  savings	  eroded)	  and	  benefit	  debtors	  (who	  saw	  the	  real	  value	  of	  their	  debts	  depreciate).	  The	  adaptation	  of	  the	  financial	  sectors	  in	  both	  countries	  during	  the	  1970s,	  and	  the	  recalibration	  of	   monetary	   regimes	   during	   the	   early	   1980s,	   facilitated	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   monetary	  policy	   by	   cushioning	   the	   financial	   sector	   from	   the	   impact	   of	   interest	   rate	   shocks.	   In	   both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  monetary	  policy	  was	  being	  reconfigured	  to	  serve	  the	  needs	  of	  private	  financial	   power	   and	   hasten	   the	   development	   of	   globalising	   financial	   markets.	   This	  represented	  another	  key	  stage	   in	   the	  emerging	  developmental	   interdependence	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism	  and	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  deregulatory	  dynamics	  set	  in	  motion	  by	  the	  emergence	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  Overall,	   this	   chapter	   argues	   that	   the	   radicalisation	   of	   monetary	   policy	   and	   the	  primacy	   accorded	   to	   central	   banking	   marked	   a	   watershed	   in	   post-­‐war	   Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism,	  with	  enormous	   ramifications	   for	   the	  wider	  global	  political	   economy.	   It	   set	   the	  tone	   for	   the	   renewed	   importance	   of	   central	   banking	   in	   a	   neoliberal	   era	   defined	   by	   the	  massive	   growth	   in	   the	   power	   of	   financial	   markets	   and	   the	   heightened	   dependency	   of	  economic	   activity	   upon	   credit-­‐debt	   relations.	   It	   also	   highlighted	   one	   of	   the	   central	  deficiencies	   of	   neoliberal	   capitalism:	   the	   crucial	   role	   and	   enormous	   power	   of	   unelected	  central	  bankers	  in	  steering	  the	  economy	  and	  shaping	  society.	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  ‘technical	  dictates’	   of	   monetarism,	   with	   their	   pseudo-­‐scientific	   notions	   of	   necessity,	   represented	   a	  return	   to	   the	   classical	   gold	   standard	   insulation	   of	   central	   banking	   from	   public	  accountability	   and	   democratic	   openness.	   In	   the	   field	   of	   monetary	   policy,	   the	   technical	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determinacy	   implied	  by	  monetarist	   ideology	  was	  a	  key	  step	   towards	   the	  enshrinement	  of	  neoliberal	  political	  economy.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  monetarist	  attempt	  to	  crush	  inflation	  and	  depoliticise	  monetary	  policy,	   however,	   lay	   a	   contradiction.	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   attempted	   to	   tighten	  monetary	  control,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  while	  they	  accelerated	  financial	  liberalisation,	  on	  the	  other.	  These	  two	   goals	   were	   incompatible,	   rendering	   the	   pursuit	   of	   monetary	   targets	   ultimately	  unsuccessful.	  This	  was	  a	  result	  not	  only	  of	  this	  central	  contradiction	  in	  ambitions,	  but	  also	  because	  of	   the	  bogus	  theoretical	   foundations	  of	  monetarist	   ideology.	  Where	  radical	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   monetary	   strategies	   did	   succeed	   however,	   was	   in	   inflicting	   austerity,	   provoking	  recession,	  and	  dampening	  inflationary	  expectations	  in	  combination	  with	  strong	  anti-­‐union	  policies	   from	   the	   government.	   In	   reality,	   the	   restoration	   of	   capitalist	   class	   power	   was	   a	  central	   aim	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   austerity	   project	   and	   the	   downward	   push	   on	  wages,	   union	  rights	  and	  working	  conditions	  was	  a	  key	  component	  of	  this.	  These	  effects	  were	  foundational	  to	   the	   emergence	   of	   neoliberal	   capitalism	   and,	   through	   their	   demonstration	   effect,	   the	  broader	  reconfiguration	  of	  global	  capitalism	  (Streeck,	  2011:	  11-­‐14).	  
	  
Floating	  rates	  and	  the	  inflationary	  challenge	  
	  The	   collapse	   of	  Bretton	  Woods	   gradually	   led	   to	   the	   reconfiguration	  of	   national	  monetary	  regimes	  as	  states	  adjusted	  to	  the	  new	  system	  of	  floating	  rates.	  With	  the	  pound	  floating	  from	  1972	   onwards,	  monetary	   policy	  was	   no	   longer	   shaped	   by	   the	   requirement	   to	  maintain	   a	  fixed	  exchange	  rate.	  Relative	  to	  fiscal	  policy,	  monetary	  policy	  now	  became	  more	  important	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than	  before.	  In	  Britain,	  the	  emergence	  of	  new	  patterns	  of	  international	  monetary	  relations	  also	  presented	  an	  opportunity	  for	  monetarists	  to	  further	  advance	  their	  strategic	  priorities.	  After	   the	   fall	  of	  Ted	  Heath	   in	  1974,	  monetarists	  within	   the	  Conservative	  Party	  had	  risen	   to	   the	   top	   under	   the	   leadership	   of	   Thatcher.	   Geoffrey	  Howe	   and	  Nigel	   Lawson	   had	  begun	  to	  emerge	  as	  key	  monetarist	  figures	  within	  the	  Conservative	  Party.	  The	  Conservative	  Party’s	  new	  economic	  strategy	  was	  outlined	  in	  their	  1977	  document,	  ‘The	  Right	  Approach	  to	  
the	  Economy’.	  The	  paper	  set	  out	  their	  commitment	  to	   lower	  government	  spending,	  cuts	   in	  direct	  taxation	  and	  the	  containment	  of	  inflation.	  Combatting	  inflation	  was	  to	  be	  achieved	  by	  controlling	  the	  money	  supply	  and	  allowing	  the	  exchange	  rate	  to	  rise	  in	  order	  to	  lessen	  the	  impact	   of	   imported	   inflation	   (Keegan,	   1984:	   70).	   Thatcher’s	   new	   government	   were	  convinced	  that	  Heath’s	  ‘U-­‐turn’	  in	  1972	  had	  been	  a	  major	  mistake,	  and	  that	  a	  more	  resolute	  commitment	   to	   achieving	   price	   stability	   was	   required.	   Inflation	   was	   now	   viewed	   as	   the	  principal	  threat	  to	  social	  and	  political	  stability,	  and	  it	  was	  recognised	  that	  tough	  measures	  were	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  counter	  inflationary	  forces.	  By	  adopting	  a	  monetarist	   approach	   to	   inflation,	   the	  new	  Conservative	  government	  set	   themselves	   apart	   from	   the	   broader	   European	   strategy	   of	   anti-­‐inflationary	   politics.	   In	  March	   1979,	   the	   countries	   of	   the	   European	   Monetary	   System	   (including	   France,	   West	  Germany	  and	  Italy),	  established	  an	  Exchange	  Rate	  Mechanism	  by	  fixing	  their	  exchange	  rates	  to	   that	   of	   the	   Deutschmark	   (Johnson,	   1991:	   36;	   Stephens,	   1996:	   5).	   This	   was	   a	   key	  difference	   from	   the	  approach	   taken	  by	  Britain	  and,	   crucially,	   the	  United	  States.	  While	   the	  Europeans	  would	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  price	  stability	  and	  arrest	  inflation	  by	  tying	  themselves	  into	   a	   regional	   fixed	   exchange	   rate	   system,	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	  went	   about	   internalising	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monetary	  discipline	  through	  the	  turn	  towards	  monetarism	  and	  the	  pursuit	  of	  unorthodox	  monetary	   policies.	   But	   this	   was	   never	   simply	   a	   question	   of	   technical	   adjustments	   to	   the	  intricacies	   of	   international	   monetary	   politics.	   Monetarism,	   and	   the	   austerity	   that	   it	  advocated	   as	   a	   cure	   to	   inflationary	   dynamics,	   was	   always	   about	   the	   restoration	   of	   class	  power	   too.	   Workers	   expectations	   of	   rising	   wages	   and	   improving	   living	   standards,	   a	   key	  component	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   capitalist	   compromise,	   would	   be	   driven	   down	   during	   the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Not	  just	  by	  the	  monetary	  tightening,	  but	  also	  by	  the	  imposition	  of	  anti-­‐union	  laws	  and	  the	  provocation	  of	  set	  piece	  engagements	  between	  unions	  and	  the	  state.	  Even	  before	  taking	  up	  the	  reins	  as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  in	  August	  1979,	  Paul	  Volcker	  was	  clearly	  aware	  of	  the	  need	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  internalise	  discipline.	  	  Volcker	  felt	  that	  more	  than	  a	  decade	  of	  mounting	  inflation	  had	  undermined	  the	  validity	  of	  interest	  rates	  as	   a	   guide	   for	   monetary	   policy	   (due	   to	   the	   difference	   between	   nominal	   and	   real	   rates),	  weakening	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   Fed	   and	   leading	   to	   uncertain	   expectations	   over	   price	  fluctuations.	  Under	  the	  pressure	  of	  monetary	  instability	  and	  inflationary	  forces,	  the	  ‘fabric	  of	   discipline’,	   was	   ‘fraying	   at	   the	   edges’	   (Volcker,	   1978a:	   9)	  Whereas	   expectations	   were	  formerly	  stabilised	  through	  the	  gold	  standard,	  the	  doctrine	  of	  the	  balanced	  budget	  and	  fixed	  exchange	  rates,	  those	  disciplines	  had	  either	  dissolved	  altogether	  or	  were,	  ‘so	  attenuated	  as	  to	  be	  meaningless’	  (Volcker,	  1978b:	  332).	  As	  a	  consequence,	  the	  United	  States	  would	  now	  have	  to	  discipline	  itself	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  163).	  Within	   this	   context,	   targeting	  monetary	   aggregates	   could	   provide	   a	   useful	   tool	   for	  communicating	  expectations	  to	  the	  public	  and	  restoring	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  Fed.	  Targeting	  aggregates	  could	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  discipline	  on	  the	  monetary	  authorities	  themselves.	  Volcker	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was	   not,	   however,	   a	   card	   carrying	   monetarist.	   He	   recognised	   that	   inflation	   was	   not	  exclusively	   a	   consequence	   of	   movements	   in	   the	   money	   supply,	   but	   stemmed	   from	   a	  complex	   combination	   of	   social,	   economic	   and	   political	   factors	   (Volcker,	   1978b:	   338).	   As	  Volcker’s	   stewardship	  of	   the	  Fed	  would	  subsequently	  demonstrate,	  his	  was	  a	  much	  more	  pragmatic	  and	  politically	  motivated	  approach.	  The	  strategy	  outlined	  by	  Volcker	  could	  only	  be	  undertaken	  within	  the	  context	  of	  the	  floating	   rates	   that	   followed	   on	   from	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	  Woods.	   Within	   the	   Bank	   of	  England,	  it	  was	  this	  very	  same	  international	  monetary	  context	  that	  helped	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  monetary	   targets,	  which	  were	  now	  viewed	  by	  some	  officials	  as	  key	   to	   ‘filling	   the	  vacuum’	  left	  by	  the	  abolition	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  (BofE,	  C40/1440:	  1978).116	  	  Mirroring	  the	  view	  taken	  by	  Volcker	   at	   the	  Fed,	  Bank	  officials	  were	   increasingly	  willing	   to	   employ	  monetary	  targeting	  in	  a	  pragmatic	  rather	  than	  principled	  manner.	  With	  demand	  management	  policies	  now	  delegitimised	  by	  their	  supposedly	  inflationary	  impacts,	  and	  the	  absence	  of	  fixed	  rates	  as	   a	   reference	   point	   for	   the	   judgement	   of	   economic	   policy,	  monetary	   targets	   became	   the	  new	  yardstick	   for	   judging	  macroeconomic	  performance	   in	  an	   inflationary	  age.	   	  No	   longer	  restrained	   by	   the	   requirement	   to	   maintain	   fixed	   parities,	   monetary	   authorities	   on	   both	  sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	   allowed	   interest	   rates	   to	   be	   pushed	   much	   higher	   with	   much	   more	  severe	  fluctuations	  in	  the	  exchange	  rate.	  Internationally,	  it	  was	  this	  context	  that	  enabled	  the	  interest	   rate	   shocks	   that	   characterised	   the	   early	   years	   of	   the	   neoliberal	   period	   in	  Britain	  and	  America.	  National	  and	  international	  monetary	  orders	  were	  continuing	  to	  develop	  in	  a	  highly	   interactive	   fashion.	   Neoliberal	   central	   banking	   has	   to	   be	   understood	   within	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  116	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives,	   C40/1440,	   ‘Monetary	   Policy:	   Miscellaneous	   18/9/78-­‐31/10/79’,	  Internal	  Memo,	  ‘Monetary	  Targets	  and	  Economic	  Policy’,	  September	  28th	  1978.	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broader	   context	   of	   the	   constraints,	   contingencies,	   and	   capacities	   of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system.	  For	   both	   Britain	   and	   America,	   the	   desire	   was	   not	   only	   to	   dampen	   inflation	   as	   a	  means	  to	  achieve	  price	  stability	  domestically,	  but	  also	  to	  restore	  the	  international	  value	  of	  their	  respective	  currencies.	  Given	  the	  international	  key	  currency	  role	  of	  the	  dollar,	  this	  was	  clearly	  a	  central	  strategic	  priority	  for	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  world	  was	  now	  effectively	  on	  a	  dollar	  standard,	  which	  required	  stable	  expectations	  about	  the	  dollar’s	  future	  value	  in	  order	  to	  effectively	  underpin	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  and	  maintain	  the	  attractiveness	  of	   American	   financial	   assets	   and	  U.S.	   Treasury	   bonds	   (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	   2012:	   163).	   For	  Britain,	  the	  immediate	  appeal	  of	  a	  strong	  pound	  is	  at	  first	  less	  clear.	  But	  examining	  the	  Bank	  of	  England’s	  archival	  record	  illuminates	  the	  motivations.	  Within	  the	  Bank,	  the	  exchange	  rate	  of	  the	  pound	  was	  now	  identified	  as	  a	  key	  factor	  in	  the	  battle	  to	  counter	  inflation.	  A	  further	  OPEC	  oil	  price	  hike	  in	  spring	  of	  1979	  meant	  that	  prices	   had	   nearly	   redoubled	   over	   the	   last	   year.	   Speaking	   at	   the	   Bank	   of	   England’s	   Court	  meeting,	  Gordon	  Richardson,	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  recognised	  that	  a	  fall	  in	  the	  strength	  of	   the	   pound	   during	   the	   1976	   crisis	   had	   led	   to	   an	   increase	   in	   inflation,	   with	   companies	  raising	   prices	   to	  meet	   the	   increased	   cost	   of	   imports.	   Richardson	  made	   clear	   the	   need	   to,	  ‘avoid	  the	  inflationary	  impact	  of	  a	  lower	  rate’	  and	  also	  mentioned	  that	  some	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy,	  ‘sought	  to	  benefit	  from	  a	  high	  rate’	  (BofE,	  1979:	  G37/3).117	  	  The	  anti-­‐inflationary	  priority	  was	  now	   firmly	  entrenched	  within	   the	  Bank’s	   thinking	  and	   the	  maintenance	  of	   a	  high	  exchange	  rate	  was	  seen	  as	  central	  to	  achieving	  this	  objective.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	  	   Bank	   of	   England	   Archives	   G37/3,	   ‘Court	   of	   Directors:	   Informal	   Records	   16/1/75-­‐31/12/80’,	  ‘Notes	  From	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Court	  Meeting’,	  24th	  May	  1979.	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The	   Bank’s	   anti-­‐inflationary	   stance	   reflected	   not	   only	   the	   priorities	   of	   the	   new	  Conservative	  government,	  whose	  monetarist	  economic	  advisers	  were	  strongly	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  floating	  pound,	  but	  also	  a	  broader	  shift	  in	  international	  opinion.	  This	  emerging	  consensus	  on	  the	  need	  for	  anti-­‐inflationary	  policies	  to	  be	  prioritised	  over	  and	  above	  the	  expansion	  of	  economic	  growth	  was	  clearly	  expressed	  in	  a	  Bank	  report	  on	  the	  October	  1979	  IMF	  meeting	  in	  Belgrade.	  Government	  officials	  from	  around	  the	  world	  had	  become	  much	  less	  confident	  about	   their	   capacity	   to	   curb	   inflation,	   with	   many	   now	   concluding	   that,	   ‘gradualism	   will	  simply	  not	  work	  in	  slowing	  down	  inflation’.	  In	  this	  context,	  it	  was	  felt	  that	  a	  sharp	  recession,	  at	   least	   as	   sharp	   as	   that	   of	   1974,	   was	   now	   required	   in	   order	   to	   adjust	   inflationary	  expectations	  (BofE,	  1979:	  G1/210).118	  Despite	  all	  of	  the	  focus	  on	  monetary	  aggregates	  and	  targets,	  then,	  the	  real	  strategy	  for	  combating	  inflation	  was	  an	  induced	  recession	  to	  slacken	  demand,	  provoke	  unemployment	  and	  produce	  spare	  capacity.	  This	  would	  hopefully	  lead	  to	  falling	   prices.	   Creative	   destruction	   would	   pave	   the	   way	   for	   stable	   accumulation	   in	   the	  future.	  For	  monetary	  policy	   to	   be	   effective,	   interest	   rates	  would	  have	   to	   be	   pushed	  much	  higher	  than	  before.	  This	  was	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  inflation	  upon	  real	  interest	  rates	  (making	   them	   negative	   unless	   they	   were	   sufficiently	   high),	   but	   also	   a	   result	   of	   the	  Euromarkets.	   The	   supply	   of	   liquidity	   available	   within	   the	   Euromarkets	   had	   eroded	   the	  efficacy	  of	  monetary	  policy	  as	  a	  means	  to	  curb	  inflationary	  pressures,	  meaning	  that	  it	  would	  now	  have	   to	  be	  much	   tighter	   than	   it	  had	  been	   in	   the	  past	   to	  effect	  a	   comparable	   slowing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives,	   G1/210,	   ‘Governor’s	   File:	   The	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	   and	  International	   Bank	   of	   Reconstruction	   and	   Development-­‐	   Christopher	   William	   Mcmahon’s	  Impressions	   of	   the	   Annual	   General	   Meetings	   10/76-­‐10/79-­‐:	   ‘Thoughts	   after	   the	   IMF/Belgrade	  Meeting’,	  October	  1979.	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Opening	  the	  floodgates	  
	  Abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls	  was	  one	  of	  the	  first	  and	  most	  important	  actions	  of	  the	  new	  Conservative	   government.	   Exchange	   liberalisation	   accorded	   with	   the	   philosophical	  commitment	  to	  extend	  the	  scope	  of	  markets	  forces	  to	  the	  widest	  possible	  degree	  (Keegan,	  1984:	   149).	   The	   Bank	   had	   long	   called	   for	   an	   end	   to	   controls	   and	   set	   to	   work	   providing	  technical	  justifications	  for	  the	  process.	  In	  June	  and	  July	  of	  1979,	  the	  Chancellor	  removed	  all	  restrictions	   on	   the	   financing	   of	   outward	   investment,	   enabled	   British	   merchants	   to	   use	  sterling	   in	   order	   to	   finance	   third	   country	   trade,	   substantially	   reduced	   controls	   on	  individuals	  and	  began	  to	  liberalise	  portfolio	  controls	  by	  allowing	  securities	  denominated	  in	  European	  Community	  currencies	  or	  issued	  by	  international	  organisations	  of	  which	  Britain	  was	  a	  member	  to	  be	  purchased	  with	  official	  exchange	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).119	  Bank	   officials	   were	   tasked	   with	   strategic	   planning	   for	   the	   further	   removal	   of	   the	  remaining	   portfolio	   controls	   and	   began	   to	   evaluate	   the	   actual	   and	   anticipated	   effects.	   In	  general,	   officials	   felt	   that	   once	   most	   controls	   had	   been	   removed	   it	   became	   logically	  necessary	   to	  dismantle	  what	  was	   left	  and	  expressed	  concerns	   that	   failure	   to	  do	  so	  would	  provoke	   a,	   ‘very	   critical	   reaction’,	   from	   media	   commentators	   and	   the	   City-­‐	   the	   same	  interests	   that	   had	   championed	   the	   monetarist	   cause	   throughout	   the	   1970s	   (BofE,	  1979:EC5/649).	  It	  was	  expected	  that	  abolition	  of	  controls	  would	  lead	  to	  greater	  purchases	  of	   overseas	   assets	   by	   British	   residents,	   producing	   net	   capital	   outflows.	   But	   the	   extent	   to	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  Bank	  of	  England	  Archives,	  EC5/649,	  ‘Exchange	  Control	  Act	  File:	  Relaxations-­‐	  Papers	  Covering	  the	  Relaxation	  and	  Dismantling	  of	  Exchange	  Controls	  6/9/79-­‐17/9/79’:	   ‘The	  next	  stage	  in	  dismantling	  exchange	  controls’,	  September	  7th	  1979.	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which	   this	   occurred	  was	   likely	   to	   depend	   upon	   the	   strength	   of	   confidence	   in	   the	   British	  economy.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  Bank’s	  thinking	  on	  the	  issue	  can	  broadly	  be	  split	  into	  three	  distinct	   components:	   the	   impact	   upon	   fiscal	   and	   monetary	   policy,	   the	   impact	   upon	  international	  regulatory	  dynamics	  and,	  finally,	  the	  impact	  upon	  the	  future	  of	  sterling.	  Regarding	   fiscal	   and	   monetary	   policy,	   officials	   recognised	   that	   the	   abolition	   of	  controls	  was	  likely	  to	  have	  profound	  effects.	   	  One	  key	  impact	  would	  be	  upon	  the	  potential	  growth	  of	  offshore	  banking.	  If	  UK	  residents	  were	  allowed	  to	  borrow	  sterling	  deposits	  from	  overseas	   then	   a	   growth	   in	   offshore	   banking	   could	   occur,	   which	   might	   lead	   to,	   ‘possible	  adverse	   consequences	   for	   the	   control	   of	   the	   UK	   money	   supply’	   (BofE,	   1979:	   EC5/649).	  British	  authorities	  were	  now	  facing	  a	  very	  similar	  dilemma	  to	  that	  faced	  by	  the	  U.S.	  after	  the	  rapid	  growth	  of	  American	  banks’	  involvement	  in	  the	  Euromarkets.	  The	  offshore	  dollar	  pool	  had	  reduced	  the	  Fed’s	  capacity	   to	  manage	   the	  credit	  supply	  by	  providing	  an	  escape	  valve	  through	   which	   U.S.	   banks	   could	   borrow	   abroad	   in	   order	   to	   lend	   on	   to	   their	   domestic	  branches	   and	   circumvent	   tight	  money	  policy	   at	   home.	  With	   sterling	   liberalised,	   the	   same	  erosion	   of	   national	   monetary	   control	   would	   now	   begin	   to	   affect	   the	   British	   authorities.	  Financial	   liberalisation	  was	  continuing	   to	  unsettle	  monetary	  regimes	  on	  both	  sides	  of	   the	  Atlantic.	  It	  was	  understood	  by	  the	  Bank	  that	  the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls	  ensured	  that	  Britain’s	   banking	   system,	   ‘loses	   a	   degree	   of	   insulation	   from	   the	  world	  monetary	   system’	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).120	  This	  inevitably	  exposed	  Britain	  to	  new	  problems	  arising	  from	  the	  interaction	   between	   domestic	   and	   external	   pressures.	   The	   Bank	   clearly	   understood	   how	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  ‘Monetary	  Policy	  and	  the	  Banking	  System’,	  September	  13th	  1979.	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this	   might	   undermine	   the	   government’s	   policy	   goals,	   commenting	   that,	   ‘it	   could	   pose	  problems	  for	  both	  the	  techniques	  and	  efficacy	  of	  monetary	  controls	  in	  the	  situation	  where	  effective	   controls	   of	   the	   money	   supply	   and	   declining	   monetary	   targets	   were	   the	   centre	  piece	   of	   the	  Government’s	   economic	   strategy’	   (BofE,	   1979:	   EC5/649).	   In	   the	  past,	   British	  authorities	   had	   relied	   upon	   direct	   controls	   over	   lending	   (apart	   from	   the	   disastrous	   and	  abortive	  attempt	  to	  do	  away	  with	  them	  during	  CCC)	  in	  order	  to	  control	  the	  money	  supply.	  These	  controls	  operated	  by	  restricting	  the	  growth	  of	  either	  part	  or	  all	  of	  the	  banks’	  balance	  sheets	  or	  by	  taxing	  the	  banking	  system	  by	  forcing	  them	  to	  hold	  assets	  at	  the	  Central	  Bank	  that	  they	  would	  not	  ordinarily	  hold.	  The	  problem	  now	  was	  that	  full	  liberalisation	  of	  sterling	  would	   produce	   a	   situation	   whereby	   banks	   could	   easily	   circumvent	   such	   controls	   by	  persuading	  their	  customers	  to	  switch	  their	  deposits	  and	  borrowing	  to	  an	  overseas	  branch.	  It	  would	  also	  enable	  overseas	  banks,	  which	  weren’t	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  controls,	  to	  extend	  their	  sterling	  operations	  in	  the	  domestic	  money	  market	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).	  At	   the	   very	  moment	  when	   the	   new	   Conservative	   government	   had	   come	   to	   power	  espousing	  the	  virtues	  of	  monetary	  control	  and	  price	  stability,	  then,	  the	  abolition	  of	  controls	  was	   totally	   undermining	   the	   existing	   framework	   of	  monetary	   control.	   This	  was	   the	   great	  contradiction	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   the	  monetarist	   attempt	   to	   quell	   inflation.	   The	   government’s	  incompetence	  here	  was	  unsurprising,	  given	  that	  monetary	  policy	  had	  actually	  received	  very	  little	  attention	  from	  the	  Tories	  while	  they	  were	  in	  opposition,	  leaving	  them	  unprepared	  for	  the	  technical	  details	  of	  monetary	  reform	  and	  confused	  over	  monetary	  policy	  matters	  upon	  their	  arrival	   in	  office	   (Keegan,	  1984:	  124).	  The	  aspiration	   towards	  price	   stability	   through	  reining	   in	   the	   money	   supply	   was	   entirely	   at	   odds	   with	   financial	   liberalisation.	   Offshore	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banking	  was	  undermining	  British	  monetary	  control	  in	  a	  remarkably	  parallel	  fashion	  to	  the	  erosion	   of	   American	   monetary	   control	   during	   the	   1960s	   as	   the	   existence	   of	   offshore	  markets	   corroded	   the	   institutional	   conditions	   of	   onshore	   finance.	   	   Indeed,	   officials	   noted	  that	   similar	   processes	   had	   already	   caused	   serious	   problems	   for	   monetary	   authorities	   in	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Germany	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).	  The	   decision	   over	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   exchange	   controls	  was	   not,	   however,	   taken	  solely	   in	   accordance	   with	   considerations	   about	   the	   efficacy	   of	   British	   monetary	   control.	  Abolition	   of	   exchange	   controls	   occurred	   against	   a	   backdrop	   of	   wider	   international	  regulatory	  competition	  in	  which	  competition	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  centre	  stage.	  In	   the	   run	   up	   to	   the	   decision	   to	   liberalise,	   the	   Bank	   produced	   detailed	   reports	   on	   the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls	  in	  both	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Japan	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).121	  Anglo-­‐American	  competition	  to	  attract	  Eurodollar	  business	  into	  their	  respective	  financial	  centres	  provided	  the	  definitive	  context	  within	  which	  the	  decision	  over	  liberalisation	  occurred.	  	  We	  should,	  therefore,	  view	  the	  decision	  to	  further	  liberalise	  exchange	  controls	  and	  further	  open	  up	  the	  City’s	  financial	  markets	  within	  the	  broader	  lineage	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  and	  the	  competition	  between	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  which	  lay	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  this	  process.	  Liberalisation	   was	   not	   simply	   a	   consequence	   of	   philosophical	   preferences	   towards	   free	  markets,	  but	  rather	  a	  response	  to	  the	  competitive	  challenge	  posed	  by	  New	  York.	  In	   the	   year	   before	   Thatcher	   came	   to	   power,	   the	   New	   York	   Clearing	   House	  Association	   made	   a	   crucial	   proposal.	   It	   stipulated	   that	   New	   York	   should	   be	   granted	   a	  specialised	  status	  as	  a	  “monetary	  free	  trade	  zone”.	  The	  plan	  was	  essentially	  an	  attempt	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  	  Exchange	  Controls	  in	  the	  USA,	  July	  26th	  1979;	  Japan	  Exchange	  Control,	  July	  26th	  1979.	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draw	  offshore	  banking	  back	  into	  the	  U.S.	  by	  encouraging	  both	  American	  and	  foreign	  banks	  to	   establish	   “International	   Banking	   Branches”	   (IBBs)	   in	   New	   York	   (BofE,	   1978:	  4A115/3).122	  This	   proposal	   posed	   a	  major	   competitive	   challenge	   to	   London’s	   status	   as	   a	  centre	  for	  offshore	  banking	  and	  was	  undertaken	  by	  the	  New	  York	  authorities	  with	  exactly	  this	   intention	   in	  mind.	  By	  drawing	   the	   rapidly	  expanding	  offshore	  banking	  business	  back	  into	  New	  York,	  it	  was	  hoped	  that	  major	  benefits	  would	  accrue	  to	  the	  city,	  the	  U.S.	  Treasury	  and	   the	   banks	   themselves.	   American	   regulators	   were	   now	   on	   the	   front	   foot	   in	   their	  attempts	  to	  restore	  New	  York’s	  pre-­‐eminence	  as	  a	  centre	  for	  global	  banking	  and	  it	  was	  the	  City	  of	  London,	  given	   its	   status	  as	   the	  principal	   location	   for	  Euromarket	  business	  and	   for	  overseas	  American	  banks,	  that	  could	  potentially	  stand	  to	  lose	  out.	  It	  was	  no	  surprise,	  then,	  that	  Bank	  officials	  paid	  careful	  attention	  to	  developments	  on	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  Under	  the	  new	  scheme	  IBBs	  would	  be	  able	  to	  make	  loans	  to,	  and	  take	  deposits	  from,	  overseas	  borrowers,	  without	  being	  encumbered	  by	  the	  reserve	  requirements	  and	  interest	  rate	   controls	   that	  were	   applied	  within	   the	   U.S.	   This	   constituted	   an	   attempt	   by	   American	  regulators	   and	   bankers	   to	   consciously	   and	   strategically	   reproduce	   the	   kind	   of	   conditions	  that	  had	  drawn	  American	  banks	  into	  the	  City	  of	  London’s	  Euromarkets	  en	  masse	  during	  the	  1960s.	  The	  plan	  would	  require	  the	  amendment	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  Regulation	  D,	  which	  as	  part	  of	  the	  New	  Deal	   regulatory	   framework	   governed	   the	   reserve	   requirements	   for	   banks	   in	   the	  U.S.	   And	   crucially,	   the	   plan	   would	   also	   require	   the	   amendment	   of	   Regulation	   Q,	   which	  prohibited	  payment	  of	  interest	  on	  deposits	  that	  fell	  short	  of	  30	  days	  (BofE,	  1978:	  4A115/3).	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	  Bank	   of	   England	   Archives,	   4A115/3,	   ‘Monetary	   Analysis:	   External	   Development	   and	   Policy	  Meetings	  4/1/78-­‐28/12/79’,	  Memo	  from	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  Overseas	  Department,	  ‘New	  York	  as	  a	  Free	  Trade	  Banking	  Zone’,	  May	  31st	  1978.	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The	  competitive	  dynamics	  between	  rival	  financial	  centres,	  New	  York	  and	  London,	  were	  
now	  driving	   the	   further	  erosion	  of	   the	  New	  Deal	   regulatory	  architecture	   in	   the	  U.S.	  and	   the	  
homogenisation	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  regulatory	  regimes,	  as	  American	  authorities	  attempted	  to	  
bring	   offshore	   business	   back	   under	   American	   territorial	   auspices	   by	   aping	   the	   regulatory	  
climate	  of	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  The	  transatlantic	  regulatory	  feedback	  loop	  was	  continuing	  to	  have	  an	  enormous	  impact	  on	  regulatory	  frameworks	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  Existing	  accounts	  of	  American	   financial	   deregulation	  during	   the	  Volcker	   era	  have	  understated	   the	  centrality	   of	   these	   Anglo-­‐American	   competitive	   dynamics	   (Greider,	   1987:	   155;	   Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  169;	  Krippner,	  2012:	  73).	  For	   the	   Americans,	   it	  was	   thought	   that	   bringing	   the	   business	   back	   into	  New	  York	  would	  bring	  substantial	  benefits.	  Repatriating	  offshore	  banking	  business	  would	  recover	  tax	  revenue	  that	  the	  federal	  government	  had	  previously	  lost	  out	  on,	  while	  the	  plan	  might	  boost	  the	  local	  New	  York	  economy	  (at	  a	  time	  when	  the	  city	  had	  been	  through	  a	  major	  fiscal	  crisis	  only	   a	   few	   years	   previously)	   by	   restoring	   the	   city’s	   prestige	   as	   an	   international	   banking	  centre	   and	   drawing	   in	   some	   portion	   of	   the	   Eurobond	   underwriting	   activities	   that	   were	  currently	  undertaken	   in	  London.	   It	  was	  anticipated	  that	   these	  developments	  might	  create	  between	   four	   to	   six	   thousand	   jobs	   (BofE,	   1978:	   4A115/3).	   Unlike	   Britain,	   the	   regulatory	  transformations	   in	   the	   U.S.	   were	   also	   motivated	   in	   part	   by	   internal	   competition	   at	   the	  federal	   level,	  reflecting	  the	  differential	  geographical	  and	  constitutional	  composition	  of	   the	  U.S.	   Regulators	   in	   New	   York	   were	   keen	   to	   take	   action	   before	   rival	   cities	   in	   other	   states	  
within	  the	  U.S.,	  such	  as	  Florida,	  Delaware,	  Chicago	  and	  Houston,	  acted	  on	  similar	  schemes.	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In	  the	  U.S.	  then,	  the	  decomposition	  of	  regulatory	  regimes	  was	  motivated	  not	  only	  by	  trans-­‐Atlantic	  competition,	  but	  also	  by	  inter-­‐federal	  competition.	  Although	   attentive	   to	   the	   potential	   competitive	   challenge	   from	  New	  York,	   officials	  within	   the	  Bank	   remained	   fairly	   sanguine	  over	   the	  effects	  of	   the	  proposed	   changes.	  They	  recognised	  that	  the	  Fed	  may	  well	   filibuster	  the	  proposal	   from	  New	  York,	   in	  an	  attempt	  to	  maintain	   monetary	   control	   in	   the	   face	   of	   potential	   leakage	   of	   funds	   between	   IBB	   and	  domestic	   markets,	   and	   noted	   that	   the	   Fed	   had	   rejected	   a	   similar	   proposal	   in	   1975	   on	  precisely	   these	   grounds.	   The	   new	   proposal	   was	   emerging	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   Fed	   was	  sensitive	   to	   its	   weakening	   control	   over	   the	   U.S.	   monetary	   system,	   with	   declining	  membership	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   System	   by	   American	   banks	   already	   a	  major	   concern	  (BofE,	  1978:	  4A115/3).	  Beyond	   their	   circumspect	   appraisal	   of	   the	   Fed’s	   likely	   attitude	   to	   the	   New	   York	  proposal,	  Bank	  officials	  also	  continued	  to	  extol	  the	  virtues	  of	  the	  London	  markets.	  Officials	  noted	  that	  London	  would	  still	  have	  a	  number	  of	  attractions	  compared	  to	  New	  York,	  even	  if	  the	   plan	  went	   ahead.	   It	  was	   felt	   that	   London	   had	   two	  major	   advantages	   over	  New	  York.	  Firstly,	   its	   geographic	   location	   gave	   it	   a	   temporal	   overlap	   with	   continental	   Europe	   that	  increased	   its	   attractiveness	   as	   an	   entry	   point	   into	   European	  markets.	   And	   secondly,	   the	  expertise	   built	   up	   in	   London	   over	   decades	   at	   the	   centre	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	  was	   also	   an	  enduring	   strength.	   In	   general,	   Bank	   officials	   accepted	   the	   view	   expressed	   by	   New	   York	  bankers;	  that	  the	  scheme	  wouldn’t	  pose	  any	  more	  of	  a	  threat	  to	  London	  than	  other	  offshore	  centres	  already	  did	  (BofE,	  1978:	  4A115/3).	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The	  proposals	  of	  the	  New	  York	  Clearing	  House	  Association	  were	  clearly	  intended	  as	  a	  competitive	  challenge	  to	  existing	  offshore	  centres	  and	  were	  subsequently	  approved	  by	  the	  Fed’s	  Board	  of	  Governors	  in	  June	  1981	  in	  the	  form	  of	  ‘International	  Banking	  Facilities’.	  The	  Fed	   eventually	   accepted	   the	   proposals:	   partly	   because	   earlier	   attempts	   to	   regulate	   the	  Euromarkets	   had	   failed.	  Between	  1978	   and	  1981,	   the	  Euromarkets	   and	  offshore	  banking	  were	   central	   to	   the	   interactions	   between	   British	   and	   American	   monetary	   authorities.	  Volcker	  and	  other	  officials	  at	  the	  Fed	  were	  wary	  of	  the	  Euromarkets	  impact	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  American	  monetary	  policy	  and	  believed	  that	  the	  absorption	  of	  Eurodollar	  funds	  into	  the	  U.S.	  money	  market,	  during	  a	  period	  of	  tight	  monetary	  policy,	  would	  undermine	  attempts	  to	  squeeze	   the	   credit	   supply.	   This	   had	   been	   the	   case	   in	   the	   late	   1960s,	   as	  we	   have	   seen	   in	  chapter	   four.	  But	  by	   the	   late	  1970s,	   the	  Eurodollar	  market	  had	  grown	  even	   larger	  and	  by	  1981	  the	  Eurodollar	  market	  was	  estimated	  to	  have	  grown	  to	  the	  size	  of	  approximately	  10%	  of	  the	  U.S.	  M3	  money	  supply.	  As	  such,	  it	  constituted	  a	  major	  source	  of	  additional	  money	  that	  was	  not	  directly	  subject	  to	  the	  policy	  operations	  of	  the	  Fed	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  135).	  Faced	   with	   the	   challenge	   of	   Eurodollar	   leakage,	   the	   Fed	   attempted	   to	   build	  international	   support	   for	   an	   attempt	   to	   encourage	   Central	   Banks	   to	   impose	   reserve	  requirements	  upon	  the	  international	  operations	  of	  their	  national	  banks	  and	  thus	  introduce	  reserve	  requirements	   for	  all	  Eurodollar	  activity.	  This	  was	   intended	   to	  arrest	   the	  market’s	  growth	  and	   limit	   its	  negative	   impact	  upon	  national	  monetary	  policy	  autonomy.	  But	  when	  the	  Fed	   took	   the	  plan	   to	   the	  BIS,	   it	  met	  stiff	   resistance	   from	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  and	   the	  Swiss	   National	   Bank,	   which	   hosted	  major	   Euromarkets	   centres.	   By	   April	   1980,	   after	   the	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Bundesbank	   had	   also	   rejected	   the	   plan,	   the	   proposal	   had	   been	   entirely	   scuppered	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  137).	  Through	   its	   failed	  attempt	   to	   regulate	   the	  Euromarkets,	   the	  Fed	  demonstrated	   the	  difficulty	  of	  trying	  to	  lead	  cooperative	  action	  to	  regulate	  international	  financial	  markets.	  If	  the	   plan	   had	   gone	   ahead,	   it	   might	   well	   have	   substantially	   arrested	   the	   trend	   towards	  deregulation	   and	   financial	   liberalisation.	   But	   the	   failure	   of	   the	   Fed’s	   regulatory	   efforts	  meant	   that	   the	   growth	   of	   international	   financial	   markets	   continued	   apace.	   As	   a	  consequence,	   the	   international	   trend	   towards	   deregulation	   and	   openness	   continued	   as	  foreign	  governments	  made	  every	  effort	  to,	  ‘create	  markets	  that	  would	  match	  conditions	  in	  London	   and	   the	   United	   States	   in	   order	   to	   attract	   footloose	   global	   financial	   operators’	  (Helleiner,	  1994:	  139).	  The	   failure	   of	   the	   Fed’s	   attempt	   to	   regulate	   the	   Euromarkets	   was	   not	   simply	   a	  consequence	  of	   opposition	   from	   foreign	  Central	  Banks.	  American	  banks	   themselves	  were	  now	   actively	   lobbying	   for	   further	   deregulation	   and	   the	   recreation	   of	   offshore	   conditions	  within	   the	   American	   financial	   system	   as	   the	   feedback	   effect	   of	   the	   liberalised	   offshore	  conditions	   within	   the	   City	   of	   London	   continued	   to	   erode	   the	   New	   Deal	   regulatory	  framework	   within	   the	   U.S.	   American	   banks	   had	   begun	   to	   lobby	   for	   the	   replication	   of	  Euromarket	   conditions	   within	   the	   U.S.	   from	   the	   late	   1970s,	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   escape	  restrictive	   New	   Deal	   regulations	   and	   compete	   more	   effectively	   with	   non-­‐bank	   financial	  institutions	  who	  were	  creating	  disintermediation	  by	  offering	  higher	  interest	  rates	  (as	  they	  were	   not	   encumbered	   by	   New	   Deal	   rate	   ceilings)	   at	   a	   time	   of	   high	   inflation.	   	   Although	  Helleiner	   (1994:	   138)	   rightly	   suggests	   that	   American	   banks	   were	   using	   the	   competitive	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pressures	   of	   the	  Euromarkets	   to	  push	   for	  domestic	   deregulation,	   he	  misses	   the	   extent	   to	  which	  this	  dynamic	  was	  part	  of	  a	  transatlantic	  regulatory	  feedback	  loop	  emerging	  from	  the	  specific	   dynamics	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   development	   that	   had	   their	   origins	   in	   the	  birth	  of	   the	  Euromarkets	  during	   the	  1950s.	  As	  banks	  on	  each	   side	  of	   the	  Atlantic	  pushed	  their	  governments	  to	  create	  regulatory	  conditions	  favourable	  to	  competing	  internationally,	  the	   existing	   regulatory	   orders	   gradually	   broke	   down.	   	   These	   effects	   continued	   to	   erode	  American	  financial	  regulation	  during	  the	  1980s.	  Questions	  of	  where	  offshore	  banking	  would	  be	  hosted	  were	  only	  one	  aspect	  of	   the	  broader	  regulatory	  interaction	  between	  London	  and	  New	  York.	  Britain	  was	  keeping	  a	  close	  eye	   on	   American	   deregulation	   through	   officials	   at	   both	   the	   Treasury	   and	   the	   Bank	   of	  England.	   In	   a	   letter	   to	   the	   Bank,	   the	   British	   Treasury	   delegation	   at	   the	   Embassy	   in	  Washington	  noted	  that	  the	  American	  financial	  system	  was	  marked	  by	  a,	   ‘discernible	  trend	  towards	   deregulation	   an	   greater	   competition	   in	   the	   financial	   environment’	   (National	  Archives,	   1979:	   T388/98). 123 	  Most	   importantly,	   Treasury	   officials	   noted	   that	   the	  momentum	  behind	  the	  dismantling	  of	  Regulation	  Q	  was	  continuing	  to	  build	  and	  noted	  that	  a	  majority	  of	  regulatory	  agencies	  would,	   ‘accept	  the	  eventual	  elimination	  of	  Regulation	  Q’.	  As	   the	   existence	   of	   Regulation	   Q	   had	   been	   crucial	   to	   the	   original	   establishment	   of	   the	  Euromarkets,	  its	  abolition	  would	  have	  been	  expected	  to	  have	  significant	  implications	  for	  the	  City.	   The	   Euromarkets	  would	   no	   longer	   be	   able	   to	   rely	   on	   their	   interest	   rate	   differential	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  Treasury	   File	   National	   Archives	   T388/98,	   ‘International	   Monetary	   System	   and	   the	   U.S.	   Dollar	  15/12/78-­‐23/5/79’,	  Letter	  from	  United	  Kingdom	  Treasury	  and	  Supply	  Delegation,	  British	  Embassy	  Washington	  to	  R	  Gilchrist,	  Bank	  of	  England,	  ‘Developments	  in	  US	  Financial	  Environment’,	  March	  7th	  1979.	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with	   American	   banks	   as	   a	   means	   to	   draw	   funds	   away	   from	   the	   more	   tightly	   regulated	  American	  money	  markets.	  Keen	  observations	  of	  international	  regulatory	  dynamics	  were	  not,	  however,	  confined	  to	  the	  British.	  The	  Americans	  were	  also	  scrutinising	  developments	  within	  Britain’s	  financial	  system.	   In	  mid-­‐1979,	   Harold	  Williams,	   the	   Chairman	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Securities	   and	   Exchange	  Commission	  paid	  a	  visit	  to	  London.	  Williams	  was	  on	  a	  fact-­‐	  finding	  mission	  that	  would	  take	  him	  to	  a	  number	  of	  key	  international	  financial	  centres,	  with	  London	  of	  foremost	  importance	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  Williams	  intended	  to,	  ‘examine	  the	  regulatory	  system	  operated	  in	  the	  UK,	  as	  compared	   with	   the	   comprehensive	   U.S.	   system’	   and	   was	   supposedly	   himself	   inclined	   to,	  ‘prefer	  self-­‐regulation	  to	  imposed	  controls’	  (National	  Archives,	  1979:	  T388/98).124	  Although	   deregulation	   in	   both	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   occurred	   within	   a	   competitive	  context,	   it	   also	  did	   so	   in	   a	  manner	  marked	  by	   remarkably	  high	   levels	   of	   cooperation	   and	  openness,	   with	   officials	   on	   both	   sides	   seemingly	   well	   aware	   of,	   and	   often	   in	   direct	  communication	  about,	  developments	  on	  the	  other.	  This	  was	  a	  relationship	  characterised	  by	  ‘coordinated	   competition’;	   the	   methods	   employed	   were	   neither	   underhand	   nor	  antagonistic,	   but	   employed	   in	   a	   manner	   that	   was	   recognised	   and	   reciprocated	   by	  authorities	  in	  the	  other	  country	  as	  part	  of	  an	  overall	  goal	  of	  maximising	  the	  competitiveness	  of	   international	   financial	  markets.	  The	  degree	  of	   integration	  between	  financial	  markets	   in	  London	  and	  New	  York,	   as	  well	   as	   the	  major	  presence	  of	  American	  banks	  within	   the	  City,	  meant	  that	  deregulation,	  although	  competitive,	  occurred	  in	  a	  highly	  symbiotic	  fashion	  and	  tended	  towards	  a	  homogenisation	  of	  regulatory	  conditions	  on	  either	  side	  of	  the	  Atlantic,	  as	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  Visit	  by	  Mr	  Harold	  Williams,	  Chairman	  of	  the	  SEC,	  April	  30th	  1979.	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offshore	  banking	  practices	  and	  financial	   liberalisation	  were	  increasingly	  embedded	  within	  both	  countries.	  This	  dynamic	  of	  coordinated	  competition	  between	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  mirrored	  in	  the	  way	  that	  British	  financial	  markets	  were	  gradually	  being	  integrated	  into	  the	  competitiveness	  predicates	  of	  the	  European	  Common	  Market.	  Williams’s	   reception	   by	   British	   officials	   is	   instructive	   with	   regard	   to	   coordinated	  competition.	  	  Heading	  to	  London	  with	  the	  explicit	  intention	  of	  understanding	  how	  the	  SEC’s	  rules	   impacted	   overseas	   borrowers,	  Williams	   sought	   to	   gauge	   foreign	   perceptions	   of	   the	  usability	  of	  the	  New	  York	  markets.	  Such	  perceptions	  were	  a	  key	  component	  in	  their	  overall	  competitiveness.	   To	   this	   end,	   discussions	   between	  Williams	   and	   his	   British	   counterparts	  were	  open	  and	   frank.	   	   Senior	  Treasury	  officials	  openly	  discussed	   their	  perceptions	  of	   the	  Yankee-­‐Bond	   market	   with	   Williams,	   raising	   the	   complaint	   that	   the	   New	   York	   market	  required	  borrowers	   to	  divulge	   too	  much	   information.	  The	   relative	  attractions	  of	   the	  New	  York	   and	   Eurodollar	   markets	   were	   also	   openly	   discussed	   and	   Williams	   was	   keen	   to	  discover	  whether	  the	   introduction	  of	   the	  Banking	  Act	  would	   impact	  U.S.	  banks	   in	  the	  U.K.	  (National	  Archives,	  1979:	  T388/98).	  Frank	   and	   open	   discussions	   between	   senior	   officials	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic	  were	  a	  symbol	  of	  just	  how	  extraordinarily	  integrated	  Anglo-­‐American	  financial	  markets	  had	  become	  as	   financial	  globalisation	  gathered	  momentum	   from	  the	   late	  1950s.	  The	  situation	  contrasted	   markedly	   to	   the	   earlier	   ignorance	   and	   suspicion	   of	   the	   U.S.	   Treasury	   and	  regulatory	  bodies,	  during	  the	  early	  years	  of	   the	  Eurodollar	  market,	  as	   to	  what	  exactly	   the	  Eurodollar	   market	   was,	   how	   it	   functioned	   and	   what	   impact	   it	   might	   have	   on	   the	   U.S.	  Increased	   financial	   interdependence	   required	   a	   greater	   degree	   of	   cooperation,	   openness	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and	   mutual	   knowledge,	   but	   it	   did	   not	   eradicate	   competitive	   dynamics	   between	   rival	  banking	   centres.	   Instead,	   the	   acceptance	   of	   international	   financial	   competition	   and	  openness	  was	  inscribed	  in	  the	  new	  regulatory	  regimes	  that	  were	  gradually	  constructed	  in	  both	  countries.	  Although	   cooperation	  was	   remarkably	   close,	   there	  was	   still	   considerable	   room	   for	  friction	   as	   the	   above	   manoeuvres	   around	   Euromarket	   regulation	   demonstrate.	   But	   the	  potential	   for	   tensions	   within	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   coordinated	   competition	   were	   not	  confined	   to	   the	   transatlantic	   horizon.	   Britain’s	   gradual	   integration	   within	   the	   European	  Economic	  Community	  (EEC)	  was	  also	  a	  source	  of	  potential	  disagreement.	  Exchange	  control	  liberalisation	  ignited	  American	  concerns	  by	  demonstrating	  the	  potentially	  different	  tempos	  and	   biases	   of	   coordinated	   competition.	   The	   Americans	   felt	   that	   the	   July	   liberalisation	  measures	  had	  unduly	  privileged	  the	  EEC	  by	  liberalising	  the	  securities	  market	  preferentially	  towards	  European	  markets,	  while	  maintaining	  regulations	  on	  the	  U.S.	  Chancellor	  Howe	  was	  prompted	  to	  explain	  to	  the	  Americans	  that	  this	  was	  just	  the	  first	  step	  towards	  the	  eventual	  goal	  of	  world-­‐wide	  portfolio	  liberalisation	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649)125.	  Indeed,	  the	  Americans	  were	   so	   put	   out	   by	   the	   European-­‐bias	   of	   exchange	   controls	   liberalisation	   that	   Howe	   felt	  compelled	   to	  write	   a	   letter	   to	   the	  U.S.	   Ambassador	   explaining	   the	  measures	   on	   technical	  grounds	   and	   assuaging	   American	   fears	   (BofE,	   1979:	   EC5/649). 126 In	   their	   efforts	   to	  liberalise	  financial	  markets,	  then,	  British	  monetary	  authorities	  increasingly	  had	  to	  negotiate	  a	   course	   that	   respected	   the	   broader	   context	   of	   coordinated	   competition	  within	   both	   the	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  The	  next	  stage	  in	  dismantling	  exchange	  control,	  September	  7th	  1979.	  126	  Brief	  note	  to	  the	  Governor	  concerning	  U.S.	  sensitivity	  about	  U.K.	  exchange	  control	  discrimination,	  September	  11th	  1979.	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E.E.C	   and	   the	  Anglo-­‐American	   sphere	  of	  monetary	   interdependence.	   If	   the	  Americans	   felt	  that	   Britain	   was	   leaning	   more	   towards	   European	   markets	   at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	   U.S.,	  frictions	  were	  likely	  to	  ensue.	  The	  third	  major	  factor	  bearing	  upon	  the	  liberalisation	  of	  exchange	  controls	  was	  the	  future	   role	   of	   sterling.	   Officials	   at	   the	   Bank	   and	   the	   Treasury	  were	   aware	   that	   exchange	  controls	  could	  only	  be	  liberalised	  if	  sterling	  was	  in	  a	  strong	  position.	  Otherwise	  the	  pound	  might	  be	  subjected	  to	  intense	  speculative	  pressure	  and	  major	  outflows.	  But	  officials	  within	  the	   Bank	   did	   express	   concerns	   over	   the	   potential	   for	   sterling	   to	   re-­‐emerge	   as	   a	   major	  international	  reserve	  currency	  after	  liberalisation.	  It	  was	  felt	  that	  too	  great	  an	  expansion	  of	  sterling’s	  international	  role	  would	  violate	  the	  Basel	  facility	  and	  agreements	  made	  in	  1976,	  which	   involved	   the	   phasing	   out	   of	   sterling’s	   status	   as	   a	   major	   international	   reserve	  currency	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).127	  Concerns	   about	   the	   impact	   of	   a	  major	   resuscitation	   of	   sterling’s	   international	   role	  did	  not,	  however,	  prevent	   the	  Bank	   from	  speculating	  about	   the	  pound’s	   future	   trajectory.	  The	   thoughts	   expressed	   here	   are	   extremely	   revealing,	   both	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   Bank’s	  perception	  of	  the	  changing	  nature	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  and	  the	  anticipated	  impact	  of	  exchange	  control	  abolition	  upon	  British	  capitalism.	  Looking	  ahead,	  Bank	  officials	  speculated	   that	   a	   number	   of	   factors	   were	   likely	   to	   make	   sterling	   an	   attractive	   asset	   to	  private	   investors	   and	   managers	   of	   official	   reserves	   over	   the	   following	   decade.	   The	   key	  factor	  was	   the	   relative	   decline	   of	   the	   dollar,	   which	  was	   expected	   to	   continue	   unchecked	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  Note	  to	  the	  Chancellor	  of	  the	  Exchequer	  and	  Bank	  and	  Treasury	  officials,	  Dismantling	  Exchange	  Control	  and	  the	  International	  Role	  of	  sterling’,	  September	  19th	  1979.	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(BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).128	  The	  value	  of	  the	  dollar	  had	  fallen	  precipitously	  throughout	  1979,	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  sustained	  U.S.	  inflation	  and	  the	  OPEC	  price	  hikes	  (Greider,	  1987:	  18).	  Clearly	  then,	  the	  Bank’s	  calculations	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  liberalisation	  upon	  the	  pound	  were	  highly	  dependent	  upon	  expectations	  about	  the	  future	  value	  of	  the	  dollar.	  The	  global	  significance	  of	  American	   monetary	   policy,	   and	   the	   interdependence	   of	   financial	   markets,	   ensured	   that	  British	   policy	   decisions	   would	   have	   to	   be	   carefully	   calibrated	   with	   regard	   to	   American	  policy	   dynamics.	   	   By	   liberalising	   exchange	   controls	   and	   expanding	   the	   scope	   for	   sterling	  business,	  as	  well	  as	  making	  it	  easier	  for	  businesses	  to	  conduct	  dollar	  transactions	  and	  hold	  offshore	   accounts,	   British	   authorities	  were	  heightening	   the	   interactivity	   between	   interest	  rates	  on	  sterling	  and	  other	  currencies,	  particularly	  the	  dollar	  (Johnson,	  1991:	  37).	  Domestically,	   the	   production	   of	   North	   Sea	   Oil	   was	   expected	   to	   exert	   sustained	  upward	  pressure	  on	  the	  value	  of	  the	  pound.	  While	  the	  continued	  predominance	  of	  the	  City	  as	   ‘the	   most	   important	   international	   banking	   centre	   in	   the	   world’,	   and	   the	   wider	  accessibility	   of	   sterling	   compared	   to	   other	  major	   currencies,	  were	   also	   key	   factors	   in	   the	  Bank’s	   assessment.	   But	   the	   broader	   international	   context	   was	   paramount	   to	   their	  considerations.	   Bank	   officials	   were	   convinced	   that	   a	   multi-­‐currency	   system	   was	   on	   the	  horizon	  as	  the	  dollar’s	  hegemony	  faltered	  (BofE,	  1979:	  EC5/649).129	  As	  the	  multi-­‐currency	  system	   developed,	   sterling’s	   international	   role	   would	   be	   revived	   as	   investors	   diversified	  away	  from	  the	  dollar.	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  Sterling	  as	  an	  international	  currency,	  September	  19th	  1979.	  129	  Memo	  by	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  External	  Finance	  Group,	  Official	  sterling	  balances,	  September	  14th	  1979.	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Regarding	   the	   future	   of	   the	   British	   economy,	   the	   Bank’s	   assessment	   revealed	   the	  differential	   impact	  of	  a	   strong	  pound	  on	  British	  capitalism.	   	  A	  potential	   to	  boost	   invisible	  earnings	   was	   identified	   as	   the	   main	   advantage	   of	   an	   enhanced	   international	   role	   for	  sterling.	  Banks	   and	  brokerage	   firms	  dealing	   in	   sterling	  would	   experience	   growth	   in	   their	  business.	  But	  the	  Bank	  recognised	  that	  the	  attendant	  sterling	  inflows	  and	  the	  high	  value	  of	  the	  pound	  could	  prove	  damaging	  to	  the	  traded	  goods	  sector;	  exposed	  to	  a	  greater	  volume	  of	  international	  capital	  movements,	   the	  economy	   ‘might	  run	  at	  a	   lower	   level	  of	  activity	   than	  otherwise’	   (BofE,	   1979:	   EC5/649).	   The	   Bank	   appeared	   under	   no	   illusion	   about	   the	  differential	  impact	  of	  a	  strong	  pound	  upon	  British	  businesses.	  It	  would	  most	  likely	  be	  good	  for	  the	   financial	  sector,	  and	  potentially	  highly	  damaging	  for	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  and	  export	   industries.	   Their	   assessment	   turned	   out	   to	   be	   incredibly	   accurate.	   The	   Tory’s	  commitment	  to	  a	  strong	  pound	  and	  exchange	  liberalisation	  would	  wreak	  havoc	  on	  British	  manufacturing	  while	  bringing	  about	  a	  boom	  for	  banking	  in	  Britain.	  Where	  the	  Bank	  proved	  less	  accurate,	  however,	  was	  in	  its	  assessment	  of	  the	  dollar’s	  future	  standing	  as	  the	  lynchpin	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  With	  the	  appointment	  of	   Paul	   Volcker	   in	   October	   1979,	   they	  were	   in	   for	   a	   hell	   of	   a	   shock.	   The	   dollar’s	   decline	  would	   be	   arrested	   in	   a	   drastic	  manner	   and	  with	   important	   bearings	   upon	   Britain’s	   own	  monetary	  policy	  framework.	  In	  order	  to	  arrest	  the	  dollar’s	  decline	  and	  push	  interest	  rates	  up	   to	   level	   that	  were	   highly	   damaging	   to	   sectors	  within	   the	   American	   economy,	   Volcker	  would	   initiate	   an	   epistemological	   shift	   in	   central	   banking	   that	   was	   instructive	   for	   the	  development	  of	  monetary	  policy	  in	  Britain.	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The	  epistemological	  break:	  monetarism	  triumphant?	  	  Paul	   Volcker	   took	   charge	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   in	   August	   1979	   in	   one	   of	   the	   most	  important	   political	   appointments	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   history	   of	   American	   capitalism.	   Jimmy	  Carter’s	   presidency	   had	   been	   wracked	   by	   high	   inflation	   and	   faltering	   economic	  performance.	   	   The	  problem	  of	   inflation,	  which	  had	  been	   simmering	   since	   the	  1960s,	  was	  now	   at	   boiling	   point.	   It	   had	   become	   the	   paramount	   issue	   within	   the	   American	   political	  economy,	   threatening	   to	   severely	   upset	   the	   existing	   distribution	   of	  wealth	   and	   power.130	  With	   inflation	   seemingly	   out	   of	   control,	   investors	   bet	   against	   the	   dollar,	   driving	   its	   value	  down	   in	   international	  markets.	   	   As	   inflation	   eroded	   the	   value	   of	   U.S.	   government	   bonds,	  which	  were	   essentially	   offering	   a	   negative	   rate	   of	   return	   in	   real	   terms,	   bondholders	   and	  asset	   owners	   began	   to	   exert	   sustained	   pressure	   upon	   American	  monetary	   authorities	   to	  take	  action	  in	  order	  to	  combat	  inflation	  (Greider,	  1987:	  40-­‐45).	  	  The	  power	  brokers	  on	  Wall	  Street	  identified	  Volcker	  as	  the	  right	  man	  to	  lead	  the	  war	  on	   inflation.	  After	   years	   of	   indecisive	   action	   from	   the	  Fed,	  which	  had	   severely	   eroded	   its	  credibility	   in	   the	   eyes	   of	   investors	   and	  monetarist	   economists,	   Volcker	   was	   tasked	   with	  restoring	  its	  credibility	  and	  stamping	  out	  inflation	  in	  order	  to	  restore	  stable	  accumulation	  conditions	   for	   investors.	   	   The	   way	   that	   Volcker	   went	   about	   achieving	   these	   goals	   in	   the	  following	  years	  signalled	  both	  the	  resolute	  commitment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  to	  quelling	  inflation	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  130	  It	  was	  upper	  income	  households	  that	  suffered	  the	  biggest	  losses	  during	  high	  inflation	  as	  the	  real	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  financial	  assets	  was	  steadily	  eroded.	  For	  the	  home	  owning	  middle	  classes,	  house	  price	   inflation	   and	   wage	   inflation	   were	   beneficial.	   In	   broad	   terms,	   debtors	   were	   rewarded	   by	  inflation	  (which	  eroded	  the	  real	  value	  of	  the	  borrowed	  money	  and	  interest	  rates),	  while	  savers	  were	  penalised	  as	  their	  asset	  values	  depreciated	  (Greider,	  1987:	  17).	  Banks,	  as	  net	  creditor	  institutions,	  tended	  to	  be	  highly	  averse	  to	  unexpected	  and	  excessive	  inflation	  (Woolley,	  1984:	  71).	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restoring	   the	   international	   standing	   of	   the	   dollar	   (Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2009:	   31),	   and	   the	  power	   of	   the	   Federal	   Reserve	   as	   an	   unelected	   body	   that	   could	   exert	   enormous	   influence	  over	  American	  and	  global	  monetary	  dynamics.	  Volcker	   immediately	   recognised	   that	   an	   extremely	   tight	   monetary	   policy	   was	  required	  to	  exert	  pressure	  upon	  the	  credit	  supply	  and	  dis-­‐incentivise	  borrowing.	  Under	  his	  stewardship,	  interest	  rates	  reached	  record	  levels.131	  Volcker	  pushed	  the	  discount	  rate	  up	  to	  10.5%	   in	  his	   first	  month	   in	   charge,	   its	  highest	   level	   in	   the	  history	  of	   the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System.	  By	  October	  of	   1979,	   the	  Federal	   Funds	   rate	  had	  hit	   16%	  and	  by	   January	  1980	   it	  reached	  20%	  (Greider,	  1987:	  76,	  146).	  As	   a	   veteran	  of	   the	  American	  political	   scene,	  Volcker	  understood	   that	  provoking	  a	  recession	  through	  extraordinarily	  high	   interest	  rates	  would	  be	  politically	  contentious,	  not	  least	  because	   it	  would	  provoke	  unemployment	  and	  business	  closures.	   	  The	  proposal	   for	  a	  sustained	  policy	  of	   tight	  money	  and	  austerity	  amounted	  to	  a	  conscious	  termination	  of	   the	  Keynesian	   commitment	   to	   growth	   and	   full	   employment,	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   deflationary	  recession.	  Volcker’s	  answer	  to	  this	  political	  problem	  was	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  central	   banking	   techniques	   that	   would	   help	   insulate	   the	   Fed’s	   decisions	   from	   political	  scrutiny	   by	   implying	   that	   interest	   rate	   decisions	   were	   taken	   on	   grounds	   of	   technical	  necessity	   rather	   than	   political	   choice	   (Greider,	   1987:	   106;	   Konings,	   2011:	   134;	   Krippner,	  2012:	   108).	   This	  move	   to	   depoliticise	   interest	   rate	   policy	  was	   a	   key	   precondition	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  131	  The	   Fed’s	   key	  mechanisms	   for	   affecting	   the	  money	   supply	  were	   open	  markets	   operations	   and	  discount	  window	  transactions.	  The	  Federal	  Funds	  rate	   (the	  price	  of	  borrowing	  between	  banks	  on	  the	  overnight	  market	  to	  cover	  shortages	  in	  their	  reserves	  relative	  to	  their	  portfolio),	  set	  through	  the	  Fed’s	   open	  market	   operations,	   was	   the	   key	   rate	   for	   the	   American	  monetary	   system	   and	  was	   the	  most	  closely	  monitored	  rate	  in	  the	  market	  (Greider,	  1987:	  62-­‐64).	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Central	  Bank	  activism	  that	  ushered	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  in	  the	  U.S.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  Volcker	  had	   been	   championing	   the	   merits	   of	   practical	   monetarism	   prior	   to	   his	   appointment	   as	  Chairman	  of	  the	  Fed	  (Volcker,	  1978:	  332).	  He	  put	  these	  views	  into	  practice	  by	  instituting	  a	  new	  Central	  Bank	  policy	  regime	  that	  involved	  a	  different	  approach	  to	  the	  traditional	  lever	  of	  open	  market	  operations.	  The	  new	  regime	  was	  designed	  to	  exercise	  tighter	  control	  over	  the	  money	   supply	   by	   enacting	   operating	   decisions	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   aggregate	   level	   of	  reserves	   in	   the	   banking	   system,	   rather	   than	   targeting	   interest	   rate	   levels,	   as	   had	  traditionally	  been	  the	  case.	  The	  Fed’s	  new	  operating	  system	  would	  be	  in	  place	  for	  the	  next	  three	  years,	  during	  the	  crucial	  conjuncture	  of	  Volcker’s	  attempt	  to	  quell	   inflation	  (Axilrod,	  2011:	  89-­‐93).	  	  The	  Federal	  Open	  Market	  Committee	  (FOMC)	  would	  meet	  to	  decide	  a	  short-­‐term	  path	   for	  money	  growth	  and	  would	   then	   task	   the	  market	  manager	   in	  New	  York	  with	  providing	   the	   system	  with	   a	   level	   of	   reserves	   that	  was	   thought	   to	   be	   consistent	  with	   the	  monetary	   targets.	   Under	   the	   new	   approach,	   interest	   rates	  would	   be	   allowed	   to	   fluctuate	  freely	  during	  the	  six-­‐week	  period	  between	  FOMC	  meetings.	  The	   stated	   aim	   of	   these	   measures	   was	   to	   restore	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   Fed	   and	  provide	  a	  reliable	  basis	  (the	  monetary	  targets)	  according	  to	  which	  the	  markets	  could	  make	  judgements	   about	   interest	   rate	   directions.	   Yet	   it	   also	   came	   with	   the	   unstated	   benefit	   of	  passing	   off	   highly	   political	   decisions	   about	   interest	   rates	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   pseudo-­‐scientific	   necessity	   rooted	   in	   monetarist	   convictions	   about	   the	   privileged	   causal	  relationship	  between	  the	  money	  supply	  and	  inflation.	  It	  allowed	  the	  Fed	  to	  depoliticise	  its	  controversial	   measures.	   The	   epistemological	   shift	   in	   favour	   of	   monetarism	   was,	   then,	   a	  facilitating	   factor	   in	   the	  political	  enactment	  of	  higher	   interest	  rates	  and	  regressive	  wealth	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redistribution.	  Monetarist	  theory	  was	  pragmatically	  employed	  in	  order	  to	  introduce	  radical	  interest	   rate	   policies	   that	   effectively	   ended	   the	   Keynesian	   commitment	   to	   maintaining	  growth	  and	  full	  employment,	  regardless	  of	  any	  associated	  inflationary	  consequences.	  Now	  the	   fight	   against	   inflation	  was	   sovereign,	   unemployment	   and	   recession	  were	   accepted	   as	  inevitable	   consequences,	   and	  monetarism	   reigned	   supreme.	   Internationally,	   the	   fact	   that	  the	  Volcker	  shock	  followed	  so	  closely	  on	  the	  heels	  of	  Carter’s	   failed	  attempt	  to	  promote	  a	  Keynesian	   ‘locomotive	   strategy’	   through	   the	   G7,	   in	   which	   Japan	   and	   Germany	   would	  stimulate	   global	   demand	   and	   drive	   growth,	   sounded	   the	   death	   knell	   of	   Keynesianism	  internationally	  and	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  ascent	  of	  neoliberal	  policy.	  Over	   in	  Britain,	   there	  was	  a	  similar	  degree	  of	  upheaval	  regarding	  monetary	  policy.	  Pressure	  from	  the	  IMF	  during	  the	  Callaghan	  government	  had	  already	  helped	  bring	  about	  a	  more	   intensive	   focus	   upon	  monetary	   targets	   in	   Britain.	   But	   under	   the	   new	   Conservative	  government	   the	   intellectual	   commitment	   to	   monetarism	   became	   a	   central	   pillar	   of	  economic	   policy.	   This	   was	   reflected	   in	   a	   whole	   raft	   of	   changes	   affecting	   the	   conduct	   of	  monetary	   policy,	   beyond	   the	   aforementioned	   impacts	   of	   exchange	   liberalisation.	   These	  changes	   reflected	  a	   continuation	  of	   the	   failed	  attempt	   to	   reform	  monetary	  policy	   through	  the	   abortive	   CCC	   policy	   in	   the	   1970s	   and	   were	   similarly	   geared	   towards	   expanding	   the	  scope	   for	   ‘market	   forces’	   within	   monetary	   policy.	   With	   the	   failure	   of	   CCC,	   monetary	  authorities	  had	   introduced	   the	  Supplementary	  Special	  Deposits	   Scheme	   to	   restrain	   credit	  creation	  and	  check	  competition	  for	  deposits	  within	  the	  banking	  sector.	  Under	  the	  scheme,	  banks	  were	   required	   to	  hold	  noninterest-­‐bearing	  deposits	   at	   the	  Bank	  of	  England	   if	   their	  portfolio	  of	   interest-­‐bearing	  deposits	  grew	  beyond	  a	   certain	   level	  mandated	  by	   the	  Bank.	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This	   scheme,	   colloquially	   known	   as	   the	   ‘Corset’,	   was	   abandoned	   in	   June	   1980,	   as	   it	   was	  thought	  that	  the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls	  rendered	  it	  ineffective	  (Artis	  &	  Lewis,	  1981:	  1;	  Buiter	  et.	  al.,	  1981:	  332-­‐333).	  	  A	  new	  Banking	  Act	  had	  been	  introduced	  in	  1979,	  to	  make	  clear	  which	  institutions	  could	  operate	  as	  banks	  within	  the	  evolving,	  institutionally	  diverse	  and	  increasingly	  competitive	  monetary	  system.	  Reserve	  asset	  ratios	  were	  phased	  out	  from	  1980	   and	   new	   operational	   techniques	   for	   open	   market	   operations	   began	   in	   November	  1980.	   From	   1981,	   there	   were	   adjustments	   to	   the	   cash	   reserve	   requirement	   and	  experimentation	  with	  systems	  of	  monetary	  base	  control	  (Artis	  &	  Lewis,	  1981:	  1).	  This	  amounted	  to	  a	  revolution	  in	  British	  monetary	  policy	  and	  it	  didn’t	  pass	  without	  producing	  serious	  tensions	  between	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister,	  in	  a	  pattern	  of	  Central	  Bank-­‐Executive	  tensions	  that	  was	  neatly	  mirrored	  across	  the	  Atlantic.	  In	  1980	   the	  Treasury	  and	   the	  Bank	  published	  a	  paper	  on	   ‘Monetary	  Control’,	  which	  outlined	  that,	   in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  Corset	  and	  other	  quantitative	  limits	  on	  bank	  lending,	  control	  of	  the	  monetary	  supply	  would	  now	  be	  achieved	   through	  adjustments	   in	   the	   level	  of	   interest	  rates	   and	   restraint	   of	   the	   Public	   Sector	   Borrowing	   Requirement	   (PSBR).	   Control	   over	  interest	   rates	   would	   be	   achieved	   through	   open	  market	   operations	   and	   variations	   in	   the	  Minimum	   Lending	   Rate.132	  The	   PSBR	   would	   be	   controlled	   through	   adjusting	   levels	   of	  taxation	   and	   spending	   (Buiter	   et.	   al.,	   1981:	   332-­‐337).	   These	   related	   components	   of	  monetary	   and	   fiscal	   control	   were	   encapsulated	   in	   the	   Government’s	   ‘Medium	   Term	  Financial	   Strategy’	   (MTFS),	   which	   mapped	   out	   medium	   term	   targets	   for	   growth	   of	   the	  money	   supply	   as	   part	   of	   a	   broad	   deflationary	   strategy	   that	   intended	   to	   lower	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  The	  Minimum	  Lending	  Rate	  was	  the	  term	  used	  to	  described	  discount	  window	  operations	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Bank.	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inflationary	  expectations	  of	  managers	  and	  trade	  union	  negotiators	  by	  tying	  the	  government	  into	  longer-­‐term	  targets	  for	  monetary	  expansion	  (Stephens,	  1996:	  13).	  Gordon	  Richardson,	  the	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank,	  opposed	  the	  government’s	  plans	  for	  the	  MTFS	  and	  argued	  that	  it	  would	  undermine	  the	  government’s	  credibility	  by	  committing	  them	  to	  targets	  that	  were	  far	  too	  specific.	   	  But	  Thatcher’s	  monetarist	  Chief	  Advisor,	  Terry	  Burns,	  stood	  fast	  and	  received	  the	  support	  of	  the	  influential	  Nigel	  Lawson.133	  The	  MTFS	  was	  rolled	  out	  in	  the	  March	  1980	  Budget,	  with	  the	  only	  concession	  to	  the	  Bank	  and	  other	  critics	  being	   that	   the	  monetary	   targets	  were	  now	  given	   in	   ranges	   of	   percentiles	   rather	   than	   the	  firm	  figures	  originally	  proposed	  (Keegan,	  1984:142).	  The	  adoption	  of	  the	  MTFS	  signalled	  to	  the	   Bank	   the	   severity	   of	   the	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   deflationary	   policies.	   But	   the	  conflict	   did	   not	   end	   at	   this	   point.	   Chancellor	   Howe’s	   announcement	   during	   the	   March	  Budget	  that	  the	  Corset	  would	  be	  gone	  by	  June,	  proved	  to	  be,	  ‘the	  harbinger	  of	  what	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  the	  worst	  period	  of	  diplomatic	  relations	  between	  a	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  a	  Governor	  of	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  since	  the	  days	  of	  Harold	  Wilson	  and	  Lord	  Cromer	  during	  the	  mid-­‐1960s’	  (Keegan,	  1984:	  150).	  The	  government’s	  high	   interest	   rate	  policy	  and	   the	  rising	  value	  of	   the	  pound	  were	  beginning	  to	  exert	  a	  heavy	  toll	  upon	  British	  industry.	  	  By	  July	  1980	  officials	  at	  the	  Bank	  had	  decided	   that	   the	   situation	   facing	  British	   industry,	  with	   increasing	   costs	  of	  borrowing	  and	  rapidly	   decreasing	   international	   competitiveness,	   was	   too	   grave	   to	   be	   allowed	   continue.	  Distress	  borrowing	  by	  struggling	  British	  industrial	  firms	  was	  pushing	  up	  the	  money	  supply	  figures.	  The	  Bank	  determined	  to	   ‘de-­‐rate	  M3’:	  to	  push	  the	  government	  off	  its	  fixation	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  133	  Lawson	  was	  perhaps	  the	  foremost	  enthusiast	  for	  monetarism	  within	  Thatcher’s	  government.	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the	   measure	   for	   broad	   money	   in	   the	   economy.	   In	   practice,	   the	   Bank	   was	   already	  undermining	   the	   government’s	   commitment	   to	   reducing	   the	   growth	   of	   M3	   by	   using	   its	  contacts	  with	  the	  clearing	  banks	  to	  ensure	  a	  supply	  of	  credit	  to	  stuttering	  industrial	  firms.	  	  In	  the	  Bank’s	  eyes,	  monetary	  policy	  was	  needlessly	  tight	  and	  in	  danger	  of	  creating	  very	  high	  unemployment,	  with	  GDP	  falling	  by	  2.2%	  in	  1980	  (Smith,	  1987:	  90).	  The	  pragmatism	  of	  the	  Bank	   was	   increasingly	   running	   up	   against	   the	   ideological	   fervour	   of	   Thatcher’s	  administration.	  Events	   came	   to	   a	   head	  when	   Richardson	   visited	   Downing	   Street	   in	   early	   July.	   He	  implored	   Thatcher	   to	   lower	   interest	   rates,	   on	   pain	   of	   strangling	   corporate	   sector	   of	   the	  economy.	   Thatcher	   grudgingly	   acceded	   to	   Richardson’s	   request,	   but	   from	   that	   point	  onwards	  wrath	  towards	  Richardson	  and	  the	  Bank	  was,	  ‘one	  of	  the	  recurring	  themes	  of	  Mrs	  Thatcher’s	  economic	  administration’.	  With	  the	  M3	  figures	  worsening	  and	  undermining	  the	  government’s	  credibility,	  Thatcher’s	  discontent	  with	  the	  Bank	  continued	  to	  grow.	  Tensions	  between	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  and	  the	  Bank	  were	  not,	  however,	  confined	  to	  disputes	  over	  the	  appropriate	   level	  of	   interest	  rates.	  The	  Bank	  increasingly	  came	  under	  pressure	  from	  Tory	  politicians	  and	  their	  monetarist	  advisers	  to	  adopt	  a	  form	  of	  monetary	  base	  control	  derived	  from	  the	  quantity	   theory	  of	  money.	  This	  would	  have	   implied	  an	  attempt	   to	  achieve	  much	  tighter	  control	  of	  the	  monetary	  base	  by	  the	  Bank,	  but	  as	  a	  consequence,	  interest	  rates	  would	  fluctuate	  unpredictably	  as	  they	  were	  doing	  in	  the	  U.S.	  (Johnson,	  1991:	  32).	  At	   this	   key	   moment	   in	   the	   first	   phase	   of	   Thatcher’s	   government,	   with	   monetary	  policy	   increasingly	   politicised	   within	   elite	   circles	   (ironically	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  government’s	  attempt	   to	  depoliticise	  monetary	  policy	   through	  the	  adoption	  of	  monetarist	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techniques)	   of	   the	   British	   state	   and	   with	   high	   interest	   rates	   beginning	   to	   seriously	  undermine	  British	  industry	  and	  intensify	  the	  recession,	  the	  Fed	  was	  increasingly	  drawn	  in	  as	   an	   important	   player	   in	   the	   debate,	   demonstrating	   the	   transatlantic	   interactivity	   of	   the	  neoliberal	  transformation	  in	  Central	  Bank	  practices.	  Officials	  at	  the	  Bank	  looked	  to	  the	  Fed	  in	   order	   to	   fulfil	   their	   own	   domestic	   political	   objectives	   in	   thwarting	   some	   of	   the	   more	  radical	   Thatcherite	   proposals.	   By	   drawing	   in	   the	   Fed’s	   expertise,	   the	   Bank	   sought	   to	  navigate	  through	  the	  institutional	  upheaval	  of	  the	  Thatcher	  government	  without	  sacrificing	  its	  institutional	  autonomy.	  With	  the	  Bank	  experiencing	  less	  independence	  than	  the	  Fed,	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  steamrollered	  by	  a	  fervently	  monetarist	  administration	  was	  graver	  than	  that	  faced	  by	  its	  American	  counterpart.	  Thatcher	   and	  her	   advisers	  were	   clearly	   inspired	  by	   the	   adoption	  of	   the	  Fed’s	   new	  monetary	  policy	  techniques	  under	  Volcker	  and	  wanted	  to	  apply	  these	  same	  methods	  to	  the	  Bank.	   British	   officials	   had	  been	   casting	   around	   for	   novel	  methods	   from	  a	  whole	   range	   of	  foreign	   Central	   Banks,	   but	   given	   its	   status	   and	   significance	   the	   Fed	   was	   a	   particularly	  important	   source	   of	   technical	   inspiration.	   This	   was	   the	   context	   within	   which	   Stephen	  Axilrod,	   a	   senior	  official	   at	   the	  Fed,	  met	  with	  a	   series	  of	  British	  Bank	  officials	   in	  order	   to	  discuss	  monetary	  policy.	  Axilrod	  went	  through	  the	  Fed’s	  new	  operating	  procedures	  in	  detail	  with	  his	  British	  colleagues	  and	  was	  also	  invited	  to	  attend	  a	  Parliamentary	  Committee	  setup	  to	   scrutinise	   British	   monetary	   policy.	   While	   in	   London,	   Axilrod	   met	   with	   Gordon	  Richardson,	  where	  they	  discussed	  how	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  should	  bring	  monetary	   and	   reserve	   aggregates	   into	   the	   policy	   process.	   Crucially,	   the	   discussion	   was	  focused	   upon,	   ‘how	   to	   go	   halfway	   toward	   meeting	   the	   Prime	   Minister’s	   wishes	   without	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actually	   going	   quite	   that	   far’	   (Axilrod,	   2011:103-­‐106).	   At	   a	   time	   of	   profound	   political	  struggles	  over	  the	  conduct	  of	  monetary	  policy,	  institutional	  cooperation	  between	  the	  Bank	  and	   the	  Fed	  was	  employed	   to	  maintain	  Central	  Bank	  autonomy	  and	  navigate	  a	  pragmatic	  and	  conciliatory	  path	  through	  the	  prescriptions	  of	  monetarist	  politicians	  and	  their	  advisers.	  In	  the	  end	  the	  Bank,	  with	  the	  support	  of	  officials	  from	  the	  Treasury,	  was	  able	  to	  resist	  the	  government’s	  attempts	  to	  move	  wholeheartedly	  towards	  a	  system	  of	  monetary	  base	  control	  (Keegan,	  1994:	  156;	  Stephens,	  1996:	  20).	  
The	   defence	   of	   Central	   Bank	   autonomy	   under	   the	   duress	   of	   fervently	   monetarist	  
political	  pressure	  was	  a	  defining	  feature	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  central	  banking	  revolution	  on	  both	  
sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  These	  early	  struggles	  represented	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  growth	  of	  Central	  
Bank	  power	  and	  autonomy	  that	  would	  come	  to	  characterise	  the	  neoliberal	  period	   in	  Britain	  
and	  the	  U.S.	  Reagan’s	  electoral	  victory	  in	  1980	  brought	  a	  monetarist	  President	  and	  a	  highly	  ideological	  government	   to	  power	   in	   the	  U.S.	  During	  Volcker’s	   tenure,	   the	  Fed	  came	  under	  pressure	   from	   Reagan’s	   Undersecretary	   of	   the	   Treasury	   for	   Monetary	   Affairs,	   Beryl	  Sprinkel.	  Sprinkel	  was	  a	  monetarist	  economist	  and	  former	  banker	  (Greider,	  1987:	  363).	  He	  was	  uncomfortable	  with	  the	   idea	  of	   the	  money	  supply	  being	  under	  the	  Fed’s	   independent	  control	   and	   repeatedly	   made	   public	   announcements	   intended	   to	   undermine	   the	   Fed’s	  credibility	   (Axilrod,	   2011:	   100).	   Jerry	   Jordan,	   a	   former	   economics	   professor	   who	   had	  participated	   in	   the	   Shadow	   Open	   Market	   Committee,	   served	   on	   Reagan’s	   Council	   of	  Economic	  Advisors	  and	  was	  also	  highly	  critical	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  anti-­‐inflationary	  credentials.	  Tensions	  between	  Reagan’s	  administration	  and	  the	  Fed	  came	  to	  a	  head	  in	  the	  spring	  of	   1981,	   with	   Reagan’s	   senior	   officials	   and	   advisers,	   men	   like	   Sprinkel	   and	   Jordan,	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vociferously	   criticising	   the	   Fed	   for	   allowing	   the	   monetary	   aggregates	   to	   rise	   at	   an	  unacceptable	  rate	  (Woolley,	  1984:	  125).	  They	  were	  convinced	  that	  Volcker’s	  actions	  were	  undermining	  the	  President.	  Indeed,	  Treasury	  Secretary	  Regan	  later	  confided	  that	  he	  and	  the	  President	   had	   even	   considered	   ‘abolishing	   the	   Fed’	   (Greider,	   1987:	   378).134	  Volcker	   was	  called	   into	  the	  Oval	  Office	  to	  defend	  his	  actions	   in	   front	  of	   the	  President	  and	  his	  advisers.	  But	   Volcker	   drew	   on	   his	   wealth	   of	   political	   experience	   in	   order	   to	   defend	   the	   Fed’s	  autonomy	   and	   evade	   answering	   questions	   transparently.	   He	   cloaked	   his	   analysis	   in	   the	  armour	  of	  complex	  technical	  details	  relating	  to	  monetary	  operations	  (Greider,	  1987:	  376-­‐381).	   Volcker	   was	   able	   to	   maintain	   the	   Fed’s	   independence	   despite	   pressure	   from	   the	  Reagan	  administration.	  Indeed,	  the	  constitutional	  basis	  of	  the	  Fed’s	  independence	  gave	  the	  American	  Central	  Bank	   a	  more	   secure	   footing	   than	   the	  Bank	  of	   England	   enjoyed,	   but	   the	  scope	   for	   policy	   actions	   was	   nevertheless	   highly	   dependent	   upon	   the	   broader	   political	  context.	  Despite	   different	   operating	   procedures	   and	   different	   degrees	   of	   institutional	  autonomy,	  both	  Central	  Banks	  consistently	  pursued	  a	  deflationary	  course	  of	  high	   interest	  rates	  between	  1979-­‐1982.	  That	  they	  were	  able	  to	  do	  so	  had	  much	  to	  do	  with	  the	  evolution	  of	   financial	   markets	   since	   the	   1970s.	   But	   it	   was	   also	   very	   a	  much	   a	   consequence	   of	   the	  lobbying	   efforts	   and	   political	   pressure	   applied	   by	   the	   banking	   sector.	   Regulatory	   and	  market	   developments	   enabled	   the	   banks	   to	   prosper	   from	   the	   high	   interest	   rate	   regimes,	  while	  industry	  and	  workers	  suffered.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  neoliberal	  central	  banking	  regime,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Of	  course,	   the	  political	   fallout	   from	  such	  a	  drastic	  move	  would	  have	  been	   immense	  and	   it	   is	  no	  surprise	  that	  this	  option	  was	  never	  attempted	  in	  practice.	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then,	  lay	  a	  partisan	  representation	  of	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  financial	  sector	  that	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  massive	  expansion	  of	  financial	  sector	  power	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  
	  
The	  differential	  impacts	  of	  neoliberal	  central	  banking	  	  In	  both	  Britain	  and	  America,	   the	  high	   interest	   rate	   regimes	  and	  deflationary	  policies	   that	  ushered	   in	   the	  neoliberal	  period	   involved	  a	  dangerous	  game	  of	  brinkmanship	  with	  banks	  and	   the	  wider	  economy.	   In	   the	  past,	   the	  Fed	  had	  been	   forced	   to	  pull	  back	   from	  sustained	  attempts	  at	  tight	  money	  policy	  due	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  major	  financial	  collapses	  resulting	  from	  the	  strain	  caused	  by	  increased	  borrowing	  costs.	  This	  had	  been	  the	  case	  in	  1969-­‐1970,	  when	  the	  American	  financial	  system	  had	  proved	  unable	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  high-­‐interest-­‐rate	  policy	   that	   had	   produced	   the	   commercial	   paper	   crisis	   and	   led	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   Penn	  Central.	  In	  response	  to	  the	  crisis,	  the	  Fed	  had	  been	  required	  to	  rapidly	  inject	  liquidity	  into	  the	  banking	  system,	  undermining	  the	  original	  aim	  of	  tight	  money	  in	  the	  process.	  American	  policy	  makers	  had	  been	  particularly	  sensitive	  to	  this	  possibility	  ever	  after	  (Konings,	  2011:	  134;	   Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   169).	   In	   Britain,	   the	   experience	   of	   the	   Secondary	   Banking	  Crisis	  in	  1974	  had	  produced	  similar	  concerns,	  with	  interest	  rate	  hikes	  provoking	  a	  series	  of	  collapses	  within	   the	  secondary	  banking	  sector	   that	   forced	  the	  Bank	  to	  organise	  a	  support	  operation	   in	   concert	   with	   the	   major	   clearing	   banks	   (BofE,	   1979:	   G1/210;	   Capie,	   2010:	  525).135	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  Thoughts	  after	  the	  IMF/Belgrade	  Meeting,	  October	  1979.	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That	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	   Bank	  were	   now	   able	   to	   implement	   policies	   of	   high	   interest	  rates	   and	   stick	   to	   them	   fairly	   consistently	   was	   a	   consequence	   not	   only	   of	   a	   generally	  supportive	   political	   climate,	   but	   also	   because	   of	   the	   development	   of	   financial	   markets	  during	  the	  1970s.	  	  Sustained	  inflation	  during	  the	  1970s	  affected	  nominal	  interest	  rates	  and	  changed	  the	  impact	  of	  interest	  rate	  ceilings	  and	  other	  financial	  regulations.	  	  Banks	  in	  both	  the	   U.S.	   and	   the	   U.K.	   also	   became	   more	   dependent	   upon	   wholesale	   markets	   and	   were	  increasingly	  able	   to	  circumvent	  domestic	   tight	  money	  policies	   through	   the	   importation	  of	  offshore	   funds.	   Banks	   also	   moved	   increasingly	   into	   loans	   and	   advances	   and	   away	   from	  traditionally	   safer	   assets	   such	   as	   government	   securities.	   As	   a	   result,	   they	   became	   more	  vulnerable	  to	  a	  sudden	  loss	  of	  earnings	  if	  market	  rates	  rose	  above	  loan	  rates.	  This	  led	  banks	  to	  switch	  towards	  variable	  rate	  lending	  contracts	  or	  ‘flexi-­‐rate’	  loans	  (Lewis	  &	  Davis,	  1987:	  9).	   Flexi-­‐rate	   loans	   increased	   banks’	   capacity	   to	   whether	   the	   interest	   rate	   shocks	   of	   the	  early	  neo-­‐liberal	  period	  by	  passing	  on	  the	   fluctuations	   in	  rates	  onto	  their	  customers,	   thus	  insulating	   themselves	   from	   risk.	   Rapid	   innovation	   and	   technological	   development	  within	  financial	  markets	  continued	  apace	  during	  the	  1980s	  (Llewellyn,	  1985:	  10).	  The	  growth	  of	  wholesale	  banking	  and	  the	  Euromarkets	  meant	  that	  banking	  practices	  became	   increasingly	   standardised	   on	   both	   sides	   of	   the	   Atlantic.	   Techniques	   of	   American	  banks	  were	  merged	  with	  practices	   in	  Britain	   and	   then	  exported	  back	   to	  America,	  driving	  homogenisation.	   As	   new	   Eurocurrency	  markets	   emerged	   in	   other	   countries,	   the	   banking	  practices	   pioneered	   by	   British	   and	   American	   banks	   in	   London	   began	   to	   be	   transmitted	  worldwide	  (Lewis	  &	  Davis,	  1987:	  9,	  83).	  Another	  notable	  innovation	  was	  the	  introduction	  of	   rollover	   credits.	   These	   new	   loans	   ‘combined	   the	   interest-­‐rate	   flexibility	   of	   British	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overdrafts	   with	   the	   legal	   formality	   of	   US	   medium-­‐length	   term	   loans’.	   Instead	   of	   a	   fixed	  interest	  rate	  for	  the	  entire	  span	  of	  the	  loan,	  the	  rate	  would	  be	  fixed	  for	  certain	  intervals	  of	  time	   (3-­‐6	   months)	   and	   then	   adjusted	   in	   line	   with	   the	   changing	   market	   rates	   on	   bank	  deposits.	   The	   LIBOR	   rate	   was	   used	   as	   the	   basis	   for	   these	   calculations,	   reflecting	   the	  international	   predominance	   of	   the	   London	   market.	   These	   innovations	   were	   part	   of	   a	  process	  whereby	  wholesale	  bankers	  pioneered	  techniques	  for	  passing	  on	  interest	  rate	  risks	  to	   borrowers	   at	   rollover	   dates	   that	   were	   directly	   linked	   to	   funding	   costs	   (Banking	  Information	   Service,	   1985:	   11;	   Lewis	   &	   Davis,	   1987:	   87,	   111).	   Floating	   rate	   issues,	  adjustable	   to	   interest	   rate	   movements,	   also	   became	   much	   more	   widespread	   within	   the	  Eurobond	  market.	  High	  inflation	  and	  interest	  rate	  volatility	  also	  led	  corporate	  borrowers	  to	  change	   their	   practices	   by	   shifting	   from	   fixed	   interest	   capital	   market	   sources	   of	   funds	   to	  floating	  rate	  bank	  sources	  (Llewellyn,	  1985:	  18).	  Nevertheless,	  high	  interest	  rate	  policies	  still	  ran	  the	  risk	  of	  triggering	  major	  financial	  collapses.	   Both	   the	   Fed	   and	   the	   Bank	   realised	   that	   selective	   interventions	   in	   the	  market	  were	  required	  to	  provide	  support	  to	  systemically	  significant	  firms	  in	  both	  the	  financial	  and	  industrial	   sectors.	   The	   Fed	   was	   able	   to	   undertake	   selective	   bailouts	   for	   systemically	  significant	   banks.	   It	   did	   so	   with	   the	   bailout	   of	   the	   First	   Philadelphia	   Bank-­‐	   the	   largest	  bailout	   in	  U.S.	   history	   at	   the	   time	   (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	   2012:	  170).	   In	  Britain,	   the	  Bank	   felt	  compelled	  to	  organise	  the	  clearing	  banks	  to	  provide	  support	  for	  significant	  firms	  that	  were	  struggling	  to	  manage	  within	  the	  context	  of	  higher	   interest	  rates	  and	  recession	  (Coakley	  &	  Harris,	  1983:	  194;	  Keegan,	  1984:	  146).	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In	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  high	  interest	  rate	  regimes	  were	  also	  conditioned	  by,	  and	  contingent	  upon,	  the	  regulatory	  transformations	  that	  affected	  the	  financial	  sector.	  Towards	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  financial	  institutions	  had	  begun	  an	  intense	  lobbying	  campaign	  in	  the	  City	  in	  order	  to	  push	  for	  the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls,	  which	  had	  limited	  the	  scope	  for	  overseas	  investment	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  period.	  This	  was	  essentially	  a	  lobbying	  campaign	  for	  the	  City	  to	  be	  free	  to	  export	  capital	  to	  wherever	  in	  the	  world	  it	  chose	  to	  do	  so,	  without	  politically	   instituted	   limitations	   (Coakley	   &	   Harris,	   1983:	   35-­‐36).	   When	   controls	   were	  abolished,	   the	   impact	  was	   hugely	   significant.	   Pension	   funds	   substantially	   increased	   their	  overseas	   investment	  portfolio	  between	  1979-­‐1980,	   transforming	   the	  geographical	   spread	  of	  their	  investment	  by	  moving	  into	  the	  stock	  markets	  in	  Tokyo,	  Hong	  Kong,	  Singapore	  and	  Australia	  (Coakley	  &	  Harris,	  1983:	  37).	  Holdings	  of	  foreign	  currency	  deposits	  also	  increased	  dramatically	  after	  liberalisation,	  while	  the	  proportion	  of	  international	  business	  that	  British	  banks	  conducted	  in	  sterling	  doubled	  between1979	  and	  1983	  (Banking	  Information	  Service,	  1985:	  15;	  Artis	  &	  Taylor,	  1989:	  14).	  	  British	   banks	   quintupled	   their	   overseas	   earnings	   between	   1980	   and	   1984,	  with	   a	  large	  proportion	  of	  their	  increased	  earnings	  derived	  from	  areas	  which	  had	  been	  influenced	  by	  the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls,	  for	  example	  portfolio	  investment	  income	  and	  interest	  earned	  on	  lending	  abroad	  in	  sterling	  (Banking	  Information	  Service,	  1985:	  33).	  The	  abolition	  of	   the	   corset	   enabled	   banks	   to	   expand	   and	   evolve	   their	   lending	   without	   the	   funding	  constraints	   that	   previously	   existed.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   they	   moved	   into	   the	   mortgage	  markets	  on	  a	  massive	  scale.	  The	  mortgage	  market	  had	  previously	  been	  a	  virtual	  monopoly	  of	   the	   building	   societies,	   but	   between	   1980-­‐1982,	   bank	   lending	   to	   the	  mortgage	  market	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rose	  from	  £50	  million	  per	  month	  to	  over	  £3500	  million	  per	  month.	  During	  this	  same	  period,	  banks’	   share	  of	  new	  mortgage	   lending	   increased	   from	  6%	  to	  40%,	  while	   the	   share	  of	   the	  building	  societies	  from	  80%	  down	  to	  54%	  (Llewellyn,	  1985:	  27).	  It’s	  not	  hard	  to	  detect	  here	  the	  beginning	  of	   the	   intensified	  mortgage	  market	  competition	  that	  would	  eventually	   filter	  through	  to	  the	  subprime	  crisis	  several	  decades	  later.	  After	   the	   abolition	   of	   exchange	   controls,	   the	   transformation	   of	   monetary	   policy	  became,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  a	  fait	  accompli.	  By	  removing	  the	  protection	  for	  domestic	  banking	  activity	  the	  abolition	  of	  controls,	  ‘forced	  the	  reform	  of	  monetary	  regulation	  to	  take	  place	  on	  a	   very	   liberal	   basis’	   (Artis	   &	   Taylor,	   1989:	   1).	   This	   was	   particularly	   the	   case	   given	   the	  accelerated	   internationalisation	  of	   financial	  markets	  during	   the	  1970s,	  which	  meant	   that,	  ‘monetarism’s	   promotion	   of	   laissez-­‐faire	   in	   financial	   markets	   became	   a	   necessity	   rather	  than	  a	  policy	  choice,	  given	   the	  City’s	  growing	   international	   role’	   (Coakley	  &	  Harris,	  1983:	  207).	  So	  although	  a	  move	  in	  this	  direction	  might	  have	  occurred	  regardless,	  ‘the	  abolition	  of	  exchange	  controls	  provided	  a	  ruthless	  logic	  for	  it’	  (Artis	  &	  Taylor,	  1989:	  1-­‐2).	  By	  pressing	  for	   liberalisation,	   then,	   the	   City	   set	   in	   motion	   a	   process	   that	   culminated	   in	   a	   wholesale	  reorganisation	   of	   monetary	   policy.	   Monetary	   policy	   had	   to	   be	   formulated	   within	   the	  constraints	  imposed	  by	  ever-­‐higher	  financial	  integration	  within	  the	  global	  economy.	  In	  this	  context,	   the	   move	   from	   quantitative	   and	   administered	   controls	   on	   lending,	   towards	   a	  market-­‐based	  system	  centred	  exclusively	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  interest	  rates	  in	  shaping	  the	  price	  and	  demand	  for	  money,	  was	  enabled.	  The	  tighter	  integration	  of	  national	  money	  markets	  also	  stimulated	  a	  convergence	  of	  interest	  rates,	  as	  financial	  operators	  were	  able	  to	  easily	  switch	  between	  markets	  in	  pursuit	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of	   interest	   rate	   arbitrage,	   thus	   lower	   rates	  would	   lead	   to	   potentially	   destabilising	   capital	  outflows	  as	  investors	  sought	  higher	  returns	  elsewhere	  (Llewellyn,	  1980:	  1).	  With	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  intent	  on	  maintaining	  a	  strong	  pound	  in	  order	  to	  dampen	  imported	  inflation,	  the	  need	  to	  follow	  suit	  with	  the	  movements	  of	  the	  dollar	  became	  even	  more	  important	  (BofE,	  1980:	   G37/3).136	  So	  when	   Volcker	   pushed	   up	   U.S.	   interest	   rates,	   the	   Bank	   felt	   obliged	   to	  follow	  suit.	  Pursuing	  and	  independent	   interest	  rate	  policy	  became	  increasingly	  difficult	  as	  the	   processes	   of	   interest	   rate	   interactivity	   that	   began	  with	   the	   birth	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	  continued	  to	  develop	  into	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Despite	  the	  apparent	  promise	  of	   the	  floating	  rates	  system	  in	  allowing	  a	  more	  independent	  and	  discretionary	  monetary	  policy	  than	  had	  previously	  been	  possible	  under	  Bretton	  Woods,	   the	   reality	  was	   that	   intensifying	   financial	  integration	  increasingly	  undermined	  this	  possibility.	  In	   the	   United	   States,	   the	   financial	   deregulation	   that	   had	   been,	   ‘gestating	   for	  more	  than	  a	  decade’	  came	  to	  fruition	  with	  the	  Depositary	  Institutions	  Deregulation	  and	  Monetary	  Control	  Act	   in	  1980	  (Greider,	  1987:	  156).	  The	  Act	  was	  a	  major	  political	   coup	   for	   the	  Fed,	  with	  all	  depository	   institutions	  now	   legally	  obliged	   to	  maintain	   reserves	  with	   the	  Central	  Bank	  (Woolley,	  1984:	  70).	  Membership	  of	  the	  Federal	  Reserve	  System	  had	  been	  declining	  and	  the	  Fed	  passed	  off	  the	  legislation	  as	  a	  technical	  prerequisite	  for	  effective	  control	  of	  the	  money	   supply.	   In	   reality,	   the	   Act	   was	   really	   intended	   to	   strengthen	   the	   Fed’s	   political	  support	  base	  by	  tying	   it	   in	  with	  the	  power	  of	   the	  private	  banks	  (Greider,	  1987:	  155).	  The	  unspoken	   quid	   pro	   quo	   of	   the	   Act	   was	   that	   the	   banks	   would	   accommodate	   the	   political	  requirements	  of	  their	  chief	  regulator,	  in	  return	  for	  favourable	  responses	  to	  their	  request	  for	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  136	  Economic	  Developments	  Abroad:	  March	  1980’,	  March	  4th	  1980.	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mergers,	  branches	  and	  the	  extension	  of	  their	  powers.	  The	  Act	  also	  included	  direct	  benefits	  for	  the	  banks,	  by	  eliminating	  interest	  rate	  ceilings	  for	  banks	  and	  other	  financial	  institutions	  (Meltzer,	  2009:	  1013,	  1066-­‐1067).	  	  This	  was	  a	  key	  moment	  in	  the	  financialisation	  of	  the	  U.S.	  economy.	  With	  the	  old	  Regulation	  Q	  checks	  on	   lending	  now	  gone,	  credit	  could	   flow	  freely	  around	  the	  economy	  even	  if	  market	  rates	  rose.	  Whereas	  the	  old	  ceilings	  had	  served	  as	  ‘stop-­‐valves’	  within	   the	   financial	   system,	   choking	   off	   credit	  when	  market	   rates	   rose	   above	   the	  administered	  ceilings,	  now	  credit	  simply	  became	  more	  expensive.	  Higher	  and	  more	  volatile	  rates	   associated	   with	   the	   abolition	   of	   ceilings	   fed	   into	   the	   development	   of	   a	   macro-­‐economic	  climate	  that	  increasingly	  favoured	  financial	  activities	  over	  investment	  in	  industry	  and	  manufacturing	  (Krippner,	  2012:	  58).	  A	  series	  of	  associated	  legislative	  measures	  were	  passed	  through	  Congress	  in	  order	  to	  deregulate	   finance	   and	   win	   the	   support	   of	   the	   sector	   for	   the	   Fed’s	   tight	   money	   regime.	  These	  measures	  repealed	  the	  New	  Deal	  regulatory	  rules	  put	  in	  place	  during	  the	  1930s	  and	  put	  the	  American	  financial	  system	  firmly	  on	  the	  path	  towards	  neoliberal	  deregulation,	  with	  the	  implication	  that,	  ‘borrowers,	  businesses	  and	  consumers	  would	  pay	  higher	  interest	  rates	  and	   creditors	  would	   enjoy	   higher	   returns	   on	   their	  wealth’	   (Greider,	   1987:	   156).	   The	   Act	  embodied	  something	  symptomatic	  of	  broader	  trends	  within	  neoliberal	  financial	  regulation:	  a	   combination	   of	   expanded	   supervisory	   authority	   and	   control	   for	   the	   Fed	   alongside	  increased	   liberalisation	   for	   banks	   and	   other	   financial	   institutions.	   The	   Act	   widened	   the	  state’s	   regulatory	   purchase	   over	   the	   entire	   banking	   sector.	   It	   was	   this	   combination	   of	  increased	   liberalisation	   alongside	   and	   through	   increased	   supervision,	   which	   allowed	   the	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Fed	  and	  the	  financial	  sector	  to	  effectively	  steer	  a	  course	  through	  the	  Volcker	  shock	  (Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  170).	  It	   was	   this	   exact	   same	   combination,	   of	   increased	   supervisory	   authority	   alongside	  financial	   liberalisation	   that	   occurred	   in	   Britain,	   as	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	  interactivity	  drove	  a	  synchronised	  homogenisation	  of	  regulatory	  conditions.137	  The	  Banking	  Act,	   which	   was	   introduced	   in	   April	   1979,	   shortly	   before	   the	   liberalisation	   of	   exchange	  controls	  and	  other	  measures,	  required	  that	  all	  institutions	  accepting	  deposits	  had	  to	  receive	  authorisation	   from	   the	   Bank	   as	   either	   recognised	   banks	   or	   licensed	   operators.	   The	   Bank	  would	   then	   supervise	   deposit-­‐taking	   institutions,	   with	   their	   advertisements	   for	   deposits,	  use	  of	  banking	  names	  and	  descriptions	  all	  regulated.	  All	  institutions	  were	  also	  required	  to	  pay	  in	  to	  a	  deposit	  protection	  scheme	  for	  their	  clients	  (Capie,	  2010:	  635).	  Liberalisation	  of	  finance	   in	   the	   neoliberal	   era	   was	   conducted	   alongside	   and	   through	   the	   increased	  formalisation	  of	  supervisory	  authority	  held	  by	  Central	  Banks	  and	  other	  regulatory	  bodies.	  	  In	  reality,	  deregulation	  meant	  reregulation.	  What	  was	   the	   impact	  of	  all	   these	  changes	   in	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   regulatory	   regimes	  and	  the	   neoliberal	   interest	   rate	   shocks?	   The	   benefits	   were	   enormously	   differential,	   both	   in	  terms	  of	  business	  sectors	  and	  in	  terms	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	  capitalists	  and	  labour,	  but	  they	  followed	  a	  remarkably	  similar	  pattern	  in	  both	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  The	  start	  of	  the	  Volcker	  shock	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  most	  profitable	  period	  for	  American	  commercial	  banking	   since	   WWII.	   Despite	   the	   wider	   recession	   in	   the	   American	   economy,	   banking	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  137	  This	   is	   not	   to	  make	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   regulatory	   systems	   in	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	   became	  identical,	   as	   they	   clearly	   did	   not	   and	   retained	   a	   high	   degree	   of	   institutional	   difference.	   Yet	   the	  tendencies	   towards	   simultaneous	   supervisory	   extension	   and	   centralisation	   alongside	   financial	  liberalisation	  were	  remarkably	  similar.	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experienced	  an	  increase	  of	  10.3%	  in	  its	  net	  operating	  income	  in	  1980,	  which	  was	  followed	  by	  another	  increase	  of	  9%	  in	  1981.	  Within	  this	  context	  of	  overall	  banking	  profitability,	  the	  largest	  gains	  went	  to	  the	  biggest	  banks.	  While	  returns	  on	  many	  other	  business	  activities	  fell,	  bank	  profits	  increased	  by	  more	  than	  25%.	  	  The	  banks	  were	  able	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  wide	  interest	  rates	  spreads	  when	  rates	  began	  to	  fall,	  borrowing	  cheaply	  but	  continuing	  to	  lend	  to	  customers	   at	   very	   high	   rates.	   Volcker’s	   measures	   were	   first	   and	   foremost	   good	   for	   the	  largest	  banks,	  which	  happened	  to	  be	  the	  Fed’s	  key	  constituency	  (Greider,	  1987:	  411-­‐413).	  But	   even	  within	   the	   financial	   sector,	   there	  were	   casualties	   of	   the	  measures.	   Savings	   and	  Loans	   companies	   experienced	   severe	  difficulties	   both	  during	   and	   after	   the	  Volcker	   shock	  with	   the	   number	   of	   insolvencies	   in	   the	   hundreds	   (Greider,	   1987:	   413;	   Panitch	  &	   Gindin,	  2012:	  173).	  Other	   interests	   also	   suffered	   during	   the	   Volcker	   shock.	   The	   strengthening	   dollar	  reduced	   demand	   for	   American	   exports,	   with	   grain	   farmers	   and	   the	   steel	   industry	   hit	  particularly	  hard,	  while	  manufacturers	  experienced	   falling	  export	  volumes	  and	  a	   reduced	  share	  of	  the	  domestic	  markets	  as	  foreign	  imports	  became	  cheaper	  (Greider,	  1987:	  415-­‐416;	  Konings,	  2011:	  138).	  	  But	  the	  real	  losers	  during	  the	  Volcker	  shock	  were	  American	  workers.	  Given	   the	   contradiction	  at	   the	  heart	  of	   the	  Fed’s	   tight	  money	   regime,	  between	   increasing	  financial	  liberalisation	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  the	  aspiration	  towards	  fuller	  monetary	  control	  on	  the	  other,	   it	  was	  not	  surprising	  that	  the	  most	  effective	  anti-­‐inflationary	  strategy	  would	  be	  to	  use	  an	   induced	  recession	  and	  the	  threat	  of	  unemployment	  to	  reduce	  worker’s	  wage	  share.	  Indeed,	  it	  is	  arguable	  that	  inflation	  was	  not	  squeezed	  out	  of	  the	  American	  economy,	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but	  merely	  redirected	  away	  from	  wages	  and	  consumer	  prices	  and	  into	  the	  financial	  sector	  and	  asset	  prices	  (Konings,	  2011:	  137).	  Volcker’s	  achievements	  in	  reducing	  inflation	  owed	  much	  to	  the	  accompanying	  stance	  of	   Ronald	  Reagan	   towards	  American	   labour	   disputes	   (Axilrod,	   2011:	   99).	   Reagan’s	   tough	  stance	  against	  the	  Air	  Traffic	  Controller’s	  trike,	  where	  he	  resisted	  their	  wage	  demands	  and	  effectively	   broke	   their	   union,	   set	   in	   place	   a	   demonstration	   affect	   that	   contributed	   to	   the	  rapid	  fall	  in	  wage-­‐push	  inflation	  (Axilrod,	  2011:	  99).	  Volcker’s	  struggle	  to	  contain	  inflation	  was	  always	  about	  more	  than	  technical	   issues	  of	  monetary	  policy.	   It	  was	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  neoliberal	   attempt	   to	   shift	   the	   balance	   of	   class	   power	   in	   the	   U.S.	   back	   towards	   capital.	  Breaking	   the	   political	   capacity	   of	   the	   American	   working	   class	   in	   order	   to	   dampen	   their	  expectations	  of	   increasing	  wages	  and	  rising	   living	  standards	  was	  a	  key	  component	  of	  that	  project	  (Greider,	  1987:	  430;	  Panitch	  &	  Gindin,	  2012:	  171).	  This	  was	  a	  point	  that	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  Volcker,	  who	  always	  accepted	  that	   in	  reality,	   inflation	  defended	  upon	  a	  broader	  socio-­‐political	   context,	   rather	   than	   the	   level	   of	   the	   money	   supply	   (Volcker,	   1978:	   330-­‐331).	  Between	   1979	   and	   1983	   personal	   incomes	   from	   interest	   earnings	   grew	   by	   over	   70%,	  whereas	  wage	  incomes	  grew	  by	  only	  33%	  during	  the	  same	  period	  (Greider,	  1987:	  578).	  The	  differential	   benefits	   of	   the	   Volcker	   shock	   were	   clear.	   Volcker’s	   high	   interest	   rate	   regime	  accelerated	  the	  trend	  towards	  financialisation	  that	  was	  already	  underway	  during	  the	  1970s	  as	   funds	  were	   drawn	   into	   the	   U.S.	   banking	   system	   from	   corporation,	   savers	   and	   foreign	  investors.	  With	  wages	  falling,	  workers	  became	  more	  entwined	  in	  the	  relations	  of	  consumer-­‐credit	  dependence	  that	  came	  to	  define	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  Internationally,	  the	  strong	  dollar	  pulled	   in	   capital	   inflows	   that	   helped	   cover	   the	   U.S.’s	   ballooning	   public	   debt	   during	   the	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Reagan	  era	  of	  massive	  defence	  expenditure.	  In	  the	  process	  it	  replenished	  the	  dollar’s	  role	  as	  the	   dominant	   international	   currency	   and	   strengthened	   the	   international	   appeal	   of	   U.S.	  financial	  markets	  (Konings,	  2011:	  139-­‐140).	  The	  reorganisation	  of	  America’s	  domestic	  class	  relations	  was	  intimately	  bound	  up	  with	  the	  maintenance	  of	  America’s	  position	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  global	  political	  economy.	  In	  Britain	  the	  story	  of	  the	  early	  neoliberal	  austerity	  regime	  runs	  remarkably	  parallel.	  The	   strong	   pound	   exerted	   a	   crushing	   toll	   on	   British	   manufacturing	   and	   export-­‐led	  industries	  as	  British	  goods	  were	  priced	  out	  of	   international	  markets	  and	  borrowing	  costs	  soared	  under	  higher	   interest	   rates	   (Stephens,	   1996:	   17).	   The	   consequences	  were,	   in	   fact,	  much	   more	   severe	   than	   in	   the	   U.S.	   and	   rapidly	   accelerated	   the	   decline	   of	   U.K.	  manufacturing.	  In	  a	  period	  when	  measures	  of	  French	  and	  West	  German	  real	  exchange	  rates	  were	  roughly	  stable,	  Britain’s	  rose	  from	  106.3	  in	  1978	  to	  137.9	  in	  1980	  and	  was	  still	  at	  the	  level	   of	   135.2	   by	   the	   end	   of	   1981.	   Britain’s	   effective	   exchange	   rate	   increased	   by	   21.6%	  between	  1979	  and	  1980	  (Buiter	  et.	  al.,	  1981:	  330).	  Britain’s	  economy	  experienced	  a	  fall	  in	  output	   on	   a	   scale	  not	  witnessed	   since	   the	  1920s	  with	   a	   decline	   of	  more	   than	  5%	  of	  GDP	  between	  1980	  and	  1981,	  and	  a	  doubling	  of	  unemployment.	  Manufacturing	  output	  fell	  by	  a	  staggering	   20%	   between	   1979	   and	   1980	   (Keegan,	   1984:	   127,	   171,	   196-­‐203;	   Stephens,	  1996:	  18).	  Beset	  by	   the	  same	  contradiction	  between	   increased	   financial	   liberalisation	  and	   the	  aspiration	  towards	  tighter	  monetary	  control,	  Thatcher’s	  government	  failed	  spectacularly	  in	  its	  attempt	  to	  hit	  the	  prescribed	  monetary	  targets.	  Monetarism	  was	  always	  defined	  more	  by	  its	   political	   implications	   than	   any	   semblance	   of	   intellectual	   coherence,	   a	   case	   of	   the	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‘uncontrollable	   in	   pursuit	   of	   the	   indefinable’	   as	   a	   member	   of	   one	   of	   Thatcher’s	   early	  cabinets	   stated	   (Buiter	   et.	   al.,	   1981:	   367).	   But	   the	   policies	   were	   much	  more	   effective	   in	  weakening	  labour	  through	  the	  inducement	  of	  large	  scale	  unemployment	  and	  the	  weakening	  of	   traditionally	  well	   unionised	   sectors.	   The	   real	   showdown	  with	   the	   unions	  would	   come	  later	  on	  than	  in	  the	  U.S.	  with	  the	  landmark	  defeat	  of	  the	  bitter	  miner’s	  strike	  in	  1984.	  For	   the	   City,	   the	   benefits	   of	   neoliberal	   austerity	   were	   widespread	   and	   Thatcher’s	  free	   market	   oriented	   credit	   policy	   was	   warmly	   received	   (Johnson,	   1994:	   39).	   The	   high	  interest	   rate	   regime	  was	  beneficial	   to	  British	  banks.	   	   The	  profitability	   crisis	   of	   the	  1970s	  had	   led	   to	   a	  decreased	   reliance	  upon	   internal	   funds	   for	   corporate	   financing;	   this	   led	   to	   a	  shift	   away	   from	   fixed	   rate	  bond	   issues	   and	   towards	  bank	   financing.	  Between	  1972-­‐1980,	  bank	  borrowing	  financed	  over	  50%	  of	  the	  corporate	  sector’s	  gross	  borrowing	  requirement.	  Banks	  also	  became	  more	  competitive	  and	  aggressive	  during	  the	  period,	  partly	  in	  response	  to	   the	   increased	   entry	   of	   foreign	   banks	   into	   the	   market,	   while	   high	   inflation	   increased	  corporations	  requirements	   for	  working	  capital	  of	  which	  banks	  were	  an	   important	  source.	  As	   the	   recession	   continued	   to	   bite	   under	  Thatcher,	   businesses	  were	   forced	   into	   “distress	  borrowing”	  in	  order	  to	  stay	  afloat	  (Llewellyn,	  1985:	  22).	  These	  factors	  combined	  to	  insure	  that	   the	   demand	   for	   credit	   was	   actually	   highly	   inelastic,	   with	   the	   implication	   that	  businesses	  would	  continue	  to	  borrow	  despite	  the	  increase	  in	  interest	  rates.	  	  Under	   the	  monetarist	   regime,	   the	  British	   economy	  at	   large	   suffered	  while	   the	  City	  prospered	   (Coakley	   &	   Harris,	   1983:	   192).	   The	   banks	   in	   the	   City	   accepted	   monetarism’s	  avowed	  attempts	  to	  control	  the	  money	  supply,	  as	  long	  as	  it	  did	  not	  entail	  direct	  restrictions	  their	   freedom,	   ‘it	   had	   to	   be	   achieved	  without	   direct	   controls	   on	   the	   banks	   and	  with	   the	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Figure	  3.1	  
UK	  Banks	  1965-­‐2011	  Capitalization	  as	  a	  share	  of	  National	  Market	  Capitalization	  	  Percentage	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Despite	  the	  differential	   impacts	  of	  neoliberal	  austerity	  within	  business	  sectors,	  this	  was	  not	  a	  case	  of	  banking	  versus	  industry.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1970s,	  American	  industry	  had	  by	   and	   large	   come	   to	   support	   the	   anti-­‐inflationary	   stance	   of	   the	   Fed	   and	   recognised	   the	  benefits	   of	   a	   strategy	   to	   defeat	   labour	   (Panitch	   &	   Gindin,	   2012:	   163).	   And	   as	   we	   have	  already	  seen,	  S&Ls	  were	  major	  casualties	  of	  the	  Volcker	  shock.	  In	  Britain,	  Thatcherism	  was	  based	  upon	  an	  unstable	  alliance	  of	  interests,	  with	  the	  CBI,	  the	  chief	  representative	  of	  British	  industry,	  welcoming	  the	  promise	  of	   lower	   inflation	  and	  reduced	  taxes	   for	  businesses.	  The	  possibility	  that	  a	  recession	  might	  allow	  the	  ’reimposition	  of	  managerial	  authority’,	  was	  also	  widely	   welcomed	   in	   the	   business	   community	   and	   the	   ‘sound	   money’	   common	   sense	   of	  monetarism	  had	  appealed	  broadly	   to	  British	  society	  (Jessop	  et.	  al.,	  1984:	  43-­‐45).	  The	  real	  victims	  of	  the	  monetarist	  austerity	  regime,	  then,	  were	  the	  millions	  of	  unemployed	  workers	  that	  felt	  the	  squeeze	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic.	  The	   development	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   high	   interest	   rate	   regimes	   and	   accelerating	  financial	   liberalisation	   also	   had	   significant	   international	   ramifications.	   In	   the	   U.S.,	   high	  interest	   rates	  drew	   in	   foreign	   capital	  on	  a	  massive	   scale	  during	   the	  1980s.	  These	   inflows	  allowed	  the	  Reagan	  administration	  to	   finance	   its	  deficit	  while	  also	   further	  contributing	   to	  the	   expansion	   of	   credit	   within	   the	   U.S.,	   further	   fuelling	   financialisation	   and	   driving	   up	  financial	   sector	   profits.	   Inadvertently,	   the	   Reagan	   administration	   had	   stumbled	   upon	   a	  solution	   to	   the	   fiscal	   crisis	   of	   the	   late	   1960s	   and	   1970s,	   with	   foreign	   inflows	   into	   U.S.	  Treasury	  bonds	  and	  dollar	  assets	  enabling	   the	  U.S.	   to	  avoid	   the	  kind	  of	   fiscal	  deflation	  or	  increased	   taxation	   that	   would	   have	   been	   required	  without	   the	   vast	   inflows	   to	   cover	   the	  deficit	  (Krippner,	  2012:	  87-­‐92).	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Not	  only	  did	   the	   interest	  rate	  shocks	  and	   financial	   liberalisation	  transform	  the	  U.S.	  capacity	  to	  finance	  its	  deficit,	   it	  also	  exerted	  a	  crushing	  impact	  on	  developing	  countries	  in	  the	  Global	   South.	  By	   responding	   to	   the	  difficult	   economic	   conditions	  of	   the	   late	  1970s	  by	  inducing	   further	   recessionary	   conditions,	   the	   Thatcher	   and	   Reagan	   administrations	  dampened	  global	  demand	  and	  devastated	  the	  primary	  commodity	  economies	  of	  developing	  countries	  in	  Africa	  and	  Latin	  America,	  as	  demand	  for	  their	  exports	  dried	  up	  (Greider,	  1987:	  415;	   Kiely,	   2007:	   202).	   The	   interest	   rate	   shocks	   and	   austerity	   also	   aggravated	   the	   debt	  crisis	  in	  the	  Global	  South.	  These	  countries	  had	  borrowed	  heavily	  from	  the	  banks	  in	  the	  City	  and	  the	  New	  York	  during	  the	  1970s,	  with	  the	  vast	  OPEC	  surpluses	  generated	  from	  the	  oil	  price	   shock	   recycled	   through	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   systems	   and	   lent	   on	   to	  developing	  countries.	  Interest	  payments	  on	  this	  foreign	  debt	  rose	  from	  $24.3	  billion	  in	  1979	  to	   $41.8	   billion	   in	   1981,	   with	   massive	   increase	   in	   the	   percentage	   of	   GDP	   attributed	   to	  servicing	  the	  debt	  (Kiely,	  2007:	  2002).	  	  
	  
Anglo-­‐American	  symbiosis	  and	  the	  termination	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  compromise	  
	  The	  tight	  money	  regimes	   imposed	   in	  Britain	  and	  American	  brought	  a	  stunning	  end	  to	   the	  post-­‐war	  Keynesian	  compromise	  and	  signalled	  the	  birth	  of	   the	  neoliberal	  era	   in	  the	  West.	  The	   trans-­‐Atlantic	   synchronicity	  of	   these	   regimes	  was	  not,	   as	   the	   story	  has	   so	  often	  been	  told,	  coincidental	  or	  merely	  a	  consequence	  of	  shared	  ideology.	  It	  was	  rather	  a	  consequence	  of	   the	   symbiotic	   development	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	   markets	   and	   central	   banking	  practices.	   The	   shared	   desire	   to	   rein	   in	   inflation	   and	   achieve	   price	   stability	   was	   a	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consequence	   of	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   Anglo-­‐American	   government	   officials	   sought	   to	  provide	  an	  anchor	  to	  macro-­‐economic	  objectives	  in	  an	  era	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates.	  Unlike	  the	   European	   members	   of	   the	   ERM,	   they	   did	   this	   through	   the	   adoption	   of	   monetarist	  ideology	  and	  technical	  practices,	  rather	  than	  through	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  multilateral	  fixed	  rate	   system.	   The	   re-­‐composition	   of	   national	   monetary	   regimes	   in	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	  emerged	  from	  the	  way	  in	  which	  they	  sought	  to	  organise	  their	  monetary	  politics	  within	  the	  post-­‐Bretton	  Woods	  context	  of	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  and	  high	  inflation.	  Restoring	  price	  stability	  was	  also	  very	  much	  about	  arresting	  the	  destabilising	  impact	  of	  inflation	  upon	  investors	  and	  financial	  markets	  and	  restoring	  class	  discipline	  over	  labour	  by	   means	   of	   austerity.	   It	   was	   no	   coincidence,	   then,	   that	   the	   most	   avowed	   attempts	   at	  monetarist	   policies	   were	   made	   in	   the	   two	   countries	   that	   played	   host	   to	   the	   foremost	  financial	  centres	  of	  the	  global	  economy.	  Bankers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  wanted	  to	  see	  a	   return	   to	   stable	   accumulation	   conditions	   and	   increased	   returns.	   	   Convergence	   of	  monetary	  regimes	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  underpinned	  by	  the	  increasing	  integration	  of	  global	   financial	  markets,	  which	   centred	   upon	   the	   interactivity	   between	   London	   and	  New	  York	   and	   the	   transatlantic	   regulatory	   feedback	   loop	   set	   in	   motion	   with	   the	   birth	   of	   the	  Euromarkets.	   Dynamics	   of	   ‘coordinated	   competition’	   between	   regulators	   in	   London	   and	  New	   York	  were	   central	   to	   the	  way	   in	  which	   the	   offshore	   conditions	   of	   banking,	   brought	  about	   through	   the	   original	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   interactivity	   of	   the	   1950s	   and	  60s,	   were	   embedded	   within	   national	   monetary	   regimes	   through	   processes	   of	   financial	  liberalisation	  and	  supervisory	  centralisation.	   	  The	  central	  contradiction	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	   experiments	  with	  monetarism,	  was	   that	   between	   financial	   liberalisation,	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on	  the	  one	  hand,	  and	  control	  of	  the	  money	  supply,	  on	  the	  other.	  The	  attempt	  to	  control	  the	  money	  supply	  more	  tightly	  were	  made	  at	  the	  precise	  point	  when	  the	  further	  liberalisation	  of	   transatlantic	   financial	  markets	  and	   the	   continued	  expansion	  of	   the	  Euromarkets,	  made	  monetary	  control	  ever	  harder	  to	  achieve	  without	  recourse	  to	  the	  kind	  of	  quantitative	  and	  administered	   restrictions	   that	  were	   now	   rejected.	   Attempts	   to	   ration	   credit	   by	   adjusting	  interest	   rates	   to	   effect	   demand	   proved	   to	   have	   a	   limited	   effect,	   given	   the	   apparent	  inelasticity	  of	  demand	  for	  credit	  (Krippner,	  2012:	  83).	  By	   tying	   themselves	   into	   neoliberal	   austerity	   policies,	   Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.	  demonstrated	   their	   commitment	   to	   countering	   inflation	   and	   restoring	   credibility.	   In	   the	  process,	   they	  showed	   that	   the	  1980s	  would	  not	  be	  characterised	  by	   the	  rising	  wages	  and	  growing	   militancy	   of	   trade	   unions,	   or	   the	   sustained	   inflation	   that	   had	   characterised	   the	  decade	  before.	  They	  also	  brought	  about	  a	  new	  era	  of	   increasingly	   financialised	  capitalism	  under	  which	  more	  and	  more	  aspects	  of	   social	   life	  and	  economic	  activity	  would	  be	  drawn	  into	   the	  orbit	  of	  credit-­‐debtor	  relations	  centred	  upon	   liberalised	   financial	  markets.	   It	  was	  during	   this	   period	   that	   the	   epochal	   conditions	   were	   laid	   for	   the	   spectacular	   crisis	   that	  engulfed	   the	   global	   economy	   in	   2008.	   As	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   austerity	   regimes	   pushed	  down	  on	  workers’	  wages	  and	  weakened	  the	  sectors	  in	  which	  the	  unions	  had	  formerly	  been	  strong,	   wages	   fell	   and	   growth	   became	   increasingly	   dependent	   upon	   debt-­‐driven	  consumption	  fuelled	  by	  financial	  innovation.	  Thus,	  the	  growing	  Anglo-­‐American	  household	  indebtedness	   that	   became	   an	   increasingly	   central	   feature	   of	   their	   economic	  development	  can	   be	   understood	   as	   the,	   ‘inadvertent	   outcome	   of	   the	   concomitant	   process	   of	   wage	  stagnation	   and	   financial	   services	   liberalisation’,	   that	  were	   central	   to	   the	   abandonment	   of	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full	  employment	  in	  favour	  of	  price	  stability.	  The	  pursuit	  of	  non-­‐inflationary	  growth	  policies	  entailed	   the	   transformation	   of	   labour	  markets	   and	   the	   development	   of	   financial	   services	  markets	   that	   laid	   the	   preconditions	   for	   neoliberal	   development	   and	   promoted	   increased	  dependence	   upon	   personal	   indebtedness	   to	   drive	   growth	   (Montgomerie,	   2006:	   122;	  Crouch,	  2009:	  382,	  390).	  Under	  this	  new	  neoliberal	  model	  of	  capitalism,	  Central	  Banks	  and	  monetary	  policy	  were	  accorded	  a	  more	  prominent	  role	  than	  during	  the	  post-­‐war	  era.	  The	  political	   struggles	   between	   the	   Fed,	   the	   Bank	   and	   their	   respective	   executives	   during	   the	  early	   neoliberal	   period	  were	   key	   to	   the	   pattern	   of	   increased	   Central	   Bank	   independence	  that	  came	  to	  define	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  One	   of	   the	   major	   consequences	   of	   the	   elevated	   role	   of	   Central	   Banks,	   and	   the	  increased	   independence	   that	   went	   alongside	   it,	   was	   that	   Anglo-­‐American	   financial	  development	   was	   central	   to	   the	   restoration	   of	   a	   global	   economy	   that	   was	   driven	   by	  politically	  unaccountable	  and	  insulated	  central	  bankers.	  Neoliberalism	  was,	  therefore,	  very	  much	  a	  case	  of	   ‘back	  to	  the	   future’:	   the	  shadowy	  patterns	  of	  Central	  Bank	   interaction	  and	  cooperation	  that	  had	  defined	  the	  global	  economy	  during	  the	  1920s	  were	  restored	  after	  the	  Keynesian	  hiatus,	  demonstrating	   the	  cyclical	  nature	  of	  capitalist	  governance.	  Processes	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  driven	  by	  the	  interactivity	  of	  financiers	  in	  London	  and	  New	  York,	  and	  the	  actions	  of	  government	  officials	  who	  sought	  to	  accommodate	  their	  needs,	  were	  central	   to	   the	   restoration	   of	   global	   financial	   power	   and	   the	   increased	   role	   of	   central	  banking.	   The	   puncturing	   of	   national	   systems	   of	   financial	   regulation	   and	   control	   that	   had	  begun	  with	  the	  Euromarkets,	  and	  had	  gradually	  eroded	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  Keynesian	  state	  in	  Britain	   and	   the	   U.S.,	   had	   now	   come	   home	   to	   roost.	   	   Greater	   financial	   integration	   and	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coordinated	   competition	   spurred	   a	  homogenisation	  of	  monetary	   regimes	   and	   accelerated	  the	  drive	  towards	  greater	  liberalisation.	  In	   both	   countries	   the	   consequences	   of	   these	   developments	   were	   severe.	   As	   the	  power	  of	  finance	  increased	  and	  wages	  fell	  or	  stagnated,	  workers	  became	  more	  indebted	  and	  dependent	  upon	   financial	  markets.	  The	   ‘politics	  of	  productivity’	   that	  had	  offered	  so	  much	  promise	   to	   workers	   in	   the	   post-­‐war	   period	   was	   now	   shattered	   by	   the	   restoration	   of	  capitalist	  power	  under	  neoliberalism.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  several	  decades	  later	  that	  the	  model	  instated	  during	   the	  1980s	  would	   fully	   implode	   in	  a	   spectacular	  manner	  during	   the	  global	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008.	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8	  	  Conclusion:	  The	  persistence	  of	  orthodoxy	  	  Unearthing	   the	   problematique	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   has	   enabled	   us,	   in	   the	  preceding	  chapters,	  to	  shed	  light	  upon	  aspects	  of	  the	  development	  of	  British	  capitalism	  that	  were	   previously	   shrouded	  within	   the	   question	   of	   decline.	   By	   breaking	   out	   of	   the	   decline	  paradigm	   and	   opening	   up	   the	   question	   of	   British	   development	   within	   the	   wider	  transatlantic	   context	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development,	   this	   thesis	   has	   provided	   a	   deeper	  understanding	   of	   the	   breakdown	   of	   the	   post-­‐war	   Keynesian	   compromise	   and	   the	  synchronised	  collapse	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  regime	  within	  which	  that	  compromise	  was	  framed.	  The	  dynamics	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	   centred	  upon	   the	   interdependence	  and	   integration	   of	   finance	   in	   the	   City	   and	  New	  York,	   the	   interactivity	   of	   sterling	   and	   the	  dollar,	   and	   the	   close	   linkages	   between	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   and	   the	   Federal	  Reserve-­‐Treasury-­‐Wall	   Street	   nexus,	   have	   been	   crucial	   to	   these	   transformations.	   The	  analysis	   provided	   in	   this	   thesis	   has	   revealed	   the	   role	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers,	   both	  private	   and	   central,	   in	   destabilising	   the	   post-­‐war	   Keynesian	   compromise	   and	   unleashing	  the	  forces	  of	   liberalised	  finance	  by	  driving	  processes	  of	  deregulation	  that	  undermined	  the	  limitations	   put	   in	   place	   on	   the	   freedom	   of	   capital	   movement	   at	   Bretton	   Woods	   and	  rendered	  the	  maintenance	  of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  much	  more	  difficult.	  	  	  During	   the	   crisis	   years	   of	   the	   1970s,	   when	   high	   inflation	   threatened	   the	  accumulation	   strategies	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers,	   they	   successfully	   pressed	   for	   the	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implementation	  of	  austerity	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Central	  Banks	  that	  prioritised	  interests	  of	  the	  banking	  sector	  above	  the	  wider	  needs	  of	  their	  national	  political	  economies.	  States	  did	  make	  globalisation,	  as	  Helleiner	  correctly	  identifies	  (1994:	  3)	  and	  the	  role	  of	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  was	  central	  here.	  But	  the	  centrality	  of	  their	  roles	  was	  a	  consequence	  precisely	  of	  the	   limits	  of	  state	  autonomy	  in	  the	  context	  of	  powerful	   international	   financial	  centres	  and	  banking	  communities	  that	  sought	  to	  advance	  their	  interests	  through	  harnessing	  the	  power	  of	   the	  state	   to	  provide	  suitable	  conditions	   for	  business	   to	   flourish.	  That	  meant	  looking	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  national	  sovereignty	  and	  developing	  business	  strategies	  that	  would	   depend	   upon	   transatlantic	   interaction,	   the	   transformation	   of	   international	  regulatory	  conditions	  and	  the	  further	  internationalisation	  of	  key	  state	  institutions.	  	  In	   the	  process	  of	   these	  attempts,	  Anglo-­‐American	  bankers	  and	  state	  officials	   set	   in	  motion	   a	   transatlantic	   regulatory	   feedback	   loop	   within	   the	   broader	   dynamics	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   that	   corroded	   the	   foundations	   of	   their	   national	   financial	   systems	  and	  weakened	  the	  international	  monetary	  order	  instituted	  at	  Bretton	  Woods.	  That	  process	  was	  highly	  interactive	  with	  the	  international	  monetary	  system	  and	  we	  can	  only	  understand	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	  embrace	  of	  monetarism	  and	  the	  early	  neoliberal	  interest	  rate	  shocks	  as	  components	   of	   the	   new	   national	   monetary	   regimes	   that	   were	   rendered	   possible	   by	   the	  transition	  to	  floating	  exchange	  rates	  during	  the	  1970s.	  In	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  old	  disciplines	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  system,	  however	  ineffective	  they	  proved	  in	  practice,	  Anglo-­‐American	  banking	  communities	  searched	  for	  new	  forms	  of	  discipline.	  The	  right	  wing	  administrations	  of	   Thatcher	   and	   Reagan	   were	   happy	   to	   enforce	   those	   disciplines	   and	   reorder	   the	  hierarchies	  of	  social	  forces	  within	  their	  societies.	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Only	  by	  disaggregating	   the	  state	  and	   isolating	   the	   interactive	  centres	  of	  public	  and	  private	   financial	  power,	  can	  we	  understand	  the	  unfolding	  politics	  of	  globalisation	  and	  the	  pivotal	   role	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   within	   them.	   Holding	   on	   to	   the	   traditional	  framework	  of	  hegemonic	  cycles	  of	  rise	  and	  decline,	  as	  Helleiner	  and	  so	  much	  of	   IPE	  does,	  simply	   doesn’t	   afford	   us	   the	   possibility	   of	   examining	   the	   dynamic	   reconstitution	   of	   these	  institutional	  bases	  of	  capitalist	  power	  through	  processes	  of	  international	  development	  and	  integration.	  Without	   identifying	   the	   importance	   of	   this	   Anglo-­‐American	   developmental	   sphere,	  we	   risk	   overstating	   the	   degree	   of	   national	   state	   autonomy	   in	   the	   politics	   of	   financial	  globalisation	  or	  stressing	  too	  much	  the	  singularity	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  implementing	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	   agreement	   and	   then	   shaping	   the	   politics	   of	   financial	   globalisation	   and	   the	   rise	   of	  neoliberalism.	   The	  U.S.	   clearly	   did	   play	   a	   privileged	   and	   unparalleled	   role	   in	   shaping	   the	  development	  of	   global	   capitalism,	   but	   it	   did	   so	   in	   conjunction	  with	  other	  major	   capitalist	  states.	  	  The	  relationship	  of	  uneven	  interdependence	  with	  Britain	  was	  crucial	  in	  this	  regard.	  American	  ascendancy	  and	  its	  achievement	  of	  global	   financial	  dominance,	  expressed	  in	  the	  primacy	   of	   American	   banking	   and	   the	   unrivalled	   international	   role	   of	   the	   dollar	   and	  U.S.	  Treasury	  bonds,	  was	  expressed	  through	  and	  conditioned	  by	  the	  subordinate	  integration	  of	  Britain.	  This	  integration	  was	  brought	  about	  by	  processes	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development,	  which	   exerted	   a	   hugely	   formative	   impact	   upon	   the	   post-­‐war	   development	   of	   British	  capitalism,	   producing	   important	   feedback	   effects	   upon	   the	   U.S.,	   none	   more	   so	   than	   the	  gradual	   decomposition	   of	   the	   New	   Deal	   regulatory	   framework,	   which	   had	   shaped	   the	  development	  of	  American	  finance	  since	  the	  1930s.	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The	  enormous	  power	  and	  influence	  of	  bankers	  in	  the	  City	  and	  New	  York	  was	  central	  to	   the	  way	   that	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   undermined	   the	   Bretton	  Woods	   order	   and	  drove	   the	   dynamics	   that	   led	   towards	   financial	   globalisation.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	  interdependence	  of	  bankers	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  Atlantic	  was	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	   and	  was	   critical	   to	   the	   restoration	   of	   the	   City’s	   role	   as	   the	  world’s	   premier	  financial	  centre.	  As	  the	  competitive	  challenge	  from	  London	  intensified	  and	  the	  integration	  of	  transatlantic	  money	  markets	  accelerated,	  the	  New	  Deal	  regulatory	  framework	  in	  the	  U.S.	  came	  under	  increasing	  pressure.	  	  The	  City’s	  restoration	  occurred	  within	  a	  context	  of	  transatlantic	  financial	  integration	  that	  meant	  that	  the	  dollar	  and	  American	  banks	  became	  the	  dominant	  players	  in	  the	  City	  of	  London.	  The	  social	  forces	  that	  benefited	  from	  the	  City’s	  restoration	  then	  drew	  in	  American	  disciplinary	   power	   in	   order	   to	   reorient	   the	   British	   state	   away	   from	   the	   potential	  radicalisation	  of	  social	  democracy	  during	  a	  key	  crisis	  moment	  in	  1976.	  The	  success	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  disciplining	  Britain,	  through	  the	  dictates	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  supported	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  financial	   markets,	   was	   a	   key	   moment	   in	   the	   furtherance	   of	   international	   financial	  liberalisation	   and	   the	   politics	   of	   globalisation.	   The	   Labour	   government’s	   public	  renunciation	  of	  Keynesian	  objectives	  remains	  one	  of	  the	  defining	  moments	  of	  both	  Britain’s	  post-­‐war	  political	  history	  and	  the	  politics	  of	  globalisation.	  At	  the	  heart	  of	  all	  of	  these	  developments,	  lay	  the	  continued	  concentration	  of	  power	  within	   the	   institutional	   complex	  of	   the	  City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	  nexus	   in	  Britain,	   and	   the	  Fed-­‐Wall	   Street-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   in	   the	   U.S.	   The	   interactions	   between	   these	   transatlantic	  concentrations	   of	   instituted	   capitalist	   power,	   where	   public	   and	   private	   finance	   were	   co-­‐
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articulated,	   were	   key	   to	   the	   collapse	   of	   Bretton	   Woods	   and	   the	   unfolding	   of	   financial	  globalisation.	  These	  institutional	  centres	  also	  provided	  a	  crucial	  basis	  for	  the	  emergence	  of	  monetarism	   and	   the	   launching	   of	   the	   broader	   neoliberal	   project	   during	   the	   1970s	   and	  1980s.	   As	   banking	   power	   increased	   after	   the	   development	   of	   global	   capital	  markets	   and	  decades	  of	   increasing	  financial	   liberalisation,	  Central	  Banks	  within	  both	  countries	  became	  increasingly	  vital	  to	  the	  management	  of	  economic	  development	  during	  the	  neoliberal	  era.	  	  By	   the	   early	   1980s,	   after	   the	   Conservatives	   had	   actively	   championed	   the	   creeping	  monetarism	  that	  had	  gathered	  momentum	  during	  the	  crisis	  years	  of	  the	  1970s,	  the	  power	  of	   finance	   and	   the	   priority	   of	   price	   stability	   over	   full	   employment	   were	   dramatically	  reinstated.	  Over	   in	   the	  U.S.,	   the	  Volcker	   shock	   represented	  a	  key	  moment	   in	  U.S.	  political	  history,	  ushering	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  and	  recalibrating	  the	  balance	  of	  social	  forces	  within	  the	  American	  political	  economy.	  The	  neoliberal	  austerity	  regimes	  imposed	  by	  Thatcher	  and	  Reagan,	  in	  which	  such	  a	  large	  emphasis	  was	  placed	  upon	  the	  role	  of	  monetary	  policy,	  have	  had	  truly	  global	  ramifications	  in	  the	  decades	  since.	  The	   financial	   liberalisation	   that	   intensified	   during	   the	   1980s,	   represented	   a	  continuation	   of	   the	   dynamics	   set	   in	   motion	   with	   the	   emergence	   of	   the	   transatlantic	  regulatory	  feedback	  loop	  after	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  Euromarkets.	  Those	  processes	  of	  competitive	  deregulation	  fed	  directly	  into	  the	  subprime	  mortgage	  crisis	  that	  engulfed	  the	  global	  political	  economy	   in	   2008.	   	   After	   being	   pioneered	   in	   the	   U.S.	   (Thompson,	   2009:	   17),	   mortgage-­‐backed	  securities	  were	  brought	  into	  London	  after	  the	  passing	  of	  the	  Services	  and	  Building	  Societies	  Act	   in	  1986,	  which	  enabled	  U.S.	   investment	  banks	  to	  establish	  mortgage-­‐lending	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subsidiaries	   in	   London.	   This	   practice	   then	   spread	   throughout	   British	   retail	   banking	   and	  building	  societies	  (Wainwright,	  2009:	  377).	  The	   contours	   of	   the	   contemporary	   global	   financial	   crisis,	   then,	   have	   deep-­‐lying	  connections	  to	  the	  patterns	  of	  Anglo-­‐American	  development	  that	  have	  been	  mapped	  out	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	   Those	  patterns	  continue	   to	  be	  of	   substantial	   relevance	   to	   the	  contemporary	  global	   political	   economy	   and	   will	   likely	   continued	   to	   do	   so	   while	   the	   predominance	   of	  London	  and	  New	  York	  within	  the	  world’s	  capital	  markets	  endures.	  	  One	  of	  the	  major	  lessons	  to	  be	  derived	  from	  this	  thesis	  is	  that	  the	  enduring	  priority	  of	   austerity	   within	   Anglo-­‐American	   capitalism	   should	   come	   as	   no	   surprise.	   It	   is	   the	  Keynesian	  heyday	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  period,	  and	  not	  the	  rise	  of	  neoliberalism,	  that	  is	  the	  real	  anomaly	   to	   be	   explained	   within	   the	   lineage	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	   development	   and	   the	  historical	  transformation	  of	  global	  capitalism.	  The	  major	  conclusion	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  Bretton	  Woods	  monetary	  order	  and	  the	  troubled	  history	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  compromise	   between	   capital	   and	   labour	   is	   that	   it	   is	   incredibly	   difficult	   to	   overcome	   the	  forces	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  orthodoxy	  within	  Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism.	  	  It	   took	   the	   unfolding	   of	   two	   cataclysmic	   World	   Wars	   within	   twenty	   years,	   the	  experience	   of	   the	  Great	  Depression	   and	  decades	   of	  working	   class	   struggle	   before	   the	   old	  gold	  standard	  orthodoxy	  of	  balanced	  budgets	  and	  deflationary	  adjustments	  imposed	  on	  the	  working	  classes,	  was	  properly	  challenged.	  Post-­‐war	  planners	  attempted	  to	  create	  the	  space	  required,	   at	   Bretton	   Woods,	   for	   countries	   to	   run	   deficits	   and	   implement	   expansionary	  economic	  policies	  that	  would	  enable	  full	  employment	  and	  high	  growth	  rates.	  But	  the	  Anglo-­‐American	   banking	   elite	   never	   lost	   their	   appetite	   for	   the	   old	   austerity	   politics	   of	   the	   gold	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standard	   era.	   The	  Keynesian	   transformation	   of	   the	  British	   state	   did	  not	   go	   far	   enough	   in	  reorienting	   the	   City	   towards	   Britain’s	   national	   development	   goals	   or	   the	   politics	   of	   full	  employment.	  In	  their	  desire	  to	  maintain	  the	  international	  role	  of	  the	  pound	  and	  restore	  the	  City’s	   prestige,	   the	   City-­‐Bank-­‐Treasury	   nexus	   undermined	   the	   foundations	   of	   a	   lasting	  Keynesian	  transformation	  and	  successfully	  attempted	  to	  restore	  the	  old	  orthodoxy	  of	  fiscal	  discipline	  and	  price	  stability.	  	  In	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.,	  both	  of	  the	  major	  political	  parties	  came	  to	  accept	  and	  advocate	  this	  policy	  programme	  wholeheartedly.	  Within	   thirty	   years	   of	   the	   implementation	   of	   Bretton	  Woods,	   the	   vision	   of	  Keynes	  and	  White	   had	   largely	   receded	   from	   view.	   The	   birth	   of	   the	   Euromarkets	   had	   punctured	  wholes	  within	  national	  money	  markets.	  The	  domestic	  commitment	  to	  full	  employment	  was	  cracking	  under	   the	  pressure	  of	   increasing	  worker	  militancy	   and	   stagflation.	  The	   IMF	  had	  been	   transformed	   into	   an	   agent	   that	  would	   impose	  market	   discipline	   and	   austerity	   upon	  debtors	   rather	   than	   affording	   them	   space	   to	   grow	   their	   way	   out	   of	   trouble	   and	   pursue	  Keynesian	  objectives.	  	  In	   Britain,	   the	   country	   that	   had	   produced	   the	   founder	   of	   the	   most	   successful	  intellectual	   challenge	   to	   the	   old	   orthodoxy,	   John	   Maynard	   Keynes,	   it	   was	   the	   IMF	   that	  helped	   drive	   the	   adoption	   of	  monetarism	   and	   the	   enactment	   of	   austerity.	   The	   system	   of	  fixed	  exchange	  rates	  and	  capital	  controls,	  designed	  to	  provide	  the	  domestic	  breathing	  space	  for	   expansionary	   fiscal	   policy	   and	   full	   employment,	   and	   to	   insulate	   states	   from	   the	  disruptive	   influence	   of	   speculative	   capital	   flows,	   had	   collapsed	   under	   the	   pressure	   of	  liberalising	   global	   financial	   markets	   that	   were	   hosted	   within	   the	   Anglo-­‐American	   twin	  engine	  rooms	  of	  financial	  globalisation:	  London	  and	  New	  York.	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Despite	  the	  positive	  experiences	  with	  planning	  and	  enlarged	  Treasury	  control	  over	  national	  economic	  management	  during	   the	  wartime	  years,	   it	  did	  not	   take	   long	  before	   the	  Bank	   and	   the	   Fed	  were	   able	   to	   recover	   their	   former	   institutional	   privileges	   in	   the	   early	  post-­‐war	  period.	  Once	  those	  privileges	  had	  been	  regained,	  even	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  Bank’s	  nationalisation	   in	   Britain,	   they	   were	   able	   to	   promote	   financial	   expansion	   and	   eventual	  liberalisation	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  imperilled	  their	  own	  post-­‐war	  models	  of	  national	  capitalism	  and	  the	  broader	  international	  monetary	  system.	  These	  processes	  did	  not	  always	  unfold	  in	  accordance	   with	   a	   grand	   strategic	   plan.	   It	   was	   at	   many	   points	   a	   product	   more	   of	   the	  haphazard	   interaction	   of	   private	   finance	   and	   state	   agencies,	   as	   Anglo-­‐American	   bankers	  sought	  to	  negotiate	  the	  crises,	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  of	  the	  international	  monetary	  system.	  What	   is	   clear	   from	   this	   study	   is	   that	   the	   Keynesian	   transformations	   of	   Anglo-­‐American	  capitalism	  did	  not	  go	  far	  enough	  in	  restraining	  the	  freedom	  of	  finance	  and	  failed	  to	   enact	   adequate	   institutional	   transformations	   to	   put	   finance	   in	   the	   service	   of	   more	  egalitarian	  goals.	  In	  this	  respect	  the	  post-­‐war	  Labour	  government	  in	  Britain	  was	  a	  failure.	  It	  left	  far	  too	  much	  of	  the	  existing	  structure	  of	  British	  capitalism	  untouched	  (Anderson,	  1992:	  164).	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  more	  radical	  elements	  of	  New	  Deal	  politics	  ran	  out	  of	  steam	  too	  early	  to	   effect	   the	   kind	   of	   changes	   that	   were	   required	   to	   put	   American	   capitalism	   upon	   a	  progressive	   trajectory	   over	   the	   longer	   term	   (Brinkley,	   1996:	   4).	   The	   incomplete	  transformation	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  state	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  to	  confront	  the	  power	  of	  finance	  more	  directly	  left	  the	  way	  open	  for	  the	  gradual	  reassertion	  of	  the	  old	  economic	  orthodoxies.	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By	  the	  1980s	  the	  predominance	  of	  Central	  Banks	  and	  bankers	  in	  shaping	  the	  global	  political	  economy	  had	  been	  restored.	  By	  the	  1997,	  with	  the	  Bank	  of	  England	  granted	  formal	  independence	  by	  the	  New	  Labour	  government,	  independent	  Anglo-­‐American	  Central	  Banks	  were	  once	  again	   fundamental	   to	  the	  politics	  of	   the	   international	  monetary	  system.	  With	  a	  distribution	  of	  national	  wealth	  and	  levels	  of	  income	  inequality	  reminiscent	  of	  the	  interwar	  years,	  one	  could	  be	  mistaken	  for	  thinking	  that	  the	  politics	  of	  the	  1920s	  had	  returned	  under	  the	  neoliberal	  political	  economy	  of	  the	  1990s	  and	  2000s.	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  of	  2008,	  the	  age-­‐old	  bankers	  remedy	  of	  austerity	  is	  once	  again	  at	  the	  top	  of	  the	  policy	  agenda.	  The	  response	  to	  the	  crisis	  in	  Britain	  and	  the	  U.S.	  has	   relied	   upon	   the	   adoption	   of	   coordinated	   policies	   of	   quantitative	   easing	   and	   loose	  monetary	   policy.	   These	   policies	   have	   boosted	   asset	   prices,	   continued	   the	   regressive	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  associated	  with	  the	  neoliberal	  era	  and	  shored	  up	  the	  balance	  sheets	  of	  banks.	  But	  they	  have	  done	  little	  to	  solve	  the	  problem	  of	  unemployment	  and	  low	  wages.	  	  Just	   as	   the	   neoliberal	   era	   was	   ushered	   in	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	   unorthodox	   Anglo-­‐American	   central	   banking	   practices,	   its	   most	   severe	   crisis	   has	   been	   met	   with	   a	   parallel	  response.	  Now,	  unlike	  the	  1980s,	  the	  concern	  is	  with	  forestalling	  deflation	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	   asset	   prices,	   but	   the	   focus	   upon	   activist	   monetary	   policy	   in	   combination	   with	   fiscal	  austerity	  remains	  the	  same.	  If	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  post-­‐war	  monetary	  order	  and	  the	  Keynesian	  state	  tells	  us	  anything,	  it	  is	  that	  the	  way	  to	  escape	  the	  recurrent	  politics	  of	  austerity	  in	  the	  longer	   term	   is	   through	   firmly	  challenging	   the	  power	  of	  private	   finance	  and	  reconstituting	  the	  key	  centres	  of	   the	  state	   in	   line	  with	  different	  goals	  and	  priorities.	  That	  will	   inevitably	  involve	   circumscribing	   the	   freedom	   of	   finance	   and	   democratising	   the	   key	   financial	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